Subtitle 1. General Provisions

Chapter 1 General Provisions

16-1-101. Recidivism definition and reporting.

  1. As used in this title, “recidivism” means a criminal act that results in the rearrest, reconviction, or return to incarceration of a person with or without a new sentence during a three-year period following the person's release from custody.
  2. An entity that makes a recidivism report under this title shall use the definition of recidivism in this section for purposes of the recidivism report.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1030, § 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1030, § 4, provided: “Temporary legislation.

“(a) The Department of Community Correction shall prepare a report on the number of persons under its supervision for the last five (5) years who would be considered recidivists under the definition provided in this act.

“(b) The report shall be completed by October 1, 2013, and copies shall be sent to the Governor and Legislative Council.”

Chapter 2 Oaths And Affirmations

Cross References. Affirmation in lieu of oath, § 16-55-120.

Definition of “oath,” § 5-53-101.

Effective Dates. Acts 1945, No. 19, § 3: approved Feb. 6, 1945. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found as a fact that members of the armed services of the United States of America may acknowledge conveyances before commissioned officers of any branch of said armed services, regardless of the amount of any money or value of the property involved, yet they cannot verify a pleading or make oath to an affidavit before such an officer; that this condition results in hardship to and discrimination against the members of the armed services of the United States of America, especially those in foreign fields; that this act is necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety; and that, therefore, this act shall take effect and be in force upon, from and after its passage.”

Research References

ALR.

Failure to swear or irregularity in swearing witnesses appearing before grand jury as ground for dismissal of indictment. 23 A.L.R.4th 154.

Am. Jur. 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Oath and Affirmation, § 1 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Theory of Testimonial Competency and Privilege, 4 Ark. L. Rev. 377.

Witnesses, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 229.

C.J.S. 67 C.J.S., Oaths and Affirmations, § 1 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

16-2-101. Methods of administration.

  1. The usual mode of administering oaths practiced by the person who swears, laying his or her hand on and kissing the Gospels, shall be observed in all cases in which an oath is or may be required by law to be administered, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.
  2. Every person who shall desire it shall be permitted to swear with an uplifted hand in the following form: “You do solemnly swear, etc.”
  3. Every person who shall declare that he or she has conscientious scruples against taking an oath or swearing in any form shall be permitted to make his or her solemn declaration or affirmation in the following form: “You do solemnly and truly declare and affirm”.
  4. Whenever the court or magistrate by whom any person is about to be sworn, shall be satisfied that the person has any peculiar mode of swearing connected with or in addition to any of the forms mentioned in this section, which mode is more solemn and obligatory in the opinion of the person, the court or magistrate may adopt that mode of swearing.
  5. Every person believing in any religion other than the Christian religion shall be sworn according to the peculiar ceremonies of his or her religion, if there are any such ceremonies, instead of any of the other modes prescribed in this section.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 105, §§ 1-5; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4175-4179; Pope's Dig., §§ 5185-5189; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 40-101 — 40-105.

Case Notes

Affidavit.

This section does not prescribe the only method of administering oaths. Signing an affidavit for the purpose of swearing to it may be sufficient to justify a finding that the party was sworn. Cox v. State, 164 Ark. 126, 261 S.W. 303 (1924).

Where affidavit supporting search warrant stated on its face that it was subscribed and sworn to before municipal judge and the judge testified that he questioned the witness about the contents of the affidavit, asked if the statements therein were true, and had witness sign in his presence, it was unimportant that the judge did not require the witness to raise his right hand and state orally that the statements in the affidavit were “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God,” and the affidavit was properly sworn to under oath. Wilson v. State, 10 Ark. App. 176, 662 S.W.2d 204 (1983).

Cited: Thomas v. Hawkins, 217 Ark. 787, 233 S.W.2d 247 (1950).

16-2-102. Officials who may administer.

Every court and judge, including former judges of courts of record who served at least four (4) years, justices and clerks thereof, and all justices of the peace, shall have the power to administer oaths and affirmations to witnesses and others concerning any thing or proceeding pending before them.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 105, § 9; C. & M. Dig., § 4180; Pope's Dig., § 5190; Acts 1983, No. 850, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 40-106.

16-2-103. Perjury.

In all cases in which an oath is required or authorized by law, it may be taken in any of the forms prescribed in this chapter. Every person swearing, affirming, or declaring in any such form, or any form authorized by law, shall be deemed to have been lawfully sworn and to be guilty of perjury for corruptly and falsely swearing, affirming, or declaring, in the same manner as if he or she had sworn by laying his or her hand on the Gospels and kissing them.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 105, § 10; C. & M. Dig., § 4181; Pope's Dig., § 5191; A.S.A. 1947, § 40-107.

16-2-104. Persons in armed services.

  1. Any person in any branch of the armed services of the United States of America may make oath to any affidavit before any commissioned officer of any branch of the services, and the certificate of the officer before whom the oath may be made shall be proof of the making of the oath.
  2. The officer shall show in his or her certificate his or her rank, the branch of service in which he or she is an officer, his or her outfit, and, if and when permissible, the place where the oath was made.

History. Acts 1945, No. 19, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 40-108.

Subchapter 2 — Uniform Unsworn Foreign Declarations Act

16-2-201. Short title.

This subchapter may be cited as the Uniform Unsworn Foreign Declarations Act.

History. Acts 2017, No. 889, § 3.

16-2-202. Definitions.

In this subchapter:

  1. “Boundaries of the United States” means the geographic boundaries of the United States, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, and any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
  2. “Law” includes the federal or a state constitution, a federal or state statute, a judicial decision or order, a rule of court, an executive order, and an administrative rule, regulation, or order.
  3. “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
  4. “Sign” means, with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record:
    1. to execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or
    2. to attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic symbol, sound, or process.
  5. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
  6. “Sworn declaration” means a declaration in a signed record given under oath. The term includes a sworn statement, verification, certificate, and affidavit.
  7. “Unsworn declaration” means a declaration in a signed record that is not given under oath, but is given under penalty of perjury.

History. Acts 2017, No. 889, § 3.

16-2-203. Applicability.

This subchapter applies to an unsworn declaration by a declarant who at the time of making the declaration is physically located outside the boundaries of the United States whether or not the location is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. This subchapter does not apply to a declaration by a declarant who is physically located on property that is within the boundaries of the United States and subject to the jurisdiction of another country or a federally recognized Indian tribe.

History. Acts 2017, No. 889, § 3.

16-2-204. Validity of unsworn declaration.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), if a law of this state requires or permits use of a sworn declaration, an unsworn declaration meeting the requirements of this subchapter has the same effect as a sworn declaration.
  2. This subchapter does not apply to:
    1. a deposition;
    2. an oath of office;
    3. an oath required to be given before a specified official other than a notary public;
    4. a declaration to be recorded pursuant to:
      1. Title 16, Chapter 47;
      2. Title 18, Subtitle 2; or
      3. Title 26, Chapter 60; or
    5. an oath required by § 28-25-106.

History. Acts 2017, No. 889, § 3.

16-2-205. Required medium.

If a law of this state requires that a sworn declaration be presented in a particular medium, an unsworn declaration must be presented in that medium.

History. Acts 2017, No. 889, § 3.

16-2-206. Form of unsworn declaration.

An unsworn declaration under this subchapter must be in substantially the following form:

I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of Arkansas that the foregoing is true and correct, and that I am physically located outside the geographic boundaries of the United States, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, and any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

Executed on the day of , , at

(date) (month) (year)

(city or other location, and state) (country)

(printed name)

(signature)

History. Acts 2017, No. 889, § 3.

16-2-207. Uniformity of application and construction.

In applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

History. Acts 2017, No. 889, § 3.

16-2-208. Relation to Electronic Signatures In Global And National Commerce Act.

This subchapter modifies, limits, or supersedes the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7001, et seq., as it existed on January 1, 2017, but does not modify, limit, or supersede Section 101(c) of that act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7001(c), as it existed on January 1, 2017, or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in Section 103(b) of that act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7003(b), as it existed on January 1, 2017.

History. Acts 2017, No. 889, § 3.

Chapter 3 Legal Notices And Advertisements

Cross References. Publication of laws, reports, etc., § 1-3-101 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1891, No. 157, § 9: effective on passage.

Acts 1893, No. 181, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1899, No. 189, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1929, No. 92, § 3: Mar. 7, 1929.

Acts 1931, No. 32, § 3: approved Feb. 17, 1931. Emergency clause provided: “This act being for the immediate preservation of the public health, peace and safety, an emergency is declared and it is ordered that it be in force and take effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1933, No. 66, § 3: approved Mar. 2, 1933. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that the fees for the publication of legal notices and advertisements and advertisements of delinquent tax sales are unreasonably high, the payment of which works a hardship on large numbers of the citizens of this State, and an emergency is therefore hereby declared to exist and in order to immediately protect the public health, peace and safety, this act shall go into effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1937, No. 169, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1937, No. 263, § 4: Mar. 17, 1937. Emergency clause provided: “Because of the frequent questions arising in the minds of the public of the proper publication in which to place legal advertising, this act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety and shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1943, No. 57, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1979, No. 18, § 4: Jan. 30, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the requirement that legal notices must be published in newspapers published in the applicable town or county has resulted in an undue burden being placed upon persons attempting to comply with such acts due to the lack of newspapers being published in such towns and counties, and that this Act is necessary to immediately remedy this inequity. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1988 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 34, § 3: Feb. 19, 1988. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that when a legal newspaper surrenders its second-class mailing privilege and is subsequently sold, it is unclear as to what requirements must be met by the resulting newspaper in order to become a legal newspaper; that this Act clarifies the law in this respect; that until this act becomes effective the legal newspaper status of some successor newspapers will be in doubt; and that this Act should become effective immediately in order to eliminate the confusion as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

General circulation newspaper, what constitutes within meaning of state statutes requiring publication of official notices and the like in such newspaper. 24 A.L.R.4th 822.

Am. Jur. 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Notice, § 1 et seq.

58 Am. Jur. 2d, Newsp., § 33 et seq.

C.J.S. 66 C.J.S., Notice, § 1 et seq.

66 C.J.S., Newsp., § 8 et seq.

16-3-101. Publication of required advertisements generally.

  1. All advertisements and orders of publication required by law or order of any court, or in conformity with any deed of trust, or real estate mortgage, or chattel mortgage where the amount therein received exceeds the sum of three hundred fifty dollars ($350), or power of attorney or administrators' notices, to be made, shall be published in at least one (1) newspaper published and having a bona fide circulation in the county in which the proceedings are had, to which the advertisement or order of publication shall pertain.
  2. If there is no newspaper published in the county, then publication shall be made by posting five (5) written or printed notices in five (5) of the most public places in the county.
  3. If there is more than one (1) legal newspaper in a county, publication may be made in each newspaper.
    1. As to amounts under three hundred fifty dollars ($350), written or printed notices may be posted in five (5) conspicuous places in the county.
    2. Notice shall be served in all cases upon the debtor as summons are served.
  4. This section shall not apply to warning orders governed by Rule 4(f) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.

History. Acts 1891, No. 157, § 4, p. 269; 1893, No. 181, § 1, p. 329; 1899, No. 189, § 1, p. 333; C. & M. Dig., § 6807; Pope's Dig., § 8776; Acts 1969, No. 116, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 15-101; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 37.

Case Notes

Authorized Newspaper.

The test whether a publication may be classed as a newspaper authorized to publish legal notices is whether the publication regularly carries a record of events of general interest to the public as a whole. Williamson v. Nixon, 187 Ark. 762, 62 S.W.2d 24 (1933).

A daily publication specializing in news relating to the courts and business transactions, having a yearly subscription rate, and carrying news of events of general public nature is a “newspaper” authorized to print legal advertisements. Williamson v. Nixon, 187 Ark. 762, 62 S.W.2d 24 (1933).

Compliance Presumed.

Where the record recited that notice was given in the manner prescribed by law, the presumption, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is that there has been compliance with this section. Smith v. First Nat'l Bank, 119 Ark. 235, 177 S.W. 895 (1915).

Contracts.

This section does not prohibit parties from contracting in regard to the manner of advertising mortgaged property for sale in case of default in payment of the debt. Clark v. Wommack, 192 Ark. 895, 95 S.W.2d 891 (1936).

Discretion of Court.

The time and place and notice of sale under this section are within the discretion of the trial court. Brown v. Merchants & Planters Bank & Trust Co., 202 Ark. 684, 152 S.W.2d 548 (1941).

Irregularities Cured.

After confirmation of sale, any irregularities of notice will be cured. Carpenter v. Zarbuck, 74 Ark. 474, 86 S.W. 299 (1905); Simmons v. A.C. Carter & Co., 125 Ark. 547, 189 S.W. 176 (1916).

Sufficiency of Notice.

Where a county has two judicial districts, a tax sale will be held invalid when the land lies in one judicial district and is advertised for sale in a newspaper published in the other judicial district. Wolf & Bailey v. Phillips, 107 Ark. 374, 155 S.W. 924 (1913).

Where a deed of trust given upon land was less than $300, in a proceeding to foreclose, the requirements were met by the trustee where he gave notice by publication in a newspaper only. Wilkinson v. Hudspeth, 134 Ark. 132, 203 S.W. 263 (1918).

Foreclosure sale under deed of trust held void for the reason that no service was had upon the debtor as required by subsection (e) (now subdivision (d)(2)) of this section. Hunt v. Boyce, 176 Ark. 303, 3 S.W.2d 342 (1928).

Cited: Yell County v. Wills, 83 Ark. 229, 103 S.W. 618 (1907); Gleason v. Boone, 123 Ark. 523, 185 S.W. 1093 (1916).

16-3-102. Time advertisement to run.

  1. When any legal advertisement or notice is required by law to be published and no definite time is given for it to run, it shall be construed to mean for one (1) week.
  2. When a definite time is specified, it shall be construed to mean once a week during the time so specified, except that when a definite time is specified for publication of constitutional amendments proposed by the General Assembly, it shall be construed to mean publication in four (4) weekly issues of some newspaper in each county as is provided by law.

History. Acts 1891, No. 157, § 6, p. 269; 1893, No. 181, § 2, p. 329; C. & M. Dig., § 6809; Pope's Dig., § 8785; Acts 1969, No. 116, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 15-106; Acts 1991, No. 798, § 2.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section is general in its nature and operates upon the publication of notices under subsequent acts which come within its terms. Pope v. City of Nashville, 131 Ark. 429, 199 S.W. 101 (1917).

Initiative Measures.

Publication of initiative measures affecting local or county government is governed by the general law as to legal notices, and a local petition published in conformity therewith is sufficient. Reeves v. Smith, 190 Ark. 213, 78 S.W.2d 72 (1935).

Cited: Harrison Elec. Co. v. Citizens' Ice & Storage Co., 149 Ark. 502, 232 S.W. 932 (1921).

16-3-103. Payment and rates.

    1. When any notice or advertisement relating to any cause, matter, or thing in any court of record shall be required by law or the order of any court to be published, the notice or advertisement, when duly published, shall be paid for by the party at whose instance it was published. This payment, or so much thereof as is deemed reasonable, may be taxed as other costs otherwise allowed by the proper courts in the course of the proceedings to which the advertisement relates.
    2. Where there is more than one (1) newspaper published in any county, the advertisement shall be made in the newspaper designated by the attorney for the party causing the advertisement to be made.
  1. When any advertisement shall be made by a public officer thereunto authorized by law, the reasonable expense for advertising shall be allowed and paid out of the state or county treasury as other demands and charges of a like nature are allowed and paid.
  2. When a publication of a legal notice of any kind is allowed or required by law, except real property and personal property delinquent tax rates, a newspaper publishing the notice shall charge and receive not more than its regular classified advertising rate for publication.

History. Acts 1891, No. 157, §§ 1-3, p. 269; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6803-6805; Acts 1929, No. 92, § 1; 1933, No. 66, § 1; 1937, No. 169, § 1; Pope's Dig., §§ 8772-8774; Acts 1947, No. 123, § 1; 1955, No. 60, § 1; 1969, No. 116, § 1; 1977, No. 547, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 15-102 — 15-104.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Rates for Legal Advertisements, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 394.

Case Notes

Liability for Fees.

Delivery by the circuit clerk of legal notices to the newspaper to be published as required by law did not make the clerk personally liable for the publisher's fees. Eddins v. Williams, 161 Ark. 226, 255 S.W. 868 (1923).

Rates.

In absence of stipulation to the contrary, publisher is entitled to charge the maximum rates. Reed v. Doniphan Lumber Co., 91 Ark. 303, 121 S.W. 275 (1909).

16-3-104. Proof of publication.

  1. When any notice or advertisement shall be required by law or the order of any court to be published in any newspaper or made in conformity with any mortgage, deed of trust, power of attorney, or administrator's notice, the affidavit of the editor, proprietor, manager, or chief accountant, with a copy of the advertisement annexed, stating the number of times and the date of the papers in which the advertisement was published, shall be sufficient evidence of publication.
  2. If the notice is given by five (5) written or printed notices, according to the provisions of § 16-3-101, then the affidavit of the party giving the notice, properly verified before some officer authorized to administer oaths and showing the time and manner of giving the notice, shall be sufficient evidence of publication.
  3. No editor, proprietor, manager, or chief accountant shall be required to make the affidavit until his or her legal fee is paid.

History. Acts 1891, No. 157, § 5, p. 269; 1899, No. 189, § 2, p. 333; C. & M. Dig., § 6808; Pope's Dig., § 8784; A.S.A. 1947, § 15-105.

Case Notes

Affidavits.

An affidavit so worded that the affiant swore only to the date and insertion of the publication, and merely stated his connection with the newspaper and its circulation, was defective. Baker v. York, 65 Ark. 142, 45 S.W. 57 (1898).

Affidavit made by an accountant, but not by the chief accountant, was defective in that it did not comply with this section. Miller County v. Gazola, 65 Ark. 353, 46 S.W. 423 (1898).

Although an affidavit is sufficient evidence under this section, an affidavit is not the exclusive evidence. Whitford v. Whitford, 100 Ark. 63, 139 S.W. 653 (1911); Allen v. Allen, 126 Ark. 164, 189 S.W. 841 (1916); Straughan v. Bennett, 153 Ark. 254, 240 S.W. 30 (1922); Mahan v. Wilson, 169 Ark. 117, 273 S.W. 383 (1925).

Amendment of Proof.

An amendment correcting proof of publication of a warning order to obtain constructive service on nonresident defendants can be filed after judgment. Blackwell Oil & Gas Co. v. Maddux, 181 Ark. 726, 27 S.W.2d 514 (1930).

Certified Copies.

In suit to confirm tax title, it was proper for court to admit in evidence a certified copy of the publication of the delinquent lands. Stout v. Healey, 216 Ark. 821, 228 S.W.2d 45 (1950).

Compliance.

Proof of publication of notice of sale held to be in substantial compliance with this section, and, if not, would be cured by confirmation. Christopher v. Wasson, 198 Ark. 297, 128 S.W.2d 1012 (1939).

Cited: Covington v. Berry, 76 Ark. 460, 88 S.W. 1005 (1905); Hildreth v. Taylor, 117 Ark. 465, 175 S.W. 40 (1915); Clarke v. Federal Land Bank, 197 Ark. 1094, 126 S.W.2d 601 (1939).

16-3-105. Authorized publications — Legal newspapers.

  1. As used in this section, “legal newspaper” means a publication bearing a fixed title or name, published at a fixed place of business, regularly issued at fixed intervals as frequently as one (1) time each week and having a second-class mailing privilege, and being not less than four (4) pages of five (5) columns each.
  2. The primary function of such a publication shall be to inform, instruct, enlighten, and entertain, and to be an intangible service to which the general public as a whole resorts for intelligence of passing events of a political, religious, commercial, or social nature, for local and general current happenings, editorial comment, announcements, miscellaneous reading matter, advertisements, and other notices.
    1. For a newspaper to be eligible to publish legal notices and to be classified as a legal newspaper, it shall have been published at regular intervals continuously during a period of at least twelve (12) months, following the securing of a second-class mailing privilege, or as a direct legal successor of such a publication issued during the immediate prior period of at least twelve (12) months, or, in the case of a legal newspaper which surrenders its second-class mailing privilege and is subsequently sold, the resulting newspaper under new ownership is a legal newspaper if the purchased newspaper had been a legal newspaper within twelve (12) months prior to its sale. The newspaper shall be circulated and distributed from an established place of business to subscribers and readers generally of all classes in the county or counties in which it is circulated for a definite price or consideration for each copy or at a fixed price per annum, which price or consideration shall be fixed by the publisher at what he or she considers the value of the publication based upon the news value and service value it contains and not upon the physical or concrete worth of the raw materials so sold.
    2. It is ascertained by the General Assembly that the value of a newspaper or other publication coming within the requisites of this section is in the service that it renders to the community or communities it serves.
    1. The circulation of a legal newspaper shall be proven bona fide by at least fifty percent (50%) of the subscribers thereto having paid cash for their subscriptions to the newspaper, or its agents, or through recognized news dealers, over a period of six (6) months.
    2. A legal newspaper must publish an average of forty percent (40%) news matter which has sufficient merit to have created a following of paid readers.
    1. The definition of “legal newspaper” provided in this section shall not be construed to classify as legal newspapers publications such as racing forms, shopping guides, and similar publications devoted primarily to advertising.
    2. Special class publications having a bona fide circulation such as patriotic organs, religious publications, construction journals, and other similar class publications shall not be affected under the provisions of this section.

History. Acts 1937, No. 152, §§ 1-5; 1937, No. 263, §§ 1, 2; Pope's Dig., §§ 8777-8781; Acts 1943, No. 57, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 15-108 — 15-112; Acts 1988 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 34, § 1.

16-3-106. Authorized publications — Newspapers of general circulation.

All statutes requiring publication of legal notices by insertions in newspapers published either in the applicable town or county, and also requiring general circulation of the newspapers in the town or county, may be complied with, if no such newspaper is actually published in the town or county, by publication in a newspaper having general circulation in the town or county, irrespective of whether the newspaper is published and printed in the town or county or outside the boundaries of the State of Arkansas.

History. Acts 1979, No. 18, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 15-116.

16-3-107. Authorized publications — Weekly newspapers of patriotic organizations.

  1. Any weekly newspaper published in the State of Arkansas by any statewide patriotic organization and having a circulation of five hundred (500) or more in the county in which the newspaper is published is declared to be a medium or forum in which there may be published all legal and judicial advertisements, notices, orders, reports, judgments, decrees, and sales in the county.
  2. All legal and judicial advertisements, notices, orders, reports, judgments, decrees, and sales published in such weekly newspapers are, and shall be deemed to have been, properly published within the meaning of the acts governing the publication of legal and judicial advertisements, notices, orders, reports, judgments, decrees, and sales.

History. Acts 1931, No. 32, §§ 1, 2; Pope's Dig., §§ 8787, 8788; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 15-113, 15-114.

16-3-108. Authorized publications — Trade journals.

Whenever it appears to any state, county, or municipal agency or department that a special class of readers should be reached in order to obtain a wider range of bids, the department or agency may, in addition to the legal notices and advertising provided by law, place the advertising or notices in any recognized trade publication or construction journal published in the State of Arkansas reaching the special class. The rates regularly charged by the trade publication or construction journal may be paid by the state, county, or municipal department or agency.

History. Acts 1937, No. 222, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 8783; A.S.A. 1947, § 15-115.

Chapter 4 Uniform Interstate And International Procedure Act

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1963, No. 101, § 3, which concerned determination of foreign law, was superseded by the enactment of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the Rules for Inferior Courts pursuant to the supersession rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in its order of December 18, 1978. See Rule 44.1, ARCP. Some provisions of this chapter may have been similarly superseded.

Effective Dates. Acts 1993, No. 7, § 6: Feb. 1, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that when the General Assembly enacted Arkansas' long-arm statute, the Uniform Interstate and International Procedures Act (Arkansas Code Annotated §§ 16-4-101 et seq.), it was not intended to exclusively define the basis for jurisdiction over non-resident corporate defendants, but rather was intended to expand the jurisdiction of Arkansas Courts, it being long held by the Arkansas bench and bar that service upon an agent appointed by a foreign corporation to receive process in Arkansas confers personal jurisdiction in a transitory action regardless of the long-arm statute, which long-held concept appears to have been struck down by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Chisley, 308 Ark. 308 (1992). Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Uniform Interstate and International Procedural Act, 17 Ark. L. Rev. 118.

Jurisdiction — Nonresident Corporation Doing Business Within the State, 17 Ark. L. Rev. 198.

Legislative Notes — No. 119 — Personal Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Defendants, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 124.

Conflict of Laws — Arkansas 1959-64, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 135.

The Uniform Long-Arm Act in Arkansas. The Far Side of Jurisdiction, 22 Ark. L. Rev. 627.

Conflict of Laws — Arkansas 1964-68, 23 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

Conflict of Laws — Personal Jurisdiction and the Long-Arm Statute, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 106.

Civil Procedure — In Personam Jurisdiction Based Upon a Single Transaction, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 322.

Grounds for Venue in Arkansas — A Survey, 25 Ark. L. Rev. 468.

Civil Procedure — Arkansas' Non-Resident Motorist Statute — What is Sufficient Compliance?, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 63.

Conflict of Laws: Arkansas 1969-72, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

Conflict of Laws: Arkansas — The Choice-Influencing Considerations, 28 Ark. L. Rev. 199.

Recent Developments: Long Arm Jurisdiction: Defendant's Motion to Quash Service Under State Long Arm Statute Shifts Burden of Proof to Moving Party. Hawes Firearm Co. v. Roberts, 263 Ark. 510, 565 S.W.2d 620 (1978), 32 Ark. L. Rev. 606.

Simmons, Hutson v. Fehr Bros., Inc.: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 33 Ark. L. Rev. 553.

Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Arkansas, 1978-82, 36 Ark. L. Rev. 191.

Watkins, The Arkansas Long-Arm Statute: Just How Long Is It?, 40 Ark. L. Rev. 21.

Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Arkansas, 1983-87, 41 Ark. L. Rev. 63.

Note, The Reach of the Long-Arm After Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Chisley: Still a “Vague and Tangled” Area of the Law?, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 209.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Owen, Survey of Arkansas Law: Civil Procedure, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 177.

Note, Quasi-in-rem Jurisdiction — Attachment of Insurer's Obligation to Nonresident Defendant (Seider Rule) Unconstitutional, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 125.

Notes, Civil Procedure — Minimum Contacts — Eighth Circuit Survey. Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, S.A., 677 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1982), 5 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 553.

Arkansas Law Survey, Greene, Civil Procedure, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 167.

Arkansas Law Survey, Nelson, Conflicts of Law, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 173.

Arkansas Law Survey, Bradley, Civil Procedure, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 107.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This chapter is procedural and not substantive and its retroactive application to a cause of action that accrued before its enactment is not unconstitutional. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Shwayder Bros., 238 Ark. 768, 384 S.W.2d 473 (1964).

This chapter does not unconstitutionally discriminate between resident and nonresident defendants as to venue. Bowsher v. Digby, 243 Ark. 799, 422 S.W.2d 671 (1968).

In General.

This chapter is, at least in part, identical to ARCP 4(e). A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc. v. Burnside, 282 Ark. 27, 665 S.W.2d 288 (1984).

Cited: National Sur. Corp. v. Inland Properties, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Ark. 1968); Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Martin v. Kelley Elec. Co., 371 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1974); Purser v. Corpus Christi State Nat'l Bank, 256 Ark. 452, 508 S.W.2d 549 (1974); Dutton-Lainson Co. v. McGee, 260 Ark. 494, 542 S.W.2d 739 (1976); Winters v. Lewis, 260 Ark. 563, 542 S.W.2d 746 (1976); Spears v. State, 264 Ark. 83, 568 S.W.2d 492 (1978).

16-4-101. Personal jurisdiction of Arkansas courts.

  1. Definition of “Person”. As used in this section, “person” includes an individual or his or her executor, administrator, or other personal representative, or a corporation, partnership, association, or any other legal or commercial entity, whether or not a citizen or domiciliary of this state and whether or not organized under the laws of this state.
  2. Personal Jurisdiction. The courts of this state shall have personal jurisdiction of all persons, and all causes of action or claims for relief, to the maximum extent permitted by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
  3. Service. When the exercise of personal jurisdiction is authorized by this section, service may be made either within or outside this state.
  4. Inconvenient Forum. When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action should be heard in another forum, the court may stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.

History. Acts 1963, No. 101, § 1; 1975, No. 252, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2502; Acts 1993, No. 7, § 1; 1995, No. 486, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 7, § 2, provided that the provisions of this act, being procedural in nature, shall apply retroactively and prospectively.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Copeland, A Brief Survey of Some Important 1991 and 1992 Insurance Law Decisions, 1992 Ark. L. Notes 85.

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, The Reach of the Long-Arm After Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Chisley: Still a “Vague and Tangled” Area of the Law?, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 209.

Recent Developments, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 1093.

Carroll, Uniform Laws in Arkansas, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 313.

Note, Davis v. St. John's Health System, Inc.: General Jurisdiction, The Door is Ajar, But How Far Will It Open? 56 Ark. L. Rev. 647 (2003).

Rachel A. Orr, Recent Developments: Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporation Violates Due Process — Yanmar Co., Ltd. v. Slater , 65 Ark. L. Rev. 163 (2012).

Robin E. Wright, Case Note: Conspiring to Create Jurisdiction: Gibbs v. PrimeLending and the Conspiracy Theory of In Personam Jurisdiction in Arkansas, 65 Ark. L. Rev. 723 (2012).

Recent Developments: Contract Faxed to Arkansas by Non-Resident Defendants Is Sufficient To Establish Personal Jurisdiction, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 601 (2013).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Civil Procedure, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 85.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Kathy McCarroll, Note: Reassessing Personal Jurisdiction in Arkansas and the Eighth Circuit After Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) and J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011), 36 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 229 (2014).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Former subdivision C.1.(e) does not violate Ark. Const., Art. 2, §§ 2, 3, or 8. Bowsher v. Digby, 243 Ark. 799, 422 S.W.2d 671 (1968).

In General.

The long-arm statute displaced the common law principle of the transitory cause of action as a rationale for asserting jurisdiction over corporate defendants and required that the cause of action arise out of prescribed conduct such as the transaction of business in Arkansas. To the extent that Running v. Southwest Freight Lines, 227 Ark. 839, 303 S.W.2d 578, (1957), stands for the principle that service upon an agent appointed by a foreign corporation to receive process in this state confers personal jurisdiction in a transitory action regardless of the long-arm statute, it is overruled. Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Chisley, 308 Ark. 308, 825 S.W.2d 558 (1992).

Five-factor test previously used by the Supreme Court of Arkansas to assess specific personal jurisdiction is no longer applicable. Instead, the following criteria are necessary for specific personal jurisdiction: (1) the defendant must purposefully avail himself or herself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state; (2) the cause of action must arise from or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum state; and (3) the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 2019 Ark. 84, 569 S.W.3d 865 (2019).

Construction.

This section should be liberally construed. Martin v. Kelley Elec. Co., 371 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1974).

Although this section is to be liberally construed, there must still be some evidence upon which a prima facie showing of jurisdiction may be found to exist. Williams v. GMC, 573 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Ark. 1983).

Burden of Proof.

A nonresident defendant filing a motion to dismiss or quash on grounds that there are not sufficient contacts within the state to be personally in the state, has the burden of going forward and offering proof to sustain the allegations of the motion, and if the motion is denied, this does not mean that the plaintiff is relieved from establishing jurisdiction; it merely means that at that point in the proceedings a prima facie case of jurisdiction sufficient to take the cause to trial has been made. Hawes Firearm Co. v. Roberts, 263 Ark. 510, 565 S.W.2d 620 (1978).

Under Arkansas law, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that a nonresident defendant has sufficient contacts with Arkansas to be sued in personam; however, the nonresident defendant filing a motion to dismiss or quash has the burden of going forward and offering proof to sustain the allegations of no jurisdiction. Jeanway Indus., Inc. v. Knudson Mfg. Co., 533 F. Supp. 678 (W.D. Ark. 1981).

Challenging a Finding of Jurisdiction.

A writ of prohibition will not lie in a case where the personal jurisdiction turns upon whether the activities of the defendant were sufficient to satisfy the “minimum contacts” test applied under this section in order to allow the court to exercise the maximum jurisdiction allowable by due process, since the “minimum contacts” test is a question of fact, and in cases where jurisdiction depends upon the establishment of facts, the issue of jurisdiction must be decided by the trial court, subject to correction on appeal rather than by a writ of prohibition. Wisconsin Brick & Block Corp. v. Cole, 274 Ark. 121, 622 S.W.2d 192 (1981).

When a trial court has made a determination that a person's contacts with Arkansas are sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057 (1945), and former subdivision C.1.(a) of this section, the proper manner of challenging the decision is by appeal and not by a petition for a writ of prohibition. Fausett v. Host, 315 Ark. 527, 868 S.W.2d 472 (1994).

Contacts Found.

Circuit court did not err in denying a nonresident defendant's motion to dismiss based on a lack of personal jurisdiction where the protective order only prohibited the nonresident from contacting the resident plaintiff and did not impose any sort of affirmative duty on the nonresident. Beason v. Parks, 2015 Ark. App. 246, 459 S.W.3d 841 (2015).

Contacts Not Found.

Motion to dismiss was granted because although plaintiff argued that general personal jurisdiction was satisfied because auto parts manufactured by defendants were ultimately included in cars sold extensively in the state, this “stream of commerce” argument was not an adequate basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction. P.A.M. Transp., Inc. v. Faurecia Auto. Seating, Inc., No. 11-5130, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124189 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 26, 2011).

Summary judgment was properly awarded to appellee, a resident of Hawaii, in an action for defamation filed by appellant, an Arkansas resident, because the exchange of an email between appellee and a resident of Mississippi did not meet the minimum-contacts test; exercise of jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Morris v. Christopher, 2013 Ark. App. 312 (2013).

In an action for defamation, false light, violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and interference with business expectancy, arising from two postings made on logistics industry websites concerning an allegedly nonconforming shipment of frozen chicken, the court did not have general jurisdiction over defendants given the limited scope of defendants' contacts with Arkansas. Sioux Transp., Inc. v. XPO Logistics, No. 5:15-CV-05265, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171801 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 22, 2015).

In an action for defamation, false light, violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and interference with business expectancy, defendants did not have sufficient contacts with Arkansas to confer specific jurisdiction on the court where (1) mail and telephone contacts alone were insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction, and (2) most of the performance relating to the parties' agreement occurred outside of Arkansas, on the road from Alabama to Michigan. Sioux Transp., Inc. v. XPO Logistics, No. 5:15-CV-05265, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171801 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 22, 2015).

Circuit court did not err in determining that it lacked personal jurisdiction over appellee; she prepared only one Arkansas tax return for appellant, he did not claim that the form was improperly prepared, and as neither party was an Arkansas resident, there was no interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents, and there was nothing about the sole act of preparing and signing one tax return that would have caused appellee to reasonably anticipate being brought into an Arkansas court. Reveley v. Roth, 2016 Ark. App. 248, 491 S.W.3d 490 (2016).

Contracts.

Contractual relationships held sufficient to establish jurisdiction over nonresident. Waukesha Bldg. Corp. v. Jameson, 246 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Ark. 1965); Dreyfus Co. v. Royster Co., 487 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Ark. 1980); Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, 677 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1982); SD Leasing, Inc. v. Al Spain & Assocs., 277 Ark. 178, 640 S.W.2d 451 (1982); McMahen v. Paramount Holdings, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1099 (E.D. Ark. 1985); Rice v. SD Leasing, Inc., 14 Ark. App. 180, 686 S.W.2d 450 (1985); Ultimatics, Inc. v. Minimatic, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1448 (W.D. Ark. 1989).

Negotiations within the state leading up to the execution of the contract constituted such minimal contacts as were sufficient to give a court in Arkansas jurisdiction over a suit on such contract. Thompson v. Ecological Science Corp., 421 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1970); Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. v. Youngblood, 359 F. Supp. 1115 (W.D. Ark. 1973).

Contractual relationship held insufficient to establish jurisdiction over nonresident. Arkansas Poultry Coop. v. Red Barn Sys., 468 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1972); Williams v. GMC, 573 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Moran v. Bombardier Credit, Inc., 39 Ark. App. 122, 839 S.W.2d 538 (1992).

Evidence did not establish a contract to supply services or things in Arkansas which would bring nonresident under Arkansas jurisdiction. Roger N. Joyce & Assocs. v. Paoli Steel Corp., 491 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Ark. 1980).

Agreement that lease would be governed by and construed under the laws of Arkansas did not give an Arkansas court personal jurisdiction in and of itself, but did provide another contact with this state which went to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement. SD Leasing, Inc. v. Al Spain & Assocs., 277 Ark. 178, 640 S.W.2d 451 (1982).

A single contract can provide the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if there is a substantial connection between the contract and the forum state. SD Leasing, Inc. v. Al Spain & Assocs., 277 Ark. 178, 640 S.W.2d 451 (1982); Jagitsch v. Commander Aviation Corp., 9 Ark. App. 159, 655 S.W.2d 468 (1983).

In an Arkansas resident's breach of contract suit alleging an agreement that the Arkansas resident would pursue a wrongful death action in Arkansas on a Virginia resident's behalf in return for fifty percent of the Virginia resident's award, an Arkansas trial court had personal jurisdiction over the Virginia resident under subdivision B. of this section because the Virginia resident had purposefully availed herself of the process and protection of the Arkansas courts to procure a large sum of money, and should have reasonably anticipated being required to appear in an Arkansas court if a dispute arose regarding an agreement, performed in Arkansas, that was an integral part in her procurement of that money. Roberts v. Bendos, 102 Ark. App. 358, 285 S.W.3d 687 (2008), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ark. App. LEXIS 626 (Aug. 20, 2008).

Where a Bermuda corporation and its principal negotiated a contract in Arkansas with an Arkansas corporation to ship Arkansas poultry to Bermuda, the Arkansas court's exercise of personal jurisdiction under subdivisions A. and B. of this section over the Bermuda corporation and its principal in an action on the contract did not violate Fourteenth Amendment due process. Twin Springs Group, Inc. v. Karibuni, Ltd., 2009 Ark. App. 649, 344 S.W.3d 100 (2009).

Questions of fact remained as to whether an Arizona shipping company and transportation brokerage and their presidents were subject to personal jurisdiction in Arkansas by virtue of their contracting with and allegedly defrauding an Arkansas trucking company for the transportation of food from Arizona to the East Coast. Hotfoot Logistics v. Shipping Point Mktg., 2013 Ark. 130, 426 S.W.3d 448 (2013), overruled in part, Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 2019 Ark. 84, 569 S.W.3d 865 (2019).

Due Process.

The purpose of this section is to permit courts to exercise maximum in personam jurisdiction allowable by due process. Martin v. Kelley Elec. Co., 371 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1974); SD Leasing, Inc. v. Al Spain & Assocs., 277 Ark. 178, 640 S.W.2d 451 (1982); Kilcrease v. Butler, 293 Ark. 454, 739 S.W.2d 139 (1987); F & M Bank v. Hamilton Hotel Partners Ltd. Partnership, 702 F. Supp. 1417 (W.D. Ark. 1988); Akin v. First Nat'l Bank, 25 Ark. App. 341, 758 S.W.2d 14 (1988); Gould v. P.T. Krakatau Steel, 957 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, Gould v. P. T. Krakatau Steel, 506 U.S. 908, 113 S. Ct. 304, 121 L. Ed. 2d 227 (1992); Brown v. PST Vans, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

Mechanical or quantitative evaluations of a defendant's activities in a state do not resolve the question of the reasonableness of personal jurisdiction, for whether due process is satisfied depends upon the quality and nature of the defendant's activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws. Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, Fehr Bros., Inc. v. Weissenfels, 439 U.S. 983, 99 S. Ct. 573, 58 L. Ed. 2d 654 (1978); Gould v. Empire Steel Trading Co., 765 F. Supp. 980 (E.D. Ark. 1991), aff'd, 957 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1992).

The use of arteries of interstate mail, telephone, railway, and banking facilities is insufficient, standing alone, to satisfy due process in asserting long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation. Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, 677 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1982).

Whether a trial court has in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants must be decided on the facts of each case. To make this determination, the court must decide whether the defendants' actions satisfy the “transacting business” requirement within the meaning of this section and whether the exercise of in personam jurisdiction is consistent with due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Jagitsch v. Commander Aviation Corp., 9 Ark. App. 159, 655 S.W.2d 468 (1983); Meachum v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 13 Ark. App. 229, 682 S.W.2d 763, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844, 106 S. Ct. 132, 88 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1985); Capps v. Roll Serv., Inc., 31 Ark. App. 48, 787 S.W.2d 694 (1990).

Factors to be considered in determining whether due process requirements have been satisfied when personal jurisdiction has been exercised over nonresident defendants are: (1) The nature and quality of the contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of contacts with the forum state; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) the convenience to the parties. Meachum v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 13 Ark. App. 229, 682 S.W.2d 763, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844, 106 S. Ct. 132, 88 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1985); Akin v. First Nat'l Bank, 25 Ark. App. 341, 758 S.W.2d 14 (1988); Ultimatics, Inc. v. Minimatic, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1448 (W.D. Ark. 1989); Capps v. Roll Serv., Inc., 31 Ark. App. 48, 787 S.W.2d 694 (1990).

This section extends this state's jurisdiction over nonresidents to the limits permitted by the due process clause of the United States Constitution.Dudley v. Dittmer, 795 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1986); Byer v. Gordos Ark., Inc., 712 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Ark. 1989).

The inquiry as to the existence of in personam “long-arm” jurisdiction requires a two-part analysis. The court must first determine whether the facts presented satisfy the requirements of the state “long-arm” statute. After that is determined, and only if that is determined affirmatively, the court must then determine whether the state's exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with the due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ultimatics, Inc. v. Minimatic, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1448 (W.D. Ark. 1989).

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that in order for state courts to maintain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident person under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a party must satisfy two prongs: (1) the party must show that the nonresident has had sufficient minimum contacts with this state; and (2) the party must show that the court's exercise of jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. John Norrell Arms, Inc. v. Higgins, 332 Ark. 24, 962 S.W.2d 801 (1998).

Trial court erred in dismissing the Arkansas concrete company's action against the Kansas paint company because, even though the paint company had few ordinary business contacts with Arkansas, the paint company had filed a materialmen's lien against the concrete company's Arkansas real estate, which was sufficient contact to subject it to the jurisdiction of Arkansas courts; further, the lien filing also showed that the paint company had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Arkansas. Concrete Wallsystems of Ark., Inc. v. Master Paint Indus. Coating Corp., 95 Ark. App. 21, 233 S.W.3d 157 (2006).

Nonresident sellers' presence in Arkansas for several days during which they consummated a large sales transaction that became the subject of litigation in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas was a sufficient contact to give the sellers a reasonable anticipation of being haled into court in Arkansas, and thus subjected them to personal jurisdiction under the Arkansas long-arm statute under this section. Bogle v. Jackson, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86776 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 13, 2007).

Japanese traction machine manufacturer's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) dismissal motion was denied because it had sufficient contacts with the Eastern District of Arkansas to warrant the court's exercising personal jurisdiction over it: (1) the Arkansas long-arm statute authorized the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign corporations to the fullest extent allowed by the U.S. Const., Amend. XIVDue Process Clause; (2) due process required that the manufacturer have minimum contacts with Arkansas, such that the maintenance of the suit did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice; and (3) the manufacturer had sufficient contacts to render it subject to the court's jurisdiction in a products liability suit brought in the Eastern District of Arkansas because it did more than simply place its machine in the stream of commerce, it authorized a U.S. distributor to be the exclusive distributor of its products in the U.S., it provided a user manual in English with its machines, it placed no limitation on where the machines could be sold, it visited the distributor in the U.S. to discuss the sale of its products, and it was aware that its products were being sold throughout the U.S., including in Arkansas. Piggee v. Patterson Med. Prods., Inc., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50785 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 29, 2008).

In a suit for fraud, unauthorized practice of law, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy, personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state corporate officers of related insurance marketing entities was established under subdivision B. of this section because the officers held Arkansas insurance licenses and the corporations they led solicited business in Arkansas. Birts v. Vermillion, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87205 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 23, 2009).

In a suit for fraud, unauthorized practice of law, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy, personal jurisdiction over out-of-state residents who were not employed by, or lacked ownership interests in, related insurance marketing entities was not established under subdivision B. of this section because minimum contacts were lacking. Birts v. Vermillion, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87205 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 23, 2009).

Based upon the allegations in the complaint and the employee's affidavit that his only contacts with Arkansas were by telephone and correspondence, the employee's contacts with Arkansas were insufficient to establish minimum contacts so as to justify exercise of personal jurisdiction. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ND v. Elender Escrow, Inc., No. 4:11CV00123 JMM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134690 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 21, 2011).

Co-conspirators' contacts with Arkansas were insufficient to establish the requisite minimum contacts to justify exercise of personal jurisdiction over them or conspiracy jurisdiction over their co-conspirators. Conspiracy jurisdiction only applied when at least one of the conspirators had minimum contacts with Arkansas in furtherance of the conspiracy and such contacts had not been pled. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ND v. Elender Escrow, Inc., No. 4:11CV00123 JMM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134690 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 21, 2011).

Personal jurisdiction based on the conspiracy theory did not violate due process. As such, the use of the conspiracy theory of in personam jurisdiction does not violate this section, Arkansas's long arm statute. Gibbs v. Primelending, 2011 Ark. 255, 381 S.W.3d 829 (2011).

Court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtors, because the complaint arose out of and was directly related to the 2003 judgments, which were entered in Arkansas and remain unsatisfied; the debtors entered into or guaranteed several loan contracts with an Arkansas bank and pledged Arkansas real estate as collateral, and the debtors defaulted on the loans and an Arkansas court entered judgments against them. Hauser v. Sims, 2012 Ark. App. 295, 423 S.W.3d 104 (2012).

Circuit court erred in finding that it could properly exercise jurisdiction over a Virginia attorney and his law firm sued for conversion, because they lacked sufficient “minimum contacts” with Arkansas, where the attorney acted as counsel for an out-of-state escrow agent, and the earnest money in question had been wired to the attorney by a Georgia company in connection with a purchase agreement between the Georgia company, as purchaser, and the Arkansas plaintiff, as seller. The Arkansas plaintiff was not a party to the escrow agreement between the Georgia company and the escrow agent, and the Court of Appeals could not say that the attorney “purposefully availed” himself of the benefits and protection of the laws of Arkansas. Goodwin v. Magness Oil Co., 2018 Ark. App. 303, 552 S.W.3d 26 (2018).

—Contacts Found.

Nonresident held to have had sufficient contacts with state to bring it within state's jurisdiction without denying due process. Davis v. Triumph Corp., 258 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Ark. 1966); Lauck v. E.C.K. Chivers & Assocs., 320 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. Dixie Sound & Communications, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Ark. 1979); Meachum v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 13 Ark. App. 229, 682 S.W.2d 763, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844, 106 S. Ct. 132, 88 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1985).

Although Honda R & D makes no direct revenue from Arkansas, the Honda Corporate family does, and Honda R & D enjoys the revenues received by the Honda family. Therefore, plaintiff submitted sufficient information to conclude that defendant Honda R & D derives substantial revenue from the State of Arkansas, and that exercising jurisdiction over Honda R & D satisfies due process. Hawes v. Honda Motor Co., 738 F. Supp. 1247 (E.D. Ark. 1990).

The fact that the corporation was neither present nor doing business in Arkansas and merely owned a subsidiary in Arkansas did not sufficiently connect the corporation to Arkansas to bring it within the state's personal jurisdiction under Arkansas's long-arm statute. Epps v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 327 F.3d 642 (8th Cir. 2003).

Court of appeals reversed the dismissal of a product liability suit for lack of jurisdiction over a French manufacturer where the manufacturer actively distributed and sold aircraft in the forum and operated a closely related business in the forum, which activities were sufficient to enforce long-arm jurisdiction over the manufacturer. Anderson v. Dassault Aviation, 361 F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 2004), rehearing denied, — F.3d —, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 6948 (8th Cir. Apr. 9, 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1015, 125 S. Ct. 606, 160 L. Ed. 2d 484 (2004).

An insurance policy's territory-of-coverage clause, insuring a manufacturer against property damage from occurrences in the United States, established defendant insurer's sufficient contact to Arkansas to satisfy due process under subdivision B. of this section and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in plaintiff Arkansas farmer's indemnity suit against the insured. Ferrell v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2005).

Putative father's contacts with Arkansas were sufficient to meet due process requirements under § 9-17-201(8), this section, and U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, based on his agreement to submit to a paternity test in Arkansas and given the fact that he drove to Arkansas for the test that was administered in Arkansas. Moreover, the father could have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Arkansas because a person submitting to a paternity test could foresee the possibility that a paternity suit and support action could have been brought there, and finally, the exercise of jurisdiction over the father did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice when the burden of litigating the action was in no way unreasonable and the state had an interest in protecting its minor children and ensuring the payment of child support. Payne v. France, 373 Ark. 175, 282 S.W.3d 760 (2008), overruled, Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 2019 Ark. 84, 569 S.W.3d 865 (2019).

Circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to a shipper and its officers because the contacts between a broker and the shipper were sufficient and the shipper and the officers should not have been surprised to be haled into court in Arkansas because the broker was an Arkansas corporation, the parties entered into a legally binding contract through the bill of lading, and the broker's breach-of-contract cause of action arose directly from the contacts between the shipper and the broker. Hotfoot Logistics, LLC v. Shipping Point Mktg., 2014 Ark. 460, 447 S.W.3d 592 (2014).

In an action alleging fraud and other claims related to an investment agreement, the federal district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's action for lack of personal jurisdiction because defendants, a California resident and his California-based business, had sufficient contacts with Arkansas to establish personal jurisdiction; the facts suggested that the individual defendant's contacts with Arkansas were not random, fortuitous, or attenuated, but rather were central to an alleged scheme to purposely avail himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Arkansas, and the individual defendant's actions in and affecting Arkansas were central to plaintiffs' allegations of fraud and misrepresentation and supported a finding of specific jurisdiction. Whaley v. Esebag, 946 F.3d 447 (8th Cir. 2020).

In a suit to recover legal fees, there was personal jurisdiction consistent with due process because the guarantor's contacts were such that he should have anticipated being haled into court in Arkansas since he negotiated the legal services contract, made hundreds of calls and emails to the Arkansas law firm, and visited the state regarding the litigation. Henry Law Firm v. Cuker Interactive, LLC, 949 F.3d 1101 (8th Cir. 2020).

—Contacts Not Found.

Contacts of nonresident with state held to be insufficient to support personal jurisdiction. Frank v. Steel, 253 Ark. 338, 485 S.W.2d 737 (1972); Carter Oil Co. v. Apex Towing Co., 532 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Ark. 1981); Janni v. Janni, 271 Ark. 953, 611 S.W.2d 785 (1981); Eagle Material Handling of Ark., Inc. v. Acme Dock Specialists, Inc., 273 Ark. 362, 616 S.W.2d 716 (1981); Marchant v. Peeples, 274 Ark. 233, 623 S.W.2d 523 (1981); Cotton v. Cotton, 3 Ark. App. 158, 623 S.W.2d 540 (1981); Lomanco, Inc. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 566 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Jagitsch v. Commander Aviation Corp., 9 Ark. App. 159, 655 S.W.2d 468 (1983); Kilcrease v. Butler, 293 Ark. 454, 739 S.W.2d 139 (1987); Gould v. P.T. Krakatau Steel, 957 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, Gould v. P. T. Krakatau Steel, 506 U.S. 908, 113 S. Ct. 304, 121 L. Ed. 2d 227 (1992).

Where a resident of another state has no contacts with Arkansas and engages in no activities that would establish a “presence” in Arkansas to render him amenable to suit, he is not subject to the in personam jurisdiction of this state. Carter v. Wilson, 279 Ark. 58, 648 S.W.2d 472 (1983).

There were insufficient contacts between the nonresident guarantors and Arkansas to subject the guarantors to the jurisdiction of the Arkansas courts, for the mere fact that the individual defendants guaranteed an obligation to an Arkansas corporation did not subject the guarantors to jurisdiction in Arkansas. Nor did the guarantors' status as shareholders in the debtor corporation, or the more remote connection between some of the guarantors and California corporation, establish the minimum contacts between the guarantors and Arkansas necessary to satisfy due process. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n v. Alchemy Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 565 (8th Cir. 1986).

Where company's single act was to guarantee a debt between an Arkansas company and a nonresident corporation, and the record was devoid of evidence of even mail or telephone transactions to bring the company within this state's jurisdiction, such contacts were insufficient to sustain personal jurisdiction. Moran v. Bombardier Credit, Inc., 39 Ark. App. 122, 839 S.W.2d 538 (1992).

In an action to collect on student loan notes, where defendant was a Tennessee resident, never resided or engaged in business in Arkansas, signed student guarantee notes in Tennessee, and his children, for whose benefit the notes were executed, went to school in Tennessee, and where defendant's only contacts with Arkansas were that the guaranteed loan was made by an Arkansas bank and the guarantor was an Arkansas corporation, the connection was too tenuous to support a finding of personal jurisdiction. Glenn v. Student Loan Guarantee Found., 53 Ark. App. 132, 920 S.W.2d 500 (1996).

A nonresident manufacturer is not subject to the jurisdiction of this state simply because its product is shipped there; there must be some showing that the manufacturer purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in this state or in some manner directed its activities at the forum state. Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Ark. 1997).

Personal jurisdiction not shown where the only contact that defendant had with Arkansas prior to the plaintiff's claim was the filing of an Oklahoma judgment against an Arkansas resident and the issuance of a writ of execution based on that judgment; such brief encounters with the state for the purpose of enforcing a judgment are not the type of continuous, systematic, and substantial contacts envisioned by the U.S. Supreme Court to satisfy due process considerations. John Norrell Arms, Inc. v. Higgins, 332 Ark. 24, 962 S.W.2d 801 (1998).

General personal jurisdiction not shown where corporation was not registered in Arkansas, had no employees here, had no agent for service in Arkansas, and had never initiated contact with people in Arkansas, and where the only contact that the corporation had had with this state had been sales to Arkansas residents, set in motion by Arkansas residents and merchandise delivered to Arkansas residents by mail or UPS. John Norrell Arms, Inc. v. Higgins, 332 Ark. 24, 962 S.W.2d 801 (1998).

A federal court in Arkansas did not have personal jurisdiction over a Kentucky bank whose only contact with Arkansas was to issue a cashier's check payable to an Arkansas bank and then, it was alleged, wrongfully dishonor the check. First Nat'l Bank of Lewisville v. First Nat'l Bank of Clinton, 258 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2001).

In a personal injury action brought by a man and his wife where the man was injured when an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) turned over on him there were insufficient contacts with Arkansas for the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction; although there were a series of transaction involving the ATV, the injured party and his wife were residents of Louisiana, where they had purchased the ATV, and they brought the ATV to Arkansas for recreational purposes. Ganey v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 366 Ark. 238, 234 S.W.3d 838 (2006), overruled in part on other grounds, Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 2019 Ark. 84, 569 S.W.3d 865 (2019).

Eastern District of Arkansas district court properly concluded that it could not exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a Japanese corporation because doing so would not comport with due process: (1) an Arkansas widow filed a wrongful death suit against the corporation after her husband was killed in Tennessee, while unloading electrodes that the corporation had manufactured in Japan; (2) the Arkansas long-arm statute conferred jurisdiction on the district court to the fullest extent permitted by the Due Process Clause; (3) due process required minimum contacts with the forum state and a finding that maintenance of the suit did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice; (4) the corporation's only contacts with Arkansas were the annual visits made by its representatives to an Arkansas customer; (5) the widow's wrongful death claims did not arise from those contacts; (5) the corporation was not directly involved in the packing, shipping, or unloading of the electrodes, which activities were related to the worker's death; and (6) the inconvenience to the parties and the witnesses was also a factor weighing against the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the corporation because essentially all of the witnesses and documents concerning the packaging, shipping, and unloading of the electrodes were located in Japan and/or outside of Arkansas. Miller v. Nippon Carbon Co., 528 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 2008).

Court dismissed plaintiff's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction because defendant's only contact with Arkansas was the filing of a Utah judgment against plaintiff in the state, and it went too far to suggest that defendant's registration of the Utah judgment against plaintiff was sufficient alone to satisfy the Arkansas long-arm statute and Fourteenth Amendment due process considerations. Barnett v. Centennial Bank, Inc., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11256 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 4, 2008).

District court did not have personal jurisdiction over defendants, an Iowa citizen and limited liability company, because the only contact with Arkansas was a single meeting by the parties in Arkansas; because defendants' trip to Arkansas (and their failure to obtain permission to use plaintiff's mark) did not cause or otherwise precipitate the alleged infringement, and nothing in the record showed any other connection to Arkansas, the contact with Arkansas was insufficient to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction consistent with the Due Process Clause. Pangaea, Inc. v. Flying Burrito LLC, 647 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2011).

—Question of Fact.

In order for a valid judgment to be rendered against a nonresident not served within the forum state, due process requires that certain minimum contacts exist between the nonresident and the state, such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice; the contacts with the forum state must be such that the nonresident defendant should reasonably anticipate being “haled” into an Arkansas court. A single contract can provide the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if there is a substantial connection between the contract and the forum state; whether the “minimum contacts” requirement has been satisfied is a question of fact. Akin v. First Nat'l Bank, 25 Ark. App. 341, 758 S.W.2d 14 (1988).

The existence of a state-created corporate form did not operate as a limitation on personal jurisdiction; it is necessary to utilize a case-by-case examination of the individual's contact with the forum. Ripplemeyer v. National Grape Coop. Ass'n, 807 F. Supp. 1439 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has established a five-factor test for determining the sufficiency of a defendant's contacts with the forum state so as to result in personal jurisdiction: (1) the nature and quality of contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of such contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) convenience of the parties. John Norrell Arms, Inc. v. Higgins, 332 Ark. 24, 962 S.W.2d 801 (1998).

Effect of Amendments.

The 1994 version of this section provided certain listed bases for personal jurisdictions; after its 1995 amendment, this section, in subdivision B., embraced all actions consitutionally permitted. Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Ark. 1997).

Enduring Relationship.

Subdivision B. of this section was not applicable where there was no showing that the defendant ever was domiciled in the state. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 257 Ark. 137, 514 S.W.2d 701 (1974).

Federal Law.

Federal court properly exercised jurisdiction over defendant, a bail bondsman, who submitted to state court an affidavit of intention to surrender accused requesting plaintiff's arrest, that lead to plaintiff's arrest and his suit for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. Dean v. Olibas, 129 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 1997).

Where none of the jurisdictional factors prescribed by 10 U.S.C. § 1408 were satisfied, and the federal statute preempted the application of the “minimum contacts” provisions of this section, the chancellor lacked personal jurisdiction to divide party's military pension. Pender v. Pender, 57 Ark. App. 305, 945 S.W.2d 395 (1997).

Foreign Company.

An Arkansas court has authority, under this section and the due process clause, U.S. Const. Amend. 14, to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign insurance company in a suit by the insured to recover under the insurance policy's uninsured motorist clause for damages arising out of an accident in Arkansas with an uninsured Arkansas motorist. Szalay v. Handcock, 307 Ark. 232, 819 S.W.2d 232 (1991).

Business owner met his burden of prima facie showing that the district court could exercise general personal jurisdiction over an international company under the Arkansas long-arm statute, subdivision B. of this section, because the owner presented evidence showing that the international company had purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting business activities within Arkansas, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of the state's laws: (1) the international company owned a security company that had promised to provide monitoring, alarm, and security services for the owner's Arkansas business; (2) statements on the international company's website and a prior lawsuit brought against the international company by the Securities and Exchange Commission provided proof that the international company manipulated and controlled the security company and that it received income from the security company's sale of security systems and services in the State of Arkansas; (3) the international company's contacts with Arkansas, through the security company, were the type of continuous and systematic contacts that established general jurisdiction even if the owner's claims did not specifically arise out of business activities directed at Arkansas; and (4) it would not violate the U.S. Const., Amend. XIVDue Process Clause to exercise jurisdiction over the international company because it could hardly be inconvenient for the international company to defend itself in a state where it was otherwise proud to conduct business. Duffer v. TYCO Int'l Ltd., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74476 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 26, 2008).

Arkansas did not have general jurisdiction over a Japanese manufacturer pursuant to subdivision (B) of this section in a wrongful-death suit arising from a tractor accident because the manufacturer was not itself doing business in Arkansas and did not dominate and control its American subsidiary, which sold tractors in Arkansas through authorized dealers, such that personal jurisdiction could be predicated on an alter ego relationship. Yanmar Co., Ltd. v. Slater, 2012 Ark. 36, 386 S.W.3d 439 (2012).

Forum Convenience.

Although this section may affect venue because of its provisions relating to jurisdiction and service of process, the provision that the court in which the action is filed has broad powers under the principle of forum non conveniens demonstrates that the statute is basically a jurisdiction-giving statute rather that a venue-fixing one. Ozark Supply Co. v. Glass, 261 Ark. 750, 552 S.W.2d 1 (1977).

Considerations usually associated with forum convenience were pertinent to federal court's decision that Arkansas' exercise of jurisdiction over foreign corporation would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, Fehr Bros., Inc. v. Weissenfels, 439 U.S. 983, 99 S. Ct. 573, 58 L. Ed. 2d 654 (1978).

Court may raise the doctrine of forum non conveniens on its own. Country Pride Foods Ltd. v. Medina & Medina, 279 Ark. 75, 648 S.W.2d 485 (1983).

The trial court's discretion in determining whether to dismiss an action due to an inconvenient forum must necessarily be based upon such factors as convenience to the parties in obtaining documents and witnesses, the expense involved in trying the case, questions of foreign law, trial docket, and other matters. Although the application of forum non conveniens lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be disturbed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion, the record must show the matters considered by the court in applying the doctrine. Country Pride Foods Ltd. v. Medina & Medina, 279 Ark. 75, 648 S.W.2d 485 (1983).

Where contract was executed in Arkansas and most of the parties were residents of the state, the convenience of the parties was best served by the hearing of the case in Arkansas. Meachum v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 13 Ark. App. 229, 682 S.W.2d 763, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844, 106 S. Ct. 132, 88 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1985).

There is no requirement that plaintiff's claim be dismissed because of a prior pending action in federal court, nor is there any requirement that the court exercise the forum non conveniens discretion given it by subsection E. Helm v. Mid-America Indus., Inc., 301 Ark. 521, 785 S.W.2d 209, cert. denied, Helm v. Mid-America Industries, Inc., 498 U.S. 850, 111 S. Ct. 142, 112 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1990).

The application of forum non conveniens lies within the sound discretion of the trial court; only if this discretion is abused will be reviewing court reverse. Life of Am. Ins. Co. v. Baker-Lowe-Fox Ins. Mktg., Inc., 316 Ark. 630, 873 S.W.2d 537 (1994).

Because an insurer was the first party to file suit, and it chose to do so in the county in which it had its principal office, pursuant to § 16-55-213(a), a circuit judge erred by applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens under subdivision D. of this section, effectively overruling the insurer's choice of venue. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark. v. Gadbury-Swift, 2010 Ark. 6, 362 S.W.3d 291 (2010).

It was not an abuse of discretion to dismiss a wrongful death complaint under the doctrine of forum non conveniens because the trial court weighed the parties' interests and the complaint's procedural posture and concluded it was best for a related federal court complaint to proceed; thus, the court did not exercise its discretion thoughtlessly or without due consideration. Silkman v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, 2015 Ark. 422, 474 S.W.3d 74 (2015).

Internet Contacts.

Manufacturer's advertisement on the World Wide Web was insufficient contact with this state to subject it to personal jurisdiction. Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Ark. 1997).

Matters Outside Pleadings.

Circuit court did not err in considering matters outside the pleadings in reaching its conclusions regarding personal jurisdiction. Reveley v. Roth, 2016 Ark. App. 248, 491 S.W.3d 490 (2016).

Circuit court may consider evidence outside the pleadings on a motion under Ark. R. Civ. P. (12)(b)(2) alleging lack of personal jurisdiction. If the circuit court considers evidence outside the pleadings, the Rule (12)(b)(2) motion is not converted to a summary judgment motion, and previous cases that have taken a contrary position are overruled, see, e.g., Ganey v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 366 Ark. 238 (2006); Payne v. France, 373 Ark. 175 (2008); and Hotfoot Logistics, LLC v. Shipping Point Mktg., Inc., 2013 Ark. 130. Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 2019 Ark. 84, 569 S.W.3d 865 (2019).

Principal and Agent.

Nonresident principal acting through agent in state held to be transacting business so as to subject principal to jurisdiction. Wichman v. Hughes, 248 Ark. 121, 450 S.W.2d 294 (1970); Nix v. Dunavant, 249 Ark. 641, 460 S.W.2d 762 (1970); F & M Bank v. Hamilton Hotel Partners Ltd. Partnership, 702 F. Supp. 1417 (W.D. Ark. 1988).

Former subdivision C.1. of this section would only enable the court to exercise jurisdiction over the principal on whose behalf the agent acted, based upon the conduct of the agent as it falls within this section. This section does not similarly authorize exercise of jurisdiction over an agent based upon the conduct of his principal, since the actions of an agent acting for a disclosed principal bind only the principal and not the agent, subjecting only the principal to jurisdiction on the basis of contact with the forum. Williams v. GMC, 573 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Ark. 1983).

Real Property.

A court of the county where real estate was located had jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident owner under former subdivision C.1.(e) of this section in an action by a real estate broker against the nonresident owner to recover a commission for the sale of the real estate. Bowsher v. Digby, 243 Ark. 799, 422 S.W.2d 671 (1968).

A nonresident of Arkansas who contracted to buy Arkansas land is subject to the personal jurisdiction of an Arkansas court in a foreclosure suit on the land. Ratliff v. Thompson, 267 Ark. 349, 590 S.W.2d 291 (1979).

State courts had personal jurisdiction over persons who not only owned the property in the state that was the subject of foreclosure, but also lived on the property when they negotiated and consummated the defaulted loan, which was the basis of the suit. Horne v. Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 295 Ark. 182, 747 S.W.2d 580 (1988).

Special Appearance.

Special appearance in an Arkansas court to contest the jurisdiction of the court and move for continuance did not subject nonresident to “long arm” personal jurisdiction. Cotton v. Cotton, 3 Ark. App. 158, 623 S.W.2d 540 (1981).

Tortious Injury.

Nonresident putative father was not subject to personal jurisdiction under former subdivision C.1.(c) of this section on ground that child was conceived in Arkansas, since sexual intercourse between consenting adults is not a “tortious act” so as to confer jurisdiction. Howard v. County Court, 272 Ark. 205, 613 S.W.2d 386 (1981).

In a suit against United States for damages for death of enlisted person due to sexual harassment by sergeant, former subdivision C.1.(c) of this section did not provide basis for jurisdiction over sergeant who had no contacts with Arkansas. Stubbs v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Ark. 1984), aff'd, 744 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1984).

While nonresident driver committed a tortious injury in Arkansas which served as a basis for personal jurisdiction over him in action for personal injuries, that tortious act did not give rise to cause of action for failure to settle under driver's insurance policy, which failure was an act of insurer and not of driver; the trial court erred in holding that driver's conduct was sufficient to support personal jurisdiction under this section in that action. Franklin v. Griffith, 282 Ark. 271, 668 S.W.2d 518 (1984).

When personal jurisdiction is based solely upon the provisions that “only a cause of action or claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted” against a defendant, there must be a relationship between the defendant's connection with Arkansas and the injury complained of. Slocum v. Sandestin Beach Resort Hotel, 679 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Ark. 1988).

In order to exercise jurisdiction under former subdivision C.1.(d) of this section, the tortious injury must occur in Arkansas, but the business activities of the defendant need not be related to the tortious injury. Brown v. PST Vans, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

A fair interpretation of the allegations made by plaintiff allowed the conclusion that her inability to find a job in Arkansas resulted from allegedly defamatory statements attributed to defendant; therefore, regarding the claim of defamation, the amended complaint stated a claim as to personal jurisdiction under this statute. Brown v. PST Vans, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

Personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state trucking company was not dependent on this section where, at trial, the proof was not in dispute as to the situs of the collision; thus, Arkansas acquired personal jurisdiction over the defendant under § 16-58-120 because the plaintiff's cause of action arose directly from an act committed in this state by the agent of the defendant. Watkins Motor Lines v. Hedrick, 316 Ark. 683, 873 S.W.2d 814 (1994).

—Injury in State Caused by Action Outside State.

Under former subdivision C.1.(d) of this section, an Arkansas court had jurisdiction over foreign corporations in action for tort and breach of warranty even though the corporations had no offices or agents within the state and their products entered the state only through being incorporated in the products of others sold within the state or through sale by manufacturer's agents and independent brokers. Pennsalt Chem. Corp. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 244 Ark. 638, 426 S.W.2d 417 (1968).

Nonresident corporation deriving substantial revenue from goods sold in Arkansas held subject to jurisdiction. International Harvester Co. v. Hendrickson Mfg. Co., 249 Ark. 298, 459 S.W.2d 62 (1970); Jeanway Indus., Inc. v. Knudson Mfg. Co., 533 F. Supp. 678 (W.D. Ark. 1981); Marshall Constr. Co. v. M. Berger Co., 533 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Ark. 1982).

Where nonresident manufacturer engaged in a persistent course of conduct or derived substantial revenue from use of its goods in Arkansas, there were sufficient substantial contacts with the state for this section to apply, and this result was not changed by the fact that the complaint sounded in warranty rather than negligence or strict liability since former subdivision C.1.(d) of this section applies both to actions for breach of warranty and to actions in tort. Trace X Chem., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Chems. Co., 519 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. Ark. 1981).

Defendant's contacts with the state, which were the mailing of monthly payments to, and maintaining an escrow account at, the plaintiff bank within the state, were insufficient to render her subject to personal jurisdiction under former subdivision C.1.(d) of this section. Union Nat'l Bank v. Thornton, 293 Ark. 385, 738 S.W.2d 103 (1987).

—Injury Outside State.

Arkansas courts held not to have jurisdiction over nonresident defendant where injury occurred in another state. Krone v. AMI, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Jeanway Indus., Inc. v. Knudson Mfg. Co., 533 F. Supp. 678 (W.D. Ark. 1981); Williams v. GMC, 573 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Carter v. Wilson, 279 Ark. 58, 648 S.W.2d 472 (1983).

To confer jurisdiction on court under this section, the connection between defendant's activities in Arkansas and plaintiff's injuries in another state must be actual and not merely antecedent. Martin v. Kelley Elec. Co., 371 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1974).

Where nonresident manufacturer engaged in a persistent course of conduct or derived substantial revenue from use of its goods in Arkansas, there were sufficient substantial contacts with the state for this section to apply, and this result was not changed by the fact that the complaint sounded in warranty rather than negligence or strict liability since former subdivision C.1.(d) of this section applies both to actions for breach of warranty and to actions in tort. Trace X Chem., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Chems. Co., 519 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. Ark. 1981).

Tortious acts in Arkansas held to confer jurisdiction over nonresident defendant where injury occurred in another state. Wright v. Newman, 539 F. Supp. 1331 (W.D. Ark. 1982), vacated, 735 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. Mo. 1984).

The failure to allege facts connecting the transaction of Arkansas business to the accident in a foreign state was fatal to the cause of action, where such allegations were required by the long-arm statute to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Chisley, 308 Ark. 308, 825 S.W.2d 558 (1992).

In a premises liability case arising from an injury that occurred in defendant's Louisiana store, the contacts between the defendant company and the Arkansas plaintiff were sufficient to warrant personal jurisdiction over the company, which should not have been surprised to be haled into court in Arkansas because it sought to have Arkansas residents patronize its Louisiana store; and the company was located roughly 30 miles from the forum, so the argument regarding an inconvenient forum was weak. Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, 2017 Ark. App. 44, 511 S.W.3d 883 (2017), vacated, remanded, 138 S. Ct. 237, 199 L. Ed. 2d 2 (U.S. 2017) (remanded for further consideration in light of Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 198 L. Ed. 2d 395 (2017)).

Circuit court properly dismissed a customer's premises liability suit against a Louisiana retail sporting-goods store that advertised and conducted promotional activities in Arkansas for lack of specific personal jurisdiction. A fundamental connection did not exist between the cause of action and Arkansas, as the cause of action did not arise from or relate to defendant's contact with Arkansas as required under Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 198 L. Ed. 2d 395 (2017). The customer's trip and fall undisputedly occurred in Louisiana, and any alleged negligence related to the incident in Louisiana did not arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with Arkansas. Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 2019 Ark. 84, 569 S.W.3d 865 (2019).

Transacting Business.

Neither marriage nor living with a person constitutes transacting any business in the state on which personal jurisdiction can be exercised by the chancery court in a divorce action. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 257 Ark. 137, 514 S.W.2d 701 (1974).

Nonresident defendant held to have transacted business in state so as to confer jurisdiction on Arkansas courts. Shannon v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank, 259 Ark. 186, 531 S.W.2d 958 (1976); Stivers v. Pacific Bldg., Inc., 269 Ark. 294, 601 S.W.2d 822 (1980); Helm v. Mid-America Indus., Inc., 301 Ark. 521, 785 S.W.2d 209, cert. denied, Helm v. Mid-America Industries, Inc., 498 U.S. 850, 111 S. Ct. 142, 112 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1990); American Gen. Fire & Cas. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 763 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

Nonresident defendant held not to have transacted business in state so as to subject itself to Arkansas jurisdiction. Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, Fehr Bros., Inc. v. Weissenfels, 439 U.S. 983, 99 S. Ct. 573, 58 L. Ed. 2d 654 (1978); Roger N. Joyce & Assocs. v. Paoli Steel Corp., 491 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Ark. 1980); Pearrow v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1983); Williams v. GMC, 573 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Davis v. Kroger Co., 576 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D. Ark. 1983).

Where a Pennsylvania corporation began transacting business within this state, those transactions would not render the corporation subject to the in personam jurisdiction of an Arkansas court in a suit arising from activities which occurred prior to that time. Carter Oil Co. v. Apex Towing Co., 532 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Ark. 1981).

The purpose of the “transacting business” provision is to permit the trial court to exercise the maximum personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant allowable by due process, and the provision should be given a broad and liberal interpretation. Jagitsch v. Commander Aviation Corp., 9 Ark. App. 159, 655 S.W.2d 468 (1983); Moran v. Bombardier Credit, Inc., 39 Ark. App. 122, 839 S.W.2d 538 (1992); Glenn v. Student Loan Guarantee Found., 53 Ark. App. 132, 920 S.W.2d 500 (1996).

The Arkansas legislature intended the term “transacting business” to be construed to expand jurisdiction to the modern constitutional limit. Meachum v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 13 Ark. App. 229, 682 S.W.2d 763, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844, 106 S. Ct. 132, 88 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1985); F & M Bank v. Hamilton Hotel Partners Ltd. Partnership, 702 F. Supp. 1417 (W.D. Ark. 1988).

In an action by a local broker against the president of a commodities brokerage business for fraud and market manipulation under the Commodities Exchange Act, the district court properly asserted personal jurisdiction over the defendant where the defendant telephoned and visited the local broker's office to trade on both customer accounts and personal accounts. Dudley v. Dittmer, 795 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1986).

Although the Arkansas legislature intended the term “transacting business” to be construed to expand the in personam jurisdiction of its courts over nonresident defendants to the maximum allowed by due process, the use of arteries of interstate mail and telephone is insufficient, standing alone, to satisfy due process. Slocum v. Sandestin Beach Resort Hotel, 679 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Ark. 1988).

Where the defendant has created continuing obligations between himself and residents of the forum, he manifestly has availed himself of the privilege of conducting business there, and because his activities are shielded by the benefits and protections of the forum's laws, it is presumptively not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum as well. Ultimatics, Inc. v. Minimatic, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1448 (W.D. Ark. 1989).

Where defendant's employee, pursuant to contract for jointly purchased aircraft engine, stopped in Marion, Arkansas while en route from Texas to Indiana on other business, and attempted delivery to plaintiff but left none of the engine because a dispute arose over identity of property agreed upon, defendant engaged in a purposeful act sufficiently substantial to subject it to long-arm jurisdiction in Arkansas. Papachristou v. Turbines Inc., 902 F.2d 685 (8th Cir. 1990).

Telephone and mail transactions of foreign company not qualified to do business in Arkansas do not, standing alone, satisfy the minimum contacts required by due process to bring company within Arkansas's jurisdiction. CDI Contractors v. Goff Steel Erectors, Inc., 301 Ark. 311, 783 S.W.2d 846 (1990).

Where nonresident defendant had no offices, agents, or property in Arkansas, was not licensed to conduct business in Arkansas and contended it did not, and at no time did any employee or representative of defendant come to Arkansas to deal with plaintiff, defendant's activities did not rise to the status of transacting any business in this state and did not have the minimum contacts required with the State of Arkansas for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dickson v. Hawker-Siddeley Power Eng'g, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Ark. 1991).

In this action for action for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the publisher for lack of personal jurisdiction was reversed and remanded where (1) the fact that defendant publisher contracted to receive monthly sales reports, especially if these reports were to display sales on a state by state basis, would permit an inference that the publisher had reasonable expectations and knowledge that its products were going to be offered in the Arkansas market; and (2) there was also evidence that the publisher was actively involved in marketing plans and promotions of books placed in stores. Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 939, 129 S. Ct. 223, 172 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2008).

In this action for action for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against one corporate entity was affirmed where (1) the entity argued that it did not contract with the staff member, did not publish the novel, and was not party to the distribution agreement; and (2) plaintiff offered no credible evidence that the entity had any involvement in the publication or distribution of the novel and instead made merely conclusory allegations about the entity's alleged role. Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 939, 129 S. Ct. 223, 172 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2008).

Facts alleged in a company's breach of contract complaint provided a sufficient basis to subject defendant to specific personal jurisdiction in Arkansas under subsection B. of this section; defendant reached into Arkansas and initiated contact with the company in order to conduct business. Pritchett v. Evans, 2013 Ark. App. 679, 430 S.W.3d 223 (2013).

Cited: Rose's Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Rex Financial Corp., 383 F. Supp. 937 (W.D. Ark. 1974); William Penn Fraternal Ass'n v. Hickman, 256 Ark. 308, 506 S.W.2d 823 (1974); Turner v. McClain, 459 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Ark. 1978); United States v. Blackmon, 496 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Ark. 1980); Oden Optical Co. v. Optique Du Mond, Ltd., 268 Ark. 1105, 598 S.W.2d 456 (1980); Burton v. Bank of Tuckerman, 276 Ark. 538, 637 S.W.2d 577 (1982); Tucker Enters., Inc. v. Hartje, 278 Ark. 320, 650 S.W.2d 559 (1983); SD Leasing, Inc. v. RNF Corp., 278 Ark. 530, 647 S.W.2d 447 (1983); Weatherford v. State, 286 Ark. 376, 692 S.W.2d 605 (1985); Zolper v. AT&T Info. Sys., 289 Ark. 27, 709 S.W.2d 74 (1986); Keene v. National Medical Care, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Ark. 1988); Akin v. First Nat'l Bank, 25 Ark. App. 341, 758 S.W.2d 14 (1988); Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1990); Miller v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 924 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1991); Carpetland of N.W. Ark., Inc. v. Howard, 304 Ark. 420, 803 S.W.2d 512 (1991); Brown v. PST Vans, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. Ark. 1992); Renfro v. Adkins, 323 Ark. 288, 914 S.W.2d 306 (1996); National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 327 Ark. 504, 938 S.W.2d 847 (1997);

Janni v. Janni, 271 Ark. 953, 611 S.W.2d 785 (1981); Eagle Material Handling of Ark., Inc. v. Acme Dock Specialists, Inc., 273 Ark. 362, 616 S.W.2d 716 (1981); Marchant v. Peeples, 274 Ark. 233, 623 S.W.2d 523 (1981); Cotton v. Cotton, 3 Ark. App. 158, 623 S.W.2d 540 (1981); Lomanco, Inc. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 566 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Jagitsch v. Commander Aviation Corp., 9 Ark. App. 159, 655 S.W.2d 468 (1983); Kilcrease v. Butler, 293 Ark. 454, 739 S.W.2d 139 (1987); Gould v. P.T. Krakatau Steel, 957 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1992).

16-4-102. Service.

A. Manner and Proof of Service.

  1. When the law of this state authorizes service outside this state, the service, when reasonably calculated to give actual notice, may be made:
  2. Proof of service outside this state may be made by affidavit of the individual who made the service or in the manner prescribed by the law of this state, the order pursuant to which the service is made, or the law of the place in which the service is made for proof of service in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction. When service is made by mail, proof of service shall include a receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of personal delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the court.
  3. Service under this section does not, of itself, require the recognition or enforcement of an order, judgment, or decree rendered outside this state.
  1. By personal delivery in the manner prescribed for service within this state;
  2. In the manner prescribed by the law of the place in which the service is made for service in that place in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction;
  3. By any form of mail addressed to the person to be served and requiring a signed receipt;
  4. As directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory; or
  5. As directed by the court.

B. Individuals Eligible to Make Service. Service outside this state may be made by any individual permitted to make service of process under the law of this state or the law of the place in which the service is made or who is designated by a court of this state. In addition, any attorney for a party is eligible to make service of process in the manner prescribed in subparagraphs (c) and (e) of paragraph 1 of subsection A. of this section.

C. Individuals to Be Served; Special Cases. When the law of this state requires that in order to effect service, one (1) or more designated individuals be served, service outside this state under this section must be made upon the individual or individuals.

D. Assistance to Tribunals and Litigants Outside this State.

1. Any court of record of this state may order service upon any person who is domiciled or can be found within this state of any document issued in connection with a proceeding in a tribunal outside this state. The order may be made upon application of any interested person or in response to a letter rogatory issued by a tribunal outside this state and shall direct the manner of service.

2. Service in connection with a proceeding in a tribunal outside this state may be made within this state without an order of court.

E. Other Provisions of Law Unaffected. This section does not repeal or modify any other law of this state permitting another procedure for service.

History. Acts 1963, No. 101, § 2; 1973, No. 37, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2503.

Cross References. Method of service, §§ 16-58-12016-58-128, § 16-58-130.

Summons, ARCP 4(c).

Case Notes

Alternative Service.

Where, under the circumstances, plaintiff was denied in its efforts to give defendants actual or personal service provided for out-of-state persons under the methods set forth under subdivision A.1. of this section and ARCP 4(e), plaintiff was relegated to obtain service of process on defendants under ARCP 4(f), which is another effective procedure for service under this section, the long-arm law; subsection E. of this section provides this section does not repeal or modify any other law of this state permitting another procedure for service. Horne v. Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 295 Ark. 182, 747 S.W.2d 580 (1988).

Individuals Eligible to Make Service.

Summons could be served by the sheriff of the county in which property was located. Stivers v. Pacific Bldg., Inc., 269 Ark. 294, 601 S.W.2d 822 (1980).

Refusal of Summons.

One who is subject to the long-arm jurisdiction of a court of Arkansas cannot defeat jurisdiction by the simple expedient of refusing to accept a registered letter containing a summons. Merriott v. Whitsell, 251 Ark. 1031, 476 S.W.2d 230 (1972).

Service on Agent.

The long-arm statute displaced the common law principle of the transitory cause of action as a rationale for asserting jurisdiction over corporate defendants and required that the cause of action arise out of prescribed conduct such as the transaction of business in Arkansas. To the extent that Running v. Southwest Freight Lines, 227 Ark. 839, 303 S.W.2d 578 (1957), stands for the principle that service upon an agent appointed by a foreign corporation to receive process in this state confers personal jurisdiction in a transitory action regardless of the long-arm statute, it is overruled. Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Chisley, 308 Ark. 308, 825 S.W.2d 558 (1992).

Validity of Service.

In a personal injury action arising from an automobile accident, where a copy of the complaint and summons, which was mailed to the out-of-state address of defendant's brother, was returned marked “undelivered,” plaintiff failed to exercise the reasonable diligence required in determining defendant's last known address and, therefore, the default judgment based on the purported service was void. Canal Ins. Co. v. Hall, 259 Ark. 797, 536 S.W.2d 702 (1976).

If a summons misstated the amount of time allowed for an answer, that discrepancy would not render the summons fatally defective so as to prevent service under this section. Stivers v. Pacific Bldg., Inc., 269 Ark. 294, 601 S.W.2d 822 (1980).

Nonresident corporation not authorized to do business in Arkansas was not properly served with notice under this section where the attempt to use the Secretary of State resulted in the notice being returned. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc. v. Burnside, 282 Ark. 27, 665 S.W.2d 288 (1984).

Cited: Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. v. Youngblood, 359 F. Supp. 1115 (W.D. Ark. 1973); Renault Cent., Inc. v. International Imports of Fayetteville, Inc., 266 Ark. 155, 583 S.W.2d 10 (1979); Watling Ladder Co. v. Aldridge, 3 Ark. App. 27, 621 S.W.2d 499 (1981); Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, 677 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1982); Miller v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 924 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1991).

16-4-103. [Reserved.]

Publisher's Notes. The Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act (U.L.A.), Article III, which concerns the taking of depositions, was not adopted in Arkansas.

16-4-104. [Superseded.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that this section, concerning proof of official records, was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The section was derived from Acts 1963, No. 101, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2505.

16-4-105. Other provisions of law unaffected.

Except as otherwise provided herein, this chapter does not repeal or modify any law of this state:

  1. Authorizing the exercise of jurisdiction on any bases other than the bases specified in § 16-4-101;
  2. Permitting a procedure for service or for obtaining testimony, documents, or other things for use in this state or in a tribunal outside this state other than the procedures prescribed in § 16-4-102; or
  3. Authorizing the proof of official records or any entry or lack of entry therein by any method other than the methods prescribed in § 16-4-104 [superseded].

History. Acts 1963, No. 101, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2506.

16-4-106. Uniformity of interpretation.

This chapter shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purposes to make uniform the laws of those states which enact it.

History. Acts 1963, No. 101, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2507.

16-4-107. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are severable.

History. Acts 1963, No. 101, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2507n.

16-4-108. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act”.

History. Acts 1963, No. 101, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2501.

16-4-109, 16-4-110. [Reserved.]

Publisher's Notes. Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act (U.L.A.), §§ 6.05 and 6.06, which concern repeal and time of taking effect, respectively, were not adopted in Arkansas.

Chapter 5 Nonliability Of Volunteer Fire Fighters, Etc.

Effective Dates. Acts 1987, No. 189, § 3: Mar. 13, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that volunteer firefighters, fire department board members and administrative personnel of volunteer fire departments should not suffer civil liability for personal injuries or property damage resulting from acts or omissions of volunteer firefighters while engaged in carrying out their responsibilities as firefighters provided that such acts or omissions were performed in good faith and did not constitute gross negligence; that the law does not now provide such civil immunity; that the present state of the law results in inequitable burdens being placed upon such persons, and that this Act is immediately necessary to eliminate such inequity. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-5-101. Volunteer firefighters, etc. — Nonliability.

  1. No volunteer firefighter or board member of a volunteer fire department nor administrative personnel of a volunteer fire department shall be civilly liable for personal injury or property damage resulting from any act or omission of a volunteer firefighter in carrying out his or her official duties as a firefighter if the act or omission was in good faith and did not constitute gross negligence.
  2. The provisions of this section shall not apply to volunteer fire departments of incorporated cities or towns.

History. Acts 1987, No. 189, § 1.

Cross References. Dues for volunteer fire departments, § 14-20-108.

16-5-102. Damage resulting from installation of free smoke alarms — Liability.

  1. No volunteer firefighter shall be civilly liable for personal injury or property damage resulting from any act or omission in the installation of a smoke alarm provided free of charge if the act or omission did not constitute intentional wrongdoing.
  2. No board member of any fire department nor administrative personnel of any fire department shall be civilly liable for personal injury or property damage resulting from any act or omission of a volunteer firefighter in installation of a smoke alarm provided free of charge.

History. Acts 1991, No. 891, § 1.

Chapter 6 Volunteer Immunity

Cross References. Liabilities of attorneys, § 16-22-301 et seq.

Division of Volunteerism, § 25-10-128.

Effective Dates. Acts 1987, No. 390, § 8: Mar. 25, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that many persons contribute their valuable knowledge and services as unpaid volunteers in the promotion and performance of various programs administered by State and local agencies which are designed to meet the needs of the State and the several communities and that such persons should not be held civilly liable for their acts or omissions in carrying out their authority and responsibilities as volunteers if such acts or omissions were performed in good faith and did not constitute gross negligence; that the law does not now specifically provide such civil immunity; that the present state of the law results in inequitable burdens being placed upon such persons; and that this Act is immediately necessary to eliminate such inequity. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Torts, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 609.

Case Notes

Charitable Immunity.

Although Arkansas still recognizes the common-law doctrine of charitable immunity, it is very narrowly construed; the following list is illustrative but not determinative of the factors used to determine whether an organization is entitled to charitable immunity: (1) whether the organization's charter limits it to charitable or eleemosynary purposes; (2) whether the organization's charter contains a “not-for-profit” limitation; (3) whether the organization's goal is to break even; (4) whether the organization earned a profit; (5) whether any profit or surplus must be used for charitable or eleemosynary purposes; (6) whether the organization depends on contributions and donations for its existence; (7) whether the organization provides its service free of charge to those unable to pay; and (8) whether the directors and officers receive compensation. Ouachita Wilderness Inst. v. Mergen, 329 Ark. 405, 947 S.W.2d 780 (1997).

Subchapter 1 — Volunteers Generally

A.C.R.C. Notes. Because Acts 1997, No. 276 enacted a subchapter 2, the existing provisions of this chapter have been designated as subchapter 1.

16-6-101. Title.

This subchapter may be cited as the “Arkansas Volunteer Immunity Act”.

History. Acts 1987, No. 390, § 2.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Sampson, Nonprofit Risk; Nonprofit Insurance, 2008 Ark. L. Notes 83.

16-6-102. Purpose.

Since the spirit of volunteerism has long animated citizens of this state to give of their time and abilities to help others, the State of Arkansas would be wise to ensure that qualified volunteers shall not be civilly liable for personal injury or property damage resulting from any act or omission in carrying out their authority or responsibilities as volunteers. While there are no known recent instances in Arkansas where a volunteer has been subjected to personal liability for negligence in performing volunteer duties and there are no cases presently known to be pending, the recent publicity generated in relation to the perceived insurance crisis has heightened concern among many who would provide volunteer services, making it more difficult to provide certain important services, cultural and educational events, and other opportunities to the citizens of the State of Arkansas through voluntary services. This subchapter limits and defines the liability of volunteers in order to diminish their concern with regard to personal liability associated with volunteer work in order that the state might maximize this important human resource.

History. Acts 1987, No. 390, § 1.

16-6-103. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Qualified volunteer” means any person who of free will provides goods or services without financial compensation to or through any volunteer agency in connection with a volunteer program;
  2. “Volunteer agency” means any volunteer program of all departments, institutions, and divisions of state government, community volunteer organization, or any not-for-profit corporation which has received a 501(c)(3) designation from the United States Internal Revenue Service, other than one established principally for the recreational benefit of its stockholders or members; and
  3. “Volunteer activity” means any activity within the scope of any project, program, effort, or other regular activity sponsored by a volunteer agency with the intent to effect a charitable purpose or confer other public benefit, including, but not limited to, enhancement of the cultural, civic, religious, educational, scientific, or economic resources of the community.

History. Acts 1987, No. 390, § 3.

U.S. Code. The phrase “a 501(c)(3) designation” refers to an exemption codified at 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).

16-6-104. Volunteer not vicariously liable — Construction of subchapter.

  1. A qualified volunteer shall not be held vicariously liable for the negligence of another in connection with or as a consequence of his or her volunteer activities.
  2. Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to limit the liability of a person acting outside the scope of the volunteer program.
  3. Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to limit the liability of any volunteer agency.

History. Acts 1987, No. 390, §§ 4, 6, 7.

Case Notes

Volunteer Agency.

A juvenile rehabilitation camp housing juvenile offenders, as a volunteer agency, was not entitled to immunity under this subchapter, nor entitled to charitable immunity under the common-law doctrine of charitable immunity. Ouachita Wilderness Inst. v. Mergen, 329 Ark. 405, 947 S.W.2d 780 (1997).

16-6-105. Nonliability for damages — Exceptions.

A qualified volunteer shall not be liable in damages for personal injury or property damage sustained by one who is a participant in or a recipient, consumer, or user of the services or benefits of a volunteer by reason of any act or omission of a qualified volunteer in connection with the volunteer except as follows:

  1. Where the qualified volunteer is covered by a policy of insurance, in which case liability for ordinary negligence is limited to the amount of coverage provided;
  2. Where the qualified volunteer acts in bad faith or is guilty of gross negligence;
    1. Where the qualified volunteer negligently operates a motor vehicle, aircraft, boat, or other powered mode of conveyance.
    2. If the actionable conduct of the qualified volunteer is covered by a policy of liability insurance, his or her liability for ordinary negligence shall be limited to the amount of the coverage provided; or
    1. Where the qualified volunteer negligently performs professional services extended to an individual which the qualified volunteer is licensed under state law to perform, including, but not limited to, legal, engineering, and accounting services.
      1. If the volunteer agency either provides or requires its professional volunteers to carry professional liability insurance in an amount customarily carried by a member of the profession involved, liability for ordinary negligence in rendering professional service shall be limited to the amount of coverage available or the amount required by the agency, whichever is larger.
      2. This exception does not apply to nurses or similar health care providers rendering health care services or other professionals rendering professional services to a government entity, business, or volunteer agency.

History. Acts 1987, No. 390, § 5; 1997, No. 276, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. Pursuant to § 16-6-201(d), the provisions of this section regarding licensed medical professionals are superseded by § 16-6-201.

Cross References. Volunteer immunity for licensed health care professionals, § 16-6-201.

Case Notes

Cited: King v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 301 Ark. 148, 782 S.W.2d 574 (1990); Elliott v. Hurst, 307 Ark. 134, 817 S.W.2d 877 (1991).

Subchapter 2 — Healthcare Professionals

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this chapter” in subchapter 1 may not apply to this subchapter which was enacted subsequently.

Cross References. Immunity from liability for volunteer services by retired physicians and surgeons, § 17-95-106.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 120, § 2: Feb. 16, 2007. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that indigent individuals in this state are in need of professional dental care; that dental professionals are not sufficiently protected from liability for rendering their services voluntarily to indigent individuals; and that this act is immediately necessary because the lack of immunity causes dental professionals to be reluctant to provide dental services voluntarily and without compensation. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-6-201. Indigent care — Rules — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, “healthcare professional” means a person who:
    1. Is licensed or certified under Subtitle 3 of Title 17; or
    2. Is a student or resident of a healthcare profession program leading to a professional degree, a license, or certification under Subtitle 3 of Title 17 who is:
      1. Providing services within the scope of the training of that student or resident; and
      2. Under the supervision of a person who is licensed in the healthcare profession for which the student is seeking a degree, a license, or a certification.
  2. A healthcare professional who renders healthcare services voluntarily and without compensation to any person at any free or low-cost healthcare clinic located in the State of Arkansas and registered by the State Board of Health that accepts no insurance payments and provides healthcare services free of charge to persons unable to pay or provides healthcare services for a nominal fee shall not be liable for any civil damages for any act or omission resulting from the rendering of the healthcare services unless the act or omission was the result of the healthcare professional's gross negligence or willful misconduct.
    1. The board may promulgate rules necessary to provide for the registration of free or low-cost healthcare clinics under this section.
    2. The rules shall require that each person to whom healthcare services are provided:
      1. Has been fully informed before any treatment by the healthcare professional providing the services or by the staff of the healthcare clinic of the immunity from civil suit provisions of this section; and
      2. Has acknowledged that fact in writing on a form approved or designated by the Department of Health.
  3. The board and its members and the department and its agents and employees are exempt and immune from liability for any claims or damages when performing their duties under this section.
  4. The provisions of this section supersede the exception for licensed medical professionals under the Arkansas Volunteer Immunity Act, § 16-6-101 et seq.

History. Acts 1997, No. 276, § 1; 2007, No. 120, § 1; 2007, No. 837, § 1; 2019, No. 315, § 1286.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment substituted “health care” for “medical” throughout the section; substituted “Physicians, dentists, or other health care professionals” for “Physicians and health care professionals” in (a); substituted “health care professional” for “physician” in (b)(2); inserted “and Human Services” in (b)(2)(B) and (c); and added (e).

The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” in the introductory language of (c)(2).

Cross References. Program for indigent medical care, § 20-77-107.

Chapter 7 Dispute Resolution

Preambles. Acts 1993, No. 641 contained a preamble which read:

“WHEREAS, formal judicial process can on occasion be disproportionately time consuming and costly for adequate resolution of certain kinds of disputes which arise in this state; and

“WHEREAS, the cumulative burden of disputes for which formal judicial proceedings are inadequate can be substantial; and

“WHEREAS, the ensuing frustrations springing from unresolved disputes vex our citizens, and neglected disputes have the potential for escalating into more serious social consequences; and

“WHEREAS, the various forms of dispute resolution processes can increase access of the public to enhanced dispute resolution opportunities, and thereby amplify public regard and usage of the legal system and reduce the volume of matters which encumber the court system of this state.

“Therefore, ….”

Research References

Am. Jur. Am. Jur. 2d (new topic service), Alt. Disp. Res. § 1 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — Arkansas Alternative Dispute Resolution Commission

A.C.R.C. Notes. Due to the enactment of subchapter 1 of this chapter by Acts 1995, No. 673, the former provisions of this chapter have been redesignated as subchapter 2.

Effective Dates. Acts 1997, No. 250, § 258: Feb. 24, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 1211 of 1995 established the procedure for all state boards and commissions to follow regarding reimbursement of expenses and stipends for board members; that this act amends various sections of the Arkansas Code which are in conflict with the Act 1211 of 1995; and that until this cleanup act becomes effective conflicting laws will exist. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governer [sic], it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 1997, No. 1354, § 51: Apr. 14, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act affects the method of selection of alternate members of the Legislative Council and Legislative Joint Auditing Committee and that this act is immediately necessary for proper continuity and efficiency in State government. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Kilpatrick, How Much Do You Know (or Care) About Alternative Disputer Resolution?, 1996 Ark. L. Notes 53.

16-7-101. Purpose.

The purpose of this subchapter is to encourage, promote, and develop voluntary alternative processes throughout the state to resolve disputes, cases, and controversies of all kinds.

History. Acts 1995, No. 673, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Former § 16-7-101 has been renumbered as § 16-7-201.

16-7-102. Arkansas Alternative Dispute Resolution Commission established — Terms of members — Meetings — Rules — Quorum.

      1. There is hereby created the Arkansas Alternative Dispute Resolution Commission, which shall consist of seven (7) members.
        1. Three (3) members shall be attorneys appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, one (1) of whom shall have been recommended to the court by the Arkansas Bar Association.
        2. One (1) member shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
        3. One (1) member shall be appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate.
        4. Two (2) members shall be appointed by the Governor.
    1. All members shall have demonstrated prior interest or involvement in alternative dispute resolution.
    2. At least one (1) commission member shall be an Arkansas resident considered to be a representative of voluntary or nonprofit alternative dispute resolution programs in the State of Arkansas.
    3. Each member shall serve for six (6) years.
    4. If any member dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to serve prior to the expiration of the term, the appointing entity shall appoint a successor to serve the unexpired portion of the term.
    5. The members of the commission shall elect a chair.
  1. Members of the commission may receive expense reimbursement in accordance with § 25-16-902.
  2. The commission shall hold regular quarterly meetings each year on dates fixed by the commission and such special meetings as the commission determines are necessary.
  3. The commission may issue rules and shall publish rules for the regulation of its proceedings.
  4. A majority of the commission shall constitute a quorum.

History. Acts 1995, No. 673, §§ 2-5; 1997, No. 250, § 115; 1997, No. 1354, § 34; 2001, No. 1288, § 13; 2019, No. 315, § 1287.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Former § 16-7-102 has been renumbered as § 16-7-202.

As enacted by Acts 1995, No. 673, subdivision (a)(4) began:

“The first members of the commission shall draw for terms of two (2), four (4), or six (6) years and shall serve until their successors are appointed. Thereafter, …”

Amendments. The 2019 amendment deleted “and regulations” following “rules” in (d).

16-7-103. Staffing.

  1. General staff support, facilities, and operating assistance for the Arkansas Alternative Dispute Resolution Commission shall be provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts from funds appropriated for that purpose by the General Assembly.
  2. The commission shall select a Coordinator of Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs who shall be an employee of the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  3. Other employees may be added by the commission as are needed to carry out the purposes of this subchapter.

History. Acts 1995, No. 673, § 6.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Former § 16-7-103 has been renumbered as § 16-7-203.

16-7-104. Powers and duties of commission.

The Arkansas Alternative Dispute Resolution Commission shall have the authority and responsibility to:

  1. Promote in a systematic manner the appropriate use of alternative dispute resolution;
  2. Provide education to the courts, other government agencies, and the public on the methods, advantages, and applications of alternative dispute resolution;
    1. Establish standards and rules for the certification, professional conduct, discipline, and training of persons who shall be eligible and qualified to serve as compensated mediators, negotiators, conciliators, arbitrators, or other alternative dispute resolution neutrals in and for state and local courts.
    2. However, nothing in this subchapter or in the standards and rules promulgated by the commission shall in any way prevent the parties to the litigation from utilizing any recognized voluntary or nonprofit program of dispute resolution;
  3. Develop recommended guidelines, including the types of disputes which may be subject to alternative dispute resolution and standard procedures for mediation, and other forms of alternative dispute resolution;
  4. Assist state and local courts and governmental and other agencies with the development and implementation of alternative dispute resolution programs;
  5. Develop standardized forms for use in state and local courts and governmental and other agencies for the reference of cases to alternative dispute resolution and for the purpose of monitoring the use of alternative dispute resolution in the state;
  6. Establish fees to be levied by the courts and governmental and other agencies and paid by parties utilizing alternative dispute resolution processes;
  7. Apply for and accept gifts or grants from any public or private source for use in maintaining and improving alternative dispute resolution programs in the state; and
  8. Collect fees for tuition and registration of educational programs and to assist in maintaining a roster of third-party neutrals.

History. Acts 1995, No. 673, § 7; 1999, No. 602, § 1; 2019, No. 315, § 1288.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Former § 16-7-104 has been renumbered as § 16-7-204.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (3)(B).

16-7-105 — 16-7-107. [Transferred.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Former §§ 16-7-10516-7-107 have been renumbered as §§ 16-7-20516-7-207, respectively.

Subchapter 2 — Dispute Resolution Processes

A.C.R.C. Notes. Due to the enactment of subchapter 1 of this chapter by Acts 1995, No. 673, the former provisions of this chapter have been redesignated as subchapter 2.

Preambles. Acts 1993, No. 641 contained a preamble which read:

“WHEREAS, formal judicial process can on occasion be disproportionately time consuming and costly for adequate resolution of certain kinds of disputes which arise in this state; and

“WHEREAS, the cumulative burden of disputes for which formal judicial proceedings are inadequate can be substantial; and

“WHEREAS, the ensuing frustrations springing from unresolved disputes vex our citizens, and neglected disputes have the potential for escalating into more serious social consequences; and

“WHEREAS, the various forms of dispute resolution processes can increase access of the public to enhanced dispute resolution opportunities, and thereby amplify public regard and usage of the legal system and reduce the volume of matters which encumber the court system of this state.

“Therefore, ….”

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Kilpatrick, How Much Do You Know (or Care) About Alternative Disputer Resolution?, 1996 Ark. L. Notes 53.

16-7-201. Legislative purpose and intent.

It is the intent of the General Assembly to:

  1. Encourage and authorize the use of dispute resolution processes throughout this state to resolve disputes, cases, and controversies of all kinds. Such processes include, but are not limited to, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, private judging, moderated settlement conferences, mediation-arbitration, fact finding, mini-trials, and summary jury trials;
  2. Encourage the development of new and the improvement of existing processes in this state; and
  3. Encourage the courts, the officers and employees of the courts of this state, state and local officers, departments, state and local governments and administrative agencies, state and local enforcement officers and agencies, prosecuting authorities and public defenders, and all other state and local officials, agencies, districts, and authorities to become versed in, accept, use, develop, and improve processes appropriate to the fair, just, and efficient resolution of disputes, cases, and controversies of all kinds in this state.

History. Acts 1993, No. 641, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-7-101.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Moberly and Levine, The New Arkansas Appellate-Mediation Program, 61 Ark. L. Rev. 429.

Case Notes

Cited: Wynne-Ark., Inc. v. Richard Baughn Constr., 2020 Ark. App. 140, 597 S.W.3d 114 (2020).

16-7-202. Duty and authority of the courts.

    1. It is the duty of each trial and appellate court of this state and each court is hereby vested with the authority to encourage the settlement of cases and controversies pending before it by suggesting the referral of a case or controversy to an appropriate dispute resolution process agreeable to the parties.
    2. On motion of all the parties, the court must make such an order of reference and continue the case or controversy pending the outcome of the selected dispute resolution process.
  1. In addition, each circuit and appellate court of this state is vested with the authority to order any civil, juvenile, probate, or domestic relations case or controversy pending before it to mediation.
  2. If a case or controversy is ordered to mediation, the parties may:
    1. Choose an appropriate mediator from a roster provided by the Arkansas Alternative Dispute Resolution Commission of those mediators who meet the commission's requirement guidelines for that type of case; or
    2. Select a mediator not on the commission's roster, if approved by the court.
    1. A party may move to dispense with the order to mediate for good cause shown.
    2. For purposes of this subsection, “good cause shown” shall include, but not be limited to, a party's inability to pay the costs of mediation.
  3. Each court is further granted the discretionary authority to make at the request of a party appropriate orders to confirm and enforce the results produced by the dispute resolution process.

History. Acts 1993, No. 641, § 2; 2003, No. 1179, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-7-102.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, Mediation, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 448.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Writ of prohibition was denied in a case challenging the constitutionality of subsection (b) of this section because a circuit court had jurisdiction to hear a motion relating to estate administration due to Ark. Const., Amend. 80, § 6, and the constitutionality of a statute could have been heard by a circuit court and appealed. Ellis v. Reynolds, 368 Ark. 572, 247 S.W.3d 845 (2007).

Abuse of Discretion.

After the parties failed to reach an agreement during mediation and did not agree on which issues had been mediated, the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to hold a hearing and in dismissing portions of the wife's motion to compel concerning issues that the parties agreed were mediated. Smyth v. Smyth, 2019 Ark. App. 12, 570 S.W.3d 472 (2019).

Circuit court's directive was to schedule mediation within 10 days, which was done, but when the circuit court learned the mediation was not scheduled to occur for approximately two and a half months, it amended the directive to have the mediation take place within 10 days; dismissing the wife's contempt petition because mediation did not take place within 10 days was an abuse of discretion, as the wife was not dilatory in scheduling the mediation, and this short window was punitive. Smyth v. Smyth, 2019 Ark. App. 12, 570 S.W.3d 472 (2019).

16-7-203. Duty and authority of state and local officers and agencies and governments.

  1. It is the duty of all the elements of government expressed or implied by § 16-7-201(3), and they are hereby authorized, to use dispute resolution processes in resolving any and all disputes, cases, or controversies in which they may be directly or indirectly involved, whether between themselves and members of the public or between any other state or local officer, agency, government, or entity of this state or of any other state or any element or entity of the federal government.
  2. The elements of government expressed or implied by § 16-7-201 are authorized to use arbitration, private judging, mediation-arbitration, fact finding, mini-trials, and summary jury trials in resolving any and all disputes, cases, or controversies in which they may be directly or indirectly involved, whether between themselves and members of the public, or their employees or bona fide employee organizations, or corporations, or nonprofit organizations, or any other state or local officer, agency, government, or entity of this state or of any other state or any element or entity of the federal government, so long as the parties have agreed to participate. This subsection is permissive and not mandatory.

History. Acts 1993, No. 641, § 3; 2007, No. 1206, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-7-103.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment added (b) and made a related change.

16-7-204. Counseling by attorneys.

An attorney licensed in this state when practicing in this state is encouraged to advise his or her client about the dispute resolution process options available to him or her and to assist him or her in the selection of the technique or procedure, including litigation, deemed appropriate for dealing with the client's dispute, case, or controversy.

History. Acts 1993, No. 641, § 4.

A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-7-104.

16-7-205. Duty to keep records of dispute resolution efforts and to file annual reports.

The courts and all the other elements of government expressed or implied by § 16-17-201(3) may keep information concerning all their efforts to use dispute resolution processes, whether or not such efforts lead to successful outcomes.

History. Acts 1993, No. 641, § 5.

A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-7-105.

16-7-206. Confidentiality of communications in dispute resolution procedures.

  1. Except as provided by subsection (c) of this section, a communication relating to the subject matter of any civil or criminal dispute made by a participant in a dispute resolution process, whether before or after the institution of formal judicial proceedings, is confidential and is not subject to disclosure and may not be used as evidence against a participant in any judicial or administrative proceeding.
  2. Any record or writing made at a dispute resolution process is confidential, and the participants or third party or parties facilitating the process shall not be required to testify in any proceedings related to or arising out of the matter in dispute or be subject to process requiring disclosure or production of information or data relating to or arising out of the matter in dispute.
  3. If this section conflicts with other legal requirements for disclosure of communications or materials, the issue of confidentiality may be presented to the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings to determine in camera whether the facts, circumstances, and context of the communications or materials sought to be disclosed warrant a protective order of the court or whether the communications or materials are subject to disclosure.

History. Acts 1993, No. 641, § 6.

A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-7-106.

Case Notes

Construction.

While this section does prevent revealing the particulars of the communications relating to the subject matter of the mediation, the Court of Appeals does not read this section to mean that the circuit court is prevented from knowing the subject matter of the mediation; otherwise, the circuit court could never know if there had been an attempt to mediate issues before motions were filed in the circuit court. Here, the circuit court refused to hold a hearing to make this determination. Smyth v. Smyth, 2019 Ark. App. 12, 570 S.W.3d 472 (2019).

Discovery.

It was error to grant at this point in the case defendant subcontractor's motion to compel discovery of the confidential settlement agreement between plaintiff and defendant general contractor that resulted from mediation, when the subcontractor sought contribution and apportionment of fault, because (1) any right of contribution does not arise until one joint tortfeasor pays more than the tortfeasor's share of liability, and no damages had been awarded yet, and (2) it was error to find the general contractor and subcontractor were joint tortfeasors before any evidence was presented. Contrary to plaintiff's argument, however, the Civil Justice Reform Act, § 16-55-201 et seq., did not eliminate contribution among “joint tortfeasors”. Wynne-Ark., Inc. v. Richard Baughn Constr., 2020 Ark. App. 140, 597 S.W.3d 114 (2020).

16-7-207. Immunity of impartial third parties.

No impartial third party administering or participating in a dispute resolution process shall be held liable for civil damages for any statement or decision made in connection with or arising out of the conduct of a dispute resolution process unless the person acted in a manner exhibiting willful or wanton misconduct.

History. Acts 1993, No. 641, § 7.

A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-7-107.

Chapters 8, 9 [Reserved.]

[Reserved]

Subtitle 2. Courts and Court Officers

Chapter 10 General Provisions

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this chapter” in subchapters 1 and 2 may not apply to subchapters 3-10 which were enacted subsequently.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Smith, The Influence of the Arkansas Supreme Court's Opinions on Policy Made by the General Assembly: A Case Study, 18 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 441.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Gingerich, Out of the Morass: The Move to State Funding of the Arkansas Court System, 17 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 249.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all municipal courts were to become district courts on January 1, 2005, and that they should assume the jurisdiction previously vested in municipal courts, police courts, justice of the peace courts, and courts of common pleas. Those courts were abolished by the amendment. City courts were to continue, but if abolished by the governing body of the city or by the General Assembly, the jurisdiction of the city court would then vest in the nearest district court.

Preambles. Acts 1959, No. 5 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics of the American Bar Association provides that if a judge should decide to become a candidate for any office not judicial, he should resign in order that it cannot be said that he is using the power or prestige of his judicial position to promote his own candidacy;

“Whereas, the Canons of Professional Ethics and Judicial Ethics have been approved by the bench and bar of the State of Arkansas….”

Acts 1981, No. 477 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas there are approximately 30,000 deaf citizens residing in the State of Arkansas; and

“Whereas, there is no provision in the laws of this State providing for an impartial and verbatim translation of court proceedings wherein deaf persons are either parties thereto or called as witnesses therein; and

“Whereas, this Act is necessary in order to insure the integrity of our judicial process in the eyes and minds of our deaf citizens;

“Now, therefore….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1931, No. 153, § 5: effective on passage.

Acts 1971, No. 536, § 2: Apr. 5, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly hereby finds that backlogs of criminal cases existing in some circuits may require the assignment of additional judges to said circuits in accordance with Act 496 of 1965; that it may be excessively time consuming and expensive to select a jury panel for said judges unless this act is passed; that this Act is necessary to fully implement Act 496 0f 1965; therefore, this Act being necessary for the expeditious dispatch of criminal cases within the State of Arkansas, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1971, No. 599, § 3: Apr. 7, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the salary of the executive secretary of the Judicial Department should be fixed from time to time by the General Assembly and the Appropriation Act establishing the biennial appropriation for the Judicial Department; and that the retirement benefits of the executive secretary should be clarified; and that only by the immediate passage of this Act may such objectives be accomplished. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1977, No. 209, § 4: Feb. 21, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “Because of drastic increases in the price of gasoline and other travel expenses in recent years and many judges are now suffering personal losses, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1979, No. 82, § 3: Feb. 7, 1979; Acts 1980 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 2, § 3: Jan. 25, 1980. Emergency clauses provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that in some courts in the State there is a serious backlog of cases, some of which have been pending in excess of a year; that it is essential to the effective administration of justice that civil matters which have been pending on court dockets for a long period of time be heard and disposed of as soon as possible; that this Act is designed to provide a procedure for the prompt disposition of those cases that have been pending in the courts a year or more and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 357, § 3: became law without Governor's signature, Mar. 5, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the caseload for many courts in this State results in lengthy delays in the disposition of civil cases; that the appointment of licensed attorneys to litigate claims on agreement of the parties would greatly relieve the courts of this State from the burden of overcrowded dockets; and that this Act is immediately necessary to provide such relief. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 981, § 4: became law without Governor's signature, Apr. 8, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “Because of drastic increases in the costs and maintenance of an automobile and in the price of gasoline and other travel expenses, and in the costs of supplies, equipment and other actual expenses in the performance of judicial duties in recent years, and that many judges are now suffering personal losses by being forced to pay the expenses of carrying on judicial duties from their salaries, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 334, § 6: July 1, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Fifth General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1985 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1985 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1985.”

Acts 1985, No. 569, § 3: Mar. 26, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there has been a tremendous increase in the number of offenses perpetrated against children in this State, that children of very tender years have increasing difficulty remembering past events necessary for a criminal prosecution the longer the length of time between the event and the trial, and that offenses against children are especially serious as to require, as nearly as possible, immediate removal of the offender from society. Therefore, this Act is necessary to shorten the time between the occurrence of the criminal offense and the trial and punishment of the perpetrator. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 11, § 4: June 22, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Fifth General Assembly, meeting in Extraordinary Session, that because of drastic increases in the costs and maintenance of an automobile and in the price of gasoline and other travel expenses, and in the costs of supplies, equipment and other actual expenses in the performance of judicial duties in recent years, and that many judges are now suffering personal losses by being forced to pay the expenses of carrying on judicial duties from their salaries, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 4, § 15: July 1, 1993. Emergency clauses provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1993 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1993 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1993.”

Acts 1995, No. 3, § 17: July 1, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eightieth General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1995 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1995 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1995.”

Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 23: Apr. 13, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the current system of funding the state judicial system has created inequity in the level of judicial services available to the citizens of the state; and it is further determined that the current method of financing the state judicial system has become so complex as to make the administration of the system impossible, and the lack of reliable data on the current costs of the state judicial system prohibits any comprehensive change in the funding of the system at this time. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 209, § 9: July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-First General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1997, No. 788, § 36: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Mar. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1997, No. 1341, § 35: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Apr. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1999, No. 1508, § 19: Apr. 15, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that this act makes various technical corrections in the Arkansas Code; that this act further clarifies the law to provide that the Arkansas Code Revision Commission may correct errors resulting from enactments of prior sessions; and that this act should go into effect immediately in order to be applicable during the codification process of the enactments of this regular session. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2001, No. 1314, § 2: Apr. 5, 2001. Emergency Clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 2001 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 2001 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2003, No. 932, § 6: July 1, 2003. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 2003 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 2003 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 2003.”

Acts 2003, No. 1031, § 7: Apr. 2, 2003. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the ‘Task Force to Study the Disparity in Sentencing for Persons Convicted of Non-violent Crimes’ has found that it appears that some Arkansas citizens do not receive equitable sentences under the law; that it is necessary to compile statistical sentencing information in order to determine if disparities exist; and that this act is immediately necessary to allow the compiling of the needed statistical information in the first quarter of 2003. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2015, No. 268, § 16: July 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one-year period; that the act entitled ‘AN ACT TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATION FOR PERSONAL SERVICES AND OPERATING EXPENSES FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS FOR THE OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS AND TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATORS OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 2016; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.’ requires the passage of this act; that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 2015, is essential to the operation of the Administrative Office of the Courts, and that in the event of an extension of the legislative session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 2015, could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 2015.”

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 49: Apr. 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that prison overcrowding is one of the largest problems currently burdening the state both from a public safety and budgetary standpoint; that safe and effective measures are needed to immediately combat this problem; and that this act is immediately necessary because in the interests of public safety and the state budget the Department of Correction, Department of Community Correction, Department of Human Services, and the Parole Board should be allowed to immediately implement these new measures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2017, No. 698, § 2: Mar. 27, 2017. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts provides a vital function concerning the operation of the judiciary; that the position of Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts will soon be vacant due to the departure of the current director; and that this act is immediately necessary because the Supreme Court feels it is necessary to consider as many qualified persons as necessary to fill the position. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

ALR.

Disqualification, for bias, of one offered as interpreter of testimony. 6 A.L.R.4th 158.

Delaying or obstructing discovery as basis for contempt proceeding. 8 A.L.R.4th 1181.

Admissibility of testimony concerning extrajudicial statements made to, or in presence of, witness through an interpreter. 12 A.L.R.4th 1016.

Failure of attorney to attend court, or tardiness, as contempt. 13 A.L.R.4th 122.

Prior representation or activity as prosecuting attorney as disqualifying judge from sitting or acting in criminal case. 16 A.L.R.4th 550.

Practice of law: statute prohibiting judge from engaging in. 17 A.L.R.4th 829.

Disqualification of judge because of assault or threat against him by party or person associated with party. 25 A.L.R.4th 923.

Failure to rise in courtroom as constituting criminal contempt. 28 A.L.R.4th 1250.

Oral communications insulting to particular state judge, made to third party out of judge's physical presence, as criminal contempt. 30 A.L.R.4th 155.

Attorney's use of objectionable questions and examination of witness in state judicial proceeding as contempt of court. 31 A.L.R.4th 1279.

Contrary order issued by another court: contempt based on violation of original court order. 36 A.L.R.4th 978.

Disqualification of judge in state proceedings to punish contempt against or involving himself in open court and in his actual presence. 37 A.L.R.4th 1004.

Failure to rise in state courtroom as constituting criminal contempt. 38 A.L.R.4th 563.

Intoxication as contempt of court. 46 A.L.R.4th 238.

Am. Jur. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 16 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Arkansas' Judiciary: Its History and Structure, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 152.

Administration of the Courts in Arkansas: Challenge, Performance, and Prospects, 30 Ark. L. Rev. 235.

C.J.S. 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 1 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Gingerich, Out of the Morass: The Move to State Funding of the Arkansas Court System, 17 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 249.

16-10-101. Administrative responsibilities of the Supreme Court.

  1. The Supreme Court shall have general superintending control over the administration of justice in all courts in the State of Arkansas. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be directly responsible for the efficient operation of the judicial branch and of its constituent courts and for the expeditious dispatch of litigation therein and the proper conduct of the business of the courts.
    1. Under rules prescribed by the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice may require reports from all courts of the state and may issue such orders, rules, and regulations as may be necessary for the efficient operation of those courts to ensure the prompt and proper administration of justice and may assign, reassign, and modify assignments of circuit and district court judges to hold, upon a temporary basis, regular or special sessions for the transaction of civil or criminal business within any other such court.
    2. The lower courts shall keep such adequate and uniform records as are required by law or as may be required by rule or order of the Supreme Court.
  2. The Supreme Court, with the assistance of the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, shall devise a uniform system of numbering, cataloging, and classifying cases in all the courts of record in this state, and the courts of record shall utilize the system in conducting the business of the courts.
  3. In the event of the absence of the Chief Justice or his or her inability to perform the duties described in this section, or as required by rule or order of the Supreme Court, the duties may be performed by the several associate justices of the Supreme Court in the order of their seniority of service on the Supreme Court.

History. Acts 1965, No. 496, § 1; 1973, No. 237, § 1; 1981, No. 489, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-142; Acts 1989, No. 760, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 38; 2019, No. 315, § 1289.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2003, No. 1711, § 1, provided:

“(a) In order to assist the Arkansas General Assembly and the Arkansas Supreme Court with the respective duties and responsibilities which they are assigned under the Arkansas Constitution to establish the jurisdiction of state courts and to set the number and boundaries of circuit court districts, there is created the Circuit Court Apportionment Commission to be composed of the following persons:

“(1) The Chairman of the Senate Interim Committee on Judiciary or his or her designee, plus two (2) other members of the committee to be selected by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate;

“(2) The Chairman of the House Interim Committee on Judiciary or his or her designee, plus two (2) other members of the committee to be selected by the Speaker of the House;

“(3) The Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court or his or her designee, who shall serve as chair of the commission;

“(4) The President of the Arkansas Judicial Council;

“(5)(A) Two (2) circuit judges appointed by the Arkansas Judicial Council, one (1) of whom shall be a minority.

“(B) The judges shall be from different congressional districts;

“(6) The President of the Arkansas Bar Association or his or her designee; and

“(7) Two (2) persons appointed by the Governor, one (1) of whom shall be a minority.

“(b) In addition to the voting members identified in subsection (a) of this section, the following persons shall serve as nonvoting ex-officio members of the commission:

“(1) The Prosecutor Coordinator or his or her designee;

“(2) The Executive Director of the Public Defender Commission or his or her designee;

“(3) The dean of the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville School of Law, or his or her designee; and

“(4) The dean of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law or his or her designee.

“(c) The commission shall meet at the call of the chair and hold hearings between July 1, 2004, and December 31, 2004.

“(d) The commission shall review the current jurisdiction of state courts and the number and location of circuit court districts and make a recommendation to the Eighty-Fifth General Assembly and the Arkansas Supreme Court.

“(e) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall provide necessary meeting space, staff, clerical support, and technical assistance to the commission.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 38, § 3, provided that the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in each of the Eighth, Twelfth, and Nineteenth Circuit and Chancery Districts and the additional circuit judgeship created in the Sixth Circuit and Chancery District by § 1 of the act would be subject to the assignment authority of the Chief Justice, pursuant to this section, and requested that the Chief Justice utilize the services of these circuit-chancery judges in alleviating heavy caseloads in other circuit and chancery districts by use of such assignments.

As to name changes involving the Administrative Office of the Courts, see Publisher's Notes, § 16-10-102.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted “rules” preceding “and regulations” in (b)(1).

Case Notes

Assignments.

It is the parties' or trial court's responsibility to apprise the Supreme Court as to whether an assignment is necessary under this section. Once that assignment is made, that responsibility continues. Neal v. Wilson, 321 Ark. 70, 900 S.W.2d 177 (1995), overruled in part, Smith v. Wright, 2015 Ark. 189, 461 S.W.3d 687 (2015).

Newly Elected Judges.

Fact that a new circuit judge had been elected after judge's assignments did not, in itself, suggest the new circuit judge was not recused from trying the case. Neal v. Wilson, 321 Ark. 70, 900 S.W.2d 177 (1995), overruled in part, Smith v. Wright, 2015 Ark. 189, 461 S.W.3d 687 (2015).

Special Judges.

The exchange of circuits upon agreement of the circuit judges or the appointment of a judge by the Chief Justice were alternative methods of selecting a judge to preside over the impaneling of a grand jury to investigate the trial judge of the circuit court. State v. George, 250 Ark. 968, 470 S.W.2d 593 (1971).

Where special judge, lawfully elected pursuant to Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 21 [repealed], had already exercised jurisdiction over pending case, his judgment would take priority over the judgments of a judge assigned at a later date pursuant to this section. Wessell Bros. Foundation Drilling Co. v. Crossett Public School Dist., 287 Ark. 415, 701 S.W.2d 99 (1985).

Cited: Henry v. Powell, 262 Ark. 763, 561 S.W.2d 296 (1978); Weston v. State, 265 Ark. 58, 576 S.W.2d 705; Hall v. Lowery, 545 F. Supp. 1152 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Burris v. Britt, 281 Ark. 225, 663 S.W.2d 715 (1984); Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Templeton, 298 Ark. 390, 769 S.W.2d 404 (1989); Waddle v. Sargent, 313 Ark. 539, 855 S.W.2d 919 (1993); Lee v. Lee, 330 Ark. 310, 954 S.W.2d 231 (1997); State v. Armstrong, 331 Ark. 294, 960 S.W.2d 451 (1998); Smith v. Wright, 2015 Ark. 189, 461 S.W.3d 687 (2015).

16-10-102. Administrative Office of the Courts — Director — Cooperation of court officers.

    1. There shall be an office for the administration of the nonjudicial business of the judicial branch which shall be known as the “Administrative Office of the Courts”.
    2. There shall be a Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts who shall be nominated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court and the Arkansas Judicial Council, Inc. Subsequent to the appointment, the director shall hold office at the pleasure of the Supreme Court.
  1. The director shall meet the qualifications as determined by the Supreme Court.
  2. The director shall receive such salary as may be fixed from time to time by the biennial appropriations salary act for the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  3. The director shall not engage directly or indirectly in the practice of law and shall hold no other office or employment.
  4. The director, subject to the direction of the Supreme Court, shall perform the following functions:
    1. Examine the administrative methods of the courts and make recommendations to the Supreme Court for their improvement;
    2. Examine the state of the dockets of the courts, secure information as to their needs for assistance, if any, prepare statistical data and reports of the business of the courts, and advise the Supreme Court to the end that proper action may be taken;
    3. Examine the estimates of the courts of the state for appropriations and present to the Supreme Court recommendations concerning them;
    4. Examine the statistical systems of the courts and make recommendations to the Supreme Court for a uniform system of judicial statistics;
    5. Collect, analyze, and report to the Supreme Court statistical and other data concerning the business of the courts;
    6. With the approval of the Supreme Court and at the request of the Arkansas Judicial Council, Inc., the director shall act as Secretary of the Arkansas Judicial Council, Inc., and shall perform such duties as may be assigned to him or her;
    7. Examine the data processing needs of the courts and make recommendations to the Supreme Court as to the purchase and use of hardware and software for computer systems, telecommunications systems, and microfilming systems, and provide education to the courts on the use of such systems so as to improve the quality and efficiency of justice in the state;
    8. Assist the Supreme Court in the operation of the Supreme Court Library; and
    9. Attend to the other nonjudicial business of the judicial branch under such rules as the Supreme Court may by order adopt.
  5. The director shall, with the approval of the Supreme Court, appoint such assistants as may be necessary. He or she shall be provided with such office facilities as may be required.
  6. The director shall advise and assist clerks of trial courts in the keeping of records of their proceedings and shall make reports and recommendations in connection therewith to the Supreme Court, the trial judges, and the clerks of those courts.
  7. The clerks, officers, and employees of the courts shall comply with all requests of the director for information and statistical data relating to the business of the courts and the expenditure of public funds for their maintenance and operation. The director shall notify the Supreme Court of any noncompliance with such requests.

History. Acts 1965, No. 496, § 2; 1971, No. 599, § 1; 1973, No. 237, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-143; Acts 1989, No. 760, § 2; 2017, No. 698, § 1; 2019, No. 315, § 1290.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2003, No. 1031, § 1, provided:

“Intent.

(a) Ethnic minorities appear to be over represented in the population of persons who are involved in the criminal justice system, charged as defendants, convicted, and incarcerated throughout the United States criminal justice systems.

“(b) It is the responsibility of criminal justice agencies and the courts in the State of Arkansas to ensure that all actions taken are based upon reasons other than the race of the defendant.

“(c) In order to allow the General Assembly to conduct a thorough review of the Arkansas criminal justice process, information on actions taken by criminal justice agencies and the courts must be reported in a timely, uniform, and consistent manner.”

Act 2015, No. 598, § 5, provided: “AOC RESPONSIBILITY FOR COURT REPORTERS AND TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATORS.

“(a) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall be responsible for the financial oversight of the Official Court Reporters of the Circuit Courts and Trial Court Administrators, which shall include but not be limited to biennial and annual budget requests, all budgeting activities, monitoring expenses, travel, substitute expenses, indigent transcript payments and to ensure projected annual expenditures do not exceed total available funding.

“(b) The Administrative Office of the Courts with assistance from the Arkansas Judicial Council shall establish an official procedure or rules for all new hires, terminations and salary adjustments for Trial Court Administrators and Official Court Reporters. The official procedures or rules shall be implemented prior to July 1, 2015 and shall be administered for all Trial Court Administrators and Official Court Reporters.

“The provisions of this sections shall be in effect only from July 1 2015, through June 30, 2016.”

Act 2015, No. 598, § 6, provided: “FUNDING FROM THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FUND.

“(a)(i) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall be responsible for requesting and verifying the need for any additional appropriation, any position change level, and any increase in the Administration of Justice Fund Allocation Section as authorized annually through special language in the Department of Finance and Administration's Disbursing Act, for the Trial Court Administrators and Official Court Reporters.

“(ii) Any annual or biennial request for an increase in the Administration of Justice Fund allocation section for Trial Court Administrators and/or Official Court Reporters shall not exceed the total or projected total revenues available for the Trial Court Administrator Fund or the Court Reporter's Fund from the Administration of Justice Fund as determined by the Administrative Office of the Courts with assistance from the Department of Finance and Administration.

“(b)(i) During a fiscal year the Administrative Office of the Courts shall not approve any change level in salary, operating expense and other distributions for Trial Court Administrators which will exceed actual or projected fund balances in the Trial Court Administrator Fund.

“(ii) During a fiscal year the Administrative Office of the Courts shall not approve any change level in salary, operating expense and other distributions for Court Reporters which will exceed actual or projected fund balances in the Court Reporter's Fund.

“The provisions of this sections shall be in effect only from July 1 2015, through June 30, 2016.”

Act 2016, No. 80, § 5, provided: “AOC RESPONSIBILITY FOR COURT REPORTERS AND TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATORS.

“(a) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall be responsible for the financial oversight of the Official Court Reporters of the Circuit Courts and Trial Court Administrators, which shall include but not be limited to biennial and annual budget requests, all budgeting activities, monitoring expenses, travel, substitute expenses, indigent transcript payments and to ensure projected annual expenditures do not exceed total available funding.

“(b) The Administrative Office of the Courts with assistance from the Arkansas Judicial Council shall establish an official procedure or rules for all new hires, terminations and salary adjustments for Trial Court Administrators and Official Court Reporters. The official procedures or rules shall be implemented prior to July 1, 2015 and shall be administered for all Trial Court Administrators and Official Court Reporters.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017.”

Act 2016, No. 80, § 6, provided: “FUNDING FROM THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FUND.

“(a)(i) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall be responsible for requesting and verifying the need for any additional appropriation, any position change level, and any increase in the Administration of Justice Fund Allocation Section as authorized annually through special language in the Department of Finance and Administration's Disbursing Act, for the Trial Court Administrators and Official Court Reporters.

“(ii) Any annual or biennial request for an increase in the Administration of Justice Fund allocation section for Trial Court Administrators and/or Official Court Reporters shall not exceed the total or projected total revenues available for the Trial Court Administrator Fund or the Court Reporter's Fund from the Administration of Justice Fund as determined by the Administrative Office of the Courts with assistance from the Department of Finance and Administration.

“(b)(i) During a fiscal year the Administrative Office of the Courts shall not approve any change level in salary, operating expense and other distributions for Trial Court Administrators which will exceed actual or projected fund balances in the Trial Court Administrator Fund.

“(ii) During a fiscal year the Administrative Office of the Courts shall not approve any change level in salary, operating expense and other distributions for Court Reporters which will exceed actual or projected fund balances in the Court Reporter's Fund.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1989, No. 761, § 1, provided:

“(a) From and after the passage of this act, the ‘Arkansas Judicial Department’ shall be known and designated as the ‘Administrative Office of the Courts’, and the ‘Executive Secretary’ of the Arkansas Judicial Department shall be known as the ‘Director’ of the Administrative Office of the Courts.

“(b) Any and all statutes of the State of Arkansas now in force in which the institution now designated as ‘Arkansas Judicial Department’ shall be construed to refer to the ‘Administrative Office of the Courts.’ Said ‘Administrative Office of the Courts’ shall succeed to all rights and benefits and assume all the responsibilities of said ‘Arkansas Judicial Department.’

“(c) Any and all statutes of the State of Arkansas now in force in which the official now designated as ‘executive secretary’ of the Arkansas Judicial Department shall be construed to refer to the ‘director’ of the Administrative Office of the Courts. Said ‘director’ shall succeed to all rights and benefits and assume all the responsibilities of said ‘executive secretary’.”

The Per Curiam Order of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, dated June 28, 1993, provided, in part:

“All Supreme Court Committees, the Supreme Court Library, and the Director of Professional Programs will hereafter operate under the Administrative Office of the Courts and subject to the administrative authority of the Director of that Office. We do not place the constitutional offices of Supreme Court Reporter and Supreme Court Clerk, see Ark. Const. art. 7, § 7, under the Administrative Office of the Courts. They will remain directly responsible to the Supreme Court although we may choose to transfer certain administrative functions which have been handled by the Clerk to the Administrative Office of the Courts.”

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “meet the qualifications as determined by the Supreme Court” for “possess the same qualifications and shall be subject to the same restrictions as district judges” in (b).

The 2019 amendment deleted “and regulations” following “rules” in (e)(9).

Case Notes

Cited: Hall v. Lowery, 545 F. Supp. 1152 (E.D. Ark. 1982).

16-10-103. Training and education of court personnel.

  1. The state's responsibility for training and providing additional judicial education to circuit judges, district judges, city judges, circuit clerks, municipal clerks, case coordinators, court reporters, and all other personnel directly associated with the state's courts shall be administered by the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  2. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall have the authority to assess and collect fees for tuition and registration for educational programs it offers.

History. Acts 1985, No. 334, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-158; Acts 2001, No. 1314, § 1.

16-10-104. Courts of record.

The Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and all circuit and county courts shall be courts of record and shall keep just and faithful records of their proceedings.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 13; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-101; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 39.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section applies to county courts. Adams v. Tackett, 236 Ark. 171, 365 S.W.2d 125 (1963).

Unauthorized Practice of Law.

Circuit court did not err in dismissing a company's tax assessment appeal for lack of jurisdiction when its tax manager, a nonlawyer, initiated the appeal on its behalf because the company invoked the legal process and its nonattorney representative engaged in the unauthorized practice of law; the company, through a nonlawyer, lodged its appeal in the county court, initiating the appeal process in a court of record. Desoto Gathering Co., LLC v. Hill, 2017 Ark. 326, 531 S.W.3d 396 (2017).

Cited: Edens v. State, 258 Ark. 734, 528 S.W.2d 416 (1975).

16-10-105. Sittings of courts to be public.

The sittings of every court shall be public, and every person may freely attend the sittings of every court.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 19; C. & M. Dig., § 2103; Pope's Dig., § 2707; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-109.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Watkins, Keeping the Courthouse Doors Open, 1984 Ark. L. Notes 51.

Ark. L. Rev.

Watkins, Open Meetings Under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, 38 Ark. L. Rev. 268.

Notes, The Free Press-Fair Trial Controversy: A New Standard for Closure Motions in Criminal Proceedings, 38 Ark. L. Rev. 403.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section prohibits a trial court judge from excluding members of the public from a “Denno” hearing conducted pursuant to § 16-89-107 and from excluding a newspaper reporter unless she agrees to a censorship of any story she might write about the hearing. Shiras v. Britt, 267 Ark. 97, 589 S.W.2d 18 (1979).

Jury Selection.

Jury selection is a stage of the proceedings where openness is particularly appropriate under the guarantee of a public trial provided for in U.S. Const., Amend. 6, Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 10, and this section. Memphis Publishing Co. v. Burnett, 316 Ark. 176, 871 S.W.2d 359 (1994).

Presence of Officers.

In trials attracting large audiences, it is not improper to have enough officers to enforce order and to protect the accused from violence and to prevent his escape or possible rescue. Thus, in prosecution for murder, presence in the courtroom of numerous officers in uniform as well as certain United States Marines who attended either as spectators or as witnesses, the deceased having been a Marine, was a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Rayburn v. State, 200 Ark. 914, 141 S.W.2d 532 (1940).

Pretrial Proceedings.

In order to overcome the presumption of open pretrial hearings, the proponent of closure must demonstrate a substantial probability that (1) irreparable damage to the defendant's fair trial right will result from an open hearing, and (2) alternatives to closure will not adequately protect the right to a fair trial. Additionally, the trial court's findings must be articulated and sufficiently specific to demonstrate on review that these requirements have been satisfied. Arkansas Television Co. v. Tedder, 281 Ark. 152, 662 S.W.2d 174 (1983).

Pretrial proceedings and their record must be open to the public, including representatives of the news media, and before an exception to that general rule is made, the test set out in Arkansas Television Co. v. Tedder, 281 Ark. 152, 662 S.W.2d 174 (1983), must be met; if that standard is met and a pleading is ordered sealed, it must be opened to the public as soon as the probability of irreparable damage to the accused's right to a fair trial no longer exists. Arkansas Newspaper, Inc. v. Patterson, 281 Ark. 213, 662 S.W.2d 826 (1984).

Pretrial proceedings should not have been closed to the public where there was no showing that a substantial probability that irreparable damage to the defendant's fair trial right would result from an open hearing and that alternatives to closure would not adequately protect the right to a fair trial. Arkansas Newspaper, Inc. v. Patterson, 281 Ark. 213, 662 S.W.2d 826 (1984).

Requirement Met.

Circuit court's decision to hold the trial in chambers over a corporation's objection was affirmed where the trial was transcribed by a court reporter, the public had access to the proceedings so that it could ascertain whether the court was properly carrying out its duties responsibly, and counsel for the corporation admitted in oral argument that he could not say whether the in-chambers trial affected the outcome of the case. Ashley Bancstock Co. v. Meredith, 2017 Ark. App. 598, 534 S.W.3d 762 (2017).

Voir Dire.

The trial court lacks the authority to prohibit the public and press from the voir dire examination. Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, 262 Ark. 87, 553 S.W.2d 270 (1977).

In accordance with this section and Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 10, the voir dire examination of the jury must be held in open court; the right to an open trial may be asserted by the public, the press, and the accused. Taylor v. State, 284 Ark. 103, 679 S.W.2d 797 (1984).

Cited: In re Arkansas Bar Ass'n, 271 Ark. 358, 609 S.W.2d 28 (1980); Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Hardy, 316 Ark. 119, 871 S.W.2d 352 (1994).

16-10-106. Power to issue writs and process.

All courts shall have power to issue all writs and process which may be necessary in the exercise of their respective jurisdiction, according to the principles and usages of law.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 20; C. & M. Dig., § 2104; Pope's Dig., § 2708; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-110.

Case Notes

Contempt.

Failure to comply with order of county court could be punished as contempt by proper proceeding. Penix v. Shaddox, 165 Ark. 152, 263 S.W. 389 (1924).

Scope of Authority.

Although this section provides that all courts shall have the power to issue process which may be necessary in the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, it does not provide the trial court with carte blanche authority to issue orders of body attachment, detention, and custody, while ignoring portions of statutory provisions relating to contempt proceedings, such as § 16-10-108(c), and without affording procedural protections of due process of law to the parties being placed in arrest and custody. Bates v. McNeil, 318 Ark. 764, 888 S.W.2d 642 (1994).

Supersedeas.

The circuit court may issue supersedeas to stay proceedings in case appealed to that court in order to preserve the status quo. Reese v. Steel, 73 Ark. 66, 83 S.W. 335 (1904); Williams v. Buchanan, 84 Ark. 404, 106 S.W. 202 (1907); Strangways v. Ringgold, 106 Ark. 433, 153 S.W. 619 (1913).

Cited: Hunter Wasson Pulpwood v. Banks, 270 Ark. 404, 605 S.W.2d 753 (Ct. App. 1980).

16-10-107. Process and proceedings to be in English language.

All writs, process, proceedings, and records in any court shall be in the English language, except that the proper and known name of process and technical words may be expressed in the language commonly used. They shall be made out on paper or parchment, in a fair and legible character, in words at length and not abbreviated; but such abbreviations as are commonly used in the English language may be used. Numbers may be expressed by Arabic figures or Roman numerals in the customary way.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 18; C. & M. Dig., § 2102; Pope's Dig., § 2706; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-108.

16-10-108. Contempt.

  1. Every court of record shall have power to punish, as for criminal contempt, persons guilty of the following acts and no others:
    1. Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior committed during the court's sitting, in its immediate view and presence, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due to its authority;
    2. Any breach of the peace, noise, or disturbance directly tending to interrupt its proceedings;
    3. Willful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued or made by it;
    4. Resistance willfully offered by any person to the lawful order or process of the court; and
    5. The contumacious and unlawful refusal of any person to be sworn as a witness and when so sworn a similar refusal to answer any legal and proper interrogatory.
    1. Punishment for contempt is a Class C misdemeanor.
    2. A court shall always have power to imprison until its adjournment.
    3. When any person is committed to prison for the nonpayment of any such fine, he or she shall be discharged at the expiration of thirty (30) days.
  2. Contempts committed in the immediate view and presence of the court may be punished summarily. In other cases, the party charged shall be notified of the accusation and shall have a reasonable time to make his or her defense.
    1. Whenever any person is committed for a contempt under the provisions of this section, the substance of his or her offense shall be set forth in the order or warrant of commitment.
    2. Nothing in subdivision (d)(1) of this section shall be construed to extend to any proceedings against parties or officers, as for contempt, for the purpose of enforcing any civil right or remedy.
  3. A person punished for contempt under subsections (a)-(d) of this section shall, notwithstanding, be liable to an indictment for the contempt if the contempt is an indictable offense, but the court before which a conviction may be had on such an indictment shall, in forming its sentence, take into consideration the punishment previously inflicted.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, §§ 37-42; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1484-1489; Pope's Dig., §§ 1784-1789; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-901 — 34-906; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 410.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment rewrote (b)(1); inserted “or she” in (b)(3); and inserted “or her” in (c) and (d)(1).

Cross References. Contempts not committed in presence or hearing of courts, or in disobedience of process, Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 26.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Becker, The Remedial Side of Contempt When Injunctions are Disregarded, 1983 Ark. L. Notes 5.

Brill, A Proposed Arkansas Contempt Statute, 1984 Ark. L. Notes 29.

Gitelman, The Zealous Advocate and Contempt of Court: Attorney Contempt in Arkansas and the Need for Change, 1984 Ark. L. Notes 39.

Ark. L. Rev.

Attorneys — Contempt — Language in a Motion as Direct Contempt, 8 Ark. L. Rev. 172.

Legal Liability for the Exercise of Free Speech, 10 Ark. L. Rev. 155.

Crabtree, Contempt Law in Arkansas, 51 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Constitutional Law, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 161.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Case Law: Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 905.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section, which sets forth the powers of the court in punishing criminal contempt, is not a limitation on the power of the court to inflict punishment for disobedience of process, for, under Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 26, the legislature cannot abridge the power of the courts to punish for contempt in disobedience of their process; the constitution specially reserved this inherent power in the courts when delegating authority to the legislature to regulate punishments for contempts. Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 295 Ark. 211, 748 S.W.2d 123 (1988).

Where a juvenile was deprived of his right to counsel during a contempt proceeding because the juvenile only had the services of an attorney ad litem and not a defense attorney, the juvenile's due process rights were violated and the court's orders were invalid. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Mainard, 358 Ark. 204, 188 S.W.3d 901 (2004).

In General.

Contempt is divided into criminal contempt and civil contempt. In determining whether a particular action by a judge constitutes a finding of criminal or civil contempt, the focus is on the character of relief rather than the nature of the proceeding. Criminal contempt carries an unconditional penalty, and the contempt cannot be purged. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Dowdy, 2018 Ark. 307, 558 S.W.3d 847 (2018).

Arkansas law also distinguishes between direct and indirect contempt, the former being committed in the presence of the court. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Dowdy, 2018 Ark. 307, 558 S.W.3d 847 (2018).

Purpose.

The purpose of a criminal contempt proceeding is that it is brought to preserve the power and vindicate the dignity of the court and to punish for disobedience of its order. A civil contempt proceeding is instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to suits and to compel obedience to orders and decrees made for the benefit of those parties. Fitzhugh v. State, 296 Ark. 137, 752 S.W.2d 275 (1988).

Applicability.

Subsection (b) of this section does not apply to contempts committed by offering physical violence to judge at time when court is not in session. Weldon v. State, 150 Ark. 407, 234 S.W. 466 (1921).

Evidence was sufficient to support a finding of contempt against the attorney where the attorney frequently interrupted the judge and argued with him; however, the appellate court found that the justification for contempt would be served by reducing the attorney's jail sentence from 10 days to three days, with credit given for time served. McCullough v. State, 353 Ark. 362, 108 S.W.3d 582 (2003).

Contrary to the attorney's argument, the father, through his guardian ad litem, did not file a motion for contempt under subsection (c) of this section, but rather filed a motion to quash the deposition, which contained a request for sanctions under Ark. R. App. P. Civ. 11; the trial court did not enter a contempt order against the attorney, but he argued such on appeal and did not develop an argument regarding the Rule 11 sanctions, and because he failed to do so, the court refused to develop an argument for him and thus the court affirmed. McDermott v. Sharp, 371 Ark. 462, 267 S.W.3d 582 (2007).

A judge's power to punish for criminal contempt is not limited by this section. Morris v. State, 2017 Ark. 157, 518 S.W.3d 70 (2017).

When the circuit court found an attorney in contempt for failing to appear on time for a first-degree murder trial and fined him $4,000, the circuit court was acting under its inherent power and was not constrained by the $500 limit that the Legislature has authorized for a Class C misdemeanor; however, as the purpose of the contempt punishment would be accomplished by a lesser fine, the appellate court reduced the fine to $2,000. Morris v. State, 2017 Ark. 157, 518 S.W.3d 70 (2017).

Actions Constituting Contempt.

Interfering with property in custody of law with or without consent of the attaching officer is contempt. Atkins v. Swope, 38 Ark. 528 (1881).

Preventing a party from attending court is contempt. Turk v. State, 123 Ark. 341, 185 S.W. 472 (1916).

—Disobeying Order.

Court may refuse to hear a party in contempt for disobeying its order. Pickett v. Ferguson, 45 Ark. 177 (1885).

It is a contempt of the Supreme Court for a clerk to contumaciously disobey an order to furnish a transcript of the record in a case when commanded by writ of error, mandamus, or other legal method. Barstow v. Pine Bluff, M. & N.O.R.R., 54 Ark. 551, 16 S.W. 574 (1891).

When a receiver has been appointed and has taken possession of property under his appointment, it is a contempt to attempt to deprive him of that possession by force or by judicial proceedings without the permission of the court that made the appointment. Walker v. Geo. Taylor Comm'n Co., 56 Ark. 1, 18 S.W. 1056 (1892).

Party held guilty of contempt for willful disobedience of court's order. Hervey v. Hervey, 186 Ark. 179, 52 S.W.2d 963 (1932); Hall v. State, 237 Ark. 293, 372 S.W.2d 603 (1963).

Where the failure or refusal to abide by an order of the court is the issue, the appellate court does not look behind the order to determine whether the order is valid. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).

Attorney's actions in disobeying the court's order fell within the inherent powers of the court to punish for contempt under Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 26 and the court was not bound by the limitations set out in this section. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).

Attorney jailed five days for criminal contempt for his willful and continued disobedience of the Supreme Court's per curiam orders directing him to file the abstract and brief in a criminal appeal. Pipkin v. State, 320 Ark. 159, 896 S.W.2d 432 (1995).

Attorneys, found in contempt for failing to comply with directives, demonstrated not only mismanagement of their client's affairs, but also an inability to fulfill their obligations to the Supreme Court in failing to file a brief, even after extensions of time were granted to do so. Stone v. State, 321 Ark. 501, 902 S.W.2d 231 (1995).

Actions in violating orders enjoining parties' massive Christmas light displays fell within the inherent power of the court to punish for contempt. Osborne v. Power, 322 Ark. 229, 908 S.W.2d 340 (1995).

The court denied a petition for writ of certiorari on the issue of whether a citation for contempt was appropriate where a circuit court held two prosecuting attorneys in contempt and incarcerated them after they refused to proceed with the jury trial in a criminal case in contravention of the scheduling order. Johnson v. Johnson, 343 Ark. 186, 33 S.W.3d 492 (2000).

In a criminal contempt case under subdivision (a)(3) of this section, substantial evidence supported the trial court's determination that defendant willfully violated the court's orders requiring her to make restitution payments because defendant testified that she received a monthly disability check in the amount of $633 but did not use the money to make restitution payments. Summers v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 247 (2012).

In a case in which an attorney appealed a circuit court's order finding him in contempt and fining him $100, he unsuccessfully argued that he did not interrupt the court but that the rhythms of the colloquy reflected the normal ebb and flow of a sometimes tense discussion. He had repeatedly interrupted the judge despite numerous warnings not to interrupt, and both the transcript and the audio recording of the hearing showed that the circuit's court's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Benca v. Benton County Circuit Court, 2013 Ark. 448 (2013).

Attorney was properly held in contempt because the attorney admittedly asked witnesses about issues into which an order barred the attorney from inquiring. James v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19 (2014).

Substantial evidence supported the circuit court's decision finding a county supervisor in contempt where a caseworker testified that the supervisor told her to release the emergency hold, the circuit court found the caseworker credible, and the emergency-hold order was clear that the child was to be taken into Department of Human Services custody. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Hellyer, 2017 Ark. App. 294, 521 S.W.3d 158 (2017).

Circuit court did not err in holding father in contempt for violating the terms of the paternity order to provide health insurance for the child. Williams v. Lofton, 2018 Ark. App. 606, 569 S.W.3d 872 (2018).

—Disobeying Process.

Where a party having actual notice of the issuance of a writ of injunction against him evades the service of the writ and violates the injunction, he is guilty of contempt, if the court had jurisdiction to make the order. Pitcock v. State, 91 Ark. 527, 121 S.W. 742 (1909).

One who, even without force or intimidation or direct refusal to obey process, hinders or prevents the prompt service thereof by deception or artifice is guilty of contempt of court. Bryan v. State, 99 Ark. 163, 137 S.W. 561 (1911).

Petitioner held guilty of contempt for failure to respond to subpoena. Morrow v. Roberts, 250 Ark. 822, 467 S.W.2d 393 (1971).

Process, in the sense of this section, is a comprehensive term which includes all writs, rules, orders, executions, warrants, or mandates issued during the progress of an action, even those used to carry a judgment into effect, including a commitment to prison for a criminal offense or for contempt. Henderson v. Dudley, 264 Ark. 697, 574 S.W.2d 658 (1978).

The portion of a commitment order of the court concerning custody of defendant constituted process of the court. Henderson v. Dudley, 264 Ark. 697, 574 S.W.2d 658 (1978).

This section is not a limitation on the power of the courts to impose punishment for disobedience of process, because under Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 26 the legislature cannot abridge the power of the courts to punish for contempt in disobedience of their process. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Clark, 305 Ark. 561, 810 S.W.2d 331 (1991).

Refusal to comply with a court order was “disobedience of process” even though the order was not in writing. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).

Substantial evidence supported the circuit court's finding that appellant willfully disobeyed or resisted the process or order of the court; when confronted with registration and lien information, appellant denied ownership of the vehicles, and he took steps to avoid execution of a writ to the sheriff to take possession of the vehicles. Burrow v. J.T. White Hardware & Lumber Co., 2018 Ark. App. 212, 547 S.W.3d 500 (2018).

—Failure to Answer Question.

A witness adjudged in contempt for failure to answer, after stating that to answer would criminate himself, was denied an appeal. Cossart v. State, 14 Ark. 538 (1854).

The fact that the questions asked a witness are irrelevant or improper furnishes no reason for impeaching the commitment for contempt. Ex parte Butt, 78 Ark. 262, 93 S.W. 992 (1906).

—Intoxication.

Defendant who appeared in court intoxicated was guilty of contempt even if defendant intended no disrespect. Burradell v. State, 326 Ark. 182, 931 S.W.2d 100 (1996).

—Publications.

Any citizen has the right to comment upon proceedings and decisions of the court, to discuss their correctness and the fitness or unfitness of the judges, but he has no right to degrade the court by libelous publications which are an abuse of the liberty of the press. State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384 (1855).

Distribution of pamphlet tended to interfere with the orderly conduct of the judiciary by creating a clear and present danger to the administration of justice, and provided basis for contempt conviction. Tupy v. State, 234 Ark. 821, 354 S.W.2d 728 (1962).

—Statements.

It was a contempt of court for an attorney to assert in open court that he had heard the court was corrupt. Davies v. State, 73 Ark. 358, 84 S.W. 633 (1903).

Mere spoken words to a lawyer out of the presence of the court, which make no threat or attempt to interfere in any proceeding, do not amount to criminal contempt. Edwards v. Jameson, 284 Ark. 60, 679 S.W.2d 195 (1984).

Attorney's argument that the chancellor was biased and had already made her mind up about the case, that she had allowed a worst case scenario to take place, and that she would not even listen to him, was disrespectful and tended to impair the respect due the court's authority. Thus, it was contumacious. Hodges v. Gray, 321 Ark. 7, 901 S.W.2d 1 (1995).

Actions Not Constituting Contempt.

Filing repeated motions which are thought to be for the purpose of vexation or delay does not constitute contempt. Johnson v. State, 87 Ark. 45, 112 S.W. 143 (1908).

Evidence insufficient to establish contempt. Ex parte Winn, 105 Ark. 190, 150 S.W. 399 (1912).

Motion asking judge to recuse himself which contained allegations of criminal misconduct was not contemptuous and was not sufficient to form the basis of a conviction for criminal contempt. Clark v. State, 291 Ark. 405, 725 S.W.2d 550 (1987).

Trial court had not issued an order commanding defense attorney from raising issue of informant's prior arrest and misdemeanor convictions for the purpose of showing informant's motive, plan or intent and could not find him in contempt for doing so. McCullough v. Lessenberry, 300 Ark. 426, 780 S.W.2d 9 (1989).

Attorney was wrongly held in contempt because an order barring the attorney's inquiry into witnesses' juvenile probation or juvenile offenses did not bar the attorney's inquiry into the witnesses' states of mind at the time of an occurrence. James v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19 (2014).

Trial court erred in holding a former husband in contempt because he did not willfully disobey the requirements of a final order since it was not definite in its commands regarding the notice to be given and did not clearly express what duties it imposed; the express terms of the order requiring notice of a proposed sale for purposes of the other party's right of first refusal did not require the seller to give “market information” about a mere offer that was presented. Elder v. Elder, 2018 Ark. App. 276, 549 S.W.3d 919 (2018).

Actions Outside Court's Presence.

In contempts not committed in the court's presence, the court may initiate the proceeding to punish the contemnor by a statement or order spread upon the record, but notice thereof should be given to the defendant and a reasonable time afforded him to make his defense. Lee v. State, 102 Ark. 122, 143 S.W. 909 (1912).

There must be an accusation in court and notice to accused when contempt is committed outside presence of the court. Ex parte Coulter, 160 Ark. 550, 255 S.W. 15 (1923).

Contempt, as defined in this section, also includes breach of the peace in matters occurring outside the courtroom which tend to interrupt its proceedings; of course, willful disobedience of any lawful order of the court is considered contumacious conduct. Edwards v. Jameson, 284 Ark. 60, 679 S.W.2d 195 (1984).

This section merely requires, where the contempt is not committed in the court's presence, that the party charged be notified and have reasonable time to make this defense. Nelson v. Nelson, 20 Ark. App. 85, 723 S.W.2d 849 (1987).

Persons accused of criminal attempt committed outside the court's view must be first notified by a writing, sufficiently definite to inform them to a reasonable degree of certainty of the charge against them, and then be afforded a reasonable time and opportunity to prepare and defend themselves against the charge. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Shipman, 25 Ark. App. 247, 756 S.W.2d 930 (1988).

An attorney's conduct in failing to appear occurs outside of presence of court and thus is indirect contempt which may not be summarily punished. Allison v. Dufresne, 340 Ark. 583, 12 S.W.3d 216 (2000).

Appeal.

All criminal contempt cases are to be reviewed by appeal instead of certiorari. Frolic Footwear, Inc. v. State, 284 Ark. 487, 683 S.W.2d 611 (1985).

The proper procedure for the review of a citation holding a party's attorney in criminal contempt is for the attorney, not the party, to appeal the conviction. Marsh v. Hoff, 15 Ark. App. 272, 692 S.W.2d 270 (1985).

In an appeal of a case of criminal contempt, the appellate court will view the record in the light most favorable to the decision of the trial judge and sustain that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).

The Arkansas Supreme Court has jurisdiction of appeals in cases involving the discipline of attorneys-at-law, including contempt citations, pursuant to S. Ct. & Ct. App. Rule 1-2(a)(5). Davis v. State, 319 Ark. 171, 889 S.W.2d 769 (1994).

A writ of prohibition is not an appropriate vehicle for requesting that a contempt citation be reviewed and set aside. Davis v. State, 319 Ark. 171, 889 S.W.2d 769 (1994).

Attorney's Fees.

Evidence that appellant actively and knowingly interfered with the process of court was of sufficient force and character for the circuit court to have held appellant in criminal contempt. Because the evidence supported the circuit court's finding of criminal contempt, which is subject to a higher standard of review than a finding of civil contempt, the circuit court did not err when it awarded attorney's fees, which are in the nature of civil contempt. Burrow v. J.T. White Hardware & Lumber Co., 2018 Ark. App. 212, 547 S.W.3d 500 (2018).

Authority of Court.

The right to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. Neel v. State, 9 Ark. 259 (1849); Edwards v. Jameson, 284 Ark. 60, 679 S.W.2d 195 (1984).

This section is merely declaratory of what the law was before its passage; the prohibiting clause is entitled to respect as an opinion of the legislature but is not binding upon the courts. State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384 (1855).

Courts may go beyond the powers given by statute to enforce their constitutional powers when acts in contempt invade them. Lee v. State, 102 Ark. 122, 143 S.W. 909 (1912).

Subsection (b) of this section is not a limitation on power of courts to punish for contempt for disobedience of process. Spight v. State, 155 Ark. 26, 243 S.W. 860 (1922).

Order of chancery court appointing committee to investigate a law firm on charges of contempt and alleged violation of Code of Professional Ethics exceeded jurisdiction of court. Davis v. Merritt, 252 Ark. 659, 480 S.W.2d 924 (1972).

The fact that the actions on which the charge is based may constitute a criminal offense does not affect the jurisdiction of the court to punish the offender for contempt. Henderson v. Dudley, 264 Ark. 697, 574 S.W.2d 658 (1978).

Power to punish for contempt includes the right to inflict reasonable and appropriate punishment upon an offender against the authority and dignity of the court. Edwards v. Jameson, 284 Ark. 60, 679 S.W.2d 195 (1984).

Inherent power to punish for contempt resides in all courts, and such power cannot be removed by enactment of laws to the contrary. Smith v. Smith, 28 Ark. App. 56, 770 S.W.2d 205 (1989).

The standard regarding the inherent power of the court to sentence someone for contempt under this section is included in Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 26. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).

Subdivision (a)(3) of this section is not a limitation on the power of the court to impose punishment for disobedience of process. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).

Although § 16-10-106 provides that all courts shall have the power to issue process which may be necessary in the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, it does not provide the trial court with carte blanche authority to issue orders of body attachment, detention, and custody, while ignoring portions of statutory provisions relating to contempt proceedings, such as subsection (c) of this section, and without affording procedural protections of due process of law to the parties being placed in arrest and custody. Bates v. McNeil, 318 Ark. 764, 888 S.W.2d 642 (1994).

Whether or not defendant's behavior falls into one of the five categories in subsection (a) of this section, a court has inherent power to punish contemptuous behavior committed in its presence, without regard to the restrictions imposed by subsection (a); summary punishment for contempt committed in the presence of the court is an inherent power reserved to the judiciary and cannot be abridged by legislation. Burradell v. State, 326 Ark. 182, 931 S.W.2d 100 (1996).

Attorney was wrongly held in contempt as to certain citations because the citations were issued one and four days after the alleged contempt, so subsection (c) of this section required notice and a chance to defend, which were absent. James v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19 (2014).

Court Orders.

Before a person may be held in contempt for violating a court order, that order must be in definite terms as to the duties thereby imposed upon him, and the command must be expressed rather than implied. McCullough v. Lessenberry, 300 Ark. 426, 780 S.W.2d 9 (1989).

When an attorney was held in contempt for inquiring into areas which the attorney was barred from asking about, the attorney could not claim, on appeal, that the attorney's cross-examination was unconstitutionally limited because the attorney was required to follow the order, whether or not the order was erroneous. James v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19 (2014).

Issuing a contempt order on Sunday did not invalidate the order because a verdict was received at the same time. James v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19 (2014).

Direct Contempt.

Summary punishment for contempt committed in the presence of the court is an inherent power reserved to the judiciary and cannot be abridged by legislation. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Dowdy, 2018 Ark. 307, 558 S.W.3d 847 (2018).

In a matter involving direct contempt, the circuit court's decision to hold an attorney for the Department of Human Services (DHS) and a DHS caseworker in contempt was supported by substantial evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, when the attorney directed the caseworker to leave court to prevent the other parties and the court from presenting or considering evidence in a dependency-neglect hearing concerning change of custody. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Dowdy, 2018 Ark. 307, 558 S.W.3d 847 (2018).

Because the conduct in question occurred in the presence of the circuit court judge, the contempt was direct; thus, the circuit court's decision was not subject to the restrictions outlined in subsection (a) of this section, and the circuit court was within its power to punish the alleged contempt summarily. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Dowdy, 2018 Ark. 307, 558 S.W.3d 847 (2018).

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the circuit court's decision, substantial evidence supported holding an attorney in contempt and imposing a fine; when the circuit court told the attorney the court would not proceed with a guardianship hearing without a written medical report, the attorney questioned the judge's integrity in open court, persisted with that theory after the court explained the court's reasoning, interrupted the court at least three times, and was unwilling to reconsider the accusation after being given an opportunity, displaying a lack of regard for the court's integrity and demonstrating disrespect. Streit v. State (In re Bevill), 2019 Ark. 218, 576 S.W.3d 27 (2019).

Due Process.

The Due Process Clause, as applied in criminal proceedings, requires that an alleged contemnor be notified that a charge of contempt is pending against him and be informed of the specific nature of that charge, and where notice of the charge and the nature thereof are not given, the judgment of conviction for contempt must be reversed. Fitzhugh v. State, 296 Ark. 137, 752 S.W.2d 275 (1988).

Appellant was not denied due process in contempt proceedings where he was afforded the rights required under this section, appellant acknowledged receipt of the motions which explained how he failed to comply with the order requiring him to provide certain financial information, he was given notice of the contempt hearing, and he was given the opportunity to present a defense at that hearing. Stilley v. Fort Smith Sch. Dist., 367 Ark. 193, 238 S.W.3d 902 (2006).

Circuit court erred in holding an attorney in contempt for obtaining its signature on an amended judgment and commitment order by misrepresenting the state's approval and consent because a letter the circuit court addressed to the attorney provided adequate notice that a hearing would occur, but it did not give the attorney adequate notice that criminal contempt charges were pending against her; both Arkansas law and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution were clear that the attorney was entitled to notice not only that the circuit court was investigating the possibility of her misrepresentation but also that it was considering holding her in criminal contempt for alleged misrepresentation. Bloodman v. State, 2010 Ark. 169, 370 S.W.3d 174 (2010).

Circuit court did not err in finding a witness in criminal contempt because he did not inform counsel for a legislative audit committee that he had a conflict, but merely left a voicemail that he was not going to appear at the hearing, his reasons for failing to answer a subpoena did not amount to good cause, the petition and order to show cause sufficiently provided the witness with notice that he was accused of criminal contempt, and he did not preserve his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. Valley v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 112, 431 S.W.3d 916 (2014).

Holding an attorney in contempt did not violate the attorney's rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard because the attorney willfully violated a court order in the court's presence, so the attorney could be summarily punished. James v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19 (2014).

Wife was afforded due process in a contempt proceeding where case law, subsection (c) of this section, and constitutional law required only that she be notified of the accusation and given a reasonable time to make her defense, and the order to show cause clearly gave notice that her failure to abide by the divorce decree regarding spending her daughter's funds subjected her to the possibility of being held in contempt and provided nearly two months' preparation time. Coleman v. Coleman, 2016 Ark. App. 324, 497 S.W.3d 688 (2016).

County supervisor's due process claim was rejected as the motion for contempt provided the supervisor sufficient notice that she personally faced contempt charges, she and the Department of Human Services were represented at the contempt hearing, she testified at the hearing, and there was no requirement for a verified petition or affidavit. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Hellyer, 2017 Ark. App. 294, 521 S.W.3d 158 (2017).

Erroneous Contempt Finding.

It was error to hold a father in indirect contempt for failure to pay child support because the Office of Child Support Enforcement presented no evidence of noncompliance, as counsel's unsworn statements that the father had not paid were not testimony or evidence required to prove indirect contempt occurring outside the court's presence, so there was no such evidence before the court. Williams v. State Office of Child Support Enforcement, 2015 Ark. App. 225, 459 S.W.3d 321 (2015).

Jurisdiction.

Trial court erred in finding the defendant in contempt of court at his third probation revocation hearing because it lost jurisdiction to do so after it executed his sentence at his second revocation hearing by accepting his guilty plea and ordering him to pay a balance of fines, fees, and court costs. Pike v. State, 344 Ark. 478, 40 S.W.3d 795 (2001), superseded by statute as stated in, Carter v. State, 350 Ark. 229, 85 S.W.3d 914 (2002), superseded by statute as stated in, Mills v. State, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Ark. App. LEXIS 128 (Feb. 11, 2004), superseded by statute as stated in, Rudder v. State, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Ark. App. LEXIS 466 (June 15, 2005).

Notice.

In action for contempt of court where accused was informed of the basis of the alleged contempt in the attachment, was further advised of facts constituting the charge at the outset of the hearing, and was given an opportunity to make his defense, which he presented, that procedure was in full compliance with this section. Hall v. State, 237 Ark. 293, 372 S.W.2d 603 (1963).

Contempt order held deficient and set aside where it failed to inform defendant with reasonable certainty of the facts constituting the offense. Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 252 Ark. 1078, 483 S.W.2d 189 (1972).

Notice held sufficient. Henderson v. Dudley, 264 Ark. 697, 574 S.W.2d 658 (1978).

There is no statutory requirement that the accused be given notice prior to the issuance of an order to show cause. Henderson v. Dudley, 264 Ark. 697, 574 S.W.2d 658 (1978); Clark v. State, 287 Ark. 221, 697 S.W.2d 895 (1985).

Notice held waived. Clark v. State, 287 Ark. 221, 697 S.W.2d 895 (1985).

Where defendant, who had appeared for a hearing on a petition to revoke a suspended sentence, was then first made aware of a criminal contempt charge and the nature and degree of the offense charged, his conviction of criminal contempt was reversed. Sellers v. State, 50 Ark. App. 32, 901 S.W.2d 853 (1995).

The Department of Human Services received constitutionally adequate notice of a show cause order on contempt; although it did not receive written notice of the first scheduled hearing, it was served with notice of the second scheduled hearing. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. R. P., 333 Ark. 516, 970 S.W.2d 225 (1998).

Notice of a criminal contempt proceeding was adequate where (1) the contemnor was personally served with a show cause order for the first hearing, (2) although the order did not describe the offense or order that was violated, she was present at the hearing where the matter was discussed, and (3) she was informed by telephone of the date of the second hearing. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. R. P., 333 Ark. 516, 970 S.W.2d 225 (1998).

Defendant attorney had to be notified of the accusation of criminal contempt and be afforded a reasonable time to make his defense, and the finding that the petition for order to show cause was deposited with the U.S. Postal Service with first-class mail postage was not sufficient to provide defendant with notice that he was accused of criminal contempt for his failure to appear at a client's hearing; as the record failed to show constitutionally sufficient notice, the judgment was reversed. Thompson v. State, 2016 Ark. 383, 503 S.W.3d 62 (2016).

Because a former husband's alleged contemptuous actions occurred outside the immediate view and presence of the trial court, the husband was entitled to notice of the accusation and a reasonable time to make his defense; the former wife's motion did not contain the term “contempt”, and the husband's responding to the wife's motion and appearing before the trial court to defend against it was not synonymous with being notified of and defending against a specific contempt charge. Elder v. Elder, 2018 Ark. App. 276, 549 S.W.3d 919 (2018).

Circuit court erred in finding the father in contempt for nonpayment of child support because he was entitled to notice of the contempt accusation and a reasonable time to defend it, which he did not receive, as the mother did not file a motion for contempt on the issue of the child-support arrearages. Wadley v. Wadley, 2019 Ark. App. 549, 590 S.W.3d 754 (2019).

Circuit court's criminal contempt finding against former wife did not violate due process or this section because the former husband's contempt petition and the wife's response to it belied her argument that she was not informed of the alleged misconduct—not making timely child support payments—or of the possible consequences of it. Crowe v. Crowe, 2020 Ark. App. 37 (2020).

Penalty.

An unconditional penalty is criminal in nature because it is solely and exclusively punitive in character whereas a conditional penalty is civil because it is specifically designed to compel the doing of some act. Fitzhugh v. State, 296 Ark. 137, 752 S.W.2d 275 (1988).

Where a fine is unconditional and is to be paid to the court, the punishment is punitive in nature as it has no coercive or compensatory aspect, and the contempt proceeding is criminal in nature. Fitzhugh v. State, 296 Ark. 137, 752 S.W.2d 275 (1988).

Where a circuit court judge held two prosecuting attorneys in contempt after they refused to proceed with the jury trial in a criminal case in contravention of the scheduling order and ordered them incarcerated, the court modified the contempt punishment to time already served in jail and assessed a $100 fine against each prosecutor. Johnson v. Johnson, 343 Ark. 186, 33 S.W.3d 492 (2000).

Punishment.

Imprisonment for contempt in disobeying an order to turn over specific funds found to be in defendant's hands is not an imprisonment for debt. Meeks v. State, 80 Ark. 579, 98 S.W. 378 (1906).

An order for the restitution of specific property or funds will be enforced by punishment for contempt only where the court has first found that such property or funds are in possession or under the control of the person ordered to make the restitution. Dodson v. Butler, 101 Ark. 416, 142 S.W. 503 (1912).

Punishment held excessive. Morrow v. Roberts, 250 Ark. 822, 467 S.W.2d 393 (1971).

Only contempts committed in the immediate view and presence of the trial court may be summarily punished; in all other cases, the party charged with contempt shall be notified of the accusation and afforded a reasonable time to make a defense. Harvell v. Harvell, 36 Ark. App. 24, 820 S.W.2d 463 (1991).

A sentence of 90 days in jail was held excessive. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).

It was not an abuse of discretion to deny defendant's mistrial motion when defendant's alibi witness was arrested in the jury's presence because the witness disobeyed a court order in the jury's presence; thus, the court was entitled to summarily punish the witness. Thacker v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 573, 473 S.W.3d 583 (2015).

Imposing 20 days' incarceration on a wife who admittedly violated a divorce decree requiring her to notify the court before spending her daughter's funds was not an abuse of discretion where the wife admittedly and repeatedly violated a known court order over several years, and the court could have imposed up to 30 days' of incarceration under § 5-4-401(b)(3). Coleman v. Coleman, 2016 Ark. App. 324, 497 S.W.3d 688 (2016).

Circuit court's punishment of an unconditional penalty (eight hours of community service and a one-page paper) is treated by the law as criminal contempt. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Dowdy, 2018 Ark. 307, 558 S.W.3d 847 (2018).

Relation to Other Law.

Criminal contempt findings do not violate an automatic bankruptcy stay. Crowe v. Crowe, 2020 Ark. App. 37 (2020).

Right to Appeal.

Because defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor of criminal contempt, he had the right to appeal under § 16-91-101 and Rule 1(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure—Criminal. The mootness doctrine did not bar a direct appeal, despite the fact that he had already served his criminal contempt sentence. Thompson v. State, 2016 Ark. 383, 503 S.W.3d 62 (2016).

Defendant was clearly convicted of a misdemeanor because this section, which he was found guilty of violating, states that punishment for contempt is a Class C misdemeanor. Thompson v. State, 2016 Ark. 383, 503 S.W.3d 62 (2016).

A defendant's right to a direct appeal from his criminal conviction continues after his service of confinement. Thus, Swindle v. State, 373 Ark. 519, 285 S.W.3d 200 (2008), was clearly wrong to the extent that it conflicted with the Supreme Court's present holding that the mootness doctrine did not bar defendant's direct appeal of his criminal contempt conviction. Thompson v. State, 2016 Ark. 383, 503 S.W.3d 62 (2016).

Right to Jury Trial.

Wife was not entitled to a jury trial after the circuit court found her in indirect criminal contempt because there was no dispute that the sentence imposed on the wife for the five counts was less than six months and that §§ 16-10-108 and 5-4-401 did not authorize a sentence in excess of six months, and, while the court did not provide a statutory cap as requested, there was nothing to indicate from the court's colloquy with the wife's counsel that the court contemplated imposing a sentence greater than six months. Damron v. Damron, 2019 Ark. App. 160, 574 S.W.3d 166 (2019).

Service of process.

Service in a criminal contempt proceeding was governed by this section, rather than ARCrP 6.3. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. R. P., 333 Ark. 516, 970 S.W.2d 225 (1998).

Time of Hearing.

Circuit court's order finding an attorney in contempt for violating an order was affirmed; although the attorney argued that the contempt hearing was held less than 20 days after the motion was filed, in violation of Ark. R. Civ. P. 6(c), this section sets no fixed time for a party's response to a charge of contempt and the attorney failed to identify any prejudice. Jackson v. Stratton, 2016 Ark. App. 6 (2016).

Cited: Hilton Hilltop, Inc. v. Riviere, 268 Ark. 532, 597 S.W.2d 596 (1980); Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Gruber, 39 Ark. App. 112, 839 S.W.2d 543 (1992).

16-10-109. Reading of record — Signing.

Full entries of the orders and proceedings of all courts of record of each day shall be read in open court on the morning of the succeeding day. However, on the last day of the term, the minutes shall be read and signed at the rising of the court.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 16; C. & M. Dig., § 2100; Pope's Dig., § 2704; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-106.

Case Notes

Judgments.

This section contemplates that the judgments entered do not become the pronouncements of the court until they have been approved by the court. Stanton v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 194 Ark. 135, 106 S.W.2d 584 (1937).

Signing.

This section does not require the circuit judge to sign the record of the preceding day every morning, but only at the close of the term, and the omission of the judge to sign the record at the close of the term will not invalidate judgments and decrees of the term, though such omission would be gross negligence and subject the judge to animadversion. Ex parte Slocomb Richards & Co., 9 Ark. (4 English) 375 (1849).

16-10-110. Seals.

  1. The Supreme Court and each of the circuit, district, city, and county courts shall preserve and keep a seal, with such emblems and devices as the court shall think proper.
  2. The impression of the seal of any court by stamp shall be sufficient sealing in all cases where sealing is required.
  3. When no official seal is provided, the clerk may use his or her private seal for the authentication of any record, process, or proceeding required by law to be authenticated by the seal of his or her court. The attestation of the clerk stating that he or she has no seal of office and that he or she has affixed his or her private seal shall be received as sufficient authentication without requiring any proof of the private seal or that it was affixed by the clerk.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, §§ 8, 11, 12; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2095, 2097, 2098; Pope's Dig., §§ 2699, 2701, 2702; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-102 — 22-104; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 40.

Cross References. Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Official seals, § 1-4-108.

Case Notes

Cited: Edens v. State, 258 Ark. 734, 528 S.W.2d 416 (1975); Unimeks, LLC v. Purolite, 2012 Ark. 20, 386 S.W.3d 419 (2012).

16-10-111. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning failure to hold court on first day of term, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 41. The section was derived from Rev. Stat., ch. 43, §§ 25-27; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2108, 2109, 2209, 2210; Pope's Dig., §§ 2713, 2714, 2850, 2851; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-115 — 22-117.

16-10-112. Proceedings not affected by lapse of term.

No writ, process, plea, or proceeding whatsoever, civil or criminal, shall be deemed discontinued or abated by the failure of any term or session of any court, nor by the failure to enter a continuance of any suit or cause on the record. The suit or cause shall be continued and proceed as if no such failure had happened.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 35; C. & M. Dig., § 2110; Pope's Dig., § 2715; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-118.

16-10-113. Change of term not to affect proceedings.

When any change is made by law in the times of holding any court in this state, the change shall in no way operate to affect or impair, avoid, annul, or discontinue any suit, action, appeal, recognizance, bail bond, notice, or process, original, mesne, or final, taken, instituted, or pending in that court, or returnable to or in that court. However, the suit, action, appeal, etc., shall be and stand valid and effectual in the court at the new term, in every respect, as if no change had been made in the time of holding court.

History. Acts 1856, § 3, p. 27; C. & M. Dig., § 2111; Pope's Dig., § 2716; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-119.

16-10-114. Courts not to open on Sunday — Exceptions.

  1. No court shall be opened or transact business on Sunday unless it is for the purpose of receiving a verdict or discharging a jury.
  2. Every adjournment of a court on Saturday shall always be to some other day than Sunday, except such adjournment as may be made after a cause has been committed to a jury.
  3. This section shall not prevent the exercise of the jurisdiction of any magistrate when it may be necessary in criminal cases to preserve the peace or arrest the offenders; nor shall this section inhibit the exercise of the jurisdiction of any magistrate on Sunday in disposing of misdemeanor cases where the defendant desires to and does enter a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 36; C. & M. Dig., § 2113; Pope's Dig., § 2718; Acts 1955, No. 30, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-120.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Courts Not to Be Open on Sunday — Exceptions, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 393.

Case Notes

Accepting Plea on Sunday.

Where the trial court accepted appellant's plea for capital felony murder on a Sunday, the statutory violation did not affect the trial court's jurisdiction over the matter; further, a petition for writ of habeas corpus was not the proper method with which to claim a statutory violation. Noble v. Norris, 368 Ark. 69, 243 S.W.3d 260 (2006).

Administrative Boards.

An order of the Board of Chiropractic Examiners suspending a chiropractor's license made at the conclusion of a hearing held on Sunday was void. Chester v. Ark. State Bd. of Chiropractic Exmrs., 245 Ark. 846, 435 S.W.2d 100 (1968).

Receiving Verdict on Sunday.

Court, after receiving verdict on Sunday, may adjourn court over to some other day. Eyer v. State, 112 Ark. 37, 164 S.W. 756 (1914).

Issuing a contempt order on Sunday did not invalidate the order because a verdict was received at the same time. James v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19 (2014).

16-10-115. Trial by temporary judge.

  1. On stipulation of the litigant parties, any court of this state, except in criminal causes, may order a cause to be tried by a temporary judge who is licensed in Arkansas to practice law. The temporary judge shall be sworn and empowered to act until final determination of the cause.
  2. The stipulation of the litigant parties shall include the amount of compensation to be paid the temporary judge for trying the cause and the method of paying the compensation.
  3. The Supreme Court may adopt rules setting forth the procedure for implementing this section.

History. Acts 1981, No. 357, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-147.

Research References

ALR.

Construction and validity of state provisions governing designation of substitute, pro tempore, or special judge. 97 A.L.R.5th 537.

Case Notes

Cited: Worch v. Kelly, 276 Ark. 262, 633 S.W.2d 697 (1982).

16-10-116. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning assignment of judge in civil action pending one year or more, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 42. The section was derived from Acts 1979, No. 82, § 1; 1980 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 2, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-146.

16-10-117. Judge temporarily assigned in district — Jury list.

A judge assigned pursuant to § 16-10-101 on a temporary basis to a judicial district other than his or her own may share by concurrence with the judge of any division of the circuit court within that district the division's set of commissioners, jury wheel or box, list of jurors, and panel of jurors.

History. Acts 1971, No. 536, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-142.1.

16-10-118. Judicial officeholder as candidate for nonjudicial office — Resignation — Warrants void.

  1. Whenever the holder of a judicial office in the State of Arkansas becomes a candidate at any primary or general election for a nonjudicial office, he or she shall immediately resign his or her judicial office and thereafter shall be ineligible to hold that judicial office for the balance of the term for which he or she was elected or appointed.
  2. Any warrant issued to the holder of the judicial office after he or she shall become a candidate for a nonjudicial office shall be void.
  3. As used in this section, “judicial office” is defined to mean the office of district judge, circuit judge, Judge or Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, and Associate Justice or Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

History. Acts 1959, No. 5, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-137 — 22-139; Acts 1995, No. 549, § 2; 2003, No. 1185, § 43.

Cross References. Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

16-10-119. Travel expenses of judges.

  1. From the appropriation provided to the Auditor of State for trial judges' expenses, a circuit judge is authorized to be reimbursed for those travel expenses at the rate as authorized for state employees and for mileage at the rate established in the state travel rules for state employees while traveling within the state in the performance of their official duties.
  2. When a circuit judge is appointed by the Chief Justice to hear a case or cases in a jurisdiction outside of that in which he or she is elected, he or she shall be entitled to reimbursement for travel expenses and mileage as provided in subsection (a) of this section.

History. Acts 1993, No. 4, § 7; 1995, No. 3, § 5; 1997, No. 496, § 1; 2011, No. 274, § 2; 2019, No. 315, § 1291.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 274, § 1, provided:

“Legislative intent.

“(a) Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 13(C), provides that the Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court may appoint a special judge to serve in circuit court or district court whenever a judge is disqualified or temporarily unable to serve or when there is other need for a temporary appointment, under rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.

“(b) Special judges may include retired justices or judges, active circuit judges or district judges, or licensed attorneys.

“(c) The current laws that govern the payment of special judges have not been revised since the adoption of Amendment 80 and are in conflict and need of clarification.”

Publisher's Notes. Former § 16-10-119, concerning expenses of judges, was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 4, § 6. The former section was derived from Acts 1977, No. 209, § 1; 1981, No. 981, § 1; 1985 (1st Ex Sess.), No. 11, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-141.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment inserted “to the Auditor of State” in (a); and added (b).

The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (a).

16-10-120, 16-10-121. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning the judicial qualifications commission and discipline or removal of judges, were repealed by Acts 1995, No. 1296, § 57. They were derived from the following sources:

16-10-120. Acts 1977, No. 418, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-144, 22-145.

16-10-121. Acts 1977, No. 418, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-145. For present law, see Ark. Const., Amend. 66.

16-10-122. Sheriffs of courts.

The sheriffs of the several counties shall be sheriffs of the several courts in their respective counties, and the sheriff in the county in which the Supreme Court is held shall be sheriff of that court.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 21; C. & M. Dig., § 2105; Pope's Dig., § 2709; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-111.

16-10-123. Furnishing fuel, blank books, and stationery.

The several sheriffs are authorized and required to furnish the fuel which may be necessary for the use of the several courts in their respective counties, and the clerks shall furnish all blank books and stationery for the use of the several courts in their respective counties.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 43; C. & M. Dig., § 2114; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-123.

16-10-124. Enforcement of return of writ or process and payment of moneys.

Each court may enforce by attachment the return of any writ or process issued out of the same court and the payment of moneys had and received by any sheriff, coroner, constable, attorney, or collector in his or her official capacity, and the delivery of papers entrusted to him or her officially, and unlawfully withheld.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 22; C. & M. Dig., § 2106; Pope's Dig., § 2710; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-112.

16-10-125. Audit of accounts of sheriff and clerk.

The several courts shall audit and adjust the accounts of the sheriff and clerk for all expenditures made under this act and certify the balance accordingly.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 44; C. & M. Dig., § 2115; Pope's Dig., § 2719; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-124.

Meaning of “this act”. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, codified as §§ 16-10-10416-10-112, 16-10-114, 16-10-12216-10-125, 16-10-128, 16-11-106, 16-11-108, 16-11-113, 16-13-214, 16-13-219, 16-13-312, 16-13-324, 16-14-103, 16-14-109, 16-15-111, 16-15-113, 16-19-206.

16-10-126. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning investigative assistance to courts in juvenile matters, was repealed by Acts 1991, No. 1081, § 5. The section was derived from Acts 1955, No. 184, §§ 1, 2, 4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-133, 22-134, 22-136.

16-10-127. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning court interpreters, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 237, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1981, No. 477, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-151 — 22-153; Acts 2001, No. 424, § 1.

16-10-128. Transcripts — Bills of exceptions.

In making out transcripts of records, except on writs of error and appeals, the bills of exception shall not be inserted unless specially required by the applicant therefor.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 17; C. & M. Dig., § 2101; Pope's Dig., § 2705; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-107.

16-10-129. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning abolition of judicial districts, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 44. The section was derived from Acts 1931, No. 153, §§ 1-4; Pope's Dig., §§ 2592-2595; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-126 — 22-129.

16-10-130. Precedence given to criminal trials when victim under age of fourteen.

Notwithstanding any rule of court to the contrary and in furtherance of the purposes of Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.1, all courts of this state having jurisdiction of criminal offenses, except for extraordinary circumstances, shall give precedence to the trials of criminal offenses over other matters before the court, civil or criminal, when the alleged victim is a person under the age of fourteen (14).

History. Acts 1985, No. 569, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-159.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1985, No. 569, § 1, is also codified as § 16-80-102.

Enforcement of § 16-10-130, Administrative Order No. 6, Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure Appendix, Rules Volume.

Case Notes

Purpose.

The legislature did not intend to create on behalf of youthful victims standing to pursue active involvement in pending criminal cases. This section mandates the urgent scheduling of those cases for trial in preference to all other cases, absent extraordinary circumstances, and the wording of this section does not suggest that anything other than a priority is intended. Thompson v. Erwin, 310 Ark. 533, 838 S.W.2d 353 (1992).

16-10-131. Exemption from overtime parking penalties.

  1. No judge or his or her court reporter of any court of this state shall be subject to a fine or other penalty for the offense of overtime parking incurred while the person was on duty as a judge or court reporter.
  2. Any person attempting to enforce any fine or other penalty notwithstanding the provisions of this section shall be subject to contempt proceedings before the judge of the court being served by the person so charged.
  3. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to give immunity from fine or penalty other than for the offense of overtime parking.

History. Acts 1971, No. 364, § 1; 1971, No. 729, §§ 3, 4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 39-119, 39-120; Acts 1987, No. 711, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1971, No. 364, § 1 and 1971, No. 729, §§ 3, 4 are also codified as § 16-31-105.

16-10-132. Addresses of parties.

The records of all judgments rendered in any circuit, county, district, or city court shall contain the addresses of all parties when reasonably ascertainable.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1087, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 45.

Cross References. Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

16-10-133. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning trial court staff, was repealed by Acts 2015, No. 268, § 14. The section was derived from Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 16; 1997, No. 209, § 3; 1997, No. 788, § 27; 1997, No. 1341, § 26; 1999, No. 1508, § 7; 2003, No. 932, § 3.

16-10-134. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning trial court staff and their credit for county service, was repealed by Acts 2015, No. 268, § 15. The section was derived from Acts 1997, No. 1355, § 10.

16-10-135. Aids for the hearing or visually impaired.

  1. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall employ the most cost-efficient method of procuring auxiliary aids for persons with hearing and visual impairments.
  2. These methods may include entering into a contractual arrangement with another state agency or with a private entity that is capable of providing these services.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1355, § 9.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 1418, § 24, provided:

“Procurement-Auxiliary Aids. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall employ the most cost efficient method of procuring auxiliary aids for persons with hearing and visual impairments. These methods may include entering into a contractual arrangement with another state agency or with a private entity that is capable of providing these services. The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2001 through June 30, 2003.”

Cross References. Interpreters for visually or hearing impaired jurors, § 16-31-108.

16-10-136. Extrajudicial activities of justices and judges.

Restrictions on extrajudicial activities found in Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, shall not preclude a justice or judge from:

  1. Being a member of a reserve unit of any branch of the United States armed forces;
  2. Being a member of the National Guard;
  3. Teaching;
  4. Serving on any state or United States boards or commissions which relate to the law for the administration of justice;
  5. Serving in an extrajudicial capacity that is not prohibited by the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct; or
  6. Serving as judge of a city court.

History. Acts 2001, No. 914, § 1; 2005, No. 1934, § 1.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment added (6) and made a related change.

16-10-137. Administrative Office of the Courts — Annual report.

  1. On July 31 of each year, the Administrative Office of the Courts shall submit an annual report to the Legislative Council showing the number of persons charged in circuit court for each criminal offense classification, comparing the state and each judicial district.
  2. The report shall include a breakdown by race of all persons charged in each criminal offense classification.
  3. The report shall include the same data for those cases in which a final disposition has been entered by the court.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1031, § 3; 2011, No. 1132, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2003, No. 1031, § 1, provided:

“Intent.

(a) Ethnic minorities appear to be over represented in the population of persons who are involved in the criminal justice system, charged as defendants, convicted, and incarcerated throughout the United States criminal justice systems.

“(b) It is the responsibility of criminal justice agencies and the courts in the State of Arkansas to ensure that all actions taken are based upon reasons other than the race of the defendant.

“(c) In order to allow the General Assembly to conduct a thorough review of the Arkansas criminal justice process, information on actions taken by criminal justice agencies and the courts must be reported in a timely, uniform, and consistent manner.”

The Commission on Disparity in Sentencing, referred to in (a), was to be created by HB 2264 of the 2003 session, which did not pass.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment, in (a), substituted “On July 31 of each year” for “Beginning July 21, 2003, and on July 31 of each year thereafter” and deleted “and the Commission on Disparity in Sentencing” following “Legislative Council.”

16-10-138. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning mandatory reporter training, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 375, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 2007, No. 703, § 13.

16-10-139. Specialty court program evaluation and approval — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, “specialty court program” means one of the following:
    1. A pre-adjudication program under § 5-4-901 et seq.;
    2. An approved drug court program under the Arkansas Drug Court Act, § 16-98-301 et seq.;
    3. The Swift and Certain Accountability on Probation Pilot Program under § 16-93-1701 et seq.; and
    4. Any other specialty court program that has been approved by the Supreme Court, including without limitation specialty court programs known as:
      1. A DWI court;
      2. A mental health court;
      3. A veteran's court;
      4. A juvenile drug court;
      5. A “HOPE” court;
      6. A “smarter sentencing” court; and
      7. A mental health crisis intervention center.
  2. A specialty court program operated by a circuit court or district court must be approved by the Supreme Court in the administrative plan submitted under Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 14.
    1. The Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee shall evaluate and make findings with respect to all specialty court programs operated by a circuit court or district court in this state and refer the findings to the Supreme Court.
    2. An evaluation under this section shall reflect nationally recognized and peer-reviewed standards for each particular type of specialty court program.
    3. The Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee shall also:
      1. Establish, implement, and operate a uniform specialty court program evaluation process to ensure specialty court program resources are uniformly directed to high-risk and medium-risk offenders and that specialty court programs provide effective and proven practices that reduce recidivism, as well as other factors such as substance dependency, among participants;
      2. Establish an evaluation process that ensures that any new and existing specialty court program that is a drug court meets standards for drug court operation under § 16-98-302(b); and
      3. Promulgate rules to be approved by the Supreme Court to carry out the evaluation process under this section.
  3. A specialty court program shall be evaluated under the following schedule:
    1. A specialty court program established on or after April 1, 2015, shall be evaluated after its second year of funded operation;
    2. A specialty court program in existence on April 1, 2015, shall be evaluated under the requirements of this section prior to expending resources budgeted for fiscal year 2017; and
    3. A specialty court program shall be reevaluated every two (2) years after the initial evaluation.

History. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 15.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

16-10-140. Accumulation of data concerning sexual offenses — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Family or household member” means the same as defined in § 5-26-302; and
    2. “Sex offense” means the same as defined in § 12-12-903.
    1. Consistent with the rules of the Supreme Court, the Administrative Office of the Courts is encouraged to individually track or design a method to track and accumulate data on the familial or residential status of the victim of a sex offense in relation to the offender.
    2. A method designed under subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall:
      1. Indicate whether the victim was a family or household member of the offender at the time of the sex offense; and
      2. Protect against revealing the identity of the victim, either directly or indirectly.

History. Acts 2017, No. 571, § 1.

16-10-141. District court costs and fees — Specialty courts.

  1. As used in this section, “specialty court program” means the same as defined in § 16-10-139.
  2. A district court judge presiding over a specialty court program that has been approved by the Supreme Court may order the offender to pay:
    1. Court costs as provided in § 16-10-305;
    2. Treatment costs;
    3. Drug testing costs;
    4. A local specialty court program user fee;
    5. Necessary supervision fees, including any applicable residential treatment fees;
    6. Global Positioning System monitoring costs; and
    7. Continuous alcohol monitoring fees.
    1. The district court judge presiding over a specialty court program shall establish a schedule for the payment of specialty court program costs and fees.
    2. The costs for treatment, drug testing, continuous alcohol monitoring and supervision shall be set by the treatment and supervision providers and made part of the order of the district court judge presiding over a specialty court program for payment.
    3. Specialty court program user fees shall be set by the district court judge presiding over a specialty court program.
    4. The costs for treatment, drug testing, continuous alcohol monitoring, and supervision shall be paid to the respective providers.
      1. Court costs and local specialty court program user fees assessed by the district court judge presiding over the specialty court program shall be paid to the county, town, or city official, agency, or department that is primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed by the district court under § 16-13-709 for remittance into a local fund entitled the “District Court Specialty Court Program Fund”.
      2. Installment payments shall be considered a payment toward court costs under § 16-10-305 until the court costs have been collected in full.
      3. Any remaining payments representing collections of other fees and costs as authorized in this section shall be remitted by the tenth day of each month to the city treasurer of the city in which the district court is located to be deposited into the fund.
      4. A district court that is funded solely by the county shall remit all remaining funds by the tenth day of each month to the county treasurer of the county in which the district court is located to be deposited into the fund.
      5. Expenditures from the fund shall require the approval of the district court judge presiding over the specialty court program and shall be authorized and paid by law concerning the appropriation and payment of county or municipal expenditures by the governing body or, if applicable, governing bodies, that contribute to the expenses of the district court.
        1. Expenditures from the fund shall be used solely for the support, benefit, and administration of the specialty court program.
        2. Expenditures may be made for indirect expenses related to the specialty court program, including training and travel expenses, program user incentives, graduation costs, and supplies.
    5. Court orders for costs and fees shall remain an obligation of the offender and shall be monitored by the district court until fully paid.
  3. A grant awarded to a specialty court program presided over by a district court judge, as well as all memorials, honorariums, and other monetary gifts to the specialty court program shall be deposited into the fund.
  4. A fee or costs under this section may be waived in whole or in part if the district court finds that the person subject to paying the cost or fee is indigent.

History. Acts 2019, No. 1044, § 1.

Subchapter 2 — Accounting Practices

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all municipal courts were to become district courts on January 1, 2005, and that they should assume the jurisdiction previously vested in municipal courts, police courts, justice of the peace courts, and courts of common pleas. Those courts were abolished by the amendment. City courts were to continue, but if abolished by the governing body of the city or by the General Assembly, the jurisdiction of the city court would then vest in the nearest district court.

Cross References. Arkansas Governmental Compliance Act, § 10-4-301 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1991, No. 904, § 28: Mar. 29, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the language of certain court cost statutes lacks uniformity; that such lack of uniformity is detrimental to the proper collection of such court costs; and that such language should be standardized to promote the proper collection of such costs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 788, § 36: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Mar. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1997, No. 1341, § 35: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Apr. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1999, No. 1508, § 19: Apr. 15, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that this act makes various technical corrections in the Arkansas Code; that this act further clarifies the law to provide that the Arkansas Code Revision Commission may correct errors resulting from enactments of prior sessions; and that this act should go into effect immediately in order to be applicable during the codification process of the enactments of this regular session. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56: Jan. 1, 2012.

Acts 2011, No. 1174, § 10: Jan. 1, 2012.

Acts 2013, No. 282, § 17: Mar. 6, 2013. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one-year period; that the effectiveness of this act as soon as possible is essential to the operation of the judiciary and the administration of justice; and that this act is immediately necessary because the delay in the effective date of this act could cause irreparable harm upon the proper administration of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-10-201. Title.

This subchapter shall be known and cited as the “Arkansas District Courts Accounting Law”.

History. Acts 1977, No. 332, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1101; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 46, 47; 2007, No. 663, § 21.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment deleted “and City Courts” following “Courts.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-10-202. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Citation” means a written order or electronic ticket issued by a law enforcement officer or employee of the department of public safety of a city or incorporated town who is authorized to make an arrest, requiring a person accused of violating the law to appear in a designated court or governmental office at a specified date and time;
  2. “Court” means a district court in the State of Arkansas; and
  3. “Electronic ticket” means an electronic citation or warning printed by a law enforcement officer and issued to a person accused of violating the law.

History. Acts 1977, No. 332, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1102; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 46, 47; 2007, No. 663, § 22; 2011, No. 908, §§ 1, 2; 2011, No. 1174, § 1.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment deleted “unless the context otherwise requires” following “subchapter” and “and city” following “district.”

The 2011 amendment by No. 908 inserted (1) and (3) and redesignated the remaining subdivision accordingly; and deleted “unless the context otherwise requires” from the end of the introductory language.

The 2011 amendment by No. 1174 inserted (1) and (3) and redesignated the remaining subdivision accordingly; and deleted “unless the context otherwise requires” at the end of the introductory language.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-10-203. Applicability of subchapter.

This subchapter shall apply to any district court within the State of Arkansas.

History. Acts 1977, No. 332, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1102; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 46, 47; 2007, No. 663, § 23.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment deleted “and city courts” following “courts.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-10-204. Bank accounts for court funds.

    1. Each municipal police department and each city or town marshal shall maintain court funds separately in depositories approved for those specific purposes by law.
    2. Court funds must be deposited into an account styled “(Name of Municipality) Police Department Bond and Fine Account”, and the funds shall be disbursed only on the signature of the chief of police or marshal of the municipality and the signature of one (1) other authorized person.
    1. Each office of county sheriff shall maintain court funds separately in depositories approved for those specific purposes by law.
    2. Court funds must be deposited into an account styled “(Name of County) County Sheriff's Bond and Fine Account”, and the funds shall be disbursed only on the signature of the sheriff of the county and the signature of one (1) other authorized person.
    1. Each court shall maintain court funds separately in depositories approved for those specific purposes by law.
    2. Court funds must be deposited into an account styled “(Name of Court) Court Account”, and the funds shall be disbursed only upon the signature of the court clerk and the signature of one (1) other person to be authorized by the court's presiding judge.
  1. All disbursements from the accounts in this section must be evidenced by prenumbered checks.
  2. Subsections (a) and (b) of this section do not apply if the court clerk has been designated to be primarily responsible for the collection of fines under § 16-13-709.

History. Acts 1977, No. 332, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1103; Acts 2011, No. 1174, § 2.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment deleted former (a) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly; added “maintain court funds separately in depositories approved for those specific purposes by law” in present (a)(1), (b)(1), and (c)(1); and added present (d) and (e).

16-10-205. Citations.

  1. Each municipal police department, city or town marshal, and county sheriff's office shall maintain and issue uniform written citations or electronic citations for violation of all municipal and state laws.
    1. All uniform written citation books must be prenumbered by the printer and a printer's certificate shall be furnished to the police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office, and the certificate shall be made available for inspection.
    2. The certificate must state the printing date, the numerical sequence of citations printed, and the printer's name.
  2. All void or spoiled written citations must be accounted for by attaching all copies to the hard copy in the uniform citation book.
    1. All written citations must have at least an original and three (3) copies used and distributed as follows:
      1. Hard copy: Violator's copy;
      2. White copy: Police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office copy;
        1. Yellow copy: Court clerk's copy, to be forwarded to the Office of Driver Services as provided in this subdivision (d)(1)(C).
        2. Within five (5) business days after a conviction or forfeiture of bail of a person charged with a violation of any law regulating the operation of vehicles on a highway, § 3-3-203(a) or § 5-27-503(a)(3), the clerk shall forward the yellow copy covering the case in which the person was convicted or forfeited bail.
        3. The yellow copy shall be certified by the person required to prepare it and shall include the name and address of the party charged, the registration number of the vehicle involved, the nature of the offense, the date of hearing, the plea, the judgment or whether bail was forfeited, and the amount of the fine or forfeiture.
        4. Within five (5) business days after the disposition of any case, the clerk shall forward the yellow copy of the citation and the resulting disposition of the case.
        5. A court using the case management system provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts or the electronic reporting system of the Office of Driver Services is not required to submit the yellow copy to the Office of Driver Services but must enter the disposition or judgment of conviction into the case management system or the electronic reporting system within the time required in this section; and
      3. Pink copy: Remains in uniform citation book.
    2. The citations shall be given to the police department, marshal's office, sheriff's office, or court clerk at least seven (7) business days before the court date.
  3. If an electronic citation is used:
    1. The electronic citation shall indicate whether or not there was a person under eighteen (18) years of age present at the time of the offense for which the electronic citation was issued;
    2. A printed copy of the electronic citation shall be given to the violator;
    3. A copy of the electronic citation must be maintained by the issuing police department, marshal's office, or county sheriff's office; and
      1. A copy of the electronic citation shall be forwarded to the court clerk in either electronic or written format, as designated by the court clerk, at least seven (7) business days before the court date.
      2. The court clerk's copy shall be forwarded to the Office of Driver Services as provided in subdivision (d)(1)(C) of this section.
  4. If an electronic citation system is used, the system must be in compliance with the Information Systems Best Practices Checklist provided by the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.
  5. Controls for citations.
    1. A list of all uniform written citation books and the corresponding range of citations in each book shall be kept in the police department, office of city or town marshal, or sheriff's office.
    2. The chief of police, marshal, or sheriff shall issue the uniform written citation books, unless the chief of police, marshal, or sheriff designates in writing another person to perform this duty.
    3. The chief of police, marshal, or sheriff shall ensure that all citations issued are entered on the arrest report or in the electronic case management system.
    4. Upon completion, each uniform written citation book shall immediately be filed with the court clerk and made available for inspection.
    5. Upon case adjudication, the police department, office of city or town marshal, or sheriff's office shall file its copy of the citation either alphabetically or numerically.
  6. A citation issued by a school resource officer under § 16-81-118 is exempt from the requirements of this section.

History. Acts 1977, No. 332, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1104; Acts 2009, No. 456, § 1; 2011, No. 44, § 1; 2011, No. 908, § 3; 2011, No. 1174, § 3; 2015, No. 1179, § 2; 2017, No. 714, § 3.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote (d).

The 2011 amendment by No. 44, in (d)(1)(C)(v), inserted “or the electronic reporting system of the Office of Driver Services” and “or the electronic reporting system.”

The 2011 amendment by No. 908 inserted “written or electronic” in (a); inserted “written” following “All” at the beginning of (b), (c), and (d)(1); and added (e).

The 2011 amendment by No. 1174 substituted “Citations” for “Uniform traffic tickets” in the section heading; substituted “written citations or electronic citations” for “traffic ticket books, sometimes called citation books, summons books, or ticket books” in (a); in (b)(1), substituted “written citation” for “traffic ticket” and deleted “or other evidence” following “the certificate”; inserted (b)(2); in (c), substituted “written citations” for “tickets” and “uniform citation” for “traffic ticket”; substituted “written citations” for “uniform traffic ticket books” in the introductory language of (d)(1); in (d)(1)(C)(v), inserted “or the electronic reporting system of the Office of Driver Services” and “or the electronic reporting system”; rewrote (d)(2); and added (e) through (g).

The 2015 amendment added (h).

The 2017 amendment added (e)(1) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; substituted “shall” for “must” in (e)(2) and (e)(4)(A); and inserted “county” preceding “sheriff's” in (e)(3).

16-10-206. Court docket.

  1. All violations shall be docketed and all judgments shall be rendered by the court's presiding judge.
  2. The court docket shall reflect the complete history of the violation and the disposition of each case, and shall contain the following information:
    1. The citation number;
    2. The date and nature of the violation;
    3. The date the court convened to hear the case;
    4. The names of arresting officers and witnesses, if any;
    5. The judgment rendered by the court;
    6. The signature or initials of the judge;
    7. The total amount of the fine and costs;
    8. The receipt number and dollar amount evidencing payment of fine and costs; and
    9. If applicable, the check number and dollar amount evidencing authorized bond refund. The check itself will indicate the docket number evidencing authorization.
  3. The docket shall be numbered by the court clerk in accordance with the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of the State of Arkansas.
    1. For manual dockets, the docket pages shall be prenumbered by the printer, and a printer's certificate or other evidence shall be furnished to the court's clerk which shall be made available for inspection.
    2. Docket pages must be either bound or loose-leaf, provided that accountability and control are maintained over loose-leaf docket pages.
  4. For manual or electronic dockets, the docket pages shall be numbered independently of court docket numbers assigned by the court clerk.
  5. The court clerk shall keep separate court dockets, one (1) for city cases and one (1) for county cases.

History. Acts 1977, No. 332, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1105; Acts 2005, No. 1934, § 2; 2011, No. 1174, § 4.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment, in (c) inserted “the Rules of the” and deleted “Administrative Ruling No. 73-240, beginning with the last two (2) digits of the current year and the number assigned to the case beginning with the number one (1), e.g., 77-1” from the end.

The 2011 amendment deleted “sheet” following “The court docket” in the introductory language of (b); substituted “citation number” for “uniform traffic ticket number” in (b)(1); in (b)(7), inserted “total” and deleted “itemized” following “costs”; inserted “For manual dockets” in (d)(1); inserted present (d)(2); and deleted former (e) and redesignated former (d)(2) as present (e).

16-10-207. Police department and marshals' and sheriffs' offices — Activities and clerical duties required.

The following activities and clerical duties relating to court functions shall be required of all police departments, city or town marshals, and sheriffs' offices:

  1. Preparation and Submission of Arrest Report.
    1. Separate arrest reports shall be prepared for city cases and county cases.
    2. The arrest report shall contain the following information:
      1. Citation number;
      2. Violator's name;
      3. Nature of the offense;
      4. Name of the arresting officer;
      5. Receipt number, if applicable;
      6. Fine and costs collected, if applicable; and
      7. Any other additional information deemed appropriate or necessary.
    3. Before the court date, the arrest report shall be prepared from the citations accumulated in the court date file in the police department office, marshal's office, or sheriff's office.
    4. If applicable, the fine and costs collected shall be totaled, and a check shall be drawn payable to the court fund that represents moneys collected and receipts issued by the police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office for those citations contained on the arrest report.
    5. A completed copy of the arrest report accompanied by the police department's, marshal's office, or sheriff's office check, if applicable, shall be delivered to the court clerk at least seven (7) business days before the court date; and
  2. Collection, Receipt, and Deposit Procedures.
    1. This subdivision (2) does not apply if the court clerk has been designated to be primarily responsible for the collection of fines under § 16-13-709.
    2. A prenumbered receipt must be issued for all moneys collected.
    3. Prenumbered manual receipts must meet the following minimum standards:
      1. All receipt books must be prenumbered by the printer, and a printer's certificate shall be furnished to the police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office, which shall be made available for inspection;
      2. The certificate must state the printing date, the numerical sequence of receipts printed, and the printer's name; and
      3. All void or spoiled receipts must be accounted for by attaching the original copy of the receipt to the duplicate copy of the receipt in the receipt book, with the reason for the void or spoiled receipt documented and retained for audit purposes.
    4. If an electronic receipting system is used, the system must be in compliance with the Information Systems Best Practices Checklist provided by the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.
    5. The receipt shall be issued in the name of the violator regardless of who paid the bond or fine or who collected the bond or fine and must indicate the method of payment, such as cash, check, money order, or credit card.
      1. Receipts shall be deposited intact daily into the bank account maintained by the police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office.
      2. All receipt numbers shall be entered on the arrest report by the police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office.
    6. The police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office may maintain separate bank accounts for city cases and county cases.
      1. The bank deposit slips prepared by the police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office shall contain the range of receipt numbers evidencing such collections.
      2. In addition, the receipts issued shall be reconciled with the monthly bank deposits.
    7. A bank reconciliation shall be made at the end of each month, and any balance remaining in the bank account shall be identified with receipts issued but not yet entered on the arrest report.
      1. A cash receipts journal or electronic receipts listing shall be established.
      2. The receipts journal or electronic receipts listing must indicate the receipt number, receipt date, violator's name, amount of the receipt, and classification of the receipt.
      3. The receipts journal or electronic receipts listing shall be properly balanced and totaled monthly and on a year-to-date basis.
      4. The receipts journal or electronic receipts listing shall be reconciled monthly to total bank deposits as shown on the bank statements.
      1. A cash disbursements journal or electronic check register shall be established.
      2. The disbursements journal or electronic check register must indicate the date, payee, check number, amount for each check written, and the classification of the disbursement.
      3. The disbursements journal or electronic check register shall be properly balanced and totaled monthly and on a year-to-date basis.
      4. The disbursements journal or electronic check register shall be reconciled monthly to total bank disbursements as indicated on the bank statements.

History. Acts 1977, No. 332, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1106; Acts 2007, No. 627, § 1; 2009, No. 456, § 2; 2011, No. 1174, § 5.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment inserted “or her” following “him” in (1)(C); deleted former (1)(F); and made related changes.

The 2009 amendment deleted (2), which was entitled “Issuance of Uniform Traffic Tickets.”

The 2011 amendment rewrote the section.

16-10-208. Court clerk or court administrator — Eligibility.

The court clerk or court administrator shall not be a member of the police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office.

History. Acts 1977, No. 332, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1107; Acts 2011, No. 1174, § 6.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment inserted “or court administrator.”

16-10-209. Court clerk — Activities and clerical duties.

The following activities and clerical duties relating to court functions shall be required of all court clerks:

  1. Collection, Receipt, and Deposit Procedures.
    1. A prenumbered receipt must be issued for all moneys collected.
    2. Prenumbered manual receipts must meet the following minimum standards:
      1. All receipt books must be prenumbered by the printer, and a printer's certificate shall be furnished to the court clerk, which shall be made available for inspection;
      2. The certificate must state the printing date, the numerical sequence of receipts printed, and the printer's name; and
      3. All void or spoiled receipts must be accounted for by attaching the original copy of the receipt to the duplicate copy of the receipt in the receipt book, with the reason for the void or spoiled receipt documented and retained for audit purposes.
    3. If an electronic receipting system is used, the system must be in compliance with the Information Systems Best Practices Checklist provided by the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.
      1. For those checks forwarded with the arrest reports, the receipt shall be issued in the name of the police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office.
      2. For those receipts issued at court date, the court clerk shall issue such receipts in the name of the defendant, regardless of who paid the bond or fine or who collected the bond or fine, indicating on the receipt the method of payment, such as cash, check, money order, or credit card.
    4. Receipts shall be deposited intact daily into the separate bank account maintained by the court clerk.
      1. The bank deposit slips prepared by the court clerk shall contain the range of receipt numbers evidencing such collections.
      2. Additionally, the receipts issued shall be reconciled with the monthly bank deposits.
    5. A bank reconciliation shall be made at the end of each month, and any balance remaining in the bank account shall be identified with receipt numbers for cases not yet adjudicated and the payments made on all unpaid individual time accounts.
    6. The court clerk may maintain separate bank accounts for city cases and for county cases;
  2. Preparation and Submission of Distribution Report.
    1. The distribution report shall contain the following information:
      1. The citation number;
      2. The defendant's name;
      3. The nature of the offense;
      4. The name of arresting officer;
      5. The court docket number;
      6. The disposition or date continued;
      7. The receipt number;
      8. The total fine and costs collected;
      9. The fine;
      10. The fees and costs itemized;
      11. The bond refund amount;
      12. The bond refund check number; and
      13. The installment payment amount.
    2. The court clerk at each court date shall prepare the distribution report from the arrest report supplied by the police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office.
    3. At the end of each court date, the court clerk shall complete the distribution report for the court date and total the dollar amounts contained in the report.
    4. The distribution reports prepared each court date shall be summarized at least monthly.
    5. The court clerk shall make a direct monetary settlement on or before the tenth day of the next-following month with each of the following:
      1. The city treasurer;
      2. The county treasurer;
      3. The Administration of Justice Funds Section; and
      4. Any other state agency or entity which receives fines or fees assessed by the court and collected pursuant to law.
    6. The court clerk shall submit electronically or in writing a monthly distribution report describing the direct monetary settlements under subdivision (2)(E) of this section no later than the tenth day of each month to the county treasurer;
  3. Minimum Bookkeeping Requirements.
      1. The court clerk shall maintain a cash receipts journal or electronic receipts listing.
      2. The court clerk may maintain separate cash receipts journals or electronic receipts listings for city cases and county cases.
      3. The receipts journal or electronic receipts listing must indicate the receipt number, receipt date, violator's or payor's name, amount of the receipt, and classification of the receipt.
      4. The receipts journal or electronic receipts listing shall be properly balanced and totaled monthly and on a year-to-date basis.
      5. The receipts journal or electronic receipts listing shall be reconciled monthly to total bank deposits as shown on the bank statements.
      1. The court clerk shall maintain a cash disbursements journal or electronic check register.
      2. The court clerk may maintain separate cash disbursements journals or electronic check registers for city cases and county cases.
      3. The disbursements journal or electronic check register must indicate the date, payee, check number, amount for each check written, and classification of the disbursement.
      4. The disbursements journal or electronic check register shall be properly balanced and totaled monthly and on a year-to-date basis.
      5. The disbursements journal or electronic check register shall be reconciled monthly to total bank disbursements as indicated on the bank statements;
  4. Bond Refunds.
    1. All bond refunds shall be made only upon the authorization of the presiding judge and shall be indicated as such on the court docket.
      1. All bond refunds shall be made only by a check drawn on the court's bank account.
      2. Additionally, the check shall indicate the court docket number for authorization.
    2. The court clerk shall enter all bond refunds on the applicable distribution report;
  5. Installment Payments.
    1. Installment payments shall be allowed only upon the authorization of the presiding judge and shall be indicated as such on the court docket.
      1. The court clerk shall establish and maintain individual installment payment account ledger records, with a duplicate copy of the ledger record being furnished to and maintained by the county or city official, agency, or department designated under § 16-13-709 as primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in district courts.
      2. The ledger records shall contain the following minimum information:
        1. Name of the individual;
        2. Court docket number and court date;
        3. Nature of the violation;
        4. Total fine and costs assessed;
        5. Receipt number, date, and amount of payment; and
        6. Unpaid balance of fine, fees, and costs.
    2. The county or city official, agency, or department designated under § 16-13-709 as primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in district courts shall be responsible for collecting all installment payments and shall enter all collected installment payments on each applicable arrest or distribution report.
      1. The court clerk shall establish and maintain a control total for installment payments, which is a summary of all unpaid individual installment payment accounts.
      2. The control total shall be reconciled monthly with the individual installment payment accounts.
      1. The court clerk shall furnish the county or city official, agency, or department designated under § 16-13-709 as primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in district courts and the presiding judge monthly with a list of all unpaid installment payment accounts for which a payment has not been received within the past thirty (30) days.
      2. The presiding judge shall then take the necessary action deemed appropriate in the circumstances.
      1. All installment payments shall initially be deemed to be collections of court costs until the court costs have been collected in full, with any remaining installment payments representing collections of restitution, and then fines.
      2. If court costs, restitution, and fines are fully paid, all remaining installment payments shall be allocated to remaining amounts due.
      3. A municipal or county governing body that adopted municipal or county legislation before July 1, 2012, to provide an alternative method of installment payment allocation as then authorized by state law shall remain in effect until repealed; and
  6. Reconciliation of Completed Citation Books.
    1. The court clerk shall reconcile on a quarterly basis on or before the fifteenth day of the month following the end of the calendar quarter the individual citations in the completed citation book to the individual citations as reflected on the arrest reports or court dockets.
      1. For any discrepancies noted in the reconciliation in subdivision (6)(A) of this section, the court clerk shall prepare a list and present this list to the court's judge for his or her appropriate action.
      2. This list shall be maintained for audit purposes.
    2. If the court clerk is designated under § 16-13-709 to be primarily responsible for the collection of fines, the reconciliation of completed citation books described in this subdivision (6) shall be performed by someone outside of the court clerk's office as determined by the court judge.

History. Acts 1977, No. 332, § 7; 1985, No. 677, §§ 1, 2; 1985, No. 776, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1107; Acts 1991, No. 904, § 21; 1997, No. 788, § 3; 1997, No. 1341, § 3; 1999, No. 1081, §§ 1, 2; 1999, No. 1508, § 7; 2003, No. 1765, § 7; 2005, No. 1934, § 3; 2011, No. 1174, § 7; 2013, No. 282, § 3; 2015, No. 903, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment by No. 1132 deleted “in conjunction with the making of the monetary settlement in subdivision (2)(E)(ii) [repealed] of this section” following “The court clerk” in the introductory language of (2)(F).

The 2011 amendment by No. 1174 rewrote the section.

The 2013 amendment rewrote (5)(F)(ii); and added (5)(F)(iii).

The 2015 amendment added (2)(F).

Cross References. Establishment of city and county shares, § 16-10-602.

Legislative intent of Acts 1997, Nos. 788 and 1341, § 16-10-601.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

16-10-210. Accounting systems above minimum.

  1. Any official charged with the maintenance of accounting or bookkeeping records under the provisions of this subchapter whose system of bookkeeping is such that it does not strictly adhere to the provisions of this subchapter, but in that official's opinion equals or exceeds the basic requirements prescribed by this subchapter, may request the court's presiding judge to request a review by the staff of the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.
  2. Upon the committee's concurrence with the official's opinion regarding the capability of the existing system of bookkeeping, a letter shall be issued by the committee to the court's presiding judge stating that the official's accounting system is of such a degree of sophistication that the basic requirements of this subchapter are being met.
  3. After issuance of the letter by the committee under subsection (b) of this section, the official is exempt from the requirements of the particulars of the procedures prescribed by this subchapter, provided the official's system of bookkeeping is not altered.

History. Acts 1977, No. 332, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1108; Acts 2007, No. 627, § 2.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment added the (a), (b) and (c) designations; in (a), substituted “Any” for “In the event any”, substituted “whose system” for “who feels his system,” inserted “does not strictly adhere to the provisions of this subchapter but, in that official's opinion,” substituted “basic requirements” for “basic system,” deleted “he” preceding “may” and inserted “staff of the” preceding “Legislative”; substituted “the official's opinion regarding the capability of the existing system of bookkeeping, a letter shall be issued by the committee to the court's presiding judge” for “such facts, the committee may issue a certificate to that official” in (b); and in (c), substituted “After issuance of the letter by the committee under subsection (b) of this section, the official is exempt” for “and exempting the official,” substituted “procedures” for “system” and inserted “provided the official's system of bookkeeping is not altered” following “subchapter.”

16-10-211. Record retention schedule.

  1. All towns, cities, and counties of the State of Arkansas shall maintain records for the district courts and are to:
    1. Permanently maintain:
      1. Case indices for all district courts;
      2. Case dockets for all district courts;
      3. Active warrants;
      4. Waivers;
      5. Expungement and sealed records;
      6. Files concerning convictions under the Omnibus DWI or BWI Act, § 5-65-101 et seq.; and
      7. Domestic battering files;
    2. Maintain for a period of at least seven (7) years and in no event dispose of before being audited:
      1. Complete case files and written exhibits for all district courts, not including civil or small claims division cases in which the judgment is not satisfied;
      2. Show cause orders;
      3. Case information, including arrest reports and affidavits; and
      4. Files concerning cases resulting in a suspended imposition of sentence; and
    3. Maintain for a period of at least three (3) years and in no event dispose of before being audited:
      1. Bank reconciliations;
      2. Check book registers and check listings;
      3. Cancelled checks;
      4. Bank statements;
      5. Receipts;
      6. Deposit collection records;
      7. Receipts listings;
      8. Distribution reports;
      9. Receipt and disbursement journals;
      10. Time payment records;
      11. Citation book logs;
      12. Citation books from each police department and sheriff's office;
      13. Served, recalled, or quashed arrest warrants;
      14. Copies of citations;
      15. Alternative service or community service time sheets;
      16. Uniform filing fees collection remittance forms and fine reports;
      17. Miscellaneous fee and fine collection reports; and
      18. Served or unexecuted search warrants.
  2. After a town, city, or county has maintained records for the time periods required by subdivision (a)(2) or subdivision (a)(3) of this section and after the records described in subdivision (a)(2) or subdivision (a)(3) of this section have been audited, the records may be destroyed.
  3. When records are destroyed under subsection (b) of this section, the town, city, or county shall document the destruction by the following procedure:
    1. An affidavit is to be prepared stating:
      1. Which records are being destroyed and to which period of time the records apply; and
      2. The method of destruction; and
    2. The affidavit is to be signed by the town, city, or county employee performing the destruction and one (1) employee of the governing body or, if applicable, governing bodies that contribute to the expenses of the court.
  4. In addition to the procedure described in subsection (c) of this section, the approval of the governing body or, if applicable, governing bodies that contribute to the expenses of the court shall be obtained before the destruction of district court records and an appropriate note of the approval indicated in the minutes of the governing body or bodies along with the destruction affidavit.

History. Acts 2007, No. 627, § 3; 2009, No. 633, § 6; 2011, No. 1174, § 8; 2015, No. 299, § 17; 2015, No. 584, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment rewrote (a); deleted former (c)(2)(A) and (d)(1) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; and, in present (c)(2), deleted “For district court records” at the beginning and deleted “described in subdivision (c)(1) of this section” following “affidavit.”

The 2015 amendment by No. 299 inserted “or BWI” following “Omnibus DWI” in (a)(1)(F).

The 2015 amendment by No. 584 inserted “district” preceding “courts” in (a)(1)(A) and (B); inserted “district” preceding “courts” and added “not including civil … is not satisfied” in (a)(2)(A); inserted “recalled, or quashed arrest” in (a)(3)(M); and added (a)(3)(R).

16-10-212. City courts — Loss of authority — Enforcement by legislative audit. [Effective until January 1, 2012.].

  1. If the Division of Legislative Audit determines that a city court is not in substantial compliance with this subchapter, the division shall report the findings to the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.
    1. If a public official or a private accountant determines that a city court is not in substantial compliance with this subchapter, the official or accountant shall notify the committee of his or her findings.
    2. Upon notification, the committee shall direct the division to review the city court's compliance with this subchapter.
    3. Upon confirmation of a substantial lack of compliance, the division shall report the findings to the committee.
    1. Upon notification of noncompliance by the division, the committee shall notify in writing the mayor, the city or town council, the city court judge, and the city court clerk that the city court's accounting records are not in substantial compliance with this subchapter.
    2. The city court shall have ninety (90) days after the date of notification to bring the city court's accounting records into substantial compliance with this subchapter.
      1. After the ninety (90) days allowed for compliance or upon request by the appropriate city court officials, the division shall review the city court's accounting records to determine if the city court is in substantial compliance with this subchapter.
      2. The division shall report its findings to the committee.
  2. If the city court has not achieved substantial compliance within the ninety-day period, the committee shall notify both the Administrative Office of the Courts and the city court of the noncompliance and inform the city court that it no longer has authority to operate.

History. Acts 2009, No. 488, § 1.

Subchapter 3 — Uniform Filing Fees and Court Costs

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all municipal courts were to become district courts on January 1, 2005, and that they should assume the jurisdiction previously vested in municipal courts, police courts, justice of the peace courts, and courts of common pleas. Those courts were abolished by the amendment. City courts were to continue, but if abolished by the governing body of the city or by the General Assembly, the jurisdiction of the city court would then vest in the nearest district court.

References to “this chapter” in subchapters 1 and 2 may not apply to this subchapter which was enacted subsequently.

Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 8, provided:

“(a) The following court costs shall not be immediately affected by this act and shall continue to be assessed and collected until such time as the Arkansas Division of Legislative Audit shall certify in writing that the debt service for the original construction for which the revenues generated by the court costs have been applied shall have been paid in full:

“(1) The costs assessed by the city, municipal, and circuit courts in Garland County pursuant to § 12-41-617 [repealed] for the purpose of building a new jail;

“(2) The costs assessed by the city, municipal, and circuit courts in Lawrence County pursuant to § 12-41-617 [repealed] for the purpose of building a new jail;

“(3) The costs assessed by the city and municipal courts of Pulaski County pursuant to §§ 16-17-111 and 16-17-113 [repealed] for the purpose of completing the municipal court renovation.

“(4) The costs assessed pursuant to Act 685 of 1971, as amended, by the city and county courts of Pulaski County for the purpose of retiring the indebtedness on the Pulaski County Law Center.

“(5) The costs assessed by the circuit and chancery courts in Saline County pursuant to § 21-6-403 in effect on January 1, 1995, and used for the purpose of renovation, refurbishing, and equipping of the Saline County Courthouse.

“(6) Any other costs assessed by the city, municipal, circuit, chancery, or probate courts which are dedicated on the effective date of this act for the purpose of retiring any debt service for construction, when certified by the Arkansas Division of Legislative Audit.

“(b) For each court in which a court cost included in paragraph (a) of this section shall be continued, that cost shall be in addition to the uniform court costs and filing fees provided in Section 3 through Section 7 of this act.

“(c) The additional costs specified in paragraph (a) shall not be remitted to the Department of Finance and Administration with the uniform court costs and filing fees provided for in Section 3 through Section 7 of this act, but shall be remitted to the city or county treasurer and credited to the fund and for the limited purpose as provided for in Arkansas Code Annotated §§ 12-41-617 [repealed], 16-17-111 and 16-17-113 [repealed] and Act 685 of 1971 as amended.”

Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 17, as amended by Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 3, provided:

“The uniform filing fees and court costs established by Sections 3 through 7 of this act shall become effective on July 1, 1995; however, from the period beginning July 1, 1995, through September 30, 1995, all courts shall deduct from the uniform fees and costs the individual fees and costs owed to local, county, and state level agencies and disburse those funds in accordance with this act. Excess funds shall be retained by the city or county and utilized as directed by the governing body, but are, however, intended to provide a sufficient level of funds as to allow for the change in the disbursement of funds as required by Sections 12 and 13 of this act.”

Publisher's Notes. Former subchapter 3, concerning judicial ethics, was repealed by Acts 1989, No. 536, § 4. The former subchapter was derived from the following sources:

§ 16-10-301. Acts 1977, No. 853, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1001.

§ 16-10-302. Acts 1977, No. 853, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1002.

§ 16-10-303. Acts 1977, No. 853, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1003.

§ 16-10-304. Acts 1977, No. 853, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1004.

§ 16-10-305. Acts 1977, No. 853, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1004.

§ 16-10-306. Acts 1977, No. 853, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1004.

§ 16-10-307. Acts 1977, No. 853, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1002.

Effective Dates. Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 23: Apr. 13, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the current system of funding the state judicial system has created inequity in the level of judicial services available to the citizens of the state; and it is further determined that the current method of financing the state judicial system has become so complex as to make the administration of the system impossible, and the lack of reliable data on the current costs of the state judicial system prohibits any comprehensive change in the funding of the system at this time. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 13: Oct. 23, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the current system of funding the state judicial system has created inequity in the level of judicial services available to the citizens of the state; and it is further determined that the current method of financing the state judicial system has become so complex as to make the administration of the system impossible, and the lack of reliable data on the current costs of the state judicial system prohibits any comprehensive change in the funding of the system at this time. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 788, § 36: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Mar. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1997, No. 1341, § 35: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Apr. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1999, No. 1508, § 19: Apr. 15, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that this act makes various technical corrections in the Arkansas Code; that this act further clarifies the law to provide that the Arkansas Code Revision Commission may correct errors resulting from enactments of prior sessions; and that this act should go into effect immediately in order to be applicable during the codification process of the enactments of this regular session. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2007, No. 177, § 15: July 1, 2007. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this bill affects the structure of the Arkansas District Judge Retirement System and the Arkansas Public Employees' Retirement System and the ideal time to make revisions to the retirement systems is at the beginning of the state's fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2007.”

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56: Jan. 1, 2012.

Acts 2013, No. 282, § 17: Mar. 6, 2013. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one-year period; that the effectiveness of this act as soon as possible is essential to the operation of the judiciary and the administration of justice; and that this act is immediately necessary because the delay in the effective date of this act could cause irreparable harm upon the proper administration of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2013, No. 504, § 5: Mar. 26, 2013. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one-year period; that the effectiveness of this act as soon as possible is essential to the operation of the judiciary and the administration of justice; and that this act is immediately necessary because the delay in the effective date of this act could cause irreparable harm upon the proper administration of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2015, No. 268, § 16: July 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one-year period; that the act entitled ‘AN ACT TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATION FOR PERSONAL SERVICES AND OPERATING EXPENSES FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS FOR THE OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS AND TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATORS OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 2016; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.’ requires the passage of this act; that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 2015, is essential to the operation of the Administrative Office of the Courts, and that in the event of an extension of the legislative session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 2015, could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 2015.”

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 49: Apr. 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that prison overcrowding is one of the largest problems currently burdening the state both from a public safety and budgetary standpoint; that safe and effective measures are needed to immediately combat this problem; and that this act is immediately necessary because in the interests of public safety and the state budget the Department of Correction, Department of Community Correction, Department of Human Services, and the Parole Board should be allowed to immediately implement these new measures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-10-301. Legislative intent.

  1. It is hereby found by the General Assembly that the current system of funding the state judicial system has created inequity in the level of judicial services available to the citizens of the state. It is further determined that the current method of financing the state judicial system has become so complex as to make the administration of the system impossible. Finally, it is determined that the lack of any reliable data on the current cost of the state judicial system prohibits any comprehensive change in the funding of the system at this time.
  2. It is, therefore, the intent of this act to eliminate the current system of collecting and assessing a large number of individual court costs and filing fees, to replace it with uniform costs and fees to be applied statewide, and to prohibit the implementation of new costs and fees for specific programs in the future.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As enacted by Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 1, subsection (b) of this section also provided:

“It is, further, the intent of this act to put in place a reporting system which will allow the General Assembly to obtain accurate data to determine the cost to the state for the funding of the judicial system, so as to allow the state, in the 1997-1999 biennium, to fund the cost of the judicial system from the costs, fees, fines, and such other sources as the General Assembly shall determine.”

As enacted by Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 1, this section also contained a subsection (c) which provided:

“(c) The General Assembly hereby advises all individuals, programs, and agencies which are affected by this act and which receive or expend funds as a part of the state judicial system to be prepared to provide information on the level of expenditures, number of staff, and related information which were in place and existing during the period January 1, 1994 — December 31, 1994 to the 1997 session of the General Assembly.”

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1995, No. 1256, codified as §§ 5-65-115, 5-65-307, 14-20-102, 14-42-112, 16-10-133, 16-10-30116-10-310, 16-14-105, 16-17-402, 16-17-705, 16-21-106, 16-21-113, 16-21-1103, 16-21-1503, 20-7-123, 20-18-502, 21-6-403, 24-8-315.

16-10-302. Court costs and filing fees — Generally.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by this act, all filing fees and all court costs shall be uniform for each type of case in all general and limited jurisdiction courts of this state.
  2. In all cases filed in such courts on or after July 1, 1995, the court costs and filing fees shall be assessed and distributed according to this act.
  3. In all cases filed in such courts prior to July 1, 1995, all court costs and filing fees shall be assessed according to law in existence on the date of the filing, but shall be disbursed in accordance with this act.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 2; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 1; 2001, No. 1809, § 1.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-10-301.

16-10-303. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section is repealed by Acts 2007, No. 663, § 24, effective January 1, 2012.

16-10-304. State actions exempt from filing fees.

Prosecuting attorneys filing actions on behalf of the state, with the exception of child support cases, shall be exempt from paying filing fees.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 2; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 1.

16-10-305. Court costs.

  1. There shall be levied and collected the following court costs from each defendant upon each conviction, each plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or each forfeiture of bond:
    1. In circuit court, one hundred fifty dollars ($150) for a misdemeanor or felony violation of state law, excluding a violation of:
      1. The Omnibus DWI or BWI Act, § 5-65-101 et seq.;
      2. The Underage DUI or BUI Law, § 5-65-301 et seq.;
      3. Section 5-75-101 et seq.;
      4. Section 27-23-114;
      5. Section 15-42-127; or
      6. Section 27-37-701 et seq.;
    2. In district court, one hundred dollars ($100) for an offense that is a misdemeanor or violation of state law, excluding a violation of:
      1. The Omnibus DWI or BWI Act, § 5-65-101 et seq.;
      2. The Underage DUI or BUI Law, § 5-65-301 et seq.;
      3. Section 5-75-101 et seq.;
      4. Section 27-23-114;
      5. Section 15-42-127; or
      6. Section 27-37-701 et seq.;
    3. In circuit court or district court, seventy-five dollars ($75.00) for a traffic offense that is a misdemeanor or violation under state law or local ordinance, excluding a violation of:
      1. The Omnibus DWI or BWI Act, § 5-65-101 et seq.;
      2. The Underage DUI or BUI Law, § 5-65-301 et seq.;
      3. Section 5-75-101 et seq.;
      4. Section 27-23-114;
      5. Section 15-42-127; or
      6. Section 27-37-701 et seq.;
    4. In district court, for a nontraffic offense that is a misdemeanor or violation under local ordinance, twenty-five dollars ($25.00);
    5. In circuit court or district court, three hundred dollars ($300) for violations of:
      1. The Omnibus DWI or BWI Act, § 5-65-101 et seq.;
      2. The Underage DUI or BUI Law, § 5-65-301 et seq.;
      3. Section 5-75-101 et seq.;
      4. Section 27-23-114; or
      5. Section 15-42-127;
      1. In circuit court or district court, twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for a violation of the mandatory seat belt use law, § 27-37-701 et seq.
      2. A defendant is not required to pay the court costs under subdivision (a)(6)(A) of this section if he or she pays the applicable fines under §§ 27-37-706 and 16-17-129 before his or her first appearance and shall not be assessed any additional court costs associated with the violation; and
    6. In circuit court or district court, twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for failure to present proof of insurance at the time of a traffic stop, §§ 27-22-103, 27-22-104, and 27-22-111.
    1. The costs set forth in this section shall be imposed at the conclusion of any criminal case enumerated in subsection (a) of this section that does not end in an acquittal, dismissal, or, with the consent of the prosecution, an order nolle prosequi.
    2. The costs shall be imposed at the conclusion of cases involving a suspended or probated sentence even though that sentence may be expunged or otherwise removed from the defendant's record.
  2. No county, city, or town shall be liable for the payment of the costs taxed under this section in any instance where they are not collected, or in any case in which the defendant pays the costs by serving time in a jail, on a county farm, or at any other official place of detention or work.
  3. No town, city, or county shall authorize and no district court or circuit court shall assess or collect any other court costs other than those authorized by this act, unless specifically provided by state law.
  4. This section shall become effective July 1, 2001, and the revised court costs shall be imposed on all cases which come before the court for final disposition on or after July 1, 2001.
    1. There shall be levied and collected from each defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to an offense, is found guilty of an offense, or forfeits bond in city court on or before December 31, 2011, the court costs applicable in city court at that time.
    2. The court costs applicable in district court shall be levied and collected in all cases filed in city court in which a defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere to an offense, is found guilty of an offense, or forfeits bond in district court on or after January 1, 2012.
  5. For each conviction for an offense under § 5-26-301 et seq., an additional court cost of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) shall be assessed and remitted to the Administration of Justice Funds Section by the court clerk for deposit into the Domestic Peace Fund, § 19-6-491.
    1. An additional court cost of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) shall be assessed and remitted to the Administration of Justice Funds Section by the court clerk or designee under § 16-13-709(a) for deposit as special revenues into the Domestic Violence Shelter Fund if a person is convicted of a domestic abuse offense or is the respondent on a permanent order of protection entered by a court under the Domestic Abuse Act of 1991, § 9-15-101 et seq.
    2. When a convicted person is authorized to make installment payments under § 16-13-704, the court cost assessed under subdivision (h)(1) of this section shall be collected from the initial installment payment first.
    3. The court clerk or designee under § 16-13-709(a) shall disburse all court costs collected each month under subdivision (h)(1) of this section to the Administration of Justice Funds Section by the fifteenth working day of the following month.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 7; 1997, No. 788, § 4; 1997, No. 1341, § 4; 1999, No. 1081, §§ 3, 12; 1999, No. 1508, § 7; 2001, No. 1632, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 49; 2007, No. 663, § 25; 2011, No. 730, § 4; 2011, No. 1218, § 1; 2013, No. 282, § 4; 2013, No. 1107, § 12; 2013, No. 1357, § 1; 2015, No. 299, §§ 18-21; 2015, No. 895, § 16; 2017, No. 583, § 3; 2019, No. 113, § 1; 2019, No. 743, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

Amendments. The 2007 amendment substituted “town or city” for “local” in (a)(3); in (a)(4), substituted “town, city, or county” for “local” and deleted “or city” following “district”; deleted “or city court” preceding “three” in (a)(5); deleted former (a)(6) and (7); added (f); and made related changes throughout.

The 2011 amendment by No. 730 inserted (a)(6).

The 2011 amendment by No. 1218 rewrote (a).

The 2013 amendment by No. 282 substituted “violation” for “violations” and variations thereof throughout the section; in the introductory language of (a)(2) and (a)(3) and in (a)(4), substituted “an offense” for “offenses” and substituted “is a misdemeanor or violation” for “are misdemeanors or violations”; in (a)(4), substituted “In district court, for a” for “For” and deleted “in district court” following “ordinance”; in (a)(6)(A), substituted “In circuit court or district court, three hundred dollars ($300) for” for “For knowingly” and deleted “in circuit court, district court, or city court, three hundred dollars ($300)”; inserted “of this section” in (a)(6)(B); and added (a)(7).

The 2013 amendment by No. 1107 substituted “Division of Behavioral Health Services” for “Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention” in (a)(6)(B).

The 2013 amendment by No. 1357 added (g).

The 2015 amendment by No. 299 inserted “or BWI” and “or BUI” throughout (a); and deleted (a)(1)(D), (a)(2)(D), (a)(3)(D), and (a)(5)(D), and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly.

The 2015 amendment by No. 895 repealed (a)(6).

The 2017 amendment added (h).

The 2019 amendment by No. 113 inserted “or designee under § 16-13-709(a)” in (h)(1) and (h)(3); and substituted “is convicted of a domestic abuse offense” for “is a convicted perpetrator of domestic abuse” in (h)(1).

The 2019 amendment by No. 743 added (a)(1)(F), (a)(2)(F), and (a)(3)(F); deleted (a)(6) [Repealed.]; redesignated (a)(7) as (a)(6)(A) and (a)(7) and added (a)(6)(B); and added “In circuit court or district court, twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for” in (a)(7).

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

Case Notes

Cited: City of Little Rock v. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 34, 592 S.W.3d 633 (2020).

16-10-306. Administration of Justice Funds Section.

  1. There is created in the Department of Finance and Administration an Administration of Justice Funds Section.
  2. The court costs and filing fees enumerated in §§ 16-10-305, 16-17-705, and 21-6-403, which are assessed and collected in the district courts and circuit courts in this state, shall be remitted to the Administration of Justice Funds Section.
  3. The Administration of Justice Funds Section shall:
    1. Deposit the court costs and filing fees remitted under subsection (b) of this section into the State Administration of Justice Fund; and
    2. Keep an accurate account of all receipts by type of case and type and location of court from which the court costs and filing fees are submitted.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 9; 2003, No. 1185, § 50; 2007, No. 663, § 26; 2013, No. 282, § 5; 2013, No. 504, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Pursuant to § 1-2-207, the amendments to this section by Acts 2013, No. 282, § 5, are superseded by the amendments to this section by Acts 2013, No. 504, § 1. Acts 2013, No. 282, § 5, amended this section to read as follows:

“(a) There is created in the Department of Finance and Administration an Administration of Justice Funds Section, to which shall be remitted the court costs and filing fees enumerated in §§ 21-6-403, 16-17-12 705, and 16-10-305, which are assessed and collected in the district courts and circuit courts in this state.

“(b) The section shall deposit the court costs and filing fees enumerated in §§ 21-6-403, 16-17-705, and 16-10-305 into the State Administration of Justice Fund.

“(c) The section shall keep an accurate account of all receipts by type of case and type and location of court from which the court costs and filing fees enumerated in §§ 21-6-403, 16-17-705, and 16-10-305 are submitted.”

Amendments. The 2007 amendment, in (b)(1), deleted “16-14-105” following “21-6-403,” “16-10-303” following “16-17-705,” and “city courts” preceding “district” and made related changes; and deleted (c).

The 2013 amendment rewrote the section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-10-307. County administration of justice fund.

  1. There is hereby created in each county a fund in the office of the county treasurer to be known as the “county administration of justice fund”.
  2. The county administration of justice fund shall be used to defray a part of the expenses of the administration of justice in the county. From the fund, the county shall continue to finance the following county agencies and programs which are currently funded, in whole or in part, by filing fees and court costs, at a funding level equal to not less than the greater of the amount which was collected by the county from filing fees and court costs for the agency or program in the calendar year ending December 31, 1994, or the amount appropriated by ordinance enacted prior to December 31, 1994, or on February 13, 1995, or on February 14, 1995, or by resolution dated February 9, 1995, to the agency or program for the calendar year ending December 31, 1995:
    1. The prosecuting attorney fund, including all grant funds awarded and appropriated for the calendar year ending December 31, 1995;
    2. The prosecuting attorney's victim-witness program fund;
    3. The public defender/indigent defense fund and public defender investigator fund, including all grant funds awarded and appropriated for the calendar year ending December 31, 1995;
    4. The county law library fund;
    5. The county jail fund; and
    6. The intoxication detection equipment fund.
      1. The county administration of justice fund of each county may retain an amount equal to the amount which was collected by the county from court costs and filing fees for county administration of justice expense in the calendar year ending December 31, 1994, or the amount appropriated from court costs and filing fees by ordinance enacted prior to December 31, 1994, or on February 13, 1995, or on February 14, 1995, or by resolution dated February 9, 1995, for county administration of justice expense from court costs and filing fees for the calendar year ending December 31, 1995, plus, for calendar years 1995 — 2001, an additional amount based upon the average percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers or its successor, as published by the United States Department of Labor for the two (2) years immediately preceding.
        1. The amount retained during calendar years 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 shall be the amount retained during calendar year 2001.
        2. Except as provided in subdivision (c)(1)(B)(iii) of this section, for calendar years beginning 2014 and each calendar year thereafter, an additional amount shall be added to the amount to be retained based upon the lesser of the average percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers or its successor, as published by the United States Department of Labor, for the two (2) years immediately preceding or the percentage rate of increase in collections of the State Administration of Justice Fund for the two (2) years immediately preceding.
        3. The provisions of subdivision (c)(1)(B)(ii) of this section shall not be effective if the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State determines that the additional amount retained under subdivision (c)(1)(B)(ii) of this section has exceeded one million dollars ($1,000,000) in a calendar year and any additional amount to be retained must be authorized by the General Assembly.
      2. All local ordinances of the counties and cities authorized and adopted under § 24-8-318 shall remain in full force and effect.
    1. For the calendar year beginning January 1, 1998, the base amount to be retained shall be:
      1. Increased by any increase in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers as provided for in subdivision (c)(1) of this section; and
      2. Decreased by eighty-five percent (85%) of the total dollar amount which was certified by the county as having been collected during calendar year 1994 and for the purpose of funding the office and operation of the public defender and public defender investigator.
  3. Nothing in this section shall prevent the county from funding any additional costs for the administration of justice from these or other county funds.
  4. The county shall remit on or before the fifteenth day of each month all sums received in excess of the amounts necessary to fund the expenses enumerated in subsections (b) and (c) of this section during the previous month from the uniform filing fees provided for in §§ 21-6-403 and 9-15-202, and the uniform court costs provided for in § 16-10-305 to the Administration of Justice Funds Section for deposit into the State Administration of Justice Fund.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1256, §§ 10, 12; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 7; 1997, No. 788, § 6; 1997, No. 1341, § 6; 2001, No. 1611, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 51; 2005, No. 434, § 1; 2005, No. 2212, § 1; 2007, No. 177, § 2; 2013, No. 282, §§ 6, 7.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As enacted by Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 10, this section contained an additional subsection which provided:

“Nothing in this act shall prevent the county from funding any additional costs for the administration of justice from other county funds or as disbursed by the county as required and authorized by the 80th General Assembly meeting in regular session.”

Amendments. The 2005 amendment by No. 434 substituted “fifteenth day of each month” for “tenth day of November 1995 and on or before the tenth day of each month thereafter” in (e).

The 2005 amendment by No. 2212 redesignated former (c)(1)(B) as present (c)(1)(B)(i); substituted “years 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005” for “year 2002 and each calendar year thereafter”; and added (c)(1)(B)(ii), (c)(1)(B)(iii) and (c)(1)(C).

The 2007 amendment deleted “Notwithstanding the creation of the Arkansas District Judge Retirement System on January 1, 2005” at the beginning of (c)(1)(C), and made a related change.

The 2013 amendment, in (c)(1)(B)(ii), substituted “2014” for “2006,” inserted “lesser of the” preceding “average percentage,” and added “or the percentage rate of increase in collections of the State Administration of Justice Fund for the two (2) years immediately preceding” at the end; and, in (e), substituted “§§ 21-6-403 and 9-15-202” for “§ 21-6-403,” inserted “Administration of Justice Funds Section of the Office of Administrative Services of the,” and deleted “Administration of Justice Funds Section” preceding “for deposit.”

Cross References. Legislative intent of Acts 1997, Nos. 788 and 1341, § 16-10-601.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

Use of County Jail Fund for supervision and transportation of inmates, § 12-41-716.

Case Notes

Purpose.

The intent of this section and § 16-87-306 is to provide representation for indigents in cases in which there is a potential for loss of liberty, but the provision of § 14-20-102 that grants authority for the trial court to appoint attorneys for minors in civil litigation to be paid by county funds, was not incorporated in the statutes establishing and defining the duties and responsibilities of the Commission. Ark. Pub. Defender Comm'n v. Burnett, 340 Ark. 233, 12 S.W.3d 191 (2000).

Applicability.

This section, which allocates to the Public Defender Commission a portion of county funds established by § 14-20-102, does not contain language authorizing the Commission to expend funds for the civil representation of a minor. Ark. Pub. Defender Comm'n v. Burnett, 340 Ark. 233, 12 S.W.3d 191 (2000).

16-10-308. City administration of justice fund.

    1. There is hereby created in each town or city which operates a district court a fund in the office of the city treasurer to be known as the “city administration of justice fund”.
      1. A town or city operating a city court that becomes a department of district court shall continue to maintain the city administration of justice fund as originally established by this section.
      2. The city administration of justice fund of any town or city shall cease to exist on and after the effective date of the ordinance that abolishes the department of district court for that town or city pursuant to state law.
  1. The city administration of justice fund shall be used to defray a part of the expense of the administration of justice in the town or city. From the fund, the town or city shall continue to finance the following town or city agencies and programs which are currently funded, in whole or in part, by filing fees and court costs, at a funding level equal to not less than the greater of the amount which was collected by the town or city from court costs and filing fees for the agency or program in the calendar year ending December 31, 1994, or the amount appropriated by ordinance enacted prior to December 31, 1994, to the agency or program for the calendar year ending December 31, 1995:
    1. The municipal court judge and clerk retirement fund for disbursement as otherwise provided by law;
    2. The police and fire pension fund;
    3. The intoxication detection equipment fund;
    4. All municipal-level programs and agencies funded in whole or in part by court costs and filing fees assessed and collected by the district court, notwithstanding the repeal by this act of laws authorizing the collection of court costs and filing fees; and
    5. All county-level programs and agencies funded in whole or in part by court costs and filing fees assessed and collected by the district court, notwithstanding the repeal by this act of laws authorizing the collection of court costs and filing fees and the disbursement of all or a part thereof to the county.
      1. The city administration of justice fund of each town or city may retain an amount equal to the amount which was collected by the town or city from court costs and filing fees for city administration of justice expense in the calendar year ending December 31, 1994, or the amount appropriated from court costs and filing fees by ordinance enacted prior to December 31, 1994, for city or county administration of justice expense from court costs and filing fees for the calendar year ending December 31, 1995, plus, for calendar years 1995-2001, an additional amount based upon the average percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers or its successor, as published by the United States Department of Labor for the two (2) years immediately preceding.
        1. The amount retained during calendar years 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 shall be the amount retained during calendar year 2001.
        2. Except as provided in subdivision (c)(1)(B)(iii) of this section, for calendar years beginning 2014 and each calendar year thereafter, an additional amount shall be added to the amount to be retained based upon the lesser of the average percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers or its successor, as published by the United States Department of Labor, for the two (2) years immediately preceding or the percentage rate of increase in collections of the State Administration of Justice Fund for the two (2) years immediately preceding.
        3. The provisions of subdivision (c)(1)(B)(ii) of this section shall not be effective if the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State determines that the additional amount retained under subdivision (c)(1)(B)(ii) of this section has exceeded one million dollars ($1,000,000) in a calendar year, and any additional amount to be retained must be authorized by the General Assembly.
      2. All local ordinances of the counties and cities authorized and adopted under § 24-8-318 shall remain in full force and effect.
    1. For the calendar year beginning January 1, 1998, the base amount to be retained shall be:
      1. Increased by any increase in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers as provided for in subdivision (c)(1) of this section; and
      2. Decreased by eighty-five percent (85%) of the total dollar amount which was certified by the town or city as having been collected during calendar year 1994 for the purpose of funding the office and operation of the public defender and public defender investigator.
  2. Nothing in this act shall prevent the town or city from funding any additional costs for the administration of justice from other town or city funds.
  3. The town or city shall remit, on or before the fifteenth day of each month, all sums received in excess of the amounts necessary to fund the expenses enumerated in subsections (b) and (c) of this section during the previous month from the uniform filing fees provided for in § 16-17-705 and the uniform court costs provided for in § 16-10-305 to the Administration of Justice Funds Section for deposit into the State Administration of Justice Fund.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1256, §§ 11, 13; 1997, No. 788, § 8; 1997, No. 1341, § 8; 2001, No. 1611, § 2; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 52, 53; 2005, No. 1934, § 4; 2005, No. 2212, § 2; 2007, No. 177, § 3; 2007, No. 663, § 27; 2013, No. 282, § 8.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment by No. 177 deleted “Notwithstanding the creation of the Arkansas District Judge Retirement System on January 1, 2005” at the beginning of (c)(1)(C), and made a related change.

The 2007 amendment by No. 663 inserted “town or” preceding “city” throughout the section; in (a), substituted “town or city which operates a district court” for “municipality which operates a police, city, or district court” in (1) and added (2); added “for disbursement as otherwise provided by law” in (b)(1); substituted “district” for “municipal, city, or police”: in (b)(4) and (5); substituted “§ 16-17-705” for “§§ 16-10-303 and 16-17-705” in (e); and made related changes.

The 2013 amendment, in (c)(1)(B)(ii), substituted “2014” for “2006,” inserted “lesser of the” preceding “average percentage,” and added “or the percentage rate of increase in collections of the State Administration of Justice Fund for the two (2) years immediately preceding” at the end.

Cross References. Additional funding sources for the municipal court judges' and court clerks' retirement benefits, §§ 24-8-317 and 24-8-318.

District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Legislative intent of Acts 1997, Nos. 788 and 1341, § 16-10-601.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-10-309. Failure to submit funds or reports.

  1. In the event a town, city, or county fails to timely or adequately submit funds and reports required by § 16-10-306, § 16-10-307(e), § 16-10-308(e), or other state law requiring a town, city, or county to submit funds and reports to the Administration of Justice Funds Section:
        1. The Attorney General may file a civil suit in circuit court against the town, city, or county alleged to have failed to submit the funds.
        2. If the town, city, or county is found by the court to have failed to submit the funds and reports, the court shall impose a civil penalty on the town, city, or county of ten percent (10%) of the amount required to be remitted for the period of time the town, city, or county has failed to be in compliance.
        3. The action may be brought in the circuit court of the subject county or the Pulaski County Circuit Court.
        4. The Attorney General shall be allowed to recover costs and attorney's fees associated with the civil suit from the town, city, or county found to have failed to be in compliance.
      1. The Chief Fiscal Officer of the State, upon a finding that the town, city, or county has failed to submit the funds and reports, may withhold from month to month an equal amount from the town's, city's, or county's share of the state turnback funds owed to the town, city, or county until the funds required to be paid have been submitted; and
      1. Provided that the failure to act continues for a period of sixty (60) days, the state, upon a finding by the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State, may require the town, city, or county to remit all costs, fees, or other funds, however designated under subdivision (a)(1) of this section.
      2. The town, city, or county will thereafter receive its share of these funds at a time and in the manner prescribed by rules of the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State.
    1. All funds received under § 16-10-306, § 16-10-307(e), or § 16-10-308(e) shall be transferred to the State Administration of Justice Fund to be held and distributed under this subchapter.
    2. All other funds received shall be transferred to the appropriate state fund as provided by law.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 14; 2005, No. 1934, § 5; 2007, No. 133, § 1; 2009, No. 166, § 1; 2019, No. 315, § 1292.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted “town” throughout this section; inserted “or other state … and Administration” in (a); inserted the present subdivision designations in (a)(1)(A) and (a)(2); deleted “required by this act” at the end of (a)(1)(A)(i) and following “and reports” in (a)(1)(A)(ii) and (a)(1)(B); deleted “with this act” from the end of (a)(1)(A)(ii); substituted “failed to be in compliance” for “violated thd provisions of this act” in (a)(1)(A)(iv); deleted “by this act” following “to be paid” in (a)(1)(B); in (a)(2)(A), inserted “or other funds however designated” and substituted “under subsection (a) of this section” for “generated by this act”; redesignated former (b) as present (b)(1); in (b)(1), substituted “under § 16-10-306, § 16-10-307(d), or § 16-10-308(e)” for “pursuant to subsection (a) of this section,” and “under this subchapter” for “pursuant to this act”; added (b)(2) and made minor stylistic and related changes.

The 2007 amendment substituted “subdivision (a)(1)” for “subsection (a)” in (a)(2)(A); and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2009 amendment substituted “compliance” for “compliance; and” in (a)(1)(A)(iv) and made a minor punctuation change.

The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (a)(2)(B).

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-10-301.

16-10-310. State Administration of Justice Fund — Distribution of revenue.

  1. At the close of books on or before the twentieth working day of each month, the Department of Finance and Administration shall distribute revenue credited to the State Administration of Justice Fund and received for the previous month as provided in this section.
  2. The revenue described in subsection (a) of this section shall be distributed to the following state programs and state agencies in monthly installments of at least one-twelfth (1/12) of the annual allocation provided for each state program or state agency from the State Administration of Justice Fund subject to the limitations stated in this section:
    1. The Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas for the purpose of and as regulated by §§ 6-64-604 — 6-64-606;
    2. The Public Health Fund and the Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment Fund for use in the drug abuse prevention and treatment program of the Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services of the Department of Human Services;
    3. The Division of Arkansas State Police for the State Police Retirement Fund;
    4. The Crime Victims Reparations Revolving Fund for the purpose of and as regulated by the Arkansas Crime Victims Reparations Act, § 16-90-701 et seq.;
    5. The Prosecutor Coordinator's office for deposit into the Law Enforcement and Prosecutor Drug Enforcement Training Fund;
    6. The Crime Information System Fund;
    7. The Justice Building Construction Fund;
    8. The District Court Judge and District Court Clerk Education Fund;
    9. The Judges Retirement Fund;
    10. The State Central Services Fund for the benefit of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission;
    11. The Court Reporter's Fund;
    12. The Justice Building Fund;
    13. The Arkansas Counties Alcohol and Drug Abuse and Crime Prevention Program Fund;
    14. The Administrative Office of the Courts to fund the Trial Court Administrator Fund;
    15. The Division of Arkansas State Police Fund;
    16. The State Central Services Fund for the benefit of the Division of Dependency-Neglect Representation of the Administrative Office of the Courts;
    17. The Miscellaneous Agencies Fund Account for the benefit of the State Crime Laboratory;
    18. The Arkansas District Judges Council Inc. for the Executive Director of the Arkansas District Judges Council Inc.;
    19. The Public Legal Aid Fund;
    20. The Administrative Office of the Courts for county reimbursements for jurors; and
    21. The Administrative Office of the Courts to reimburse the State Central Services Fund for the Drug Court Coordinator.
  3. If the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State determines that the State Administration of Justice Fund balance and estimated revenue to be received by the State Administration of Justice Fund are inadequate to fully fund all authorized monthly allocations from the State Administration of Justice Fund:
      1. The available revenue and remaining State Administration of Justice Fund balance shall be distributed first to fully fund the monthly allocation for:
        1. The Court Reporter's Fund;
        2. The Arkansas District Judges Council Inc. for the Executive Director of the Arkansas District Judges Council Inc.; and
        3. The Administrative Office of the Courts to fund the Trial Court Administrator Fund.
      2. Funds or allocations for a state program or state agency listed in subdivision (c)(1)(A) of this section shall not be affected if a deficit occurs in other State Administration of Justice Fund appropriations, allocations, or funds not listed in subdivision (c)(1)(A) of this section for that particular state program or state agency;
    1. The Chief Fiscal Officer of the State shall notify the disbursing officer of each state agency and state program not listed in subdivision (c)(1)(A) of this section of the amount of the state agency's or state program's portion of any reduction required from the state agency's or state program's authorized allocation in order to maintain the State Administration of Justice Fund with a projected positive balance; and
      1. The total funds remaining in the State Administration of Justice Fund after the distribution is made under subdivision (c)(1)(A) of this section shall be distributed to the state programs and state agencies not listed in subdivision (c)(1)(A) of this section in an amount equal to the proportion of the State Administration of Justice Fund that each state program would have received under subsection (b) of this section.
      2. A funding shortage from one (1) month shall be recouped from future months' payments as funds become available.
    1. If required to help meet the commitments of the State Administration of Justice Fund and if funds are determined to be available, the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State may transfer a sum not to exceed four million dollars ($4,000,000) during any fiscal year from the Budget Stabilization Trust Fund to the State Administration of Justice Fund.
    2. As determined by the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State, if a positive fund balance remains in the State Administration of Justice Fund at the end of a fiscal year, the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State may transfer the positive fund balance from the State Administration of Justice Fund to the Budget Stabilization Trust Fund to reimburse for any transfers made under subdivision (d)(1) of this section.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 15; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 2; 1997, No. 788, § 10; 1997, No. 1341, § 10; 2003, No. 1185, § 54; 2009, No. 166, § 2; 2011, No. 1132, § 3; 2013, No. 504, § 2; 2013, No. 1107, § 13; 2015, No. 268, §§ 1, 2; 2017, No. 913, § 40.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Highway Safety Program referred to in (b)(3) was the former Highway Safety Special Fund, a fund repealed by Acts 1997, No. 298.

The language removed in former (b)(3) relating to the Highway Safety Special Fund was only in reference to the previously repealed special revenue fund by that name and in no way alters the distribution to the miscellaneous fund by that name.

Acts 2013, No. 1443, § 58, provided: “DISTRIBUTION OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FUNDS.

In the event that the fund balance in the Administration of Justice Fund is inadequate to fund the monthly allocation to State Agencies, the funds will be distributed as follows:

“(a) The available revenue and remaining State Administration of Justice Fund balance shall be distributed first to fully fund the monthly allocations found in Section 59 herein for

“(1) the Auditor of State to fund the Trial Court Administrative Assistants Fund,

“(2) the District Judges Association for the District Court Coordinator, and

“(3) the Court Reporter Fund.

“(b) The total funds remaining in the State Administration of Justice Fund after the monthly distribution is made under subdivision (a) of this section shall be distributed to the remaining state programs and state agencies listed in Section 59 herein but not listed in subdivision (a) of this section and shall be funded in the percentage of the total funds available in the Administration of Justice Fund; that is, if less than 100% of the total monthly allocation is available for distribution, monthly allocations for the remaining agencies will be funded at an equal percentage consistent with the remaining available funds, provided that any of the allocations listed in Section 59 that have been fully pledged prior to January 1, 2001 to the repayment of a bond issue or bond issues shall not be reduced below the amount listed in Section 59. Any shortage from one month will be adjusted in future months' payments as funds become available.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014.”

Acts 2014, No. 105, § 36, provided:

“TRANSFER AUTHORITY. The Department of Finance and Administration shall transfer funds, from time to time, from the State Administration of Justice Fund to the State Central Services Fund in such amounts as are required to reimburse the State Central Services Fund for a portion of the expenses of the Administrative Office of the Courts — Division of Dependency-Neglect Representation.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2014 through June 30, 2015.”

Acts 2014, No. 285, § 61, provided:

“DISTRIBUTION OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FUNDS. In the event that the fund balance in the Administration of Justice Fund is inadequate to fund the monthly allocation to State Agencies, the funds will be distributed as follows:

“(a) The available revenue and remaining State Administration of Justice Fund balance shall be distributed first to fully fund the monthly allocations found in Section 62 of this Act for

“(1) The Auditor of State to fund the Trial Court Administrative Assistants Fund,

“(2) the District Judges Association for the District Court Coordinator, and

“(3) the Court Reporter Fund.

“(b) The total funds remaining in the State Administration of Justice Fund after the monthly distribution is made under subdivision (a) of this section shall be distributed to the remaining state programs and state agencies listed in Section 62 of this Act but not listed in subdivision (a) of this section shall be funded in the percentage of the total funds available in the Administration of Justice Fund; that is if less than 100% of the total monthly allocation is available for distribution, monthly allocations for the remaining agencies will be funded at an equal percentage consistent with the remaining available funds, provided that any of the allocations listed in Section 62 that have been fully pledged prior to January 1, 2001 to the repayment of a bond issue or bond issues shall not be reduced below the amount listed in Section 62 of this Act. Any shortage from one month will be adjusted in future months' payments as funds become available.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2014 through June 30, 2015.”

Acts 2015, No. 1070, § 59, provided: “DISTRIBUTION OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FUNDS

In the event that the fund balance in the Administration of Justice Fund is inadequate to fund the monthly allocation to State Agencies, the funds will be distributed as follows:

“(a) The available revenue and remaining State Administration of Justice Fund balance shall be distributed first to fully fund the monthly allocations found in Section 59 of this Act for

“(1) The Auditor of State to fund the Trial Court Administrative Assistants Fund,

“(2) the District Judges Association for the District Court Coordinator, and

“(3) the Court Reporter Fund.

“(b) The total funds remaining in the State Administration of Justice Fund after the monthly distribution is made under subdivision (a) of this section shall be distributed to the remaining state programs and state agencies listed in Section 59 of this Act but not listed in subdivision (a) of this section shall be funded in the percentage of the total funds available in the Administration of Justice Fund; that is if less than 100% of the total monthly allocation is available for distribution, monthly allocations for the remaining agencies will be funded at an equal percentage consistent with the remaining available funds, provided that any of the allocations listed in Section 59 that have been fully pledged prior to January 1, 2001 to the repayment of a bond issue or bond issues shall not be reduced below the amount listed in Section 59 of this Act. Any shortage from one month will be adjusted in future months' payments as funds become available.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2015 through June 30, 2016.”

Acts 2016, No. 239, § 39, provided: “TRANSFER AUTHORITY. The Department of Finance and Administration shall transfer funds, from time to time, from the State Administration of Justice Fund to the State Central Services Fund in such amounts as are required to reimburse the State Central Services Fund for a portion of the expenses of the Administrative Office of the Courts — Division of Dependency-Neglect Representation.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017.”

Acts 2016, No. 251, § 59, provided: “DISTRIBUTION OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FUNDS.

In the event that the fund balance in the Administration of Justice Fund is inadequate to fund the monthly allocation to State Agencies, the funds will be distributed as follows:

“(a) The available revenue and remaining State Administration of Justice Fund balance shall be distributed first to fully fund the monthly allocations found in the ALLOCATION RESTRICTIONS SECTION of this Act for

“(1) The Auditor of State to fund the Trial Court Administrative Assistants Fund,

“(2) the District Judges Association for the District Court Coordinator, and

“(3) the Court Reporter Fund.

“(b) The total funds remaining in the State Administration of Justice Fund after the monthly distribution is made under subdivision (a) of this section shall be distributed to the remaining state programs and state agencies listed in the ALLOCATION RESTRICTIONS SECTION of this Act but not listed in subdivision (a) of this section shall be funded in the percentage of the total funds available in the Administration of Justice Fund; that is if less than 100% of the total monthly allocation is available for distribution, monthly allocations for the remaining agencies will be funded at an equal percentage consistent with the remaining available funds, provided that any of the allocations listed in the ALLOCATION RESTRICTIONS SECTION that have been fully pledged prior to January 1, 2001 to the repayment of a bond issue or bond issues shall not be reduced below the amount listed in the ALLOCATION RESTRICTIONS SECTION of this Act. Any shortage from one month will be adjusted in future months' payments as funds become available.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1997, No. 855, § 5, set out the maximum allocation to each fund for fiscal years 1997-98 and 1998-99.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote (2), deleted (7) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly; substituted “Judges Retirement” for “Arkansas Judicial Retirement System” in (10); inserted “State” in (15); added (16) through (22); and made related changes.

The 2011 amendment deleted “of the Division of Behavioral Health of the Department of Human Services” following “Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention” in (b)(2); deleted former (b)(3) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; and, in (b)(18), substituted “Arkansas District Judges Council” for “District Judges Association” and “Executive Director” for “District Court Coordinator.”

The 2013 amendment by No. 504 added “State Administration of Justice Fund” to the section heading; rewrote (a) and the introductory language of (b); inserted “the Arkansas Crime Victims Reparations Act” in (b)(4); rewrote (b)(14); and added (c) and (d).

The 2013 amendment by No. 1107 substituted “Division of Behavioral Health Services” for “Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention” in (b)(2).

The 2015 amendment substituted “Administrative Office of the Courts” for “Auditor of State” and “Trial Court Administrator” for “Trial Court Administrative Assistant” in (b)(14) and (c)(1)(A)(iii).

The 2017 amendment substituted “Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services of the Department of Human Services” for “Division of Behavioral Health Services” in (b)(2).

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Legislative intent of Acts 1997, Nos. 788 and 1341, § 16-10-601.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

16-10-311. Transfer of funds from State Administration of Justice Fund.

The Department of Finance and Administration may transfer funds, from time to time, from the State Administration of Justice Fund to the State Central Services Fund in such amounts as may be required to reimburse the State Central Services Fund for expenses of the Administration of Justice Funds Section of the Department of Finance and Administration.

History. Acts 1997, No. 855, § 4.

16-10-312. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the distribution of the State Administration of Justice Fund, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 504, § 3. The section was derived from Acts 1997, No. 855, § 8.

16-10-313. Support for State Crime Laboratory.

Notwithstanding §§ 16-10-306, 16-10-307, 16-10-603, 16-10-604, and 19-5-993 or any other law to the contrary, twenty-five dollars ($25.00) of the uniform filing fee collected in circuit court under § 21-6-403(b)(1) shall be deposited into the State Treasury as special revenues to the credit of the Miscellaneous Agencies Fund Account, there to be used solely for the operations and support of the State Crime Laboratory. These moneys shall be in addition to all other sources of funding for the State Crime Laboratory and shall not be used to supplant any other source of funding for the State Crime Laboratory.

History. Acts 2005, No. 65, § 2.

16-10-314. Support for Arkansas publicly funded law schools.

  1. Notwithstanding §§ 16-10-306, 16-10-307, 16-10-603, 16-10-604, and 19-5-993 or any other law to the contrary, fifteen dollars ($15.00) of the uniform filing fee collected in circuit court under § 21-6-403(b)(1) shall be deposited as follows:
    1. Fifty percent (50%) of the revenues shall be deposited into the State Treasury as special revenues to the credit of the University of Arkansas Fund, there to be used for the support of the University of Arkansas School of Law; and
    2. Fifty percent (50%) of the revenues shall be deposited into the State Treasury as special revenues to the credit of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock Fund, there to be used for the support of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law.
  2. These moneys shall be in addition to all other sources of funding for the law schools and shall not be used to supplant any other source of funding for the law schools.

History. Acts 2005, No. 431, § 2.

16-10-315. City courts — Loss of authority — Enforcement by Department of Finance and Administration. [Effective until January 1, 2012.]

  1. If the Department of Finance and Administration determines that a city court is not in substantial compliance with § 16-10-306 or § 16-10-308, the department shall report the findings to the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.
    1. Upon notification of noncompliance by the department, the committee shall notify in writing the mayor, the city or town council, the city court judge, and the city court clerk that the city court is not in substantial compliance with this subchapter.
    2. The city court shall have ninety (90) days after the date of notification to substantially comply with this subchapter.
      1. After the ninety (90) days allowed for compliance or upon request by the appropriate city court officials, the department shall review the city court's records to determine if the city court is in substantial compliance with this subchapter.
      2. The department shall report its findings to the committee.

(d) If the city court has not achieved substantial compliance within the ninety-day period, the committee shall notify both the Administrative Office of the Courts and the city court of the noncompliance and inform the city court that it no longer has authority to operate.

History. Acts 2009, No. 488, § 2.

Subchapter 4 — Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission

Effective Dates. Acts 1993, No. 505, § 11: July 1, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1993 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1993 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1993.”

Acts 1997, No. 250, § 258: Feb. 24, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 1211 of 1995 established the procedure for all state boards and commissions to follow regarding reimbursement of expenses and stipends for board members; that this act amends various sections of the Arkansas Code which are in conflict with the Act 1211 of 1995; and that until this cleanup act becomes effective conflicting laws will exist. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governer [sic], it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judges, § 50 et seq.

C.J.S. 48A C.J.S., Judges, § 40 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey, Legal Profession, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 649.

Averill, Observations on the Wyoming Experience with Merit Selection of Judges: A Model for Arkansas, 17 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 281.

16-10-401. Definitions.

The word “judge” in this subchapter means anyone, whether or not a lawyer, who is an officer of the judicial system performing judicial functions, including an officer such as a referee, special master, court commissioner, or magistrate, whether full-time or part-time.

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 1.

16-10-402. Creation.

  1. There is hereby established a commission to be known as the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, hereinafter referred to as the “commission”, consisting of nine (9) members, each of whom shall be residents of Arkansas, and shall be appointed as follows:
    1. Three (3) members shall be judges of the Arkansas Court of Appeals, circuit court, or municipal court appointed by the Arkansas Supreme Court;
    2. Three (3) members shall be lawyers admitted to practice in Arkansas who are not judges or former or retired judges, one (1) of whom shall be appointed by the Attorney General, one (1) by the President of the Senate, and one (1) by the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
    3. Three (3) members, who are neither lawyers, or judges, or former or retired judges, appointed by the Governor.
    1. A commission member shall serve for a term of six (6) years and shall be eligible for reappointment to a second full term.
    2. A member appointed to a term of less than six (6) years or to fill an unexpired term may be reappointed to two (2) full terms.
    3. The appointing authority for each category of commission membership shall also appoint an alternate member for each regular member appointed. An alternate member shall be appointed for a term of six (6) years and may be reappointed for a second term. An alternate member appointed to fill an unexpired term shall be eligible for an appointment for two (2) full terms.
  2. If a commission member or an alternate commission member moves out of the jurisdiction, ceases to be eligible for appointment to represent the category for which he or she was appointed, or becomes unable to serve for any reason, a vacancy shall occur. An appointment to fill a vacancy for the duration of its unexpired term shall be made by the appropriate appointing authority, effective no later than sixty (60) days from the occurrence of the vacancy. If a vacancy is not filled in accordance with this subsection, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall, within ten (10) days thereafter, appoint, from the category to be represented, a member who shall serve for the duration of the unexpired term.
  3. Commission members shall serve without pay, but may receive expense reimbursement in accordance with § 25-16-901 et seq.

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 2; 1997, No. 250, § 116.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 2, provided, in part, that initial appointments shall be made so that the terms of one member in each of the three categories shall expire every other year.

Acts 1989, No. 632, § 2, also provided:

“When initial appointments are made, the appointing authority for each category of commission membership shall also appoint an alternate member for each regular member appointed.”

Ark. Const., Am. 80, § 19(A)(2) provided that all circuit, chancery, and circuit-chancery judges “in office at the time this Amendment takes effect shall continue in office as Circuit judges…” Amendment 80 further provided in § 19(B)(1) that the circuit courts would “assume the jurisdiction of Circuit, Chancery, Probate and Juvenile Courts.” Accordingly, the reference to “circuit court, chancery court” in subdivision (a)(1) has now been made “circuit court” in conformity with Amendment 80. This change made by Amendment 80 took effect July 1, 2001. Amendment 80 also provides that many of the lower courts will combine into district courts. The first portion of Amendment 80, § 19(B)(2) state “District Courts shall have the jurisdiction vested in Municipal Courts, Corporation Courts, Police Courts, Justice of the Peace Courts, and Courts of Common Pleas at the time this Amendment takes effect. District Courts shall assume the jurisdiction of these courts of limited jurisdiction and other jurisdiction conferred in this Amendment on January 1, 2005.”

Cross References. Judicial Discipline And Disability Commission, Ark. Const. Amend. 66.

16-10-403. Director — Staff.

  1. The Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission shall employ a director and such additional professional and clerical staff as may be authorized, from time to time, by appropriation passed by the General Assembly.
  2. Effective July 1, 1994, the Director of the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission shall be an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Arkansas.
  3. The director shall not engage in the practice of law nor serve in a judicial capacity during his or her employment.

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 2; 1993, No. 505, § 5.

16-10-404. Duties — Records.

  1. The Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission shall initiate or shall receive information, conduct investigations and hearings, and make recommendations to the Supreme Court concerning:
    1. Allegations of judicial misconduct;
    2. Allegations of physical or mental disability of judges requiring leave or involuntary retirement; and
    3. Matters of voluntary retirement or leave for disability.
    1. Investigatory records, files, and reports of the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission are confidential, and no disclosure of information, written, recorded, or oral, received or developed by the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission in the course of an investigation related to alleged misconduct or disability of a judge shall be made except as follows:
      1. Upon waiver in writing by the judge at any stage of the proceedings;
      2. Upon inquiry by an appointing authority or by a state or federal agency conducting investigations on behalf of such authority in connection with the selection or appointment of judges;
      3. In cases in which the subject matter or the fact of the filing of charges has become public, if deemed appropriate by the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, it may issue a statement in order to confirm the pendency of the investigation, to clarify the procedural aspects of the proceedings, to explain the right of the judge to a fair hearing, and to state that the judge denies the allegations;
      4. Upon inquiry in connection with the assignment or recall of a retired judge to judicial duties, by or on behalf of the assigning authority;
      5. Upon the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission's taking final action with respect to a complaint about a judge, notice of the final action shall become public information;
      6. Where the circumstances necessitating the initiation of an inquiry include notoriety, or where the conduct in question is a matter of public record, information concerning the lack of cause to proceed shall be released by the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission;
      7. If, during the course of or after an investigation or hearing, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission reasonably believes that there may have been a violation of any rules of professional conduct of attorneys at law, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission may release such information to any committee, commission, agency, or body within or outside of the state empowered to investigate, regulate, or adjudicate matters incident to the legal profession;
      8. If, during the course of or after an investigation or hearing, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission reasonably believes that there may have been a violation of a law or rule falling under the jurisdiction of the Arkansas Ethics Commission, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission may release such information to the Arkansas Ethics Commission; or
      9. If, during the course of or after an investigation or hearing, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission reasonably believes that there may have been a violation of criminal law, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission shall release such information to the appropriate prosecuting attorney.
    2. All proceedings held prior to a determination of probable cause and the filing of formal charges shall be confidential. Any hearing scheduled after the filing of formal charges shall be open to the press and to the public, except that following the completion of the introduction of all evidence, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission may convene to executive session for the purpose of deliberating its final conclusions and recommendations, provided that, upon completion of the executive session, the final action of the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission shall be announced in an open and public session.
    3. The Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission is authorized to request the appropriate prosecuting authorities to seek to obtain immunity from criminal prosecution for a reluctant witness using the procedure outlined in § 16-43-601 et seq.

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 2; 1993, No. 1078, § 1; 2013, No. 1115, § 2; 2015, No. 1152, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 1078, § 2, provided:

“It is hereby found that an Arkansas Supreme Court en banc decision, dated May 14, 1990 has left statues in conflict with the Commission's Rules of Procedure. In addition, because the commission is an agency of limited jurisdiction, strict confidentiality requirements have prevented the Commission from cooperating with enforcement agencies like the Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct and prosecuting attorneys. This legislation is necessary to conform statutes to the commission's Rules of Procedure and to provide an avenue of cooperation between the above mentioned enforcement agencies.”

Amendments. The 2013 amendment redesignated former (b)(1)(G) as present (b)(1)(G)(i); substituted “Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission” for “commission” throughout present (b)(1)(G)(i); and added (b)(1)(G)(ii).

The 2015 amendment redesignated (b)(1)(G)(i) and (b)(1)(G)(ii) as (b)(1)(G) and (b)(1)(H); and redesignated former (b)(1)(H) as (b)(1)(I).

Case Notes

Notice Requirements.

The commission was not required to comply retroactively with the amended notice requirements of Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission Rule 7. Gannett River States Pub. Co. v. Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Com., 304 Ark. 244, 801 S.W.2d 292 (1990).

Review.

Circuit court properly dismissed an individual's complaint for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and mandamus against the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, stemming from the Commission's decision not to file formal charges against a judge, because the circuit court properly concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Review of the Commission's decisions lies exclusively with the Supreme Court of Arkansas. Since the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, appellate jurisdiction was lacking. Perroni v. Sachar, 2017 Ark. 59, 513 S.W.3d 239 (2017).

Pursuant to Ark. Const. Amend. 66, as well as §§ 16-10-401 through 16-10-411 and the Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, a review of the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission's decision lies exclusively with the Supreme Court of Arkansas. Perroni v. Sachar, 2017 Ark. 59, 513 S.W.3d 239 (2017).

Cited: In re Badami, 309 Ark. 511, 831 S.W.2d 905 (1992); Daily World v. Phillips County Circuit Court, 361 Ark. 146, 205 S.W.3d 134 (2005); Helena Daily World v. Simes, 365 Ark. 305, 229 S.W.3d 1 (2006).

16-10-405. Rules.

The Supreme Court shall adopt rules with regard to all matters of Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission operations and all disciplinary and disability proceedings and promulgate rules of procedure.

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 9.

Case Notes

Cited: Gannett River States Pub. Co. v. Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Com., 304 Ark. 244, 801 S.W.2d 292 (1990).

16-10-406. Immunity from suit.

Members of the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, referees, commission counsel, and staff shall be absolutely immune from suit for all conduct in the course of their official duties.

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 8.

Case Notes

Cited: Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm'n v. Digby, 302 Ark. 333, 789 S.W.2d 731 (1990); Comm'n on Judicial Discipline & Disability v. Digby, 303 Ark. 24, 792 S.W.2d 594 (1990).

16-10-407. Leave.

Grounds for leave consist of a temporary physical or mental incapacity which impairs the ability of the judge to substantially perform the duties of his or her judicial office and which exists or is likely to exist for a period of one (1) year or less. Leave cannot be granted to exceed one (1) year.

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 3.

16-10-408. Suspension with pay.

A judge may be suspended by the Supreme Court with pay:

  1. While a recommendation to the Supreme Court by the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission for his or her removal or involuntary disability retirement is pending; or
  2. When articles of impeachment have been voted by the House of Representatives.

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 4; 2015, No. 938, § 1.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment deleted former (1) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly.

Case Notes

Cited: In re Switzer, 303 Ark. 288, 796 S.W.2d 341 (1990).

16-10-409. Mandatory suspension.

    1. A judge shall be suspended from office with pay by the Supreme Court if:
      1. An indictment or information charges the judge in any court in the United States with a crime punishable as a felony under the laws of Arkansas or the United States or with any other offense that involves moral turpitude; or
      2. In any court in the United States he or she pleads guilty or no contest to, or is found guilty of, an offense punishable as a felony under the laws of Arkansas or the United States or any other offense that involves moral turpitude.
      1. If the judge requests a hearing on a suspension under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, the Supreme Court shall:
        1. Hold the hearing no later than ten (10) days after the request to determine whether the suspension with pay remains in effect during the pendency of criminal proceedings against the judge; and
        2. Notify the requesting judge and the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission of the date of the hearing.
      2. In the hearing under this subdivision (a)(2) the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission shall act as the opposing party of the requesting judge.
      3. The suspension with pay under subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section shall be removed and the judge shall be allowed to perform his or her duties as a judge if the judge shows at the hearing by a preponderance of the evidence that:
        1. The performance of his or her duties as a judge while charges are pending will not impair the public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary; and
        2. The charges are not likely to result in a conviction.
  1. If his or her conviction becomes final, he or she may be removed from office pursuant to § 16-10-410.
    1. If his or her conviction is reversed and he or she is cleared of the charge, by order of the court, whether without further trial or after further trial and a finding of not guilty, his or her suspension terminates.
    2. If the judge is suspended under subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section and the charge is subsequently dismissed, the judge's suspension terminates.
  2. Nothing in this section shall prevent the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission from determining that a judge be disciplined or removed according to § 16-10-410.

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 5; 2015, No. 938, § 2.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment rewrote the section.

16-10-410. Removal from office.

  1. The grounds for removal conferred by this subchapter shall be both alternative and cumulative to the power of impeachment provided by the Arkansas Constitution and removal otherwise provided by law.
  2. A judge may be removed from office on any of the following grounds:
    1. Conviction of any offense punishable as a felony under the laws of Arkansas or the United States;
    2. Conviction of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the judge's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a judge in other respects;
    3. The commission of conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation;
    4. The commission of conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
    5. Willful violation of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct or the Model Rules of Professional Conduct;
    6. Willful and persistent failure to perform the duties of office; or
    7. Habitual intemperance in the use of alcohol or other drugs.
  3. In considering recommending removal, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission may consider the frequency of the offense, the motivation of the conduct, the length of time since the conduct in question, and similar factors.
  4. [Repealed.]

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 6; 1995, No. 1296, § 58; 2001, No. 5, § 1; 2015, No. 939, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2015, No. 939, § 1, provided: “Legislative Intent. The intent of this act is to repeal § 16-10-410(d) as the Supreme Court has held this provision unconstitutional under Proctor v. Daniels, 2010 Ark. 206 (2010).”

Amendments. The 2015 amendment repealed (d).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

In a judge's declaratory action, this section was held unconstitutional, as it added a qualification to the office of circuit judge, encroaching on the power of the judiciary to interpret the law. Proctor v. Daniels, 2010 Ark. 206, 392 S.W.3d 360 (2010).

Federal Review Barred.

Complaint was dismissed because each of the judge's asserted wrongs were either directly encompassed in the state supreme court's judgment, or, as the bar from seeking re-election, “inextricably intertwined” with those claims already adjudicated in state court. The relief the judge sought was, therefore, barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Proctor v. Hannah, 688 F. Supp. 2d 851 (E.D. Ark. 2010).

Removal Appropriate.

Removal of the judge from office was proper under subdivision (b)(5) of this section because he willfully violated the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct when he, in part, acted inappropriately with defendants under his jurisdiction and when he enforced the payment of civil fees, knowing that the funds would go to a probation-type program that he started. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n v. Proctor, 2010 Ark. 38, 360 S.W.3d 61, cert. denied, isability Comm'n, 561 U.S. 1027, 130 S. Ct. 3516, 177 L. Ed. 2d 1093 (2010).

Cited: In re Switzer, 303 Ark. 288, 796 S.W.2d 341 (1990).

16-10-411. Vacancy.

The granting of leave, suspension, with or without pay, removal, or involuntary disability retirement pursuant to this subchapter shall create a vacancy in the judicial office.

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 7.

Subchapter 5 — Circuit Court Judgeships and Redistricting

16-10-501. Development of criteria for new judgeships or redistricting.

  1. The Arkansas Judicial Council, hereinafter referred to as the “council”, is authorized and directed to develop criteria for new judgeships or redistricting of the circuit court districts of this state and to make recommendations to the regular session, fiscal session, or special session of the General Assembly regarding the number and boundaries of the circuit court districts in the state, the number of judges in each of such districts, and such other matters regarding circuit courts in the state as it determines to be appropriate.
  2. In establishing circuit court districts of this state, the council shall take into consideration caseload, geographic area to be served by the respective circuit courts, and such other matters as the council determines to be appropriate.
  3. The council shall meet on or before November 1 of each even-numbered year to finalize criteria for establishing additional judgeships or redistricting during the next regular session of the General Assembly.

History. Acts 1989, No. 864, §§ 1-3; 2003, No. 1185, § 55; 2009, No. 962, § 34.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted “session, fiscal session” preceding “or special session” in (a).

Subchapter 6 — Funding

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all municipal courts were to become district courts on January 1, 2005, and that they should assume the jurisdiction previously vested in municipal courts, police courts, justice of the peace courts, and courts of common pleas. Those courts were abolished by the amendment. City courts were to continue, but if abolished by the governing body of the city or by the General Assembly, the jurisdiction of the city court would then vest in the nearest district court.

Effective Dates. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 36: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Mar. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1997, No. 1341, § 35: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Apr. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56: Jan. 1, 2012.

16-10-601. Legislative intent.

  1. It is hereby found by the General Assembly that the current system of funding the state judicial system has created inequity in the level of judicial services available to the citizens of the state. It is further determined that, with the passage and implementation of Acts 1995, No. 1256, a uniform structure for the accounting and distribution of court-generated funds has been established and reliable data on the cost of providing court services and the revenue produced by the court system now exists.
  2. It is, therefore, the intent of this act to begin to phase in the responsibility of the funding of a part of the state trial court system from county government to the state. It is, further, the intent of this act to continue and improve the reporting of information from cities and counties concerning the costs of providing the court system and the revenues produced from court costs, fees, and fines.

History. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 1; 1997, No. 1341, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. For the codification of Acts 1995, No. 1256, referred to in this section, please consult Tables Volume B.

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1997, No. 788, codified as §§ 5-76-103, 16-10-133, 16-10-209, 16-10-305, 16-10-307, 16-10-308, 16-10-310, 16-10-60116-10-604, 16-10-701 [repealed], 16-13-512, 16-14-105(a), 16-87-203(a), 16-87-204(b), 16-87-210, 16-87-212(a), 16-87-215, 16-87-30116-87-307, 16-96-403, 19-5-1087, 21-6-403, 26-60-112; and Acts 1997, No. 1341, codified as §§ 5-76-103, 16-10-133, 16-10-209, 16-10-305, 16-10-307, 16-10-308, 16-10-310, 16-10-60116-10-604, 16-10-701, 16-13-512, 16-14-105(a), 16-87-203(a), 16-87-204(b), 16-87-210, 16-87-212(a), 16-87-215, 16-87-30116-87-307, 16-96-403, 21-6-403, 26-60-112.

16-10-602. Establishment of city and county shares.

  1. Pursuant to §§ 16-10-307(c) and 16-10-308(c), each town, city, and county may retain a portion of the uniform court costs and filing fees collected and deposited into the city or county administration of justice fund.
  2. On or before the first day of October of each year, the Department of Finance and Administration shall certify in writing to each county and to each town or city which operates a district court the amount of money which may be retained during each month of the following calendar year by the town, city, or county.

History. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 5; 1997, No. 1341, § 5; 2001, No. 1809, § 11; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 56, 57; 2007, No. 663, § 28.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment inserted “town” preceding “city” throughout the section; deleted “or city court” following “district court” in (b); and made related changes.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 57: Jan. 1, 2005, by its own terms.

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-10-603. Procedure — County administration of justice funds.

    1. Pursuant to § 16-10-307, each county is to create a county administration of justice fund.
    2. Each county treasurer should deposit into the fund:
      1. All receipts from the collection of uniform filing fees established by § 21-6-403 which are collected by the circuit clerk, county clerk, or other official and remitted to the county treasurer;
      2. All receipts from the collection of uniform court costs established by § 16-10-305 which are collected by the county official, agency, or department designated pursuant to § 16-13-709 as primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in circuit court and remitted to the county treasurer;
      3. All receipts of the county's share of uniform filing fees established by § 16-17-705 which are collected by the district courts within the county and remitted to the county treasurer; and
      4. All receipts of the county's share of uniform court costs established by § 16-10-305 which are collected by the official, agency, or department of the county, town, or city designated pursuant to § 16-13-709 as primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in district courts within the county and remitted to the county treasurer.
  1. From the county administration of justice fund, the county treasurer is to make, on a monthly basis, the following fund transfers or disbursements:
      1. Pursuant to § 16-10-307(c), the Department of Finance and Administration will certify for each county the county's monthly share of uniform court costs and filing fees to be retained by the county.
        1. Each year the quorum court shall establish the amount of uniform filing fees and court costs to be appropriated to each of the county programs or agencies enumerated in § 16-10-307(b) from the county's share of uniform court costs and filing fees.
        2. Each program or agency shall receive, as a minimum, the amount established by § 16-10-307(b); and
    1. The excess of the monthly receipts into the fund from subdivisions (a)(2)(A) and (B) of this section, less the county's certified monthly share and the county treasurer's commission, if any, as authorized by § 21-6-302, shall be remitted to the Department of Finance and Administration, pursuant to § 16-10-307(e).

History. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 7; 1997, No. 1341, § 7; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 58, 59; 2007, No. 663, § 29.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment, in (a), rewrote (2)(B), in (2)(C), substituted “§ 16-17-705” for “§§ 16-17-705 and 16-10-303” and deleted “and city” following “district”, and rewrote (2)(D); in (b), substituted “§ 16-10-307(c)” for “§§ 16-10-307(c) and 21-6-403” in (1)(A), deleted “provided, that each program or agency shall receive, as a minimum, the amount established by § 16-10-307(b); and” from the end of (1)(B)(i), and added (1)(B)(ii); and made related changes.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

16-10-604. Procedure — City administration of justice funds.

    1. Pursuant to § 16-10-308, each town or city which operates a district court is to create a city administration of justice fund.
      1. Any town or city operating a city court that becomes a department of district court shall continue to maintain the city administration of justice fund as originally established pursuant to § 16-10-308.
      2. The city administration of justice fund of any town or city shall cease to exist on and after the effective date of an ordinance that abolishes the department of district court for the town or city pursuant to state law.
    2. There shall be deposited into the fund:
      1. All receipts from the collection of uniform filing fees established by § 16-17-705 which are collected by the district court operated by the town or city; and
      2. All receipts from the collection of uniform court costs, established by § 16-10-305 which are collected by the county, town, or city official, agency, or department designated pursuant to § 16-13-709 as primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in the district court operated by the town or city.
  1. From the city administration of justice fund, the following fund transfers or disbursements shall be made on a monthly basis:
      1. Pursuant to § 16-10-308(c), the Department of Finance and Administration will certify for each town or city the town's or city's monthly share of uniform court costs and filing fees to be retained by the town or city.
        1. Each year the town or city council shall establish the amount of uniform filing fees and court costs to be appropriated to each of the town or city programs or agencies enumerated in § 16-10-308(b) from the town's or city's share of uniform court costs and filing fees.
        2. Each program or agency shall receive, as a minimum, the amount established by § 16-10-308(b).
      2. Each program or agency shall be paid, by warrant or fund transfer, a monthly installment of at least one-twelfth (1/12) of the annual appropriation provided for each by the town or city council;
      1. Pursuant to § 16-10-308(b)(5), the town or city shall remit to the county treasurer for deposit into the county administration of justice fund a portion of the town's or city's share of uniform court costs and filing fees.
      2. The amount of the remittance shall be based upon the amount, if any, of uniform court costs and filing fees which had been remitted by the town or city to the county to fund county-level programs and agencies during the base year defined in § 16-10-308(b).
      3. By common agreement, towns, cities, and counties may establish a different fixed dollar amount or percentage of the town's or city's monthly share of filing fees and court costs which shall be remitted to the county treasurer;
    1. For the calendar year beginning January 1, 1998, the amount of the remittance shall be based upon the amount, if any, of uniform court costs and filing fees which had been remitted by the town or city to fund county-level programs and agencies during the base year defined in § 16-10-308(b), less eighty-five percent (85%) of the total dollar amount which was certified by the town or city as having been collected during calendar year 1994 for the purpose of funding the office and operation of the public defender and public defender investigator; and
    2. The excess of the monthly receipts into the fund, less the town's or city's certified monthly share, shall be remitted to the department, pursuant to § 16-10-308(e).
    1. If a district court is operated solely by a county rather than a town or city and all of the uniform court costs and filing fees collected by the court are remitted to the county, the town or city shall not be required to create a city administration of justice fund.
    2. The town's or city's share of uniform court costs and filing fees shall be remitted directly to the county treasurer for deposit into the county administration of justice fund.
      1. For any district court which was created after January 1, 1994, such that the base year used to calculate the town's or city's share pursuant to § 16-10-308 was not complete, the town or city share shall be deemed to be fifty percent (50%) of the uniform court costs and filing fees collected and remitted to the city administration of justice fund.
      2. District courts created pursuant to § 16-17-901 et seq. shall not be considered for purposes of this section to have been created after January 1, 1994, or to have a base year that is not complete if the district court is merely a continuation of a district or city court that was in existence on December 31, 2007, or December 31, 2011 .
      3. From the fifty-percent share described in subdivision (d)(1)(A) of this section, the town or city shall disburse or transfer fifty percent (50%) of the funds to the local programs or agencies pursuant to subdivision (b)(1) of this section and fifty percent (50%) to the county treasurer pursuant to subdivision (b)(2) of this section.
    1. The remaining fifty percent (50%) shall be remitted to the Department of Finance and Administration, pursuant to § 16-10-308(e).

History. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 9; 1997, No. 1341, § 9; 2001, No. 1809, § 2; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 60, 61; 2007, No. 663, § 30.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment inserted “town or” preceding “city” or variant throughout the section; rewrote (a); substituted “§ 16-10-308(c)” for “§§ 16-10-308(c) and 21-6-403” in (b)(1)(A); deleted “provided that each” following “fees” in (b)(1)(B)(i); subdivided (c) into (1) and (2); deleted “rather, the” following “fund” in present (c)(1) and added “The town's or” at the beginning of present (c)(2); substituted “district” for “municipal, city, or police” in (d)(1)(A); added present (d)(1)(B) and redesignated former (d)(1)(B) as present (C); inserted “described in subdivision (d)(1)(A) of this section”; and made related changes.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

Subchapter 7 — Additional Filing Fees and Court Costs

Effective Dates. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 36: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Mar. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1997, No. 1341, § 35: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Apr. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 49: Apr. 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that prison overcrowding is one of the largest problems currently burdening the state both from a public safety and budgetary standpoint; that safe and effective measures are needed to immediately combat this problem; and that this act is immediately necessary because in the interests of public safety and the state budget the Department of Correction, Department of Community Correction, Department of Human Services, and the Parole Board should be allowed to immediately implement these new measures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-10-701. Additional fees for specialty court programs — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Pre-adjudication” means the period of time after:
      1. The prosecuting attorney files a criminal information or an indictment is filed in circuit court;
      2. The person named in the criminal information or indictment is arraigned on the charge in circuit court; and
      3. The person enters a specialty court program without a guilty plea or the person enters a plea of guilty but before the circuit court enters a judgment and pronounces a sentence against the person; and
    2. “Specialty court program” means:
      1. A pre-adjudication program under § 5-4-901 et seq.;
      2. An approved drug court program under the Arkansas Drug Court Act, § 16-98-301 et seq.;
      3. A Swift and Certain Accountability on Probation Pilot Program under § 16-93-1701 et seq.; and
      4. Any other specialty court program that has been approved by the Supreme Court, including without limitation specialty court programs known as:
        1. A DWI court;
        2. A mental health court;
        3. A veteran's court;
        4. A juvenile drug court;
        5. A “HOPE” court;
        6. A “smarter sentencing” court; and
        7. A mental health crisis intervention center.
  2. In addition to any other court cost or court fee provided by law:
    1. A specialty court program user fee of up to two hundred fifty dollars ($250) shall be assessed on any participant in a specialty court program and remitted to the Administration of Justice Funds Section by the court clerk for deposit into the State Treasury as special revenues credited to the Specialty Court Program Fund; and
    2. A specialty court program public defender user fee not to exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250) may be assessed by the court for a defendant who participates in a specialty court program designed for preadjudication purposes and who is appointed representation by a public defender and remitted to the Administration of Justice Funds Section by the court clerk for deposit into the State Treasury to the credit of the Public Defender User Fees Fund within the State Central Services Fund.
  3. A district court or circuit court may not assess and collect a fee under this section if the district court or circuit court is operating a specialty court program that has not been previously approved by or no longer meets the approval criteria of the Supreme Court.

History. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 17.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Pursuant to § 1-2-207, the amendment to this section by Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 62 and 63, were superseded by the repeal of this section by Acts 2003, No. 1474, § 1.

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

Publisher's Notes. Former § 16-10-701, concerning adoption of additional court costs and filing fees, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1474, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1997, No. 788, § 29; 1997, No. 1341, § 28.

Subchapter 8 — Substitute Trial Court Administrators

Publisher's Notes. Acts 2015, No. 268, § 3, substituted “Administrators” for “Staff Persons” in the subchapter heading.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, No. 268, § 16: July 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one-year period; that the act entitled ‘AN ACT TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATION FOR PERSONAL SERVICES AND OPERATING EXPENSES FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS FOR THE OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS AND TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATORS OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 2016; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.’ requires the passage of this act; that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 2015, is essential to the operation of the Administrative Office of the Courts, and that in the event of an extension of the legislative session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 2015, could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 2015.”

16-10-801. Temporary employment authorized.

As authorized by § 16-13-3302, in the absence or unavailability of the trial court administrator the circuit judge may temporarily employ the services of a substitute trial court administrator if the temporary employment is essential to prevent a disruption of the business of the court.

History. Acts 1999, No. 393, § 1; 2015, No. 268, § 3.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment rewrote the section.

16-10-802. Information provided to Administrative Office of the Courts.

  1. When a circuit judge temporarily employs a substitute trial court administrator, the circuit judge may certify to the Administrative Office of the Courts upon forms prepared by the office that he or she has temporarily employed a substitute trial court administrator and that the temporary employment was essential to prevent a disruption of the business of his or her court.
  2. The circuit judge shall further furnish to the office the name, address, and Social Security number of the substitute trial court administrator and the number of days the substitute trial court administrator was or will be temporarily employed, plus any other information concerning the employment requested by the office.

History. Acts 1999, No. 393, § 2; 2015, No. 268, § 3.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment substituted “Administrative Office of the Courts” for “Auditor of State” and “administrator” for “staff person” throughout; in (a), substituted “When” for “Whenever,” inserted “circuit” before “judge may,” deleted “the services of” following “employed,” and deleted “necessary and” preceding “essential”; and inserted “circuit” preceding “judge” in (b).

16-10-803. Payment.

  1. The Administrative Office of the Courts may pay from funds specifically appropriated for this purpose a substitute trial court administrator for the services furnished to the circuit judge under this subchapter.
  2. The substitute trial court administrator shall be paid at the rate of one hundred twenty-five dollars ($125) per day.

History. Acts 1999, No. 393, § 3; 2001, No. 509, § 1; 2005, No. 461, § 1; 2015, No. 268, § 3.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “the rate of one hundred twenty-five dollars ($125) per day” for “a daily rate, based upon the daily pay rate of the trial court staff person for whom he or she is substituting” in (b).

The 2015 amendment substituted “administrator” for “staff person” throughout; in (a), substituted “Administrative Office of the Courts may” for “Auditor of State is authorized to” and added “under this subchapter” to the end; and substituted “shall” for “will” in (b).

Cross References. Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

16-10-804. Extended employment periods.

  1. If a substitute trial court administrator is employed for a period that extends beyond the normal payroll period for the position, the Administrative Office of the Courts shall make an interim disbursement of the salary that has accrued during that period.
  2. In any one (1) fiscal year, however, the office shall not pay for the services of a substitute trial court administrator for any one (1) circuit judge in excess of thirty (30) working days unless approved and ordered by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

History. Acts 1999, No. 393, § 4; 2015, No. 268, § 3.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment substituted “Administrative Office of the Courts” for “Auditor of State” and “administrator” for “staff person” throughout; in (a), substituted “If a” for “In the event the” and “that” for “which”; and, in (b), substituted “shall” for “will” and “thirty (30)” for “eighty (80),” and deleted “Arkansas” preceding “Supreme Court.”

16-10-805. Employment of county staff.

This chapter does not preclude or prohibit any circuit judge from obtaining payment for the services of a substitute trial court administrator from the county or counties composing the circuit judge's judicial district rather than from the Administrative Office of the Courts.

History. Acts 1999, No. 393, § 5; 2015, No. 268, § 3.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment substituted “This chapter does not” for “Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to,” “administrator” for “staff person,” “composing” for “comprising,” and “Administrative Office of the Courts” for “Auditor of State” and inserted “circuit” preceding “judge's.”

Subchapter 9 — Compensation for Retired Judges Appointed to Temporary Service

A.C.R.C. Notes. The references throughout this subchapter to Amendment 78 are to Ark. Const., Amend. 78, as proposed by 1999 Senate Joint Resolution 9. This subchapter became effective when Ark. Const., Amend. 78 was adopted at the November 2000 general election and approved by a vote of 427,407 for and 355,943 against.

16-10-901. “Retired judge” defined.

For purposes of this subchapter, a retired judge is a former circuit judge, chancery judge, circuit-chancery judge, Court of Appeals judge, or Supreme Court justice receiving benefits under the Arkansas Judicial Retirement System.

History. Acts 1999, No. 390, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

As to the effective date of this subchapter and Ark. Const., Amend. 78, see A.C.R.C. Notes at the beginning of this subchapter.

“[Contingent Effective Date]” language was removed after passage of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 78.

16-10-902. Amount of compensation.

  1. A retired judge appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as a special judge under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, and the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court shall receive compensation, in addition to his or her retirement benefits, at one-half (½) the rate as fixed by law for a regularly elected circuit judge.
  2. The compensation shall be paid from the appropriation provided to the Auditor of State for special and recalled judges for the circuit courts.

History. Acts 1999, No. 390, § 2; 2001, No. 1071, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 64; 2011, No. 274, § 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As to the effective date of this subchapter and Ark. Const., Amend. 78, see A.C.R.C. Notes at the beginning of this subchapter.

“[Contingent Effective Date]” language was removed after passage of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 78.

Acts 2011, No. 274, § 1, provided:

“Legislative intent.

“(a) Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 13(C), provides that the Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court may appoint a special judge to serve in circuit court or district court whenever a judge is disqualified or temporarily unable to serve or when there is other need for a temporary appointment, under rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.

“(b) Special judges may include retired justices or judges, active circuit judges or district judges, or licensed attorneys.

“(c) The current laws that govern the payment of special judges have not been revised since the adoption of Amendment 80 and are in conflict and need of clarification.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment, in (a), substituted “by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as a special judge” for “to temporary service” and inserted “and the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court”; and added (b).

16-10-903. Retirement benefits.

The judge or justice shall not be entitled to a change in membership status or to any increase, decrease, or other modification to his or her retirement benefits as a result of his or her service after retirement.

History. Acts 1999, No. 390, § 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As to the effective date of this subchapter and Ark. Const., Amend. 78, see A.C.R.C. Notes at the beginning of this subchapter.

“[Contingent Effective Date]” language was removed after passage of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 78.

16-10-904. Mileage and expenses.

In addition to the per diem compensation provided by this subchapter, a special judge serving under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, shall receive expenses and mileage reimbursement from the appropriation provided to the Auditor of State for special and recalled judges for the circuit courts at the rate as prescribed in § 16-10-119.

History. Acts 1999, No. 390, § 4; 2001, No. 1071, § 2; 2011, No. 274, § 4.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As to the effective date of this subchapter and Ark. Const., Amend. 78, see A.C.R.C. Notes at the beginning of this subchapter.

“[Contingent Effective Date]” language was removed after passage of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 78.

Acts 2011, No. 274, § 1, provided:

“Legislative intent.

“(a) Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 13(C), provides that the Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court may appoint a special judge to serve in circuit court or district court whenever a judge is disqualified or temporarily unable to serve or when there is other need for a temporary appointment, under rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.

“(b) Special judges may include retired justices or judges, active circuit judges or district judges, or licensed attorneys.

“(c) The current laws that govern the payment of special judges have not been revised since the adoption of Amendment 80 and are in conflict and need of clarification.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “special” for “temporary” and “Amendment 80” for “Amendment 78”; and added “from the appropriation provided to the Auditor of State for special and recalled judges for the circuit courts.”

16-10-905. Amount of per diem compensation.

  1. Per diem compensation prescribed in § 16-10-902 shall be for each day or portion of a day the judge serves on the bench.
  2. For each day or portion of a day that a special judge appointed under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, performs his or her judicial duties other than on the bench, the judge shall receive compensation as prescribed by rules adopted by the Supreme Court.

History. Acts 1999, No. 390, § 5; 2011, No. 274, § 5.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As to the effective date of this subchapter and Ark. Const., Amend. 78, see A.C.R.C. Notes at the beginning of this subchapter.

“[Contingent Effective Date]” language was removed after passage of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 78.

Acts 2011, No. 274, § 1, provided:

“Legislative intent.

“(a) Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 13(C), provides that the Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court may appoint a special judge to serve in circuit court or district court whenever a judge is disqualified or temporarily unable to serve or when there is other need for a temporary appointment, under rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.

“(b) Special judges may include retired justices or judges, active circuit judges or district judges, or licensed attorneys.

“(c) The current laws that govern the payment of special judges have not been revised since the adoption of Amendment 80 and are in conflict and need of clarification.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment subdivided the previously undesignated section into (a) and (b); and, in (b), substituted “special” for “temporary” and “Amendment 80” for “Amendment 78.”

Subchapter 10 — Arkansas Court Security Act

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2007, No. 576, § 3, provided:

“The General Assembly recommends:

“(1) That the Supreme Court develop a comprehensive policy on security and emergency preparedness for the judicial branch of the government;

“(2) That the Supreme Court establish standards for every county for the development of a local security and emergency preparedness plan for circuit courts in the county and establish standards for every city in which a district court is located for the development of a local security and emergency preparedness plan for district courts in the city; and

“(3)(A) That the Supreme Court create a Security and Emergency Preparedness Advisory Committee.

“(B) The committee should be inclusive of judges, law enforcement officers, sheriffs, city and county executive officers, emergency preparedness officials, legislators, and others involved in providing security to the courts.

“(C) Legislative representation on the committee should be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate.”

16-10-1001. Title.

This subchapter shall be known as the “Arkansas Court Security Act”.

History. Acts 2007, No. 576, § 1.

16-10-1002. Purpose and findings.

  1. Recent incidents involving serious court security failures resulting in death or injury to judges and others in court facilities across the United States indicate that court security is an issue requiring an immediate response from this state.
  2. It is a valid expectation that every person who attends or is present in a court proceeding in a district, circuit, or appellate court in this state is entitled to a reasonably safe and secure environment.
  3. It is a goal of this state to provide citizens, litigants, jurors, attorneys, court employees, and judges with a safe and secure venue in which to work and conduct business.
  4. It is the purpose of this subchapter to establish a general program for security and emergency preparedness for the judicial branch of government.

History. Acts 2007, No. 576, § 1.

16-10-1003. Administrative Office of the Courts — Duties — Director of Security and Emergency Preparedness.

  1. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall:
    1. Assist the Supreme Court with the creation and management of a state security and emergency preparedness plan for the judicial branch of government; and
    2. Provide assistance and support to city and county governments of this state for the adoption and implementation of local security and emergency preparedness plans for circuit and district courts.
    1. There is created within the Administrative Office of the Courts a Director of Security and Emergency Preparedness for the judicial branch of government. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall provide space and administrative assistance to support the work of the Director of Security and Emergency Preparedness.
    2. The Director of Security and Emergency Preparedness shall report to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts.
    3. The Director of Security and Emergency Preparedness shall:
      1. Assist with the development and adoption of a state security and emergency preparedness plan for the judicial branch of government;
      2. Assist agencies of this state and local governments of this state with the development and adoption of local security and emergency preparedness plans for circuit and district courts;
      3. Assist in the development and provision of training and education on court security and emergency preparedness to judges, court employees, and court security officers;
      4. Conduct periodic assessments of state and local security and emergency preparedness plans for courts and note deficiencies and areas of improvement; and
      5. Serve as the point of contact on state court security and emergency preparedness issues for the judicial branch of government and act as the representative of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to executive and legislative branch officials involved with the issues of court security and emergency preparedness.

History. Acts 2007, No. 576, § 1.

16-10-1004. Court security officers — Definition.

    1. There is established a training and certification program for court security officers.
    2. As used in this section, “court security officer” means an individual who is assigned the duty of providing security or security-related services at the request of an appellate court, circuit court, or district court in this state.
      1. A court security officer may be employed directly by an appellate court, circuit court, district court, or a law enforcement agency of this state or a city or county in this state.
      2. A court security officer may provide services to a court on either a full-time or part-time basis.
  1. The duties of a court security officer may include:
    1. The attendance in court when court is in session;
    2. The supervision and maintenance of order in a courtroom or courthouse;
    3. Providing security for individuals involved in court proceedings; and
    4. Other incidental and related duties at the direction of a court.
  2. In order to be eligible to provide services in an appellate court, circuit court, or district court in this state, a court security officer shall:
      1. Be certified as a law enforcement officer by the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training under the laws and rules of this state.
      2. A court security officer shall complete the law enforcement certification requirement within one (1) year of beginning his or her term of service as a court security officer.
      3. A court security officer shall maintain the law enforcement certification during the term of his or her service as a court security officer; and
      1. Complete an additional training program for court security officers approved by the commission.
      2. A court security officer shall complete the additional training program for court security officers within one (1) year of beginning his or her term of service as a court security officer.
  3. A court or law enforcement agency employing a court security officer shall:
    1. Ensure that a court security officer meets or attains the certification required under subdivisions (c)(1)(B) and (c)(2)(B) of this section; and
    2. Require submission of and maintain records for the documentation of the court security officer's certification as a law enforcement officer and of the court security officer's completion of the additional training program for court security officers.
    1. Subject to the certification requirements of the commission, the officers of the Supreme Court police may offer and provide training for court security officers as required by this section.
    2. In addition to the general powers of a specialized law enforcement officer, Supreme Court police officers may, in the course of their official duties, provide security for members of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals when either court shall convene for the purpose of considering oral arguments or conferencing in any location within the State of Arkansas, including the authority to act as a peace officer to arrest, with or without warrant, any person within the boundaries of the State of Arkansas who is or is reasonably believed to be committing an offense against any laws of the State of Arkansas or against the ordinances of the city in which the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals is convened, and to deliver the person before any court of competent jurisdiction to be dealt with according to law.

History. Acts 2007, No. 576, § 1; 2009, No. 236, § 1; 2011, No. 1132, § 4; 2019, No. 315, § 1293.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The reference in subdivision (c)(2)(A) to the “Supreme Court Security and Emergency Preparedness Advisory Committee” refers to Acts 2007, No. 576, § 3, which provided:

“The General Assembly recommends:

“(1) That the Supreme Court develop a comprehensive policy on security and emergency preparedness for the judicial branch of the government;

“(2) That the Supreme Court establish standards for every county for the development of a local security and emergency preparedness plan for circuit courts in the county and establish standards for every city in which a district court is located for the development of a local security and emergency preparedness plan for district courts in the city; and

“(3)(A) That the Supreme Court create a Security and Emergency Preparedness Advisory Committee.

“(B) The committee should be inclusive of judges, law enforcement officers, sheriffs, city and county executive officers, emergency preparedness officials, legislators, and others involved in providing security to the courts.

“(C) Legislative representation on the committee should be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate.”

Acts 2009, No. 236, § 2, provided: “A person who is a court security officer on the effective date of this act shall complete the additional training program for court security officers in Arkansas Code § 16-10-1004(c) by December 31, 2009, or within one (1) year of the beginning of his or her term of service as a court security officer, whichever is later.”

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote (c)(2) and (d).

The 2011 amendment deleted “recommended by the Supreme Court Security and Emergency Preparedness Advisory Committee and” following “court security officers” in (c)(2)(A).

The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (c)(1)(A).

16-10-1005. Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training — Duties.

The Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training shall:

  1. Establish the standards and requirements for the training and certification program for court security officers;
  2. Work with the Administrative Office of the Courts to develop curriculum specific to the needs and requirements of a court security officer;
  3. Maintain an official roster of individuals who have successfully completed the training of a court security officer;
  4. Establish minimum curriculum requirements and approve courses and programs offered and operated by or for this state or its political subdivisions for the specific purpose of offering training to a court security officer; and
  5. Consult and cooperate with counties, municipalities, agencies of this state, other governmental agencies, universities, colleges, junior colleges, community colleges, and other institutions or organizations concerning the development of court security officer programs or courses of instruction.

History. Acts 2007, No. 576, § 1.

16-10-1006. Court security grant program.

  1. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall administer a court security grant program for the purpose of providing financial assistance from funds specifically appropriated for that purpose to city and county governments to assist in the implementation of local security and emergency preparedness plans for circuit courts and district courts.
    1. Guidelines for the court security grant program shall be developed by the Administrative Office of the Courts by December 31, 2007, and shall be approved by the Legislative Council prior to the disbursement of any grant funds.
    2. Beginning July 31, 2008, and on July 31 of every year, the Administrative Office of the Courts shall provide an annual report to the Legislative Council that shall include the number of grant requests received from cities and counties and the number and amount of grants approved.

History. Acts 2007, No. 576, § 1.

Subchapter 11 — Court Interpreters

16-10-1101. Purpose.

  1. The State of Arkansas requires that court proceedings be conducted in the English language under § 16-10-107.
  2. Recognizing that a person with limited English proficiency cannot fully participate in the legal process and exercise the rights afforded to him or her, a court shall appoint a qualified interpreter to assist a person with limited English proficiency in a court proceeding.

History. Acts 2013, No. 237, § 1.

16-10-1102. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Interpret” means to convey spoken English in a manner understood by a person who has limited English proficiency by using American Sign Language and transliteration, Communication Access Realtime Translation (CART) services or similar procedures, or a language in which the person is fluent, and to convey the communication made by that person into spoken English; and
  2. “Limited English proficiency” means either:
    1. The inability of a person to adequately understand or communicate effectively in English in a court proceeding because the person has not developed fluency in English; or
    2. The inability of a person to adequately hear, understand, or communicate effectively in English in a court proceeding due to a speech impairment, hearing loss, deafness, deaf-blindness, or other disability.

History. Acts 2013, No. 237, § 1.

16-10-1103. Court interpreter for persons with limited English proficiency.

  1. A person with limited English proficiency who is a party to or a witness in a court proceeding is entitled to a qualified interpreter to interpret for the person throughout the court proceeding.
    1. The Supreme Court shall administer an interpreter program to appoint and use interpreters in court proceedings and to ensure interpreter certification, continued proficiency, and discipline.
    2. Staff and administrative support required by the Supreme Court relating to the program shall be provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts, and the program may include:
      1. Establishing and administering a comprehensive testing and certification program for foreign language interpreters;
      2. Establishing and adopting standards concerning written and verbal proficiency in English and the foreign language to be interpreted;
      3. Establishing and adopting recognized standards for interpreters for the deaf and hearing impaired, including without limitation certification by the Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf, Inc., or similar registries;
      4. Conducting periodic examinations to ensure the availability of certified interpreters;
      5. Charging reasonable fees as necessary for testing and certification;
      6. Ensuring reciprocity of certification for interpreters from other jurisdictions provided that the criteria for certification in the other jurisdiction is comparable to that established by the office;
      7. Establishing a schedule of reasonable fees for services rendered by interpreters in court proceedings;
      8. Establishing a process to review and respond to allegations of misconduct by interpreters; and
      9. Addressing other matters relating to interpreters in the courts.
    1. The General Assembly may appropriate to the office funds as necessary to establish a program to facilitate the use of interpreters and otherwise satisfy the requirements of this subchapter.
    2. Implementation of this subchapter is contingent upon the availability of appropriated funds to carry out its purposes.
    1. With the support of the office, all court personnel shall make a reasonable effort to ensure public awareness of interpreter services.
    2. Clerks of courts shall clearly publicize the availability of interpreter services.

History. Acts 2013, No. 237, § 1; 2015, No. 1152, § 2.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment substituted “other” for “foreign” preceding “jurisdiction is comparable” in (b)(2)(F).

16-10-1104. Appointment of interpreter.

  1. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall compile, maintain, and disseminate a certified registry of qualified interpreters for the courts.
  2. When an interpreter is requested or when the court determines that a party to or a witness in a court proceeding has limited English proficiency, a qualified interpreter shall be appointed under procedures adopted by the Supreme Court.
  3. An attorney, a clerk of court, employee or officer of a law enforcement agency, or a party to or a witness in a court proceeding shall notify the court as soon as the need for an interpreter is identified.
  4. If a qualified interpreter is not available through the office's registry, the court may appoint an interpreter qualified under procedures adopted by the court, and the interpreter shall take the oath under § 16-10-1105.

History. Acts 2013, No. 237, § 1.

16-10-1105. Interpreter oath.

Before commencing his or her duties, an interpreter appointed under this subchapter shall take an oath in substantially the following form: “Do you [swear] [affirm] that you will make a true and impartial interpretation using your best skills and judgment in accordance with the standards and ethics of the interpreter profession and that you will abide by the Arkansas Code of Professional Responsibility for Interpreters in the Judiciary, [so help you God][under the penalty of perjury]?”

History. Acts 2013, No. 237, § 1.

16-10-1106. Replacement of interpreter.

  1. A court that appoints an interpreter shall dismiss the interpreter and obtain the services of a qualified interpreter under procedures adopted by the Supreme Court:
    1. If the interpreter fails to follow the standards prescribed by law or by the Arkansas Code of Professional Responsibility for Interpreters in the Judiciary;
    2. If the interpreter is unable to effectively communicate; or
    3. For other reasons prescribed by the Supreme Court.
  2. A court that appoints an interpreter shall notify the Administrative Office of the Courts in writing if the court dismisses an interpreter, setting forth the reason for the dismissal.

History. Acts 2013, No. 237, § 1.

16-10-1107. Confidential communications in presence of interpreter.

An interpreter appointed under this subchapter shall not be compelled to testify in a court proceeding as to any statements made by the person with limited English proficiency and interpreted by the interpreter when the person with limited English proficiency is engaged in a privileged communication recognized by the Arkansas Rules of Evidence.

History. Acts 2013, No. 237, § 1.

16-10-1108. Compensation of interpreter.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the payment of the cost of providing an interpreter appointed under this subchapter shall be the responsibility of the local government responsible for funding the court that has jurisdiction over the court proceeding.
  2. If an interpreter from the registry maintained by the Administrative Office of the Courts is appointed by a court, the court may certify upon prescribed forms upon the conclusion of the interpreter's services those services to the office for payment from funds specifically appropriated for this purpose at the rate set by the office.
  3. A person with limited English proficiency who is a party to or witness in a court proceeding shall not be denied the services of an interpreter because he or she is unable to pay for the services.
  4. A defendant in a criminal proceeding shall not be required to pay a fee for the services of a court-appointed interpreter.
  5. If costs are assessed or collected by the court under the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, the disposition of the costs shall be at the discretion of the court, and the court may order reimbursement to the local government responsible for funding the court or the office for its responsibilities under this subchapter.

History. Acts 2013, No. 237, § 1.

Chapter 11 Supreme Court

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2015, No. 221, § 8, provided: “ACCESS TO JUSTICE.

The General Assembly finds that the Access to Justice Foundation serves a public purpose, therefore financial accounting, general bookkeeping, management and administrative services may be provided by employees of the Arkansas Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Bar of Arkansas in support of the Arkansas Access to Justice Foundation, Inc.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2015 through June 30, 2016.”

Acts 2016, No. 232, § 8, provided: “ACCESS TO JUSTICE. The General Assembly finds that the Access to Justice Foundation serves a public purpose, therefore financial accounting, general bookkeeping, management and administrative services may be provided by employees of the Arkansas Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Bar of Arkansas in support of the Arkansas Access to Justice Foundation, Inc.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Smith, The Influence of the Arkansas Supreme Court's Opinions on Policy Made by the General Assembly: A Case Study, 18 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 441.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1991, No. 7, § 6, provided:

“The General Assembly recognizes that each judge of the Arkansas Supreme Court incurs considerable expense in carrying out his or her responsibilities to the people of the State of Arkansas, including expenses for housing; the purchase and maintenance of an automobile; the acquisition, maintenance and equipping of a home-office where the judge can work nights, weekends and other times when it is inappropriate or impractical to work in his or her regular office; for attending bar, civic and social meetings and in otherwise carrying out their responsibilities as judges of the Arkansas Supreme Court; and that said judges should be entitled to a monthly expense allowance to cover such expenses.

“The funds appropriated by Item (10) of Section 1 herein may be used by each judge of the Arkansas Supreme Court to cover his expenses. The monthly allowance for fiscal year 1991-92 shall not exceed $550 per month and for fiscal year 1992-93 shall not exceed $550 per month.

“The amount prescribed herein shall be paid monthly upon vouchers submitted by such judges, with each such voucher to state only that it is for expenses incurred by such judge in carrying out his or her responsibilities to the people of the state as described herein.

“Upon receipt of each such voucher, the Auditor of State shall issue a warrant payable to the judge claiming such expense allowance and the State Treasurer is hereby authorized to pay the same from the funds appropriated for such purpose. The balance of the appropriation for housing and transportation which remains at the close of business of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1992, shall be carried forward into the fiscal year ending June 30, 1993, there to be used for the same purpose.”

Preambles. Acts 1977, No. 545 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, the Model Criminal Jury Instructions Committee has devoted considerable time and energy to the development of proposed Model Criminal Jury Instructions, to be followed in the several circuit courts of this State in criminal cases; and

“Whereas, upon completion of the Committee's work, such Model Criminal Jury Instructions will be submitted to the Arkansas Supreme Court for its consideration; and

“Whereas, it is essential that the Model Criminal Jury Instructions as considered and approved by the Arkansas Supreme Court be published in an appropriate manner, to be made available to the trial courts, prosecuting attorneys, members of the Bar, and to the public, and that provision also be made for the publication of supplements to said publication that may be developed and approved by order of the Supreme Court from time to time;

“Now, therefore….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1868 (Adj. Sess.), No. 1, § 5: effective on passage.

Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [890]: effective 90 days after passage.

Acts 1874 (Spec. Sess.), No. 9, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1895, No. 145, § 9: effective on passage.

Acts 1925, No. 205, § 5: approved Mar. 21, 1925. Emergency clause provided: “That the Supreme Court of this state being more than a year behind with its docket hereby causing unreasonable delay in the dispensation of justice, constitutes an emergency making it necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, that this act take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1961, No. 132, § 3: Feb. 22, 1961. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of Arkansas that the funds available to the Supreme Court for the maintenance and improvement of the Supreme Court Library are grossly inadequate, that there is urgent need for additional funds, and that enactment of this bill will provide the additional necessary funds. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1963, No. 6, § 3: approved Feb. 1, 1963. Emergency clause provided: “It has been determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the present restrictions in the law make it difficult to employ competent personnel and causes great hardships on the citizens of this state and only the provisions of this act will correct the situation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, the same shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1985, No. 665, § 5: July 1, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Fifth General Assembly that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1985, is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in the Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1985, could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and providing of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1985.”

Acts 2013, No. 1026, § 11: July 1, 2013. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one (1) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 2013 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the legislative session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 2013 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 2013.”

Acts 2019, No. 780, § 10: July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one (1) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 2019 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the legislative session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 2019 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 2019”.

Research References

Am. Jur. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 16 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

A New Judicial System for Arkansas, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 221.

C.J.S. 21 C.J.S., Courts, §§ 8, 319, 320.

16-11-101. Terms of court — Recess — Adjournment.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas shall begin its annual term on the second Monday of September in each year and may recess and adjourn from time to time as the court orders.

History. Acts 1874 (Spec. Sess.), No. 9, § 1, p. 12; C. & M. Dig., § 2121; Pope's Dig., § 2723; Acts 1961, No. 134, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-205; Acts 1995, No. 549, § 3.

16-11-102. Adjournment of court in absence of quorum.

If a quorum of the court is not present at the time and place fixed by law for holding court, the court shall stand adjourned until the first Monday next following. If a quorum is not present on that day, the court shall stand adjourned by operation of law, from day to day, until a quorum appears, and then proceed to business and continue in session until all business ready for trial is adjudicated.

History. Acts 1868 (Adj. Sess.), No. 1, § 3, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 2123; Pope's Dig., § 2729; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-209.

16-11-103. Divisions of court.

  1. The court may sit in two (2) divisions to be designated Division I and Division II.
  2. Each division shall be composed of three (3) justices.
    1. The Chief Justice shall alternate in presiding over these divisions. In addition, he or she shall have a vote and the same power as an associate justice.
    2. At each sitting, the division not being presided over by the Chief Justice shall be presided over by the justice in that division having the highest seniority by reason of service as a justice.
  3. In case of a tie in either division, the cause shall be transferred to the court en banc for decision.

History. Acts 1925, No. 205, §§ 2, 3; Pope's Dig., §§ 2725, 2726; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-206, 22-207.

Case Notes

Remedies.

Where defendant sought to establish its right to receive water service from city unencumbered by the previous tenants' unpaid bill, writ of mandamus was not the proper remedy as mandamus may not be used to establish a legal right, and defendant should have sought relief under this section by filing a petition for declaratory relief. Buttolph Trust v. Jarnagan, 302 Ark. 393, 789 S.W.2d 466 (1990).

Cited: Citizens Bank v. Estate of Pettyjohn, 282 Ark. 222, 667 S.W.2d 657 (1984).

16-11-104. Cases heard en banc.

  1. In all cases where the construction of the Arkansas Constitution is involved, or in a capital criminal case, the cause shall be heard by the court en banc.
  2. In each case heard by the court en banc, the concurrence of four (4) judges shall be necessary to a decision.

History. Acts 1925, No. 205, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 2725; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-206.

Case Notes

Affirmance.

Judgment of the lower court is affirmed where majority of judges agree to it though they differ as to reason therefor. Pollock v. C. Hennicke Co., 64 Ark. 180, 46 S.W. 185 (1897) (decision under prior law).

When the judges of the court are equally divided on a case, the judgment of the lower court will not be disturbed. Barnard & Leas Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 77 Ark. 590, 92 S.W. 858 (1906) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Citizens Bank v. Estate of Pettyjohn, 282 Ark. 222, 667 S.W.2d 657 (1984); Arkansas Intercollegiate Conference v. Parnham, 309 Ark. 170, 828 S.W.2d 828 (1992).

16-11-105. Rules and laws applicable to court.

  1. All rules of the Supreme Court and all laws respecting the Supreme Court shall apply to the Supreme Court sitting in divisions and en banc.
  2. The Supreme Court may make such further rules as may be necessary for the transaction and dispatch of business.
  3. The Supreme Court may, by general rules, provide what causes shall have a preference on the docket.

History. Civil Code, § 17; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [17], p. 219; 1925, No. 205, § 4; C. & M. Dig., § 2126; Pope's Dig., §§ 2727, 2732; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-208, 22-213; Acts 2019, No. 315, § 1294.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment deleted “and regulations” following “rules” in (b).

Case Notes

Preference on Docket.

A cause will not be advanced on the ground of public interest unless it appears that some department of the government will be embarrassed by the delay. Brodie v. Fitzgerald, 55 Ark. 460, 18 S.W. 632 (1892).

16-11-106. Issuance of writs and process.

The Supreme Court shall have power to direct the forms of writs and process which are not contrary to or inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of this state.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 2126; Pope's Dig., § 2732; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-212.

Case Notes

Attorney General.

On appeal of the order granting a permanent guardianship of appellant's son to his grandmother, the Supreme Court of Arkansas did not address the merits of appellant's constitutional challenge to the guardianship statutes, §§ 28-65-101 to 28-65-707, because the attorney general was not notified of the challenge as required by subsection (b) of this section and there had not been a complete adversarial development of the constitutional issues. Mahavier v. Mahavier (In re A.M.), 2012 Ark. 278 (2012).

Writs.

A writ of prohibition is issued to prohibit a court from acting, while a writ of certiorari is issued to direct a judge to perform a duty. Dougan v. Gray, 318 Ark. 6, 884 S.W.2d 239 (1994).

A writ of certiorari lies where there is a lack of jurisdiction or there has been an act in excess of jurisdiction that is apparent on the face of the record; it is not to be used to look beyond the face of the record to ascertain the actual merits of a controversy, or to control discretion, or to review a finding of facts, or to reverse a trial court's discretionary authority. Dougan v. Gray, 318 Ark. 6, 884 S.W.2d 239 (1994).

A writ of prohibition is never issued to prevent a trial court from erroneously exercising jurisdiction; it is issued only where the trial court is wholly without jurisdiction. Dougan v. Gray, 318 Ark. 6, 884 S.W.2d 239 (1994).

A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary writ and is granted only when the lower court is wholly without jurisdiction, when there are no disputed facts, when there is no adequate remedy otherwise, and when the writ is clearly warranted. Dougan v. Gray, 318 Ark. 6, 884 S.W.2d 239 (1994).

16-11-107. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the senior justice presiding in absence of Chief Justice, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 65. The section was derived from Acts 1868 (Adj. Sess.), No. 1, § 4, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 2124; Pope's Dig., § 2730; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-210.

16-11-108. Disqualification of justice.

No justice of the Supreme Court shall sit on the determination of any case in which he or she is interested in the outcome, is related to any party within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity, has been counsel in the case or presided over it in any inferior court, or is otherwise disqualified under the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, unless the parties waive the disqualification, as provided in the code.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 23; C. & M. Dig., § 2125; Pope's Dig., § 2731; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-211; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 66.

Cross References. Motions requesting disqualification, S. Ct. & Ct. App. Rule 6-4.

Case Notes

Interest in Suit.

Justice of Supreme Court is disqualified when his salary is involved. Ferrell v. Keel, 103 Ark. 96, 146 S.W. 494 (1912).

Recusal.

Appellee's motion for vacatur, treated as a Letter of Suggestion of Disqualification under former S. Ct. Rule 27 (now S. Ct. and Ct. App. Rule 6-4), alleging that the Chief Justice had a social relationship with an attorney involved in this case and that because of this relationship, all members of the Arkansas Supreme Court should be disqualified, was denied. First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Stoltz, 312 Ark. 516, 849 S.W.2d 525 (1993).

16-11-109. Law clerks.

No person shall be employed as a law clerk by the Arkansas Supreme Court unless that person is a licensed attorney or a graduate of a law school approved by the State Board of Law Examiners.

History. Acts 1961, No. 244, § 1; 1963, No. 6, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-241.

16-11-110. Library — Librarian.

    1. Except as provided in this section, the Supreme Court Library shall be under the exclusive control and supervision of the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are hereby authorized to make such rules regarding its use and operation as they may deem proper.
      1. There shall be a Director of the Supreme Court Library who shall be nominated by the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
      2. Subsequent to the appointment, the Director of the Supreme Court Library shall hold office at the pleasure of the Supreme Court.
  1. All books obtained and placed in the library shall be the absolute property of the state, subject to the control and management of the Supreme Court, except:
    1. Items deposited in the library by the United States Superintendent of Documents under the Federal Depository Library Program; and
    2. The reports of the Supreme Court directed to be placed in the library, which may be exchanged by the Director of the Supreme Court Library for the reports of the other states or of the United States courts or for other law books, under the direction of the Supreme Court.
    1. The Director of the Supreme Court Library shall have the authority to accept any donation of books, money, or property to increase the library.
    2. Any donation of money shall be deposited in the Supreme Court Library Fund.
  2. The Secretary of State is directed, upon demand, to deliver to the Director of the Supreme Court Library, whenever there are two (2) or more copies of any statute book, book of reports of any court of the United States, or any other law book in his or her office, one (1) copy of every such statute book or book of reports or law book.
    1. Every person who is enrolled as an attorney in the Supreme Court shall pay a fee determined by rule of the Supreme Court for enrolling and recording the license and the certified transcript thereof furnished to the attorney.
    2. The clerk shall deposit this fee in the Supreme Court Library Fund to be used by the Supreme Court for the maintenance and improvement of the library.
    1. The Director of the Supreme Court Library is authorized and empowered at any time to dispose of any books, magazines, papers, or files which may be in the custody or care of the library and which may be found by the Supreme Court to be no longer useful.
      1. The disposition may be by any method permitted by law, as the Director of the Supreme Court Library may determine.
      2. If the disposition is by sale, then the proceeds shall be placed in the Supreme Court Library Fund.

History. Acts 1851, §§ 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, p. 89; 1895, No. 145, § 7, p. 213; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2141, 4572, 9776a, 9776d-9776f, 9776h, 9776i; Pope's Dig., §§ 2747, 5656, 13310, 13313-13315, 13317, 13318; Acts 1961, No. 132, § 1; 1961, No. 133, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 12-1709, 22-232, 22-234 — 22-238; Acts 1999, No. 960, § 1; 2019, No. 315, § 1295.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment deleted “and regulations” following “rules” in (a)(1).

16-11-111. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning disposal of books, papers, magazines, and files, was repealed by Acts 1999, No. 960, § 2. The section was derived from Acts 1957, No. 67, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-239, 22-240.

16-11-112. Authorization to contract for publication of Arkansas Model Jury Instructions.

  1. The Arkansas Supreme Court is authorized to provide for the publication by private publishing firms of the Arkansas Model Criminal Jury Instructions and the Arkansas Model Civil Jury Instructions for use in the trial courts of this state.
  2. The Supreme Court shall solicit proposals from reputable publishing firms and may enter into contracts with the publishing firms which are deemed by the court to offer the best proposals for the separate publication of the Arkansas Model Criminal Jury Instructions and the Arkansas Model Civil Jury Instructions, with provision being made for the publication from time to time of pocket part supplements containing revisions or additions to the instructions if the prices at which the publishers propose to sell the Arkansas Model Criminal Jury Instructions and the Arkansas Model Civil Jury Instructions are deemed to be reasonable and adequate by the Supreme Court and upon the publisher's agreeing to pay to the Supreme Court a reasonable market-rate royalty for the use and benefit of the Supreme Court Library Fund.
  3. The Supreme Court may delegate to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, or to any other employee or official of the court as the court may designate, the responsibility for soliciting and tabulating bid proposals and performing other duties as may be directed by the Supreme Court.
  4. The awarding of contracts to private publishers for the publication of the Arkansas Model Criminal Jury Instructions and the Arkansas Model Civil Jury Instructions shall be by a majority vote of the justices of the Supreme Court sitting in session for that purpose.

History. Acts 1977, No. 545, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-250, 22-251; Acts 2001, No. 625, § 1.

16-11-113. Expenses of Supreme Court.

  1. All expenditures for fuel, blank books, and stationery accruing in the Supreme Court shall be paid out of the State Treasury from any moneys appropriated for the contingent expenses of the Supreme Court.
  2. The Auditor of State shall draw his or her warrant for the amount of the expenditures. The certificate of the court shall be a sufficient voucher.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, §§ 45, 46; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2116, 2117; Pope's Dig., §§ 2720, 2721; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-214, 22-215.

16-11-114. Salaries of Chief Justice and associate justices.

The salary of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be seventy-one thousand eight hundred seventy dollars ($71,870) per annum, and the salary of each associate justice of the Supreme Court shall be sixty-six thousand ten dollars ($66,010) per annum.

History. Acts 1985, No. 665, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-140.

16-11-115. Compensation of special justice.

Each special justice of the Supreme Court who is not a retired judge or justice or an active circuit or district judge, appointed under the provisions of the Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 13, shall receive, as full compensation for services rendered, the sum of one hundred dollars ($100) for each case in the special justice's or special judge's commission. When the case or cases shall be decided, this amount shall be certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court after having been approved by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

History. Acts 1981, No. 607, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-130; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 67.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

16-11-116. Employees of the Supreme Court — Bar of Arkansas.

  1. Pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 28, the Supreme Court is charged with the authority and responsibility to regulate the practice of law. As of July 1, 2013, those persons who are employed by the Supreme Court to carry out these responsibilities and who are paid from the Bar of Arkansas account shall be considered employees of the State of Arkansas administered by the Supreme Court.
  2. For all purposes involving annual leave, sick leave, and career service recognition as a state employee, years of service as an employee of the Supreme Court — Bar of Arkansas shall be recognized as eligible service as a state employee.
  3. Notwithstanding § 19-4-801 or any other law to the contrary, employees shall be paid from cash funds of the Supreme Court derived solely from revenues received from attorney license fees and any other fees, fines, interest income, or other revenues derived from the regulation of the practice of law that may be deposited into the Bar of Arkansas account as determined by the Supreme Court.
      1. On July 1, 2013, the Bar of Arkansas Employees Pension Plan shall be abolished, and its power, duties, plan liabilities and assets shall be transferred to and assumed by the Arkansas Public Employees’ Retirement System, together with all accrued service credit due its members.
      2. All current members and beneficiaries of the Bar of Arkansas Employees Pension Plan shall be members of the Arkansas Public Employees’ Retirement System and covered by that system's eligibility, retirement and beneficiary provisions, except that those employees who were members of the Bar of Arkansas Employees Pension Plan and who were eligible for the lump-sum distribution provisions of that plan as referenced in Section 9.2(h) of the official plan document shall retain those rights as provided by the Bar of Arkansas Employees Pension Plan.
    1. Employees of the Supreme Court — Bar of Arkansas who are hired after July 1, 2013, shall be enrolled in the Arkansas Public Employees’ Retirement System as a condition of employment as provided for in § 24-4-301.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1026, § 8.

16-11-117. Access to Justice Foundation.

The General Assembly finds that as the Access to Justice Foundation Inc. serves a public purpose, financial accounting, general bookkeeping, and management and administrative services may be provided by employees of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court — Bar of Arkansas in support of the Arkansas Access to Justice Foundation Inc.

History. Acts 2019, No. 780, § 7.

Subchapter 2 — Supreme Court Reports

Effective Dates. Acts 1915, No. 326, § 15: approved Mar. 30, 1915. Emergency declared.

Acts 1981, No. 803, § 5: Mar. 28, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Third General Assembly that courts in Arkansas are faced with a tremendous increase in their workload; that appeals from the trial courts will continue their upward trend in view of the continued record-shattering number of cases filed in these courts; that appeals from these courts which will increase in number will add to the workload of the Supreme Court; that the newly created Court of Appeals was necessary to relieve some of the workload of the Supreme Court, but the Court of Appeals has, also, caused an increased burden on the Reporter of the Supreme Court who reports the decisions of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals; and that it is this increase in workload that requires the Reporter of the Supreme Court to have assistance in reporting opinions of both these courts. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, §§ 76, 77.

C.J.S. 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 224.

16-11-201. Clerk to furnish Reporter with copy of decisions.

It shall be the duty of the Clerk of the Supreme Court to furnish the Reporter of the Supreme Court with a copy of all decisions of the court within thirty (30) days after the expiration of the time allowed for filing motions for reconsideration.

History. Acts 1915, No. 326, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 9776k; Pope's Dig., § 13320; Acts 1971, No. 257, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-219.

Cross References. Copies of opinions to be furnished to Reporter, § 16-20-206.

16-11-202. Preparation of syllabus, headnotes, corrections — Publication.

It shall be the duty of the Reporter of the Supreme Court to:

  1. Prepare the syllabus without delay after the Clerk of the Supreme Court furnishes him or her with a copy of the decisions of the court;
  2. Prefix notes to each published decision containing the points decided therein;
  3. Edit the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and make technical corrections thereto;
  4. Oversee publication and distribution of the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in such format and medium as the Supreme Court may direct; and
  5. Perform other duties as the Supreme Court assigns.

History. Acts 1915, No. 326, §§ 2, 11, 13; C. & M. Dig., §§ 9776k, 9776o, 9776q; Pope's Dig., §§ 13320, 13324, 13326; Acts 1971, No. 257, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-219, 22-221, 22-222; Acts 2009, No. 221, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted gender-neutral language in (1); inserted “published” in (2); rewrote (3) and (4); and added (5).

16-11-203. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning authority to omit opinions, was repealed by Acts 2009, No. 221, § 2. The section was derived from Acts 1915, No. 326, § 10; C. & M. Dig., § 9776o; Pope's Dig., § 13324; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-220.

16-11-204. Assistant to Reporter of the Supreme Court.

  1. The Reporter of the Supreme Court is authorized to employ an assistant to aid the Reporter in the preparation of the headnotes for the published decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and in the supervision of the distribution and publication of the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
  2. No person shall be employed as an assistant by the Reporter in accordance with this section unless he or she is a licensed attorney.
  3. The position of assistant to the Reporter shall be state-funded at a salary to be set by the General Assembly.

History. Acts 1981, No. 803, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-219.1 — 22-219.3; Acts 2009, No. 221, § 3.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote (a); and inserted “in accordance with this section” and “or she” in (b).

16-11-205. Reporter to superintend distribution and publication of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.

It shall be the duty of the Reporter of the Supreme Court to superintend the distribution and publication of the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in such format and medium as the Supreme Court may direct.

History. Acts 1915, No. 326, § 3; C. & M. Dig., § 9776l; Pope's Dig., § 13321; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-225; Acts 2009, No. 221, § 4.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote the section.

16-11-206 — 16-11-209. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning proofreader and proof sheets furnished by printer, delivery of printed volumes, payment of printing and binding bills, and contractor's failure to perform, forfeiture, and letting new contracts, were repealed by Acts 2009, No. 221, §§ 5-8. The sections were derived from:

16-11-206. Acts 1915, No. 326, § 14; C. & M. Dig., § 9776r; Pope's Dig., § 13327; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-226.

16-11-207. Acts 1915, No. 326, § 8; C. & M. Dig., § 9776n; Pope's Dig., § 13323; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-229; Acts 1991, No. 549, § 9.

16-11-208. Acts 1915, No. 326, § 9; C. & M. Dig., § 9776n; Pope's Dig., § 13323; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-230; Acts 1991, No. 549, § 10.

16-11-209. Acts 1915, No. 326, §§ 6, 7; C. & M. Dig., § 9776m; Pope's Dig., § 13322; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-227, 22-228.

Subchapter 3 — Procedural Rules

Cross References. Rules for conduct of appeals, § 16-67-302.

Effective Dates. Acts 1971, No. 470, § 6: Mar. 1, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly finds that pleading, practice, and procedure in criminal cases and proceedings in the inferior courts of law of this state is not efficient, certain, or responsive to the reasonable expectations and legitimate needs of the people of this state; that the system of administering criminal justice in the state of Arkansas is in need of immediate reform; and, that the immediate passage of this act is necessary to empower the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas, which the General Assembly finds to be the proper authority for prescribing rules of pleading, practice, and procedure in criminal cases and proceedings in the courts of this state to effectuate such needed reforms. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after March 1, 1971.”

Acts 1979, No. 333, § 5: Mar. 9, 1979.

Acts 1981, No. 312, § 5: became law without Governor's signature, Mar. 5, 1981. Emergency clauses provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that this Act is necessary to clarify the authority granted by the legislative branch of government to the judicial branch of government, and that this Act is in keeping with the separation of powers provision of Section 2 of Article 4 of the Arkansas Constitution, and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 82 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Cox and Newbern, New Civil Procedure: The Court That Came in From the Code, 33 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

C.J.S. 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 124 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Spears, Comment: The 1979 Civil Procedure Rules, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 89.

Heller, Survey of Civil Procedure, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 172.

Case Notes

Uniform Rules of Evidence.

Under its own rule-making power and under existing statutory authority, the Supreme Court adopted the Uniform Rules of Evidence as the law in this state. Ricarte v. State, 290 Ark. 100, 717 S.W.2d 488 (1986).

16-11-301. Rules of pleading, practice, and procedure — Supersession.

All statutes concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts shall be deemed superseded by rules adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 3, or pursuant to the Supreme Court's constitutional, inherent, or statutory authority prior to the effective date of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80.

History. Acts 1971, No. 470, §§ 1-3; 1979, No. 333, § 1; 1981, No. 312, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-242 — 22-244; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 68.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, To Truly Reform We Must Be Informed: Davis v. Parham, the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the Constitutionality of Tort Reform in Arkansas, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 781.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Constitutional Law — Child Hearsay Exception in Sexual Abuse Cases — New Arkansas Supreme Court Rule Conflicts with New General Assembly Rule: Which Controls? Vann v. State, 309 Ark. 303, 831 S.W.2d 126 (1992), 15 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 143.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Sevawn Foster, Note: Constitutional Law — Arkansas’s Current Procedural Rulemaking Conundrum: Attempting to Quell the Political Discord, 37 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 105 (2014).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The legislature's delegation of power to prescribe rules of criminal procedure is not unconstitutional nor outside the enabling act, provided the rule in question is truly procedural. Miller v. State, 262 Ark. 223, 555 S.W.2d 563 (1977).

This section is not an unlawful delegation of legislative authority; it merely recognizes and is harmonious with the court's inherent powers rather than conferring an express power. Jennings v. State, 276 Ark. 217, 633 S.W.2d 373, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862, 103 S. Ct. 137, 74 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1982).

Amendment of Rules.

Since the Supreme Court has the inherent power to make the Rules of Criminal Procedure, it follows that it has the inherent power to amend those rules. Jennings v. State, 276 Ark. 217, 633 S.W.2d 373, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862, 103 S. Ct. 137, 74 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1982).

Application.

Petition to revive a foreign judgment was properly granted because it was authenticated under Ark. R. Civ. P. 44 where it was signed by a clerk for a United States Bankruptcy Court; the Arkansas Supreme Court's rule-making authority over procedural matters was exclusive. It was argued that the proper authentication process was not followed when a certified copy of the judgment was attached to an application. Bird v. Shaffer, 2012 Ark. App. 464 (2012).

Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, § 16-66-601 et seq., was enacted before Ark. Const. Amend. 80 and this section, and Ark. R. Civ. P. 44 therefore supersedes it with respect to how foreign judgments must be filed with an Arkansas court. Agility Fin. Credit Union v. Largent, 2018 Ark. App. 358, 552 S.W.3d 471 (2018).

Cited: Gardner v. State, 252 Ark. 828, 481 S.W.2d 342 (1972); Adams v. State, 269 Ark. 548, 601 S.W.2d 881 (1980); Clines v. State, 282 Ark. 541, 669 S.W.2d 883 (1984).

16-11-302. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in civil cases, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 69. The section was derived from Acts 1973, No. 38, §§ 1-6; 1979, No. 333, § 2; 1981, No. 312, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-245 — 22-249, 22-249n.

Chapter 12 Court Of Appeals

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1991, No. 7, § 7, provided:

“The General Assembly recognizes that each judge of the Arkansas Court of Appeals incurs considerable expense in carrying out his or her responsibilities to the people of the State of Arkansas, including expenses for housing; the purchase and maintenance of an automobile; the acquisition, maintenance and equipping of a home-office where the judge can work nights, and other times when it is inappropriate or impractical to work in his or her regular office; for attending bar, civic and social meetings and in otherwise carrying out their responsibilities as judges of the Arkansas Court of Appeals; and that said judges should be entitled to an expense allowance to cover such expenses.

“The funds appropriated by Item (13) of Section 1 herein may be used by each judge of the Arkansas Court of Appeals to cover his expenses. The monthly allowance for fiscal year 1991-92 shall not exceed $550 per month and for fiscal year 1992-93 shall not exceed $550 per month.

“The amount prescribed herein shall be paid monthly upon vouchers submitted by such judges, with each such voucher to state only that it is for expenses incurred by such judge in carrying out his or her responsibilities to the people of the state as described herein.

“Upon receipt of each such voucher, the Auditor of State shall issue a warrant payable to the judge claiming such expense allowance and the State Treasurer is hereby authorized to pay the same from the funds appropriated for such purpose. The balance of the appropriation for housing and transportation which remains at the close of business of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1992, shall be carried forward into the fiscal year ending June 30, 1993, there to be used for the same purpose.”

Acts 1999, No. 889, §§ 1-4, provided:

“Section 1. At the November 2000 general election, the electors of each of the six (6) existing Court of Appeals districts created in accordance with Act 208 of 1979 shall elect an additional Court of Appeals judge from each district to begin office on January 1, 2001. The newly-elected judges shall each be elected to serve for four (4) years, or until such later date as the boundaries of the existing Court of Appeals districts are redefined and judges from those districts are elected.

“Section 2. The elected judges of the Court of Appeals now serving shall be designated as position 1 within their respective districts, and the new judges elected under this act shall be designated position 2 within their districts.

“Section 3. Those present judges of the court, who were appointed pursuant to Acts 11 and 15 of 1995 (First Extraordinary Session), shall be entitled to seek election at the November 2000 general election from the district in which they reside.

“Section 4. Except as provided in Section 1, members of the Court of Appeals shall serve eight (8) year terms.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1973, No. 231, § 6: Mar. 7, 1973. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of Arkansas that doubt and confusion exists as to the proper construction of existing statutes pertaining to the effective date of orders of the Arkansas Public Service Commission and with respect to the proper procedures to follow to obtain judicial review of such orders; that such doubt and confusion could lead to a miscarriage of justice through a technical failure to comply with these statutes as ultimately construed by the courts; and that enactment of this bill will resolve said doubt and confusion. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1979, No. 208, § 9: July 1, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the caseload of the Supreme Court has constantly risen, that the case filings have reached the point that the Court cannot adequately dispose of the appeals, and that the people of this State, through the passage of Amendment 58 to the Constitution of Arkansas, recognized the necessity for a Court of Appeals. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1979.”

Acts 1983, No. 410, § 5: Aug. 1, 1983.

Acts 1985, No. 665, § 5: July 1, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “There is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Fifth General Assembly that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1985 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in the Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1985 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and providing of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1985.”

Acts 1985, No. 770, § 4: Apr. 3, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the practice of requiring circuit court judicial review of Public Service Commission orders works an undue hardship on the people of this State by creating undue delay in the final implementation of just and reasonable rates, and immediate correction of this hardship is necessary in order to preserve the public safety, health, peace, and general welfare of the State. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 959, § 6: Mar. 29, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Eighth General Assembly that the caseload of the Court of Appeals has risen so dramatically in recent years that it has created the potential for a severe backlog in the prompt decision of matters before the court. This act is necessary to alleviate this backlog particularly since the present normal term of the Court of Appeals would expire before this act would otherwise become effective. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 1085, § 12: §§ 6-11 effective July 1, 1995.

Acts 1995, No. 1323, § 13: became law without Governor's signature. Noted Apr. 19, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act amends Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-12-101 and uncodified sections of Acts 1993, No. 1085; the judicial positions created by § 16-12-101 are to become effective July 1, 1995 and this act would delay the effect of Act 1085 until January 1, 1996; and that in the event of the extension of the regular session the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1995 would work irreparable harm on the proper administration of this act. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), Nos. 11 and 15, § 7: Oct. 23, 1995, and Oct. 24, 1995, respectively. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act amends Uncodified Act 1085 of 1993 and is needed to provide for the appointment of additional Court of Appeals judges from the state of Arkansas since the 80th General Assembly meeting in regular session failed to prescribe new districts and irreparable harm to the proper administration of justice would result if this act is not given immediate effect. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 113, § 6: Feb. 7, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 10 of the First Extraordinary Session of 1995 abolished the Joint Interim Committee on Judiciary and in its place established the House Interim Committee and Senate Interim Committee on Judiciary; that the Arkansas Code 21-9-203 refers to the Joint Interim Committee on Judiciary and should be corrected to refer to the House and Senate Interim Committees on Judiciary; that this act so provides; and that this act should go into effect immediately in order to make the laws compatible as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 16 et seq.

C.J.S. 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 319.

Ark. L. Notes.

Laurence, Four Observations and an Inquiry About the Practice and Frequency of Dissenting Votes by the Judges of the Arkansas Court of Appeals, 1994 Ark. L. Notes 89.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Heller, Survey of Civil Procedure, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 172.

Heller and Sallings, Survey of Public Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 296.

Stafford, Separation of Powers and Arkansas Administrative Agencies: Distinguishing Judicial Power and Legislative Power, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 279.

Legislative Survey, Civil Procedure, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 85.

Watkins, Division of Labor between Arkansas's Appellate Courts, 17 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 177.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Publisher's Notes. Because of the enactment of subchapter 2 of this chapter by Acts 2003, No. 1812, the existing provisions of this chapter have been designated as subchapter 1.

16-12-101. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was repealed by Acts 1999, No. 889, § 7. Section 5 of Acts 1999, No. 889, amended uncodified Section 1 of Acts 11 and 15 of 1995, First Extraordinary Session rather than the codified version.

Acts 1999, No. 889, § 5, provided:

“(a) There is created, pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 58, the Arkansas Court of Appeals, to be composed of six (6) members until January 1, 1996.

“(b) On or after January 1, 1996, the Court of Appeals shall be composed of nine (9) judges. On or after January 1, 1997, the Court of Appeals shall be composed of twelve (12) judges. The terms of office of the six (6) Court of Appeals judges currently holding office shall not be affected by this act.

“(c) Three additional judgeships created by subsection (b) of this section shall be effective on and after January 1, 1996 and three shall be effective on or after January 1, 1997. The Governor shall appoint three (3) persons from the state at large to serve from January 1, 1996 through December 31, 1998 and shall appoint three (3) persons from the state at large to serve from January 1, 1997 through December 31, 1998.”

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning creation of court and apportionment board, composition, and establishment of districts, was repealed by Acts 1999, No. 889, § 7. The section was derived from Acts 1979, No. 208, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1201; Acts 1993, No. 1085, §§ 1, 3; 1995, No. 1323, § 1; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 11, § 1; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 15, § 1; 1997, No. 113, § 1; 1999, No. 889, § 5.

16-12-102. Election of judges.

  1. Except as provided in § 16-12-106, all judges of the Court of Appeals shall be elected for full eight-year terms.
  2. Each elected judge shall be a resident of the district from which he or she is elected.

History. Acts 1979, No. 208, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1202; Acts 1991, No. 959, § 1; 2005, No. 1448, § 1; 2007, No. 213, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1979, No. 208, § 2, provided, in part, that at the 1980 general election, six persons should be elected to serve as judges of the Court of Appeals beginning January 1, 1981, that one judge should be elected from each of the six districts established by the board, and that the terms of office of the initial six judges should be determined by lot by the board so that two judges should be elected to four-year terms, two judges should be elected to six-year terms, and two judges should be elected to eight-year terms.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted the subsection (a) and (b) designations; and added (c).

The 2007 amendment deleted (c) relating to eligibility of appointed judges.

Cross References. Court of Appeals transition, § 16-12-202.

16-12-103. Location of court.

The Court of Appeals shall be located in Little Rock and shall have offices as convenient to the State Capitol and the law library in the Justice Building as can be arranged, but the court en banc, or any division thereof, may sit in any county seat for the purpose of hearing argument in cases before it.

History. Acts 1979, No. 208, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1203; Acts 1993, No. 1085, § 6; 1995, No. 1323, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As amended by Acts 1995, No. 1323, this section began:

“Effective January 1, 1996.”

16-12-104. Authority of court.

The Court of Appeals shall have authority to issue any writs, directives, orders, and mandates that are appropriate, and only those that are appropriate, for the determination of cases within its jurisdiction.

History. Acts 1979, No. 208, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1204.

16-12-105. Chief Judge.

The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall designate one (1) of the judges of the Court of Appeals as Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals. The appointment as Chief Judge shall be for a four-year term, and the person so named shall be eligible for reappointment, subject to the discretion of the Chief Justice.

History. Acts 1979, No. 208, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1205.

16-12-106. Special judges.

  1. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court may commission special judges pursuant to the Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 13.
  2. Each special judge of the Court of Appeals who is not a retired judge or justice or an active circuit or district judge, appointed under the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, shall receive as full compensation for services rendered the sum of one hundred dollars ($100) for each case in the special justice's or special judge's commission. When the cases are decided, this amount shall be certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court, after having been approved by the Chief Justice.

History. Acts 1979, No. 208, § 6; 1981, No. 607, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-130, 22-1206; Acts 1991, No. 959, § 2; 2003, No. 1185, § 70.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

16-12-107. Salaries.

  1. The judges of the Court of Appeals shall receive such compensation as provided by law.
  2. The salary of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals shall be sixty-four thousand eight hundred eighty-seven dollars ($64,887) per annum, and the salary of each of the judges of the Court of Appeals shall be sixty-three thousand seven hundred sixty-three dollars ($63,763) per annum.

History. Acts 1979, No. 208, § 7; 1985, No. 665, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-140.4, 22-1207.

16-12-108. Staff.

  1. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall serve as Clerk of the Court of Appeals.
  2. The Reporter of the Supreme Court shall serve as Reporter of the Court of Appeals.
  3. The sheriff of the county wherein the Court of Appeals is sitting shall be the bailiff of that court.
  4. Each judge of the Court of Appeals shall have a secretary and a law clerk to be selected by the judge personally.
  5. The Clerk of the Supreme Court is authorized to select two (2) additional persons as deputies. He or she may assign deputies to primarily handle all matters relative to the Court of Appeals, including, but not limited to, filing cases which have been appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning briefs and motions to the judges, submitting cases, keeping all court records, notifying counsel of oral argument, preparing the payroll, and any and all other duties connected with the Court of Appeals.
    1. Law clerks for the Court of Appeals shall receive the same salaries as Supreme Court law clerks.
    2. All other employees of the Court of Appeals shall be of the same grade classification as Supreme Court employees performing the same duties, except that the original salaries may be in accordance with Step 2 of that grade as set out in § 21-5-209.

History. Acts 1979, No. 208, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1208.

16-12-109 — 16-12-114. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning the Court of Appeals, divisions, decisions and rehearings, were repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 71. These sections were derived from the following sources:

16-12-109. Acts 1983, No. 410, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-1209, 22-1210; Acts 1993, No. 1085, § 7; 1995, No. 1323, § 3; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 11, § 2; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 15, § 2.

16-12-110. Acts 1983, No. 410, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1212; Acts 1993, No. 1085, § 8; 1995, No. 1323, § 4.

16-12-111. Acts 1983, No. 410, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1211; Acts 1993, No. 1085, § 9; 1995, No. 1323, § 5.

16-12-112. Acts 1973, No. 231, § 3; 1985, No. 770, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 73-229.1.

16-12-113. Acts 1983, No. 410, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1211; Acts 1993, No. 1085, § 10; 1995, No. 1323, § 6; 1999, No. 924, § 1.

16-12-114. Acts 1983, No. 410, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1211; Acts 1993, No. 1085, § 11; 1995, No. 1323, § 7; 1999, No. 924, § 2.

Subchapter 2 — Reapportionment of the Court of Appeals Districts

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2003, No. 1812, § 1, provided:

“(a) Under Act 889 of 1999, the Arkansas Court of Appeals Apportionment Commission was created to review the electoral districts for the Court of Appeals and make a recommendation on the changes to be made effective January 1, 2004. The commission has reviewed the current districts and the data from the 2000 census, received input from judges, lawyers, and the general public, and considered the requirements and restrictions of federal and state law. Because of major shifts in population which have occurred since the current districts were created utilizing the 1970 census, a realignment of these districts is necessary.

“(b) The Arkansas Court of Appeals consisted of six (6) judges when it was first created. The number of members grew to nine (9) judges in 1996, and to twelve (12) judges in 1997. However, when the new judgeships were created, no plan was made to stagger the dates of the end of the terms for each of the judges. As a result, the terms of eight (8) of the twelve (12) judges end in 2004. In order to provide for an orderly transition of members and create a reasonable level of stability on the court, it is necessary to adjust the current terms of office.

“(c) It is the purpose of this act to create new electoral districts for the Arkansas Court of Appeals and to establish the dates for electing the judges within each of these districts.”

Acts 2003, No. 1812, § 4, provided:

“Each currently serving member of the Court of Appeals shall continue in office until his or her position shall be subject to election, as provided for under this act, regardless of the date otherwise set as the expiration of his or her term, and regardless of any changes in the geographical boundaries in the district from which he or she was elected.”

Publisher's Notes. Because Acts 2003, No. 1812 enacted a subchapter 2, the existing provisions of this chapter have been designated as subchapter 1.

16-12-201. Court of Appeals — Districts.

The State of Arkansas is divided into the following seven (7) districts for the election of judges to the Court of Appeals:

  1. District 1 shall be composed of Clay, Craighead, Crittenden, Cross, Greene, Lonoke, Mississippi, Monroe, Poinsett, Prairie, White, and Woodruff counties;
  2. District 2 shall be composed of Baxter, Boone, Cleburne, Conway, Faulkner, Fulton, Independence, Izard, Jackson, Lawrence, Marion, Newton, Pope, Randolph, Searcy, Sharp, Stone, and Van Buren counties;
  3. District 3 shall be composed of Benton, Carroll, Crawford, Franklin, Johnson, Madison, and Washington counties;
  4. District 4 shall be composed of Clark, Garland, Hempstead, Hot Spring, Howard, Little River, Logan, Miller, Montgomery, Pike, Polk, Scott, Sebastian, Sevier, and Yell counties;
  5. District 5 shall be composed of Ashley, Bradley, Calhoun, Cleveland, Columbia, Dallas, Drew, Grant, Lafayette, Lincoln, Nevada, Ouachita, and Union counties;
  6. District 6 shall be composed of Pulaski, Perry, and Saline counties; and
  7. District 7 shall be composed of Arkansas, Chicot, Desha, Jefferson, Lee, Phillips, and St. Francis counties.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1812, § 2.

16-12-202. Court of Appeals — Transition.

The elections under this section shall be for an eight-year term as follows:

  1. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 2, Position 2”, shall continue to be designated “District 2, Position 2”, and shall be subject to election in District 2;
  2. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 4, Position 1”, shall continue to be designated “District 4, Position 1”, and shall be subject to election in District 4;
  3. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 4, Position 2”, shall continue to be designated “District 4, Position 2”, and shall be subject to election in District 4;
  4. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 5, Position 1”, shall be designated “District 5” and shall be subject to election in District 5;
  5. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 3, Position 2”, shall continue to be designated “District 3, Position 2”, and shall be subject to election in District 3;
  6. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 1, Position 2”, shall be designated “District 1, Position 1”, and shall be subject to election in District 1;
  7. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 5, Position 2”, shall be designated “District 1, Position 2”, and shall be subject to election in District 1;
  8. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 6, Position 2”, shall continue to be designated “District 6, Position 2”, and shall be subject to election in District 6;
  9. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 1, Position 1”, shall be designated “District 7” and shall be subject to election in District 7;
  10. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 6, Position 1”, shall continue to be designated “District 6, Position 1”, and shall be subject to election in District 6;
  11. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 2, Position 1”, shall continue to be designated “District 2, Position 1”, and shall be subject to election in District 2; and
  12. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 3, Position 1”, shall continue to be designated “District 3, Position 1”, and shall be subject to election in District 3.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1812, § 3; 2011, No. 1132, § 5.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “designated prior to July 16, 2003” for “currently designated” throughout the section; deleted “in 2004” following “shall be subject to election” in (1) through (4); deleted “in 2006” following “shall be subject to election” in (5) through (8); deleted “in 2008” following “shall be subject to election” in (9) and (10); and deleted “in 2010” following “shall be subject to election” in (11) and (12).

Chapter 13 Circuit Courts

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1987, No. 846, § 5, provided:

“The State Board of Judicial Reapportionment, created and established by Act 826 of 1985, will continue to exist until December 31, 1988, at which time such Board will cease to exist, and prior to December 31, 1988, such State Board of Judicial Reapportionment shall prepare a comprehensive plan reapportioning the existing judicial circuits of this State, and recommending the number and type of judges required under such reapportionment. The Board shall present such plans and recommendations to the Arkansas General Assembly for its consideration during its regular session in 1989.”

The subchapter placement of certain judicial circuits had to be rearranged after publication of the 1999 Replacement Volume 14A.

Acts 2019, No. 1003, § 8, provided:

“(a) The House Judiciary Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee shall conduct a joint study on the composition of the judicial circuits and allocation of circuit court judgeships statewide and issue recommendations concerning the reassignment of judicial circuits and the reapportionment of circuit court judgeships, if necessary, to the General Assembly for consideration during the 2021 Regular Session.

“(b) The recommendations, if any, under this section shall be made no later than September 1, 2020, in order to be available for potential budgetary considerations during hearings of the Joint Budget Committee before the 2021 Regular Session”.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 1224, § 4, provided:

“It is the intent of the 79th General Assembly that the authorization of seven additional Circuit & Chancery Judge positions created in response to the United States District Court Order in the case of Eugene Hunt, et al v. State of Arkansas, et al be discontinued as the terms of the displaced incumbent judges expire pursuant to the court order.”

Cross References. Uniform filing fees and court costs, § 16-10-105.

Research References

Am. Jur. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 25 et seq.

C.J.S. 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 9 et seq., § 186 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Gitelman, The Separation of Law and Equity and the Arkansas Chancery Courts: Historical Anomalies and Political Realities, 17 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 215.

Averill, Observations on the Wyoming Experience with Merit Selection of Judges: A Model for Arkansas, 17 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 281.

Case Notes

Complaint.

In an action by a county resident against officials of the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, alleging that the Commission used public funds to enter into gas leases with private commercial enterprises and diverted the monies generated from those leases to unauthorized expenditures, the resident failed to state a claim for illegal extraction under this section because the monies at issue did not arise from taxation but were generated from the Commission's gas leases with private, third-party companies. Dockery v. Morgan, 2011 Ark. 94, 380 S.W.3d 377 (2011).

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Effective Dates. Acts 1971, No. 649, § 3: Apr. 7, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the compensation presently provided for special circuit and chancery judges is not adequate to compensate said judges for their services and that the same will result in a delay in the administration of justice, this act is immediately necessary to correct the situation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 665, § 5: July 1, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “There is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Fifth General Assembly that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1985 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in the Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1985 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and providing of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1985.”

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 28, § 7: Nov. 7, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the caseload of the Second and Sixth Judicial Districts necessitates the appointment of additional circuit-chancery judges immediately; and that this Act so provides and should therefore be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-13-101. Reassignment of case upon disqualification of judge.

When it appears that the circuit judge before whom a case is pending is disqualified under § 16-13-214, the case shall be reassigned to another judge.

History. Acts 1925, No. 127, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 2712; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-114; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 72.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 20 [repealed] did not operate to preclude enactment of this section. Thus, this section does not contravene Ark. Const., Art. 7, §§ 21 [repealed], 22 [repealed]. Black v. Cockrill, 239 Ark. 367, 389 S.W.2d 881 (1965).

Purpose.

This section tends to carry out the intention of Ark. Const., Art 7, § 20 [repealed]. Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978).

Applicability.

This section applies whether or not the related presiding judge of the division is actually presiding at the trial. Black v. Cockrill, 239 Ark. 367, 389 S.W.2d 881 (1965).

Personal Interest.

The “interest” which is disqualifying under this section is a personal proprietary or pecuniary interest or one affecting the individual rights of the judge, and the liability, gain, or relief to the judge must turn on the outcome of the suit. Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978).

Transfer Required.

The terms of this section are mandatory and transfer is required on motion of any party. Black v. Cockrill, 239 Ark. 367, 389 S.W.2d 881 (1965); Ennis v. Brainerd, 240 Ark. 16, 397 S.W.2d 809 (1966).

16-13-102. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning salaries of circuit and chancery judges, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 73. The section was derived from Acts 1985, No. 665, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-140.1.

16-13-103. Special judges — Compensation — Expenses.

    1. A licensed attorney who is elected as a special judge of the circuit court under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, and the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court may request compensation at one-half (½) the rate as fixed by law for a regularly elected circuit judge.
    2. This section does not allow a special judge to receive compensation for any days that he or she is not actually serving in his or her appointed capacity.
  1. The compensation provided for in this section shall be paid from the appropriation provided to the Auditor of State for special and recalled judges for the circuit courts, upon certification by the clerk of the court in which the special circuit judge was elected stating the number of days or a portion of a day served, under the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.

History. Acts 1971, No. 649, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-131, 22-131.1; Acts 2011, No. 274, § 6.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 274, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent.

“(a) Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 13(C), provides that the Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court may appoint a special judge to serve in circuit court or district court whenever a judge is disqualified or temporarily unable to serve or when there is other need for a temporary appointment, under rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.

“(b) Special judges may include retired justices or judges, active circuit judges or district judges, or licensed attorneys.

“(c) The current laws that govern the payment of special judges have not been revised since the adoption of Amendment 80 and are in conflict and need of clarification.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment rewrote (a) and (b).

Case Notes

Special Judge.

A special judge who granted extension of time for filing bill of exceptions for a period running beyond expiration of his term of court could approve the bill of exceptions after lapse of his term but could not exercise a separate and new judicial act to grant a further extension of time. Patterson v. Carpenter, 207 Ark. 539, 181 S.W.2d 465 (1944).

16-13-104. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning ineligibility for an appointed circuit judge as a candidate, was repealed by Acts 2007, No. 213, § 2. The section was derived from Acts 2005, No. 1448, § 2.

Subchapter 2 — Circuit Courts Generally

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided:

“The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided:

“Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [890]: effective 90 days after passage.

Acts 1899, No. 62, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1943, No. 202, § 3: approved Mar. 15, 1943. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas Initiated Act Number 5 adopted by the People November 6, 1936, provided that Circuit Courts are open at all times for Criminal proceedings; and whereas considerable confusion exists in determining the powers of a circuit court in civil proceedings when convened in special or adjourned sessions, and whereas Pretrial procedure, rendition of consent judgments and other court actions between the terms fixed by law for holding the several courts in the judicial districts in this state will expedite litigation and reduce the expense of court sessions and this act being for the speedy administration of justice, an emergency is hereby declared, and this Act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1943, No. 290, § 4: approved Mar. 23, 1943. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas in the event a regular judge shall enter the armed services of the United States, a special election of the members of the bar upon the second day of the term in each county in the district must be held to elect a special judge, and whereas, the special judge is allowed only ten dollars [$10.00] per day for his services, and no expenses; and whereas, such procedure would result in great expense and delay to litigants difficulty in securing a competent and qualified attorney to fill such position, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary to promote the public peace, health and welfare, shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1949, No. 257, § 6: Mar. 8, 1949. Emergency clause provided: “Because of the geographical extent and number of courts required to be held, and to expedite the disposition of court matters and actions, and to better facilitate the disposition of same by consent of parties and thereby avoid delays, and to save costs, and for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval by the governor.”

Acts 1961, No. 14, § 2: approved Jan. 30, 1961. Emergency clause provided: “The legislature having determined that the appointment of a law clerk for counties with population of 240,000 or more would expedite the handling of litigation in the circuit courts of said counties, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 66, §§ 2, 4: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1968, and salaries payable from that date. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present requirement that the law clerk of the circuit court be a licensed attorney renders it difficult if not almost impossible to employ a person to fill said position; that the present law prescribing qualifications for the law clerks of the Arkansas Supreme Court require only that the law clerks be licensed attorneys or graduates of approved law schools; that the qualifications of law clerks for circuit courts should be the same as but no greater than those for the Supreme Court Clerks; and, that this Act is immediately necessary to revise the qualifications of circuit court law clerks to conform to the qualifications of Supreme Court law clerks and to make it possible to employ persons to fill the position of circuit court law clerk and thereby to further the administration of justice. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary to the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect from the date of its passage and approval.” Became law without Governor's signature, February 27, 1968.

Acts 1975, No. 68, § 3: approved Feb. 7, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “The Legislature having determined that the appointment of a case coordinator for districts with populations of two hundred forty thousand (240,000) or more would expedite the handling of litigation in the circuit courts of said counties and because the number or cases being filed is increasing rapidly, an emergency is hereby declared to exist. This Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1979, No. 580, § 4: Mar. 26, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the volume of work required by the circuit courts which have judicial districts comprising 240,000 or more has greatly increased in recent years, and that it is immediately necessary to provide additional support for the circuit judges in order to assure the orderly disposition of cases in order to facilitate the prompt administration of justice. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force from and after the date of its approval.”

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Brill, Law and Equity in Arkansas: Will Liles v. Liles Lead Us Out of the Morass?, 1987 Ark. L. Notes 1.

Brill, The Maxims of Equity, 1993 Ark. L. Notes 29.

Ark. L. Rev.

Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration — Arkansas, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 1, 5.

Arkansas' Judiciary: Its History and Structure, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 152.

Administration of the Courts in Arkansas: Challenge, Performance, and Prospects, 30 Ark. L. Rev. 235.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Stafford, Separation of Powers and Arkansas Administrative Agencies: Distinguishing Judicial Power and Legislative Power, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 279.

16-13-201. Jurisdiction.

  1. Circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters not otherwise assigned pursuant to the Arkansas Constitution.
    1. Circuit courts shall have appellate jurisdiction of the judgments and final orders of county courts, district courts, city courts, and police courts in all civil actions.
    2. On appeal from such judgments and final orders, the case shall be tried de novo, and the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit court shall extend to errors of fact as well as errors of law.
  2. The circuit courts shall have appellate jurisdiction from the decision of any inferior board, council, or tribunal in the contest of any county, township, or municipal office, and on such appeals the case shall be tried de novo.

History. Civil Code, §§ 18-20; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [19], p. 249; 1873, No. 88, § 1 [18, 19], p. 213; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2228, 2233, 2234; Pope's Dig., §§ 2856, 2861, 2862; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-301, 22-304, 22-308; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 74.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all municipal courts were to become district courts on January 1, 2005, and that they should assume the jurisdiction previously vested in municipal courts, police courts, justice of the peace courts, and courts of common pleas. Those courts were abolished by the amendment. City courts were to continue, but if abolished by the governing body of the city or by the General Assembly, the jurisdiction of the city court would then vest in the nearest district court.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Research References

ALR.

Criminal jurisdiction of municipal or other local court. 102 A.L.R.5th 525.

Case Notes

Administrative Determinations.

The legislature has the right, in authorizing a civil service commission, to vest in the circuit court the power to review judicially, either by way of original proceeding or by way of appeal, the action of the commission. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Matlock, 205 Ark. 286, 168 S.W.2d 424 (1943).

Appellate Jurisdiction.

The circuit court can acquire no jurisdiction by appeal from a court or justice of the peace that was without jurisdiction. Little Rock, Miss. R. & Tex. R.R. v. Manees, 44 Ark. 100 (1884); Bynum v. Patty, 207 Ark. 1084, 184 S.W.2d 254 (1944).

Where a cause is appealed to the circuit court from the county court, the former court obtains jurisdiction to the same extent as if it had been originally brought in that court and should enter final judgment therein and remand the same to the county court with directions to enter that judgment. Batesville v. Ball, 100 Ark. 496, 140 S.W. 712 (1911).

The circuit court has jurisdiction to review on appeal the action of the county court relative to the organization of a road district. Horn v. Baker, 140 Ark. 168, 215 S.W. 600 (1919).

If the county court had jurisdiction to hear a contest over the result of a stock law election, which was not decided, a judgment of that court dismissing a petition attacking the legality of the election was not void on its face, however erroneous it may have been, and a review of it must be by appeal to the circuit court and not by certiorari. Patterson v. Adcock, 157 Ark. 186, 248 S.W. 904 (1923).

The circuit court had jurisdiction to try a case on appeal by a taxpayer from a judgment of the county court allowing a claim against the county and the fact that a warrant had been issued and paid before the case was tried in the circuit court was immaterial. McLain v. Miller County, 180 Ark. 828, 23 S.W.2d 264 (1930), superseded by statute as stated in, Lott v. Circuit Court, 328 Ark. 596, 945 S.W.2d 922 (1997).

Appeals from the county court to the circuit court shall be granted as a matter of right. Watts & Sanders v. Myatt, 216 Ark. 660, 226 S.W.2d 800 (1950).

The chancery court had no jurisdiction to order repayment of a claim allowed by the county judge in paying dues to the Arkansas Association of County Judges; in the absence of fraud, the remedy was by appeal to the circuit court. Ark. Ass'n of County Judges v. Green, 232 Ark. 438, 338 S.W.2d 672 (1960).

Exclusive Jurisdiction.

The chancery court has exclusive jurisdiction of all cases involving matters of child support; neither the municipal nor circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction with chancery court to enforce an agreement for child support. Boren v. Boren, 318 Ark. 378, 885 S.W.2d 852 (1994).

Circuit court cannot decide a claim of breach of contract or otherwise enforce a child support agreement since under subsection (a) of this section it does not have concurrent jurisdiction. Granquist v. Randolph, 326 Ark. 809, 934 S.W.2d 224 (1996).

Regardless of the context in which a support order is entered, whether divorce, paternity, abandonment, or any other situation, a trial court has the power to enter a child-support order; thus, where a father was held in contempt for failure to pay support, and appealed, even though the trial court did not have jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage because there was no corroboration of residence, the trial court had jurisdiction to enter contempt orders for the father's failure to pay support. Rogers v. Rogers, 80 Ark. App. 430, 97 S.W.3d 429 (2003).

Original Jurisdiction.

The correct method of ascertaining the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the circuit courts is to see what cases or classes of cases are confided by the Constitution exclusively to the jurisdiction of other tribunals, and the great residuum belongs exclusively, or concurrently, to the circuit courts. State v. Devers, 34 Ark. 188 (1879).

Jurisdiction to hear and determine contests of elections for a city office, not being vested elsewhere, is in the circuit court. Whittaker v. Watson, 68 Ark. 555, 60 S.W. 652 (1901); Doherty v. Cripps, 82 Ark. 529, 102 S.W. 394 (1907).

If the law does not expressly vest jurisdiction to hear an action, it falls within the general jurisdiction of the circuit courts. State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Sams, 81 Ark. 39, 98 S.W. 955 (1906); Patterson v. Adcock, 157 Ark. 186, 248 S.W. 904 (1923).

Circuit court has jurisdiction to determine liability of county depository for interest on county funds. Price v. Madison County Bank, 90 Ark. 195, 118 S.W. 706 (1909).

Where the trial court accepted appellant's plea for capital-felony murder on a Sunday in violation of § 16-10-114, the statutory violation did not affect the trial court's jurisdiction over the matter; further, a petition for writ of habeas corpus was not the proper method with which to claim a statutory violation. Noble v. Norris, 368 Ark. 69, 243 S.W.3d 260 (2006).

—Jurisdictional Amount.

The circuit court has jurisdiction of mechanics' liens enforceable against land regardless of the amount. White v. Millbourne, 31 Ark. 486 (1876).

Where no one of several debts sued on exceeds the sum of one hundred dollars, the plaintiff cannot combine them so as to give the circuit court jurisdiction. Mannington v. Young, 35 Ark. 287 (1880).

Circuit courts have jurisdiction in tort action in the nature of a fraud without regard to the amount. Bagley v. Shoppach, 43 Ark. 375 (1884).

In actions for damages to personal property, jurisdiction is determined by the damages asked. Little Rock, Miss. R. & Tex. R.R. v. Manees, 44 Ark. 100 (1884).

Since garnishment is only an attachment of the debt, the jurisdiction of the court over the funds in the hands of the garnishee is not dependent upon the amount of the indebtedness. Moore v. Kelley, 47 Ark. 219, 1 S.W. 97 (1886).

A complaint for breach of contract alleging damages sufficient to give the circuit court jurisdiction is a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, and in the absence of a special plea or charge that the allegation was illusive and fraudulent, the court could correctly assume jurisdiction. Neale v. Smith, 61 Ark. 564, 33 S.W. 1058 (1896).

If the question is raised whether or not the amount claimed was a lien on real estate, the circuit court has jurisdiction without regard to the amount involved. Sanders v. Brown, 65 Ark. 498, 47 S.W. 461 (1898); Naylor v. McNair, 92 Ark. 345, 122 S.W. 662 (1909).

If a demurrer (now abolished) is sustained to one of two paragraphs of complaint and the remaining paragraph demands an amount less than the jurisdictional requirement, the circuit court is without jurisdiction to proceed. Harris-Damon Lumber Co. v. Craddock, 72 Ark. 334, 80 S.W. 228 (1904).

Complaint which alleged that party possessed title to a vehicle valued at $3,900.00 which she obtained under divorce decree and which was being unlawfully detained was a replevin action properly within the jurisdiction of the county circuit court, and, as a consequence, a writ of prohibition did not lie. Bonnell v. Smith, 322 Ark. 141, 908 S.W.2d 74 (1995).

—Misdemeanors.

Circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction with justices of the peace in misdemeanor cases. Walker v. State, 35 Ark. 386 (1880); McClure v. State, 37 Ark. 426 (1881).

It is not in the power of the legislature, under the provisions of the Constitution, to deprive the circuit courts of all original jurisdiction of misdemeanors. Naylor v. McNair, 92 Ark. 345, 122 S.W. 662 (1909).

—Petitions.

The issue of the sufficiency of a petition for a local option election is one over which chancery court has no jurisdiction. Zaruba v. Phillips, 320 Ark. 199, 895 S.W.2d 544 (1995).

Proceedings on Appeal.

Appeals from final orders and judgments of the county courts are tried de novo. Marion County v. Estes, 79 Ark. 504, 96 S.W. 165 (1906); Thomas v. Burke, 91 Ark. 595, 121 S.W. 1060 (1909); Jones v. Coffin, 96 Ark. 332, 131 S.W. 873 (1910); Thornton v. Allen, 101 Ark. 106, 141 S.W. 499 (1911); Stephens v. School Dist., 104 Ark. 145, 148 S.W. 504 (1912).

Circuit court may permit record to be amended so as to show allowance of appeal by the county court. Drainage Dist. v. Rolfe, 110 Ark. 374, 161 S.W. 1034 (1913).

The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing an appeal where the original papers were not filed before the trial date, inasmuch as certified copies had been filed and there was no showing that appellees were in any manner prejudiced. Woollard v. Circuit Court, 222 Ark. 287, 258 S.W.2d 886 (1953).

—Petitioners for Drainage District.

A petitioner may appeal to the circuit court from an order of the county court refusing a petition for the establishment of a drainage district. Sharum v. Fry, 95 Ark. 385, 129 S.W. 818 (1910).

The petitioners, as well as the remonstrants, have a right to appeal from an order of the county court adverse to their interests and relative to the formation of a drainage district. Collins v. Stewart, 117 Ark. 4, 173 S.W. 824 (1915).

—School Districts.

Where it is sought to annex certain territory of one school district to another, the district whose territory is to be annexed may appeal from a judgment of the county court to the circuit court without its board of directors first appearing in the county court. School Dist. v. Rural Special School Dist., 128 Ark. 383, 194 S.W. 241 (1917).

School district properly appealed from an order approving a bond. Hulbert Special Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 180 Ark. 29, 20 S.W.2d 322 (1929).

—Taxpayers.

If a county court has proceeded irregularly in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction to make a contract for the building of a courthouse, citizens, residents, and taxpayers have a remedy to correct that irregularity by becoming parties to the proceeding and appealing to the circuit court, but a bill in equity will not lie to restrain the making of such a contract for irregularity only. Bowman v. Frith, 73 Ark. 523, 84 S.W. 709 (1905).

One who is a citizen of the county and taxpayer in a drainage district and who is interested in an order of the county court allowing a claim against the district is entitled to appeal therefrom. Huddleston v. Coffman, 90 Ark. 219, 118 S.W. 1010 (1909).

One who is a citizen or resident and a taxpayer has the right to appeal from an order of allowance against the county, whether he intervenes before or after the allowance is made. Van Hook v. McNeil Monument Co., 101 Ark. 246, 142 S.W. 154 (1911).

A citizen and taxpayer may appeal from an order designating a county depository. Casey v. Independence County, 109 Ark. 11, 159 S.W. 24 (1913).

Where the county court made an order establishing a road through certain lands, a citizen and taxpayer owning lands taken by the road may make himself a party to the proceedings and appeal from the order of the court. McMahan v. Ruble, 135 Ark. 83, 204 S.W. 746 (1918).

A taxpayer is authorized to appeal from an order of the county court allowing a claim against the county and confirming a sale of county property in satisfaction thereof without becoming a party to the proceedings. Wright v. LeCroy, 184 Ark. 837, 44 S.W.2d 355 (1931).

The county court, in passing on a claim presented to it, acts in a judicial capacity. Any citizen of any county, city, or town may institute suit in behalf of himself and others interested, to protect the inhabitants thereof against the enforcement of any illegal exactions whatever, and their proper remedy is to appeal to the circuit court. Ark. Ass'n of County Judges v. Green, 232 Ark. 438, 338 S.W.2d 672 (1960).

Cited: Norman v. Fife, 61 Ark. 33, 31 S.W. 740 (1895); Morgan v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 106 Ark. 74, 152 S.W. 1023 (1912); Lee v. McNeil, 308 Ark. 114, 823 S.W.2d 837 (1992).

16-13-202. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning rules, was repealed by Acts 2011, No. 1132, § 6. The section was derived from Civil Code, § 18; Acts 1873, No. 88, § 1 [18], p. 213; C. & M. Dig., § 2231; Pope's Dig., § 2859; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-309.

16-13-203. Supervision of county courts and county, local, and municipal boards or officers.

  1. The circuit courts shall have superintending control over the judgments, final orders, and proceedings of county courts and county boards or officers.
  2. The circuit courts shall have supervision and control over all local, county, and municipal boards or officers in their actions or proceedings in the taxing, assessing, seizing, or sale of property.

History. Civil Code, § 19; Acts 1873, No. 88, § 1 [19], p. 213; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2239, 2240; Pope's Dig., §§ 2867, 2868; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-305, 22-306.

Case Notes

Continuing Jurisdiction.

Upon appeal to the circuit court from order of the county court disallowing claim for damages, the circuit court acquired exclusive jurisdiction of the case and thereafter, it had the jurisdiction to issue such orders as were necessary to the exercise of its jurisdiction. Dobbins Bros. v. Anderson, 199 Ark. 635, 135 S.W.2d 325 (1940).

Correction of Illegal Levy.

There is no provision to correct an illegal or erroneous levy by the county court, and, in that case, the taxpayer must look to the superintending control and appellate jurisdiction of the circuit courts over the county courts, and where no remedy by appeal is provided, he is entitled to relief by certiorari or prohibition. Floyd v. Gilbreath, 27 Ark. 675 (1872).

16-13-204. Issuance of writs, orders, or process.

  1. The circuit courts and their judges shall have the power to issue all proper writs, orders, or process in the cases mentioned in §§ 16-13-201(b)(1) and 16-13-203.
  2. The circuit courts and their judges shall have power to issue all writs, orders, and process which may be necessary in the exercise of their jurisdiction, according to the principles and usages of law.

History. Civil Code, § 19; Acts 1873, No. 88, § 1 [19], p. 213; C. & M. Dig., § 2241; Pope's Dig., § 2869; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-307.

Cross References. Power to issue writs and process, § 16-10-106.

Case Notes

Bail.

Where probable cause for detention in a felony matter had been found in municipal court, and the case had been bound over to circuit court, then the circuit court had jurisdiction to reduce the bail set by the municipal court. State v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 326 Ark. 886, 934 S.W.2d 915 (1996). See also State v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 327 Ark. 287, 938 S.W.2d 815 (1997).

Restraining Order.

On appeal to the circuit court from order of county court disallowing claim for damages, circuit court had jurisdiction to issue restraining order enjoining county judge from allowing claims except for essential county purposes authorized by law, and in the absence of the circuit judge from the county, the chancellor, acting for him, had jurisdiction to issue the order, but the order would be that of the circuit court, having been made by the chancellor for that court, and would not vest jurisdiction in the chancery court or deprive the circuit court of its jurisdiction, and the continuance or dissolution of the order would be a matter within the jurisdiction of the circuit court. Dobbins Bros. v. Anderson, 199 Ark. 635, 135 S.W.2d 325 (1940).

Cited: Shelton v. State, 44 Ark. App. 156, 870 S.W.2d 398 (1994).

16-13-205. Writs of certiorari — Temporary restraining orders — Enforcement.

  1. The circuit courts shall have power to issue writs of certiorari to any officer or board of officers, city or town council, or any inferior tribunal of their respective counties in order to correct any erroneous or void proceeding or ordinance and to hear and determine the proceeding or ordinance.
    1. Application for a writ of certiorari may be made to the court or the judge thereof in vacation on reasonable notice.
    2. A temporary restraining order may be granted upon the application for a writ of certiorari on bond and good security being given, in a sum to be fixed by the court or the judge in vacation, conditioned that the applicant will perform the judgment of the court.
    1. Affidavits may be read on such applications, and evidence dehors the record may be introduced by either party on the hearing.
    2. The record of any such inferior judicial tribunal shall be conclusive as far as the record extends, but the acts of any executive officer or board of that inferior tribunal shall only be prima facie evidence of their regularity and legality.
  2. The court shall have power in such cases to enforce its judgment by mandamus, prohibition, and other appropriate writs.

History. Civil Code, § 18; Acts 1873, No. 88, § 1 [18], p. 213; 1899, No. 62, § 1, p. 112; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2237, 2238; Pope's Dig., §§ 2865, 2866; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-302, 22-303.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Certiorari in Arkansas, 17 Ark. L. Rev. 163.

Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies in Arkansas, 25 Ark. L. Rev. 397.

Case Notes

Boards or Officers.

Certiorari does not lie to review action of election commissioners. Graves v. McConnell, 162 Ark. 167, 257 S.W. 1041 (1924).

Certiorari is available for the purpose of giving opportunity to review decision of a board in removing an officer pursuant to the terms of the statute. McCain v. Collins, 204 Ark. 521, 164 S.W.2d 448 (1942).

Under this section, circuit court had jurisdiction over Eclectic State Medical Board (now Arkansas State Medical Board) and, upon finding that board was failing or refusing to act in accordance with court's order to conduct a hearing, court could act in lieu of board. Schirmer v. Cockrill, 223 Ark. 817, 269 S.W.2d 300 (1954).

City Councils.

In certiorari proceeding to review resolution of city council declaring vacant the position of commissioner of street improvement district, circuit court acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter when the petition was filed and procedural matters, including issuance of writ, could be waived. Jones v. Leighton, 200 Ark. 1015, 142 S.W.2d 505 (1940).

The action of the city commission in revoking a permit to operate a taxicab is subject to review by certiorari in circuit court, and that court's action is subject to review by certiorari in the supreme court. Veteran's Taxicab Co. v. City of Ft. Smith, 213 Ark. 687, 212 S.W.2d 341 (1948).

Discretion of Court.

Certiorari, being a writ of discretion, may be denied by the court to which application is made where the law does not expressly or by clear implication direct that it shall be issued. McAllister v. McAllister, 200 Ark. 171, 138 S.W.2d 1040 (1940).

Unless trial court abuses its discretion in denying or granting a writ of certiorari, Supreme Court will not reverse that decision. Ricci v. Poole, 253 Ark. 324, 485 S.W.2d 728 (1972).

The writ is not one of right, but is to be granted or denied within the discretion of the court from which it is sought. Gran v. Hale, 294 Ark. 563, 745 S.W.2d 129 (1988).

Evidence.

Where the writ of certiorari is limited as at common law, the court is confined in its review of the evidence to the determination of whether there was substantial evidence to sustain the judgment. Hall v. Bledsoe, 126 Ark. 125, 189 S.W. 1041 (1916).

Records of a legislative body are conclusive and, on application for certiorari, evidence not appearing in the record would be inadmissible. McAllister v. McAllister, 200 Ark. 171, 138 S.W.2d 1040 (1940).

On hearing the writ of certiorari, circuit court does not proceed de novo and try the case as if it had never been heard in the inferior court; the office of the writ is to review errors of law, one of which may be the legal sufficiency of the evidence. McCain v. Collins, 204 Ark. 521, 164 S.W.2d 448 (1942).

On certiorari, circuit court may hear evidence dehors the record in order to ascertain what evidence was heard by the inferior tribunal and to determine whether the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the judgment of that tribunal. McCain v. Collins, 204 Ark. 521, 164 S.W.2d 448 (1942).

Neither circuit court nor Supreme Court had authority on writ of certiorari to pass on the question of the preponderance of the evidence supporting action of agency. McCain v. Collins, 204 Ark. 521, 164 S.W.2d 448 (1942).

Hearing.

A hearing is contemplated on a petition for certiorari under this section. Carrier v. Beck, 227 Ark. 92, 296 S.W.2d 446 (1956).

Inferior Tribunals.

The errors of a mayor's court, having jurisdiction of a case of assault and battery, in overruling a plea of former conviction and refusing to dismiss for want of a bond for costs, are not jurisdictional and cannot be corrected on certiorari. Salem v. Colley, 70 Ark. 71, 66 S.W. 195 (1901).

Judgment in action of writ of certiorari, refusing to quash a judgment of a justice of the peace, was proper where petition merely alleged that petitioner had a meritorious defense but did not show the facts constituting the defense. Overton v. Alston, 199 Ark. 96, 132 S.W.2d 834 (1939).

A wife's petition for certiorari to quash a divorce decree would be denied where the circumstances and conditions which arose since the decree would render it inequitable and unjust to an innocent third party to grant the writ, and because the petition did not allege fraud or inequitable conduct in obtaining the decree or a defense to the divorce action. Whaley v. Whaley, 213 Ark. 232, 209 S.W.2d 871 (1948).

Other Remedy.

The writ of certiorari should not be issued in any case where there is, or has been, a right to appeal, unless the opportunity for appealing has been lost without fault of the petitioner. Payne v. McCabe, 37 Ark. 318 (1881). See Vance v. Gaylor, 25 Ark. 32 (1867); Wyatt & Hensley v. Burr, 25 Ark. 476 (1869); Smith v. Parker, 25 Ark. 518 (1869); Vance v. City of Little Rock, 30 Ark. 435 (1875); Burke v. Coolidge, 35 Ark. 180 (1879); Burgett v. Apperson, 52 Ark. 213, 12 S.W. 559 (1889).

Judgment will not be quashed if there was other adequate remedy. Aven v. Wilson, 61 Ark. 287, 32 S.W. 1074 (1895); Gates v. Hayes, 69 Ark. 518, 64 S.W. 271 (1901).

Certiorari will not lie at the instance of the creditors of a decedent's estate to set aside the classification of a claim allowed by the probate court in favor of another creditor as the appeal by the personal representative provided in such case furnishes an adequate remedy. Merchants & Planters Bank v. Fitzgerald, 61 Ark. 605, 33 S.W. 1064 (1896).

The Department of Human Services (DHS) was not entitled to a writ of certiorari ordering the Claims Commission to dismiss a claim pending before it since the pending claim was within the jurisdiction of the Claims Commission and the DHS had an adequate remedy of appealing the Claims Commission's ruling to the General Assembly. Hanley v. Arkansas State Claims Comm'n, 333 Ark. 159, 970 S.W.2d 198 (1998).

Record.

On certiorari, the record is conclusive as far as it extends. Countz v. Markling, 30 Ark. 17 (1875).

Clerk should return transcript of record with his response. Phillips v. Desha, 58 Ark. 250, 24 S.W. 249 (1893).

Though equalization board had finally adjourned when assessment of taxpayer's mineral rights were made, taxpayer was not without right of redress since he had the right, by certiorari from the circuit court directed to the county clerk, to have the record brought up for review and correction. Stout Lumber Co. v. Parker, 197 Ark. 65, 122 S.W.2d 180 (1938).

Scope of Writ.

This section does not enlarge the writ of certiorari into an appeal or writ of error for the correction of mere errors in judicial proceedings; the practice is still to affirm or quash the judgment on the trial of the certiorari. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Barnes, 35 Ark. 95 (1879); North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Sangster, 210 Ark. 294, 195 S.W.2d 549 (1946).

The writ of certiorari cannot be used by the circuit courts for the correction of errors of inferior courts as upon appeal; but where the inferior judgment shows upon its face that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, or the person of the defendant, it may be quashed upon certiorari. State ex rel. Izard County v. Hinkle, 37 Ark. 532 (1881); Street v. Stuart, 38 Ark. 159 (1881); Baskins v. Wylds, 39 Ark. 347 (1882); Haynes v. Semmes, 39 Ark. 399 (1882); Pettigrew v. Washington County, 43 Ark. 33 (1884); Burgett v. Apperson, 52 Ark. 213, 12 S.W. 559 (1889).

Certiorari cannot be converted into injunction suit. Moore v. Turner, 43 Ark. 243 (1884).

A writ of certiorari may be quashed after the return when it is made to appear that it will not serve the ends of justice; but it will not be quashed where the return shows that the bill of exceptions (now abolished) as certified does not conform to that which was originally filed. Martin v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., 53 Ark. 250, 13 S.W. 765 (1890).

A judgment void upon its face will be quashed on certiorari. Chevrolet Motor Co. v. Landers Chevrolet Co., 183 Ark. 669, 37 S.W.2d 873 (1931).

The scope of a writ of certiorari at common law is not enlarged by this section. McAllister v. McAllister, 200 Ark. 171, 138 S.W.2d 1040 (1940).

Writ of certiorari can be used by the circuit court in the exercise of its appellate power and superintending control over inferior courts, where the tribunal to which it is issued has exceeded its jurisdiction, where party applying for it had the right of appeal but lost it through no fault of his own, and where circuit court has superintending control over a tribunal which has proceeded illegally and no other mode has been provided for directly reviewing its proceedings; but it cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal or writ of error, for the correction of errors or irregularities in proceedings of inferior courts. McCain v. Collins, 204 Ark. 521, 164 S.W.2d 448 (1942).

Neither mandamus, certiorari, nor prohibition may be used as a substitute for appeal. Gran v. Hale, 294 Ark. 563, 745 S.W.2d 129 (1988).

Cited: Eclectic State Medical Bd. v. Beatty, 203 Ark. 294, 156 S.W.2d 246 (1941); Carrier v. Beck, 227 Ark. 92, 296 S.W.2d 446 (1956).

16-13-206. Term of court — Court to remain open.

    1. The circuit court of each county and of each division in each county having two (2) or more divisions of circuit court shall be open by operation of law at the beginning of each regular term of that court, as fixed by law, and shall remain open until the beginning of the next term of the court.
    2. When any circuit court is duly convened for a regular term, the court shall remain open for all criminal, civil, or special proceedings until its next regular term.
  1. No term of the court shall lapse by reason of the fact that the court was not formally opened at the beginning of the term.

History. Acts 1943, No. 202, § 1; 1951, No. 207, § 1; 1955, No. 49, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-311, 22-312.

Cross References. Change of term not to affect proceedings, § 16-10-113.

County court terms not to conflict with terms of circuit court, § 16-15-103.

Case Notes

Cited: Bean v. Roberts, 240 Ark. 9, 397 S.W.2d 784 (1966); Higginbotham v. State, 251 Ark. 832, 475 S.W.2d 522 (1972); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Renfro v. City of Conway, 260 Ark. 852, 545 S.W.2d 69 (1977).

16-13-207. Sessions.

    1. Each circuit court may by a rule or order fix times and places when the court will be in session for the transaction of business. However, the scheduled sittings of the court shall not preclude the transaction of business by the court at other times or places.
    2. No jury, however, shall be convened at a place other than the regular and customary place for holding court in each county or district thereof, as the case may be.
  1. When any circuit court is duly convened for a regular term, the court may be in session at any time the judge thereof may deem necessary. However, no session of the court shall interfere with any other court to be held by the same judge.
  2. Two (2) or more circuit courts of the same district may be concurrently in session.

History. Acts 1943, No. 202, § 1; 1951, No. 207, § 1; 1955, No. 49, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-311, 22-312.

Case Notes

Continuance.

Motion of defendant for a continuance on the ground that court was not properly in session, since court was in session in another district in the same county, was properly overruled, since evidence failed to show that the court was in session in another district in the same county, and even if the court was in session in another district, that did not interfere with the holding of session of any other court. McGaha v. State, 216 Ark. 165, 224 S.W.2d 534 (1949).

Discretion of Court.

When the regular term of court has been convened, the judge at his discretion may adjourn and convene court as he “may deem necessary.” Bradley v. State, 213 Ark. 927, 213 S.W.2d 901 (1948).

Cited: Bean v. Roberts, 240 Ark. 9, 397 S.W.2d 784 (1966); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Renfro v. City of Conway, 260 Ark. 852, 545 S.W.2d 69 (1977).

16-13-208. Adjournments — Recess.

There shall be no adjournments of circuit courts. However, courts shall be deemed in recess while not engaged in the transaction of business.

History. Acts 1951, No. 207, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-312.

Case Notes

In General.

Under this section, there is no longer any such thing as a final adjournment after the first session of each term, for the court remains open until the last instant of each regular term. Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961).

Cited: Bean v. Roberts, 240 Ark. 9, 397 S.W.2d 784 (1966); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Renfro v. City of Conway, 260 Ark. 852, 545 S.W.2d 69 (1977).

16-13-209. Notice of proceedings.

Where the defendant or respondent has answered or otherwise pleaded and if the time has not been set by the court, all interested parties, together with their attorneys, shall receive notice from the clerk of the court of any proceeding affecting their rights and shall be given time to prepare to meet the proceeding. However, this section shall not apply in cases wherein all interested parties are required by law to take notice.

History. Acts 1943, No. 202, § 1; 1955, No. 49, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-311.

Case Notes

In General.

This section does not require that the court clerk give notice to all interested parties in all cases, but only in those cases where the time has not been fixed by the court and in those cases where parties are not required by law to take notice. Harris v. State, 6 Ark. App. 89, 638 S.W.2d 698 (1982).

Due Process.

While a circuit court is authorized to affirm a judgment of a lower court if the appellant fails to appear when his case has been scheduled for trial, due process dictates that appellant be afforded proper notice and an opportunity to be heard in a proceeding involving the deprivation of life, liberty or property; that interested parties as well as their attorneys receive notice from the clerk of the court of proceedings scheduled; and that time shall be afforded counsel to prepare for trial. Rawls v. State, 266 Ark. 919, 587 S.W.2d 602 (Ct. App. 1979).

Where a bonding company failed to show that it was prejudiced by the lack of notice of an original bond forfeiture order prior to the entry of the nunc pro tunc order correcting the name of the bonding company that was subject to the same, it could not prove that its due process rights were violated; because the nunc pro tunc judgment was correct, reflecting an accurate correction of the clerical error in the earlier order, nothing would be gained by setting aside the order and immediately reentering it. Holt Bonding Co. v. State, 353 Ark. 136, 114 S.W.3d 179, 2003 Ark. LEXIS 250 (2003).

Failure to Give Notice.

Circuit court has no power to render a default judgment, without notice, in a county other than that in which the action is pending. Howell v. Van Houten, 227 Ark. 84, 296 S.W.2d 428 (1956).

Record.

If court was not in session on a certain day, authority to hear witnesses and make their testimony a part of the record in the original proceeding was lacking unless this section had been complied with or no notice had been waived. Vaccinol Prods. Corp. v. State ex rel. Phillips County, 201 Ark. 1066, 148 S.W.2d 1069 (1941) (decision under prior law).

Sufficiency.

Notice held to be insufficient. Renfro v. City of Conway, 260 Ark. 852, 545 S.W.2d 69 (1977); Davis v. Univ. of Ark. Medical Ctr. & Collection Serv., Inc., 262 Ark. 587, 559 S.W.2d 159 (1977); Rawls v. State, 266 Ark. 919, 587 S.W.2d 602 (Ct. App. 1979); Prine v. State, 267 Ark. 304, 590 S.W.2d 25 (1979).

Notice held sufficient. Harris v. State, 6 Ark. App. 89, 638 S.W.2d 698 (1982).

Since defense attorney had two days notice before the trial date and knew that the case would be reset for a day within ten days or two weeks and there was no reason shown for the attorney's stated inability to contact defendant in Iowa so that he could be present for trial, statutory and due process requirements were met. Whitmire v. State, 50 Ark. App. 34, 901 S.W.2d 20 (1995).

16-13-210. Circuit judge may hear and adjudicate causes pending in the circuit.

    1. Any circuit judge of this state, at any time while mentally and physically competent and physically present in the geographical area of the judicial circuit which he or she serves as judge, may hear, adjudicate, or render any appropriate order with respect to any cause or matter pending in any circuit court over which he or she presides, subject to such notice of the time, place, and nature of the hearing being given as may be required by law or by rule or order of the court.
    2. However, no contested case may be tried outside the county of the venue of the case, except upon the agreement of the parties interested.
  1. A circuit judge assigned to a cause or matter, either by regular docket assignment or by Supreme Court order, may render or sign orders in that cause or matter in a geographical location other than the judicial circuit in which the cause or matter is pending.
  2. A retired circuit judge, chancellor, or circuit-chancery judge assigned to a cause or matter by Supreme Court order may render or sign orders in that cause or matter in a geographical location other than the judicial circuit in which the cause or matter is pending.

History. Acts 1961, No. 81, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-313; Acts 2003, No. 1000, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, Power to Sign Orders Outside Judicial Circuit, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 447.

Case Notes

In General.

Section 16-88-105, this section, and Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 13 [repealed], provide that a circuit judge may act in a criminal case only when he is within the geographical area of the judicial district in which the charge is filed; it has been so for over 150 years. Waddle v. Sargent, 313 Ark. 539, 855 S.W.2d 919 (1993).

A circuit judge has the authority to preside over proceedings in any courtroom, in any county, within the judicial district for which that judge was elected. Davis v. Reed, 316 Ark. 575, 873 S.W.2d 524 (1994).

The constitution and applicable statutes provide that a circuit judge may act in a criminal case only when he is within the geographical area of the judicial district in which the charge is filed. State v. Vaughan, 343 Ark. 293, 33 S.W.3d 512 (2000).

Charge and Sentence in Different Districts.

It was not error to charge the defendant with having committed a crime in one district in a county in the circuit, and have him sentenced by the circuit judge in another. Renfro v. State, 264 Ark. 601, 573 S.W.2d 53 (1978).

Dismissal of Action.

Court granted physician's petition for a writ of certiorari in administratrix's third medical negligence and wrongful death action as the trial judge's reversal of his order dismissing the administratrix's second complaint, which was assigned to another judge, had no bearing on whether the trial judge could make a ruling on the motion to dismiss the third complaint. Jordan v. Circuit Court, 366 Ark. 326, 235 S.W.3d 487 (2006).

16-13-211. Proceedings during vacation of court or in chambers.

  1. The circuit judges of the circuit courts constituting the judicial districts over which they have jurisdiction and preside are empowered and authorized to deliver opinions and make and sign judgments in cases taken under advisement and submitted to that court at a term of court, or by consent and agreement of interested parties in vacation, either in chambers or at the regular place of holding court in the respective counties constituting the judicial district.
  2. By consent of interested parties and counsel, where a jury is waived and a cause is submitted for trial before the court sitting as a jury, the trial and hearing may be held in chambers in the county of the residence of the regular presiding circuit judge.
  3. Consent judgments, ex parte proceedings, and matters not requiring the services of a jury may be made and hearings had in chambers in the county of the residence of the regular presiding circuit judge.
  4. Any opinion, judgment, or order rendered and made under and pursuant to this section shall be signed by the presiding circuit judge. This opinion, judgment, or order shall become effective when entered of record in the county where the action or matter originated or was filed.
  5. The purpose of this section is to better facilitate the disposition of court matters where the services of a jury are not required and to expedite, by consent of interested parties and counsel, legal matters and actions which otherwise would be delayed until the regular convening of a term of court and to save the costs of such regular convening.

History. Acts 1949, No. 257, §§ 1-5; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-314 — 22-318.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section applies only to actions of the court in vacation and would not require that the trial judge sign the judgment sentencing a criminal defendant. Shipman v. State, 261 Ark. 559, 550 S.W.2d 424 (1977).

Consent of Interested Parties.

Persons who were not parties to action, did not intervene therein, did not employ attorney to act for them, and did not even communicate their desires to parties or their attorneys, could not have judgment in action set aside on ground that parties to action committed fraud on court by agreeing to try action in chambers in county of judge's residence. Morrell v. Hill, 218 Ark. 552, 237 S.W.2d 467 (1951).

16-13-212. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning counterclaims and setoffs exceeding inferior court's jurisdiction, was repealed by Acts 1987, No. 431, § 8. The section was derived from Acts 1963, No. 488, §§ 2-5; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-2010—27-2013.

16-13-213. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning special judges, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 75. The section was derived from Civil Code, § 761; C. & M. Dig., § 2226; Pope's Dig., § 2854; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-339.

16-13-214. Disqualification of judges.

No judge of the circuit court shall sit on the determination of any case in which he or she is interested in the outcome, is related to any party within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity, has been of counsel in the case or presided over it in any inferior court, or is otherwise disqualified under the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, unless the parties waive the disqualification as provided therein.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 24; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2107, 6400; Pope's Dig., §§ 2711, 8362; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-113; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 76.

Publisher's Notes. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 24, is also codified as §§ 16-13-312 [repealed], 16-14-103 [repealed], 16-15-111, and 16-19-206 [repealed].

Cross References. Computing degrees of consanguinity, § 28-9-212.

Disqualification of judges, Ark. Const., Amend. 80, § 12.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Brill, The Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, 35 Ark. L. Rev. 247.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Justice Robert L. Brown, Essay: Judicial Recusal: It’s Time to Take Another Look Post-Caperton, 38 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 63 (2015).

Case Notes

Purpose.

This section and § 16-13-101 tend to carry out the intention of Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 20 [repealed]. Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978).

Continuance.

It is no ground of error that a judge who was incompetent to sit in a cause took jurisdiction of it so far as to grant a continuance, for it would have been continued by operation of law, without action of the judge, he being incompetent to try it. Stone v. Robinson, 9 Ark. (4 English) 469 (1849).

Grounds.

A trial judge is not disqualified in a criminal case because the defendant claims to have entered a plea of guilty upon an agreement with the judge and prosecuting attorney that certain other pending indictments would be dismissed where the agreement was denied by the judge. Hudspeth v. State, 188 Ark. 323, 67 S.W.2d 191 (1933), cert. denied, Hudspeth v. Arkansas, 296 U.S. 642, 56 S. Ct. 178, 80 L. Ed. 456 (1935).

—Acting as Counsel.

The objection that a judge was disqualified by reason of having appeared for the plaintiffs in a previous suit against the defendants upon the same cause of action which had been dismissed for want of prosecution will be deemed waived where the case was allowed to proceed to judgment without calling the judge's attention to his disqualification. Washington Fire Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 139 Ark. 130, 213 S.W. 7 (1919).

—Bias or Prejudice.

Prejudice is not ground for disqualifying judge. Jones v. State, 61 Ark. 88, 32 S.W. 81, 1895 Ark. LEXIS 81 (1895).

Evidence did not establish bias or prejudice warranting disqualification of judge. Norman v. State, 236 Ark. 476, 366 S.W.2d 891 (1963), cert. denied, Norman v. Arkansas, 375 U.S. 933, 84 S. Ct. 337, 11 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1963); Van Hook v. Van Hook, 270 Ark. 27, 603 S.W.2d 434 (1980); Matthews v. Rodgers, 279 Ark. 328, 651 S.W.2d 453 (1983); Welch v. State, 283 Ark. 281, 675 S.W.2d 641 (1984).

The fact that a judge may have, or may develop during the trial, an opinion, a bias or a prejudice does not make the trial judge so biased and prejudicial as to require his disqualification in further proceedings. Matthews v. Rodgers, 279 Ark. 328, 651 S.W.2d 453 (1983).

Whether a judge has become biased to the point that he should disqualify himself is a matter to be confined to the conscience of the judge; the reason is that bias is a subjective matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the trial judge. Thus, absent some objective demonstration of prejudice, it is a communication of bias which will cause an appellate court to reverse a trial judge's decision on disqualification. Matthews v. Rodgers, 279 Ark. 328, 651 S.W.2d 453 (1983).

Arkansas Supreme Court Justices were entitled to a writ of mandamus to dismiss an action filed by a trial judge after the justices permanently barred him from presiding over death penalty cases based on his alleged anti-death penalty bias in violation of Ark. Code Jud. Conduct 2.11; extraordinary circumstances warranted the writ and the judge stated no plausible claims for relief. In re Kemp, 894 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1176, 203 L. Ed. 2d 199 (2019).

—Interest.

The interest which disqualifies a judge is not the kind of interest which one feels in public proceedings or public measures; it must be a pecuniary or property interest or one affecting his individual rights; and the liability of pecuniary gain or relief must occur upon the event of the suit and not result remotely in the future from the general operation of laws and government upon the status fixed by the decision. Osborne v. Board of Imp., 94 Ark. 563, 128 S.W. 357 (1910).

A judge who was the victim of alleged criminal libel by publisher was disqualified from presiding as judge in proceedings under several indictments returned against the publisher since he himself was a party within the necessary degree as used in this section and Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 20 [repealed]. Copeland v. Huff, 222 Ark. 420, 261 S.W.2d 2 (1953).

The exchange of circuits was a proceeding in which the self-disqualified trial judge should not have exercised the discretionary powers of his office since he was personally affected. State v. George, 250 Ark. 968, 470 S.W.2d 593 (1971).

Judge passing on compromise settlement between injured employee and tort-feasors in which insurance carrier had subrogation rights did not have a disqualifying interest in the case because he had pending an action for injury to his own hand involving the same liability carrier. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Billingsley, 256 Ark. 947, 511 S.W.2d 476 (1974).

The “interest” which is disqualifying under this section, § 16-13-101, and Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 20 [repealed], is a personal proprietary or pecuniary interest or one affecting the individual rights of the judge, and the liability, gain or relief to the judge must turn on the outcome of the suit. Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978).

Motion for recusal was properly denied where the trial judge had no interest in underlying action beyond that of general interest which any other taxpayer or property owner had, and thus, he did not have a personal or pecuniary interest that justified disqualification. Worth v. Benton County Circuit Court, 351 Ark. 149, 89 S.W.3d 891 (2002).

—Relationship.

The husband of the aunt is related to the husband of her niece within the fourth degree of affinity. Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657 (1852).

A circuit judge is not disqualified to preside where he is related by affinity, within the constitutional degrees, to one of the parties in a cause who is merely a trustee and has no interest in the determination of the cause. Fowler v. Byers, 16 Ark. (3 Barber) 196 (1855).

An application to the Supreme Court, in the first instance, for a writ of certiorari to a justice of the peace because the circuit judge is of kin to the petitioner, and disqualified, should show how he was related. Ex parte Allston, 17 Ark. (4 Barber) 580 (1856).

A judge is disqualified when related within prohibited degree to attorney in the case who has a contingent interest in that his fee is dependent upon the determination of the cause. Johnson v. State, 87 Ark. 45, 112 S.W. 143 (1908).

Notwithstanding the conclusion that the trial judge acted in utmost good faith, a person convicted of murder was entitled to a new trial when he was in ignorance, at the time of trial, of the fact that the judge's wife was a cousin of the victim. Byler v. State, 210 Ark. 790, 197 S.W.2d 748 (1946).

Murder defendant who pleaded guilty after the death penalty was waived was not prejudiced by a father-in-law/son-in-law relationship between the judge and one of defendant's court-appointed counsel. Fuller v. State, 256 Ark. 998, 511 S.W.2d 474 (1974).

When the relationship is within the proscribed limits, neither the frequency of contact nor the closeness of the individuals bears on the result. Morton v. Benton Publishing Co., 291 Ark. 620, 727 S.W.2d 824 (1987).

Where one spouse's relationship with a judge comes within the prohibition of Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 20 [repealed], this section, and §§ 16-13-312 [repealed], 16-14-103 [repealed], 16-15-111, or 16-19-206 [repealed], the other spouse shares the same degree of relationship by affinity to the judge. Morton v. Benton Publishing Co., 291 Ark. 620, 727 S.W.2d 824 (1987).

Presumption.

Where the record fails to show that the court acted on a suggestion of disqualification, it will be presumed that he found that he was not disqualified. Davis v. Atkinson, 75 Ark. 300, 87 S.W. 432 (1905).

Cited: Braswell v. Gehl, 263 Ark. 706, 567 S.W.2d 113 (1978).

16-13-215. Entry of judge into armed services — Discharge — Vacancy.

  1. The entry of a regular judge into the armed services of the United States shall not have the effect of vacating his or her office, but during the period of his or her service, he or she shall not be entitled to receive or enjoy the salary or emoluments of the office.
  2. Upon certifying to the Governor his or her discharge from the service, the judge shall be entitled to resume his or her office and thereafter to receive and enjoy the salary and emoluments until a regular judge shall be elected and qualified.
  3. In the event a regular judge enters the armed services of the United States and is killed upon the field of battle, dies, is reported missing for twelve (12) months, or is unheard from for a period of twelve (12) months so that his or her whereabouts are unknown, his or her office shall become vacant upon proclamation by the Governor of such fact, and such vacancy shall be filled as provided by law.

History. Acts 1943, No. 290, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-347.

Cross References. Military leave of absence, election of emergency circuit judge, § 21-4-306.

16-13-216. Clerk and court reporter — Assistants — Salaries.

  1. The circuit judge of any judicial district which had a total population between forty-two thousand (42,000) and forty-four thousand (44,000) according to the 1960 Federal Decennial Census may appoint for the district some person who is either a lawyer, or who has served as an official court reporter prior to February 27, 1968, to serve as clerk and court reporter for the judicial district.
    1. The official so provided for in this section for such a judicial district shall receive a salary of five thousand four hundred dollars ($5,400) per year for such work.
    2. The salary is to be paid in monthly or quarterly payments by the various counties of the judicial district out of proper and appropriate funds and as set out in this section.
    1. The circuit judge of the judicial circuit is authorized, empowered, and directed to employ and appoint a person to assist the clerk or court reporter at the request of the clerk or court reporter at wages to be designated by the circuit judge.
    2. The wages of the assistant shall be paid out of the salary of the clerk or court reporter appointed under this section to serve the judicial district.
    1. The annual salary of the clerk and court reporter shall be paid by the respective counties comprising the judicial districts which may be affected by this section according to an assessment or assessments to be fixed, made, determined, and proportioned among the counties comprising the judicial district by the presiding judge of the judicial district at such time as he or she may deem proper and necessary.
    2. The proportioning, fixing, prorating, and determining of the amounts each county shall pay shall be determined on a basis of assessed valuation of the property in the counties or in the district as a whole.
    3. The salary shall be paid as provided in subsection (b) of this section by the various counties from appropriate county funds.
  2. Nothing in this section shall affect the fees chargeable by court reporters of the judicial districts with a total population of between forty-two thousand (42,000) and forty-four thousand (44,000) according to the 1960 Federal Decennial Census for transcripts and such services as may be now in force and effect.

History. Acts 1961, No. 14, § 1; 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 66, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-361.

16-13-217. Law clerks — Service as court reporters and masters.

    1. A circuit judge of any judicial district, any county of which has a population of two hundred forty thousand (240,000) or more according to the most recent federal census, may appoint one (1) law clerk for the county who shall be a licensed attorney or a graduate of a law school approved by the State Board of Law Examiners.
    2. In any judicial district having more than one (1) division of a circuit court, the appointment of the law clerk shall be by concurrence of a majority of the judges of that district.
  1. The law clerk may, in addition, serve as court reporter for the court or any division of the court.
  2. Each circuit judge of a judicial district having a population of two hundred forty thousand (240,000) or more according to the most recent federal census may appoint a law clerk who may also serve as master who shall be a graduate of a law school approved by the State Board of Law Examiners.
  3. The law clerk shall serve at the discretion and under the direction of the circuit judge to whom he or she is assigned.
  4. The powers and duties of the law clerk shall be to administer oaths and affirmations; to take acknowledgments, affidavits, and depositions; to conduct pretrial and prejudgment hearings; and to make recommendations for dispositions to the circuit judge.
  5. A law clerk may be assigned such additional duties at the discretion of the circuit judge as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the State of Arkansas.
    1. The salary of a law clerk for circuit court provided for under this section shall be the same salary as provided for a circuit court reporter in the district in which the law clerk is appointed.
    2. Should the law clerk serve both as court reporter and law clerk, he or she shall receive in addition thereto the sum of six hundred dollars ($600) per annum.

History. Acts 1961, No. 14, § 1; 1963, No. 29, § 1; 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 66, § 1; 1979, No. 580, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-361 — 22-362.

Case Notes

Judicial Authority.

The letter opinion of the judge's law clerk informing the defendant that his petition for post-conviction relief was denied was invalid because a trial judge may not delegate his judicial authority to a law clerk, and the General Assembly has not attempted to give law clerks the power to decide cases. Brown v. State, 290 Ark. 289, 718 S.W.2d 937 (1986).

16-13-218. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning case coordinators, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 77. The section was derived from Acts 1975, No. 68, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-364.

16-13-219. Court expenses — Payment.

  1. The expenses accruing in the circuit courts shall be paid out of the county treasury in which each court is held in the same manner as other demands.
    1. These expenses shall include reasonable sums for the employment of secretaries by circuit judges and for reasonable office expenses and office supplies of the circuit judges.
    2. In the event any circuit judge employs a secretary under the provisions of this section, the salary of each secretary shall be fixed by the quorum court of the county or counties involved.
  2. In any case where a particular judicial district is comprised of more than one (1) county, the expenses shall be prorated among the counties comprising the district in such manner as the circuit judge may by order direct.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 47; C. & M. Dig., § 2118; Pope's Dig., § 2722; Acts 1977, No. 751, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-125.

Publisher's Notes. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 47, is also codified as §§ 16-13-324, 16-14-109, and 16-15-113.

Case Notes

Jurors' Fees.

The compensation of jurors is part of the current expense of holding the circuit court and is not taxable as costs. Independence County v. Dunkin, 40 Ark. 329 (1883).

16-13-220. Counsel for incompetents.

In addition to all other authority granted by law, every circuit court is authorized to appoint legal counsel to represent a person the court deems incompetent due to minority or mental incapacity in civil and criminal actions.

History. Acts 1987, No. 96, § 2; 2003, No. 1185, § 78.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1987, No. 96, § 2, is also codified as § 16-13-325.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Attorneys, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 539.

16-13-221. Legal counsel to personnel.

The Attorney General shall serve as the legal counsel to probation officers and support personnel of circuit courts and shall represent them in any action brought as a result of their official duties.

History. Acts 1989, No. 433, § 1.

16-13-222. Private hearings by circuit courts.

    1. The circuit courts of the various judicial districts of the state shall hear the case or matter in privacy, upon application of all litigants to a divorce action, proceeding for alimony or separate maintenance, proceeding touching the maintenance or custody of children, proceeding for annulment of marriage, adoption proceeding, or any other proceeding pertaining to domestic relations.
    2. To this end, circuit judges are empowered to exclude from any such hearing and from the courtroom all individuals other than the litigants, their counsel, and the officers of the court.
  1. A circuit judge, upon his or her own initiative, may hear such cases and matters in chambers or in privacy where he or she deems it in the best interests of the parties and the best interests of society.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 79.

16-13-223. Sale and confirmation of property.

A circuit court may make orders for the sale of property in the custody of the court and may confirm the sale, but the sale shall not be confirmed until all parties have reasonable notice and an opportunity to be present and resist the confirmation.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 79.

16-13-224. Temporary exchange of districts — Assignment.

  1. Circuit judges may temporarily exchange judicial districts by joint order, and any circuit judge who consents may be assigned to another district for temporary service under rules adopted by the Supreme Court.
  2. When a circuit judge is serving temporarily in a judicial district other than his or her own, he or she shall not thereby be disqualified from conducting court or performing the usual and customary functions of his or her office in his or her own judicial district.
  3. A circuit judge on temporary duty by exchange or assignment:
    1. Shall have the same power and authority as a regularly elected or appointed judge for the judicial district; and
    2. May sign any judgment, order, document, or other paper relating to any case heard by the judge, either in the judicial district where the cause or matter is pending or in his or her own district, and the judgment, order, document, or other paper shall for all intents have the same effect, irrespective of the district in which it is signed.
  4. The sheriff and the circuit clerk in the county where a circuit judge is on temporary duty by exchange or assignment shall perform the same duties and functions in carrying out the operation of the court as they perform in cases assigned to the regularly elected or appointed judges.
  5. If a circuit judge who is on temporary duty by exchange or assignment needs a jury for the disposition of any case, he or she may use the regular or special panel of the circuit court of that county. If the regular and special panels are exhausted, he or she may summon the circuit clerk and have him or her select the required number of qualified jurors.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 79; 2017, No. 600, § 3.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “circuit clerk and have him or her” for “jury commissioners previously appointed and have them” in the second sentence of (e).

16-13-225. Juvenile cases — Information system.

  1. The Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts shall develop for the circuit courts a case-based management information system, capable of capturing information at each stage of the process of juvenile cases, with the capacity to serve basic administration, operations, planning, evaluation, and monitoring needs.
  2. A judge of the circuit court designated to hear juvenile cases in the district plan adopted pursuant to Order 14 of the Administrative Orders of the Supreme Court shall designate an employee of the court to be responsible for the timely completion and submission of information to the Administrative Office of the Courts.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 79.

16-13-226. Installment payments by a criminal defendant in circuit court — Priority of payment.

  1. An installment payment by a criminal defendant to a circuit court shall initially be deemed to be a collection of court costs until the court costs have been collected in full, with any remaining installment payments representing collections of restitution, and then any applicable fines.
  2. If court costs, restitution, and fines are fully paid, all remaining installment payments shall be allocated to remaining amounts due as ordered by the circuit court.
  3. A municipal or county governing body that adopted municipal or county legislation before January 1, 2017, to provide an alternative method of installment payment allocation as then authorized by state law shall remain in effect until repealed by the municipal or county governing body.

History. Acts 2017, No. 885, § 1.

Subchapter 3 — Juvenile Division of Circuit Court Generally

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 66, § 1, provided:

“(a) There is hereby created the position of Chancery Judge at Large, which shall be appointed by the Governor as authorized by law and assigned by the Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-10-101 from those Chancery Judges who lost two years of their elected terms pursuant to the United States District Court Consent Decree in the case of Eugene Hunt et al. v. State of Arkansas et al.

“(b) The Chancery Judge at Large shall have original jurisdiction in all matters of equity in judicial districts where assigned and shall serve until December 31, 1996, when the provisions of this act shall expire.

“(c) The Chancery Judge at Large shall receive compensation at the same rate as fixed by law for regularly elected Chancery Judges.

“(d) The Chancery Judge at Large may appoint a court reporter as provided by law, whose salary and expenses shall be paid from the Court Reporter's Fund.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1989, No. 418, § 8: Mar. 8, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the juvenile division of chancery court is to be created to replace the juvenile court system provided for in Act 14 of 1987 and that the immediate passage of this act is necessary to insure that there is an orderly and efficient administration of the juvenile justice system of this state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 8: Mar. 27, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the juvenile division of chancery court is to be created to replace the juvenile court system provided for in Act 14 of 1987 and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to insure that there is an orderly and efficient administration of the juvenile justice system of this state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), Nos. 61 and 62, § 8: Aug. 26, 1994. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that in order to address the problem of juvenile crime it is necessary to authorize the commitment of delinquent juveniles to juvenile detention facilities; that present law now limits to two thousand dollars ($2,000) the amount a juvenile can be required to pay as restitution to victims, and that amount is becoming increasingly too low; that this act remedies both situations and should go into effect immediately in order to better protect the citizens of this state from the acts of delinquent juveniles and more adequately compensate the victims through restitution. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 321, § 5: Mar. 3, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that juvenile officers serve a vital function; that the present law concerning state reimbursement to counties for a portion of the cost of providing juvenile officers is inadequate; and that this act is immediately necessary in order to adequately provide for this necessary function. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 1999, No. 460, § 8: July 1, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1999 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1999 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1999.”

Acts 2005, No. 1398, § 7: July 1, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 2005 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 2005 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 2005.”

Acts 2009, No. 956, § 34: Apr. 6, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that laws concerning juveniles need to be amended and updated; that the fair and efficient administration of juvenile law is highly important to society at large; and that this act is immediately necessary because the judiciary needs to begin addressing these changes in laws involving juveniles. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2016, No. 87, § 7: July 1, 2016. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one (1) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 2016 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the legislative session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 2016 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 2016.”

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Brill, Law and Equity in Arkansas: Will Liles v. Liles Lead Us Out of the Morass?, 1987 Ark. L. Notes 1.

Brill, The Maxims of Equity, 1993 Ark. L. Notes 29.

Ark. L. Rev.

Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration — Arkansas, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 12.

The Arkansas Judiciary at the Crossroads, 17 Ark. L. Rev. 259.

Arkansas' Judiciary: Its History and Structure, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 152.

La Dolce Vita — Law and Equity Merged at Last! III. A Continuing Saga, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 162.

Cox and Newbern, New Civil Procedure: The Court That Came in From the Code, 33 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

Killenbeck, And Then They Did …? Abusing Equity in the Name of Justice, 44 Ark. L. Rev. 235.

16-13-301 — 16-13-317. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning establishment and operation of chancery courts, and duties and appointment of chancellors, masters, clerks and sheriffs in chancery courts, were repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 80. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-13-301. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 1, p. 314; C.& M. Dig., § 2186; Pope's Dig., § 2797; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-401.

16-13-302. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 14, p. 314; C.& M. Dig., § 2200; Pope's Dig., § 2825; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-402.

16-13-303. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 14, p. 314; C.& M. Dig., § 2200; Pope's Dig., § 2825; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-402.

16-13-304. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 4, p. 314; C. & M. Dig., § 2188; Pope's Dig., § 2814; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-404; Acts 1989, No. 949, § 2; 1995, No. 1016, § 1; 1995, No. 1298, § 13; 2001, No. 1153, § 1.

16-13-305. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 17, p. 314; C. & M. Dig., § 2203; Pope's Dig., § 2828; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-403.

16-13-306. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 14, p. 314; C. & M. Dig., § 2200; Pope's Dig., § 2825; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-402.

16-13-307. Acts 1969, No. 358, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-406.1.

16-13-308. Acts 1969, No. 358, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-406.2.

16-13-309. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 5, p. 314; C. & M. Dig., § 2189; Acts 1937, No. 171, § 1; Pope's Dig., §§ 2795, 2816; Acts 1973, No. 52, § 1; 1979, No. 211, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-409, 22-411, 22-432.

16-13-310. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 11, p. 314; C. & M. Dig., § 2197; Pope's Dig., § 2822; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-436.

16-13-311. Acts 1941, No. 417, §§ 1-4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-437 — 22-440.

16-13-312. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 24; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2107, 6400; Pope's Dig., §§ 2711, 8362; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-113.

16-13-313. Acts 1967, No. 37, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-449.

16-13-314. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 10, p. 314; C. & M. Dig., § 2196; Pope's Dig., § 2821; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-441.

16-13-315. Acts 1943, No. 42, §§ 1-7; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-442 — 22-447, 22-448; Acts 1987, No. 283, §§ 1, 2; 1987, No. 364, §§ 1, 2.

16-13-316. Acts 1951, No. 6, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-407.1.

16-13-317. Acts 1951, No. 6, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-407.1.

16-13-318. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning private hearings by chancery courts, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 81. This section was derived from Acts 1953, No. 277, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-404.1.

16-13-319. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning decisions of chancellors, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 82. The section was derived from Acts 1903, No. 166, § 11, p. 314; C. & M. Dig., § 2197; Pope's Dig., § 2822; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-436.

16-13-320. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning sale and confirmation of property, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 83. The section was derived from Acts 1913, No. 82, § 2, p. 318; C. & M. Dig., § 2191; Pope's Dig., § 2818; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-434.

16-13-321 — 16-13-325. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning issuance of injunctions in absence of chancellors, appeals, court expenses and payment, and counsel for incompetents, were repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 84. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-13-321. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 12, p. 314; C. & M. Dig., § 2198; Pope's Dig., § 2823; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-435.

16-13-322. Acts 1969, No. 358, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-406.3.

16-13-323. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 4, p. 314; C. & M. Dig., § 2188; Pope's Dig., § 2814; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-404.

16-13-324. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 47; C. & M. Dig., § 2118; Pope's Dig., § 2722; Acts 1977, No. 751, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-125.

16-13-325. Acts 1987, No. 96, § 2.

16-13-326. Circuit court juvenile division funds.

    1. All court costs, fines, and fees assessed by the juvenile division of circuit court shall be deposited and accounted for by the county in which they are received.
    2. The court shall have the authority to direct that the fees, court costs, and fines shall be collected by either the juvenile officer, the sheriff, or the clerk of the juvenile division of circuit court or other person designated by the court for the county in which the fees, court costs, and fines are charged.
    1. The officer designated by the court to collect juvenile fees, court costs, and fines shall deposit the fees, court costs, and fines into the appropriate fund and monthly deposit the fees, court costs, and fines into the fund in the county treasury of the county where the fees are collected.
      1. In a judicial district with multiple judges designated to hear juvenile cases in the district plan under Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 14, the majority of the judges shall determine who is to be in charge of the collection and accounting of fees, court costs, and fines.
      2. If there is no majority, the administrative judge is to determine who shall be in charge of the collection and accounting of fees, court costs, and fines as provided by this section.
      1. However, in judicial districts having more than one (1) county, the majority of the judges or the administrative judge may designate the treasurer of one (1) of the counties in the district as the depository of all juvenile and diversion fees, court costs, and fines collected in the district.
      2. The treasurer so designated by the court shall maintain a separate account of the juvenile fees, court costs, and fines collected in each county in the district so that fees, court costs, and fines collected in a county are spent to support the juveniles and juvenile division court services and programs in that county.
      3. Money remaining at the end of the fiscal year shall not revert to any other fund but shall remain in the circuit court juvenile division fund and carry over to the next fiscal year.
  1. The funds derived from the collection of juvenile fees, court costs, and fines shall be used by agreement of the judge or judges of the circuit court designated to hear juvenile cases in the district plan under Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 14, originally issued April 6, 2001, and the quorum court of the county to provide services and supplies to juveniles and support court programs at the discretion of the juvenile division of circuit court, including without limitation:
    1. Juvenile drug courts;
    2. Teen courts;
    3. Volunteer probation programs;
    4. Court-appointed special advocates; and
    5. After-school and community-based programs.

History. Acts 1989, No. 418, § 5; 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 61, § 3; 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 62, § 3; 1995, No. 1204, § 1; 2003, No. 1809, § 14; 2011, No. 1175, § 13.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment rewrote the section.

Case Notes

Custodian.

The trial court cannot assess a probation fee against a custodian under § 9-27-330 or § 9-27-331, because § 9-27-330 does not authorize the assessment of a probation fee against a custodian, and a juvenile court's authority to assess a probation fee is based upon subsection (a) of this section, which is silent on assessing a probation fee against a custodian. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481, 850 S.W.2d 847 (1993).

16-13-327. Probation officers.

  1. Each juvenile division of circuit court shall be provided with no fewer than one (1) probation officer to manage the probation services and needs of the court.
  2. Each probation officer shall:
    1. Be an employee of the judge or judges of the circuit court designated to hear juvenile cases in the district plan under Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order Number 14, originally issued April 6, 2001; and
    2. Serve at the pleasure of the judge or judges.
    1. A probation officer:
      1. Shall be certified as a juvenile probation officer according to the laws of this state;
      2. Must complete initial certification requirements within one (1) year of the officer's employment; and
      3. Must maintain the certification during the terms of his or her employment.
    2. The Juvenile Intake and Probation Officers' Certification Committee, composed of juvenile officers and judges of the circuit court designated to hear juvenile cases in their district plan under Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order Number 14 originally issued April 6, 2001, and staffed by an employee of the Administrative Office of the Courts, shall establish certification standards for intake and probation officers.
    3. The office shall collect and maintain records for the juvenile officers' certification documentation.
      1. The salary of the probation officer shall be paid by the county or counties in which the probation officer works.
      2. Except as provided in subdivision (d)(3) of this section, the state shall pay a portion of the salary of a full-time probation officer:
        1. Who is certified according to the laws of this state; and
        2. Whose salary has been paid by the county or counties for a period of one (1) year.
    1. The portion to be paid by the state shall be the lesser of:
      1. Fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) per year; or
      2. One-half (1/2) the probation officer's average salary as calculated over the last twelve (12) months.
    2. For reimbursement under the requirements of this subsection, the state shall reimburse a county only for salaries paid to the number of probation officers that:
      1. Meet the requirements of subdivision (d)(1) of this section; and
      2. Do not exceed two hundred fifty (250) positions authorized by the counties for probation and intake officers, subject to state funding.

History. Acts 1989, No. 418, § 1; 1997, No. 1171, § 1; 2003, No. 1166, § 33; 2005, No. 1398, § 2; 2009, No. 956, § 31.

Publisher's Notes. Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order Number 14, referred to in this section, is published in the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated's annual Court Rules volume immediately preceding the Rules of Appellate Procedure — Civil.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted the present subdivision designations in (d)(1) and made related changes; substituted “except as provided in subdivision (d)(3)” for “beginning August 1, 1990” in present (d)(1)(B); and added (d)(3).

The 2009 amendment made a minor stylistic change in (d)(1)(B); deleted (d)(3)(B)(i); rewrote (d)(2) and redesignated it as (d)(3)(B); and made a related change.

Case Notes

Salary.

Where circuit and chancery judge issued an order setting salaries of the judicial district's probation officer and intake officer at $18,000.00 per year, and petitioners, members of the county quorum court, voted to pay county's share of the salary, but at the rate of only $15,000.00 per year and judge ordered petitioners to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for not complying with his order, petitioners had not failed to fund the court, there was no showing that level of funding was so low that the court could not effectively operate, the inherent authority doctrine did not apply, and court had no authority to hold petitioners in contempt for not complying with its order. Abbott v. Spencer, 302 Ark. 396, 790 S.W.2d 171 (1990).

16-13-328. Intake officers.

  1. Each juvenile division of circuit court shall be provided with no fewer than one (1) intake officer to manage the intake needs of the court.
  2. Each intake officer shall:
    1. Be employed by the judge or judges of the circuit court designated to hear juvenile cases in the district's plan under Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order Number 14, originally issued April 6, 2001; and
    2. Serve at the pleasure of the judge or judges.
    1. Each intake officer:
      1. Shall be certified as a juvenile intake officer according to the laws of this state;
      2. Must complete initial certification requirements within one (1) year of the officer's employment; and
      3. Must maintain the certification during the terms of employment.
    2. The Juvenile Intake and Probation Officers' Certification Committee, composed of juvenile officers and judges of the circuit court designated to hear juvenile cases in the district plan under the order and staffed by an employee of the office, shall establish certification standards for intake and probation officers.
    3. The office shall collect and maintain records for the juvenile officers' certification documentation.
      1. The salary of the intake officer shall be paid by the county or counties in which the intake officer works.
      2. Except as provided in subdivision (d)(3) of this section, the state shall pay a portion of the salary of a full-time intake officer:
        1. Who is certified according to the laws of this state; and
        2. Whose salary has been paid by the county or counties for a period of one (1) year.
    1. The portion to be paid by the state shall be the lesser of:
      1. Fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) a year; or
      2. One-half (½) the intake officer's average salary as calculated over the last twelve (12) months.
    2. The state shall reimburse a county only for a portion of salaries paid to the number of intake officers that:
      1. Meet the requirements of subdivision (d)(1) of this section; and
      2. For reimbursement under the requirements of this subsection, do not exceed two hundred fifty (250) positions authorized by the counties for probation and intake officers, subject to state funding.
    1. Each circuit judge whose primary responsibility is conducting hearings for the involuntary admission or commitment of persons to the Arkansas State Hospital or any other public or private hospital with a fully trained psychiatrist on the active or consultant staff shall be provided with no fewer than one (1) intake officer to manage the intake needs of the court.
    2. The salaries of the intake officers shall be paid by the county or counties in which the intake officers work, with the state's paying a portion, e.g., the lesser of either fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) per year or one-half (½) of each full-time intake officer's annual salary.

History. Acts 1989, No. 418, § 2; 1991, No. 794, § 1; 1997, No. 1171, § 2; 2003, No. 1166, § 34; 2005, No. 1398, § 3; 2009, No. 956, § 32.

Publisher's Notes. Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order Number 14, referred to in this section, is published in the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated's annual Court Rules volume immediately preceding the Rules of Appellate Procedure — Civil.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted the present subdivision designations in (d)(1) and made related changes; substituted “except as provided in subdivision (d)(3)” for “beginning August 1, 1990” in present (d)(1)(B); and added (d)(3).

The 2009 amendment deleted (d)(3)(B)(i); rewrote (d)(3)(B)(ii) and incorporated it as part of (d)(3)(B); and made related changes.

16-13-329. Dual role precluded.

A person shall not serve as both a juvenile probation officer and a juvenile intake officer.

History. Acts 1989, No. 418, § 4; 2003, No. 1166, § 35.

16-13-330. Contract providers.

Intake and probation services deemed necessary by the court may be provided by contract providers by contract between the county or counties in a judicial district and the contract provider, upon approval of the judge or judges of the circuit court designated to hear juvenile cases in their district plan under Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order Number 14, originally issued April 6, 2001. Persons providing juvenile intake and probation services by contract shall be certified in the same manner as juvenile intake and probation officers employed by the judge or judges.

History. Acts 1989, No. 418, § 3; 1991, No. 787, § 1; 2003, No. 1166, § 36.

Publisher's Notes. Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order Number 14, referred to in this section, is published in the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated's annual Court Rules volume immediately preceding the Rules of Appellate Procedure — Civil.

16-13-331. State reimbursement.

  1. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall administer the state reimbursement to the counties for the juvenile officers' previous year's salaries.
  2. In order for a county to receive the state reimbursement for juvenile officers, the county must submit the following documentation to the office, including, but not limited to:
    1. Proof of each juvenile officer's certification and continuing education hours;
    2. A copy of each juvenile officer's W-2 form for the salary year that is being reimbursed; and
    3. A completed form concerning the employment status of the officer which shall be designed and distributed by the office.
  3. If a county contracts with a service provider to provide juvenile services pursuant to § 16-13-330, the county must submit documentation to the office, including, but not limited to:
    1. A copy of the contract for the salary year that is being reimbursed;
    2. A copy of each juvenile officer's certification and continuing education hours;
    3. A copy of each juvenile officer's W-2 form for the salary year that is being reimbursed; and
    4. A completed form concerning the employment status of each officer which shall be designed and distributed by the office.
    1. A county may determine that part-time service of a juvenile officer is sufficient to meet the needs of the county.
      1. Multiple counties in a judicial district may share the cost of the salary of the juvenile officer.
      2. One (1) county may be designated as the county to be reimbursed by the state, or each county shall designate the portion of the salary that it pays for juvenile services.
      1. A county may contract with a service provider for full-time or part-time juvenile officer services, and the county shall indicate the percentage of the contractor's time that is spent providing juvenile officer services for the county.
      2. The county or the contractor shall be reimbursed for one-half (1/2) of the portion of the salary that is used for such services, up to fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000).
  4. Nothing in this section removes the obligation of each circuit judge designated to hear juvenile cases in a district plan under Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 14, originally issued April 6, 2001, to have a minimum of one (1) intake officer, pursuant to § 16-13-328, and one (1) probation officer, pursuant to § 16-13-327.
  5. Funds appropriated for county reimbursement as provided in this section and for which a county has not submitted reimbursement documentation by January 1 of each year as required under subsection (b) of this section may be distributed to a county based on the following factors:
    1. The use of or inability of a county to use risk assessment and behavioral health screenings;
    2. The financial need of the county;
    3. The juvenile crime rate of the county;
    4. The juvenile division of circuit court reduction in commitments and the need for community service in the county; and
    5. The plan of the juvenile division of circuit court or the county for the use of funds for the provision of juvenile officer services.

History. Acts 1997, No. 321, § 1; 1999, No. 460, § 2; 2003, No. 1166, § 37; 2016, No. 87, § 4; 2019, No. 941, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 351, § 2 amended this section to read as follows:

“(a) The Auditor of State shall administer the state reimbursement to the counties for the juvenile officers' previous year salaries.

“(b) In order for a county to receive the state reimbursement for juvenile intake and probation officers the county must submit the following documentation to the Auditor of State, including but not limited to: (1) Proof of the juvenile officers' certification and continuing education hours; (2) A copy of the juvenile officers' W-2 form for the salary year that is being reimbursed; and (3) A completed form concerning the employment status of the officer which shall be designed and distributed by the Auditor of State.

“(c) If a county contracts with a service provider to provide juvenile intake and probation services pursuant to § 16-13-330, the county must submit documentation to the Auditor of State, including but not limited to: (1) A copy of the contract for the salary year that is being reimbursed; (2) A copy of the juvenile officers' certification and continuing education hours; (3) A copy of the juvenile officers' W-2 form for the salary year that is being reimbursed; and (4) A completed form concerning the employment status of the officer which shall be designed and distributed by the Auditor of State.

“(d) A county may determine that part-time service of a juvenile officer is sufficient to meet the needs of a county. (1) Multiple counties in a judicial district may share the cost of the salary of the intake and probation officer. One county may be designated as the county to be reimbursed by the state or each county shall designate the portion of the salary that it pays for juvenile intake and probation services. (2) The county may contract with a service provider for full or part-time juvenile intake and probation officer services and the county shall indicate the percentage of the contractors' time that is spent providing juvenile intake and probation officer services for the county. The county or the contractor shall be reimbursed for one-half (½) of the portion of the salary that is used for such services up to fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000).

“(e) Nothing in this section removes the obligation for each juvenile judge to have a minimum of one (1) intake officer, pursuant to § 16-13-328 and one (1) probation officer, pursuant to § 16-13-327.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2001 through June 30, 2003.”

Publisher's Notes. The language set forth in Acts 2001, No. 351, § 2 is nearly identical to the language in this section. Because the amendment is temporary, it was not incorporated into this section at the direction of the Arkansas Code Revision Commission and the Arkansas General Assembly.

Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order Number 14, referred to in this section, is published in the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated's annual Court Rules volume immediately preceding the Rules of Appellate Procedure — Civil.

Amendments. The 2016 amendment substituted “Administrative Office of the Courts” for “Auditor of State” throughout the section.

The 2019 amendment deleted “intake and probation” following “juvenile” in the introductory language of (b) and (c), and in (d)(2)(B) and twice in (d)(3)(A); substituted “the county” for “a county” in (d)(1); substituted “juvenile officer” for “in-take and probation officer” in (d)(2)(A); and added (f).

Subchapter 4 — Exchange of Cases

16-13-401. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning transfer of cases between circuit and chancery courts, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 85. The section was derived from Acts 1885, No. 106, § 12, p. 171; 1891, No. 156, § 9, p. 266; 1893, No. 9, § 9, p. 12; 1897 (Ex. Sess.), No. 37, § 9, p. 90; C. & M. Dig., § 2185; Pope's Dig., § 2794; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-405.

16-13-402. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning exchange or substitution upon judge's request, temporary or special judges and proceedings, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 86. The section was derived from Acts 1961, No. 135, §§ 1-5; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-342 — 22-346.

16-13-403 — 16-13-405. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning exchange of districts, powers and authority of exchange judges, and authority of exchange judges to sign papers in either district, were repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 87. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-13-403. Acts 1881, No. 68, § 1, p. 134; C. & M. Dig., § 2224; Acts 1933, No. 160, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 2852; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-340; Acts 1992 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 51, § 1.

16-13-404. Civil Code, § 758; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [758], p. 219; C. & M. Dig., § 2225; Acts 1933, No. 160, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 2853; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-341.

16-13-405. Acts 1963, No. 239, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-341.1.

Subchapter 5 — Court Reporters

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2010, No. 167, § 3, provided: “TRANSCRIPTS. Official Court Reporters shall prepare transcripts, which are to be included within a record on appeal, pursuant to the time requirements that are outlined in the Arkansas Supreme Court Rules. In the event an official Court Reporter fails to complete a transcript within the prescribed time, he or she shall immediately inform the judge, for whom he or she is employed, and the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners. Failure of a Court Reporter to report to his or her judge and to the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners shall result in the immediate suspension of the Court Reporter's license, pending a hearing before the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners.”

Acts 2011, No. 927, § 3, provided: “TRANSCRIPTS. Official Court Reporters shall prepare transcripts, which are to be included within a record on appeal, pursuant to the time requirements that are outlined in the Arkansas Supreme Court Rules. In the event an official Court Reporter fails to complete a transcript within the prescribed time, he or she shall immediately inform the judge, for whom he or she is employed, and the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners. Failure of a Court Reporter to report to his or her judge and to the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners shall result in the immediate suspension of the Court Reporter's license, pending a hearing before the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners.”

Acts 2012, No. 110, § 3, provided: “TRANSCRIPTS. Official Court Reporters shall prepare transcripts, which are to be included within a record on appeal, pursuant to the time requirements that are outlined in the Arkansas Supreme Court Rules. In the event an official Court Reporter fails to complete a transcript within the prescribed time, he or she shall immediately inform the judge, for whom he or she is employed, and the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners. Failure of a Court Reporter to report to his or her judge and to the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners shall result in the immediate suspension of the Court Reporter's license, pending a hearing before the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners.”

Acts 2013, No. 1028, § 3, provided: “TRANSCRIPTS. Official Court Reporters shall prepare transcripts, which are to be included within a record on appeal, pursuant to the time requirements that are outlined in the Arkansas Supreme Court Rules. In the event an official Court Reporter fails to complete a transcript within the prescribed time, he or she shall immediately inform the judge, for whom he or she is employed, and the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners. Failure of a Court Reporter to report to his or her judge and to the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners shall result in the immediate suspension of the Court Reporter's license, pending a hearing before the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners.”

Acts 2014, No. 111, § 3, provided: “TRANSCRIPTS. Official Court Reporters shall prepare transcripts, which are to be included within a record on appeal, pursuant to the time requirements that are outlined in the Arkansas Supreme Court Rules. In the event an official Court Reporter fails to complete a transcript within the prescribed time, he or she shall immediately inform the judge, for whom he or she is employed, and the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners. Failure of a Court Reporter to report to his or her judge and to the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners shall result in the immediate suspension of the Court Reporter's license, pending a hearing before the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1981 (Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 1: Nov. 25, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined that some of the provisions of Act 824 of 1981, which provides that the official court reporters of the circuit and chancery courts in the State are state employees, and provide for the levy and collection of additional court costs to pay the salaries and expenses of reporters, are vague and difficult to interpret, and that it is essential to the effective and efficient administration of justice that this Act be given effect immediately to clarify the law relating to court reporters. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981 (Ex. Sess.), No. 27, § 5: Dec. 1, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Third General Assembly, meeting in Extraordinary Session, that the passage of this Act is necessary for continued efficient operation of the circuit and chancery courts and to pay authorized salaries for the official court reporters. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 868, § 4: Mar. 28, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that since court reporters are now State employees, indigent defendants should be provided a free transcript without the necessity of paying additional fees to the court reporters, and that this Act is immediately necessary to so provide. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1987, No. 581, § 2: Apr. 4, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the compensation to court reporters, of the circuit, chancery, and probate courts, for making transcripts of court proceedings is inadequate, and that this Act is immediately necessary to provide adequate compensation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 677, § 4: Mar. 20, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the inability of judges on assignment and the Arkansas Judicial Department to employ substitute court reporters is creating an urgent and immediate problem in the court system of this state, and that the immediate passage of this act is necessary to insure there is an orderly and efficient administration of justice in the state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 788, § 36: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Mar. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1997, No. 1341, § 35: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Apr. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 2015, No. 268, § 16: July 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one-year period; that the act entitled ‘AN ACT TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATION FOR PERSONAL SERVICES AND OPERATING EXPENSES FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS FOR THE OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS AND TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATORS OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 2016; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.’ requires the passage of this act; that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 2015, is essential to the operation of the Administrative Office of the Courts, and that in the event of an extension of the legislative session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 2015, could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 2015.”

Acts 2019, No. 716, § 13: July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one (1) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 2019 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the legislative session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 2019 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 2019”.

16-13-501. Court reporters made state employees.

  1. The official court reporters of the circuit courts in this state are employees of the State of Arkansas.
  2. The Administrative Office of the Courts may employ or contract with a court reporter previously employed by the state for services provided at any time after his or her separation from state employment, regardless of a limitation otherwise provided under § 19-11-709(d).
  3. The office is responsible for the financial oversight of the court reporters employed by the circuit court, which includes without limitation:
    1. Biennial and annual budget requests;
    2. Relevant budget activities;
    3. Monitoring expenses;
    4. Travel;
    5. Substitute expenses;
    6. Indigent transcript payments; and
    7. Ensuring projected annual expenditures do not exceed total available funding.
  4. The office, with the assistance of the Arkansas Judicial Council, Inc., shall establish an official procedure or rules for:
    1. The hiring of court reporters;
    2. The termination of court reporters; and
    3. Salary adjustments for court reporters.

History. Acts 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-366.3; Acts 2015, No. 268, § 4; 2019, No. 716, § 8.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment deleted the second sentence.

The 2019 amendment added (b) through (d) and designated the former section as (a).

16-13-502. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning employment of court reporters, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 88. The section was derived from Acts 1977, No. 432, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-366.

16-13-503. Appointment — Compensation — Leave.

  1. Each judge of each circuit court may appoint one (1) or more court reporters as may be authorized by law.
    1. The salaries of the court reporters shall:
      1. Be exempt from the provisions of the Uniform Classification and Compensation Act, § 21-5-201 et seq.;
      2. Not exceed the maximum annual salary rate authorized by the General Assembly in the applicable appropriation act; and
      3. Be determined by the Administrative Office of the Courts.
    2. The salaries, together with other expenses authorized by law for the court reporters to be paid from state funds, shall be paid with moneys appropriated for the salaries and other expenses by the General Assembly from the Court Reporter's Fund.
    3. The total amount of salaries paid to court reporters and other distributions of the Court Reporter's Fund shall not exceed:
      1. The total annual allocation authorized by the General Assembly to the Court Reporter's Fund from the State Administration of Justice Fund as supplemented, if necessary, by any real property transfer tax revenues under § 26-60-112(b)(2); and
      2. Any remaining balances in the Court Reporter's Fund.
    1. Notwithstanding the exemption provided by § 21-4-203, the circuit judge of the circuit court served by a court reporter shall administer the attendance and leave policies for the court reporter in the manner prescribed for state employees by the Uniform Attendance and Leave Policy Act, § 21-4-201 et seq.
    2. The court reporter shall forward all approved requests for leave to the office on a regular and timely basis for payroll purposes.
    3. The office shall prescribe the procedures for obtaining all relevant leave information, including without limitation the forms, method of transmittal, and format for obtaining the leave information.
    1. Rules for the regulation of the practice of court reporting in this state, including, but not limited to, certification, discipline, and provisions for the retention of court reporter records, shall be the responsibility of the Supreme Court.
    2. Provided, however, that nothing in this subsection shall permit the Supreme Court to require that counties or county officials provide space for the storage of court reporter records.

History. Acts 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-366.3; Acts 1995, No. 743, § 1; 2003, No. 1363, § 1; 2015, No. 268, § 5.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As enacted by the General Assembly, Acts 2003, No. 1363, § 1, provided in part:

“(d)(2) The person employed in the position paid through the Court Reporters' Fund and who is assigned and providing services as the coordinator of the Post Adjudication Court of the Ninth Division of the Sixth Judicial Circuit is not required to be certified as a court reporter as provided in subsection (d)(1).”

Amendments. The 2015 amendment rewrote (b)(1); in (b)(2), substituted “other expenses” for “such expenses as may be” and “for the salaries and other expenses” for “therefor”; added (b)(3); redesignated and rewrote (c) as (c)(1); and added (c)(2) and (c)(3).

Case Notes

Cited: Jacobs v. State, 321 Ark. 561, 906 S.W.2d 670 (1995).

16-13-504. Salary implementation procedures.

  1. If a court reporter was an official court reporter in the state on June 30, 1981, the increase eligibility date for purposes of salary implementation shall be July 1, 1982.
  2. If an official court reporter was appointed after June 30, 1981, the increase eligibility date for purposes of salary implementation shall be determined by the date of appointment.

History. Acts 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 27, § 1; 1983, No. 868, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-366.4, 22-367.5; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 89; 2015, No. 268, § 6.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The reference to the Uniform Classification and Compensation Plan in (a) refers to the “Uniform Classification and Compensation Act”, § 21-5-201 et seq., which was partially amended by Acts 2009, No. 688, effective July 1, 2009. All career service plans for state agencies and institutions were reclassified within §§ 21-5-208 and 21-5-209.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 27, § 1, provided, in part, effective January 1, 1982, for the compensation of court reporters who were official court reporters in the state on June 30, 1981.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment deleted “Initial annual salary of court reporters” from the section heading and rewrote the section.

16-13-505. Court reporters — Reimbursement for expenses.

    1. A court reporter for a circuit court is entitled to reimbursement for actual expenses incurred for meals, lodging, and transportation costs for attending court away from the court reporter's official station.
    2. Notwithstanding the exemption from state travel rules provided by § 19-4-904, if a court reporter uses a personal vehicle for transportation, he or she is entitled to reimbursement for mileage at the same rate prescribed by the Department of Finance and Administration for executive branch employees.
  1. Reimbursements for actual expenses and mileage under subsection (a) of this section shall be made monthly by the Administrative Office of the Courts upon claims by the respective court reporters certified by the circuit judge.

History. Acts 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 6; 1985, No. 63, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-367.3; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 89; 2005, No. 461, § 2; 2015, No. 268, § 7; 2019, No. 315, § 1296.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 6, is also codified as § 16-14-107.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment deleted the former last sentence in (a), which read: “However, no court reporter shall be entitled to receive reimbursement for such meals, lodging, and transportation in excess of four thousand five hundred dollars ($4,500) per year.”

The 2015 amendment, in (a)(1), substituted “A court reporter for a circuit court is” for “The official court reporters of the respective circuit courts shall be” and “the court” for “a”; in (a)(2), substituted “Notwithstanding the exemption from state travel regulations provided by § 19-4-904, if a court” for “If the” and “is” for “shall be,” inserted “same” and “by the Department of Finance and Administration,” substituted “executive branch” for “state,” and deleted “in the state travel regulations” at the end; and, in (b), substituted “actual expenses and mileage under subsection (a) of this section” for “expenses” and “Administrative Office of the Courts” for “Auditor of State.”

The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (a)(2).

16-13-506. Court reporters — Transcript fees.

    1. When required to make a transcript of court proceedings, each court reporter of the circuit courts shall be entitled to compensation at the rate of four dollars and ten cents ($4.10) per page for the original and two (2) copies and at the rate of fifty cents (50¢) per page for each additional copy.
    2. When required to prepare photocopied evidence as part of a transcript, each reporter shall be entitled to compensation at the rate of one dollar and fifty cents ($1.50) per page, for an original and two (2) copies and at the rate of fifty cents (50¢) per page for each additional copy thereafter, with the cost to be paid by the parties ordering transcripts.
      1. In indigent and in forma pauperis proceedings, the compensation to the court reporter for transcripts provided for in subsection (a) of this section shall be paid by the State of Arkansas.
      2. However, in such proceedings, the court reporters shall be entitled to compensation from the state only for the original and two (2) copies of the transcript.
    1. The payments shall be made only upon certification of the payments by the presiding circuit judge and shall be paid by the Administrative Office of the Courts from funds appropriated out of the Court Reporter's Fund.

History. Acts 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 7; 1983, No. 868, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-367.4; Acts 1987, No. 581, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 90; 2005, No. 461, § 2; 2015, No. 268, § 8.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 7, as amended is also codified as § 16-14-106.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “four dollars and ten cents ($4.10)” for “three dollars and ten cents ($3.10)” in (a)(1).

The 2015 amendment, in (b)(2), substituted “of the payments” for “thereof,” inserted “circuit,” and substituted “Administrative Office of the Courts” for “Auditor of State.”

16-13-507. Liability for loss of records.

Court reporters shall not be liable, criminally or civilly, for the unintentional loss, damage, or destruction of their official records which are more than five (5) years old.

History. Acts 1981, No. 154, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-366.2.

16-13-508. Court Reporter's Fund established.

There is created on the books of the Auditor of State, Treasurer of State, and Chief Fiscal Officer of the State a fund to be known as the Court Reporter's Fund which fund shall be used exclusively for paying such salaries, transcript fees, and expenses of court reporters as may be provided by law to be paid from state funds.

History. Acts 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-157.

Cross References. Court Reporter's Fund, § 19-5-1082.

16-13-509. Substitute court reporters.

    1. In the absence or unavailability of the official court reporter, the circuit judge or circuit judge on assignment as authorized by § 16-10-101 may temporarily employ the services of a substitute court reporter if the temporary employment is essential to prevent a disruption of the business of the circuit court.
    2. The substitute court reporter shall be a court reporter certified by the Certified Court Reporter Examiners Board.
    1. When a circuit judge or circuit judge on assignment temporarily employs a substitute court reporter, the circuit judge shall certify to the Administrative Office of the Courts, upon forms prepared by the office, that he or she has temporarily employed the services of a substitute court reporter and that the temporary employment was essential to prevent a disruption of the business of the circuit court.
    2. The circuit judge or circuit judge on assignment shall further furnish to the office the name, address, and Social Security number of the substitute court reporter and the number of days the substitute court reporter was temporarily employed, plus any other information concerning the employment requested by the office.
    1. The office may pay the substitute court reporter for the court reporting services furnished to the circuit judge from funds specifically appropriated for that purpose.
    2. The substitute court reporter shall be paid at the rate of one hundred seventy-five dollars ($175) per day.
    3. The substitute court reporter is entitled to reimbursement for actual expenses incurred for meals, lodging, and transportation costs for attending court under § 16-13-505.
  1. If a trial court administrator employed under § 16-13-3302 and also certified under subsection (a) of this section is appointed to act temporarily as a substitute court reporter, he or she is not entitled to be paid an additional salary but is entitled to reimbursement for actual expenses incurred for meals, lodging, and transportation costs when attending court away from his or her official station, under § 16-13-505.
  2. In any one (1) fiscal year, however, the office shall not pay for the services of a substitute court reporter or substitute court reporters for any one (1) circuit judge or circuit judge on assignment in excess of thirty (30) working days, unless approved and ordered by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
  3. This subchapter does not preclude or prohibit any circuit judge from obtaining payment for the services of a substitute court reporter from the county or counties composing the circuit judge's judicial district rather than from the office.

History. Acts 1987, No. 373, §§ 1-4; 1989, No. 677, § 1; 1989, No. 762, § 1; 1997, No. 1169, § 1; 2001, No. 510, § 1; 2005, No. 461, § 3; 2015, No. 268, § 9.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment deleted “or chancery judge” at the end of (c)(1); and substituted “the rate of one hundred and seventy-five dollars ($175) per day” for “a daily rate, based upon the daily pay rate of the court reporter for whom he or she is substituting” in (c)(2).

The 2015 amendment substituted “Administrative Office of the Courts” for “Auditor of State” throughout the section; in (b)(1), substituted “shall certify” for “may certify” and deleted “necessary and” preceding “essential”; inserted “or circuit judge on assignment” in (b)(2); added (c)(3); substituted “a trial court administrator employed under § 16-13-3302” for “any trial court administrative assistant employed pursuant to § 16-10-133” in (d); substituted “thirty (30) working days” for “twenty (20) working days” in (e); and made stylistic changes.

16-13-510. Complete record required — Waiver.

  1. In all cases before a circuit court of this state, a complete record of the proceedings shall be made by the official court reporter, or other reporter designated by the court. Upon the request of either party or the circuit judge, said record shall be transcribed, certified by the reporter as true and correct, and filed with the clerk of the court in which the proceedings were had, not less than ten (10) days before the expiration of time allowed for appeal.
  2. Nothing contained in this section shall prevent the parties, with the permission of the circuit court, from waiving a complete record of the proceeding.
  3. The court reporter's duty to transcribe and certify the record may be conditioned upon the payment, when requested by the court reporter, of up to fifty percent (50%) of the estimated cost of the transcript.

History. Acts 1989, No. 844, §§ 1, 2; 1993, No. 812, § 1.

Case Notes

Child Custody.

The clear and unambiguous language of the statute does not allow anything less than a complete record of the proceedings to be made and this requirement cannot be waived; thus, a record must be made of in-camera interviews in matters of child custody. Mattocks v. Mattocks, 66 Ark. App. 77, 986 S.W.2d 890 (1999).

Harmless Error.

Although the trial court's failure to make a verbatim record of the in-chambers conference was error, it was not reversible error since the record was settled by the trial court. Smith v. State, 324 Ark. 74, 918 S.W.2d 714 (1996).

Motion to Compel Arbitration.

In a case involving a trial court's order denying a motion to compel arbitration, remand was necessary because, in its order denying the motion to compel arbitration, the trial court said that it had announced its decision in open court during a hearing but there was no transcript of such a hearing either in the addendum or in the record. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y v. Kolesar, 2013 Ark. App. 195 (2013).

Notice of Appeal.

Failure to lodge the record was due to the dilatory actions of the husband's attorney, because while the notice of appeal stated that the attorney had ordered the transcript, it was apparent that she failed to provide the court reporter with a copy of the notice of appeal or otherwise inform court reporter that she needed the transcript until just before the original deadline to lodge the record. Eggestein v. Eggestein, 2009 Ark. 262, 308 S.W.3d 144 (2009).

Circuit court erred in granting a city's motion for extension of time to file the record in its appeal of condemnation action because the city failed to strictly comply with Ark. R. App. P. Civ. 5 where it failed to make the financial arrangements necessary for the court reporter to prepare the stenographically recorded material until the very last day that an extension could be granted. It would make little sense to hold that an extension was necessary for the court reporter to include the stenographically reported material in the record when the city was at fault in creating the necessity by failing to pay the court reporter the required deposit. City of Little Rock v. Hermitage Dev. Corp., 2015 Ark. 453, 476 S.W.3d 788 (2015).

Silence Not Waiver.

Because the state and the defense did not waive their right to a verbatim record, the trial court's failure to make a verbatim record of the in-chambers conferences on the defendant's directed-verdict motion was error; although the state voiced no objection to the trial court's handling of the directed-verdict motion in this manner, the Supreme Court of Arkansas would not construe the state's silence on the issue at trial as implying a waiver of this requirement and warned that in the future the record requirement would be strictly construed and enforced. Robinson v. State, 353 Ark. 372, 108 S.W.3d 622 (2003).

Cited: Valley v. Bogard, 341 Ark. 302, 20 S.W.3d 271 (2000); Arkansas Realtors Ass'n v. Real Forms, LLC, 2014 Ark. 385, 442 S.W.3d 845 (2014); Terry v. State, 2019 Ark. 342 (2019).

16-13-511. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning transfer of funds to the court reporters' fund from county aid fund to pay salaries and expenses, was repealed by Acts 1997, No. 788, § 31 and No. 1341, § 30. The section was derived from Acts 1991, No. 479, § 1.

16-13-512. Funding of official court reporters.

  1. The state, rather than individual counties, shall bear the responsibility of funding the salaries and expenses of official state court reporters.
  2. Each county or counties within a judicial district shall continue to bear the responsibility of providing, at the county's expense, each official court reporter with appropriate office space and operating expenses, when approved in advance by the quorum court.

History. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 30; 1997, No. 1341, § 29.

Cross References. Legislative intent of Acts 1997, Nos. 788 and 1341, § 16-10-601.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

Subchapter 6 — Juvenile Division of Chancery Court

16-13-601, 16-13-602. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning legislative intent and creation of the Juvenile Division of the Chancery Court, were repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 91. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-13-601. Acts 1989, No. 294, § 1.

16-13-602. Acts 1989, No. 294, § 2.

16-13-603. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning jurisdiction of the Juvenile Division of the Chancery Court, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 92. The section was derived from Acts 1989, No. 294, §§ 2, 5, 7; 1995, No. 1016, § 2.

16-13-604 — 16-13-607. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning judges and clerks of the Juvenile Division of the Chancery Court, were repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 93. These sections were derived from the following source:

16-13-604. Acts 1989, No. 294, § 3.

16-13-605. Acts 1989, No. 294, § 3.

16-13-606. Acts 1989, No. 294, §§ 3, 4.

16-13-607. Acts 1989, No. 294, § 6.

16-13-608. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning transfer of dockets and records, etc, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 1296, § 59. The section was derived from Acts 1989, No. 294, § 6.

Subchapter 7 — Enforcement of Fines

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all municipal courts were to become district courts on January 1, 2005, and that they should assume the jurisdiction previously vested in municipal courts, police courts, justice of the peace courts, and courts of common pleas. Those courts were abolished by the amendment. City courts were to continue, but if abolished by the governing body of the city or by the General Assembly, the jurisdiction of the city court would then vest in the nearest district court.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56: Jan. 1, 2012.

Acts 2013, No. 282, § 17: Mar. 6, 2013. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one-year period; that the effectiveness of this act as soon as possible is essential to the operation of the judiciary and the administration of justice; and that this act is immediately necessary because the delay in the effective date of this act could cause irreparable harm upon the proper administration of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-13-701. Scope — Definition.

  1. The procedures established by this subchapter shall apply to the assessment and collection of all fines, however designated, imposed by circuit courts and district courts for criminal convictions, traffic convictions, civil violations, and juvenile delinquency adjudications and shall be utilized to obtain prompt and full payment of all fines.
  2. As used in this subchapter, “fine” means a monetary penalty imposed by a court, including without limitation:
    1. A monetary fine;
    2. Court costs;
    3. Court-ordered restitution;
    4. Probation fees;
    5. Supervision fees;
    6. Public service supervisory fees; and
    7. Other court-ordered fees.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 1; 1997, No. 941, § 1; 2001, No. 1809, § 12; 2003, No. 1765, § 8; 2005, No. 1934, § 6; 2007, No. 663, § 31; 2019, No. 113, § 2.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “or city courts” for “city courts, or police courts” in (a).

The 2007 amendment, in (a), deleted “or city courts” following “district courts” and made a related change.

The 2019 amendment added “Definition” in the section heading; deleted “monetary” following “collection of all” in (a); rewrote (b); and made a stylistic change.

Cross References. City courts generally, § 16-96-101 et seq.

District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-13-702. Immediate payment.

    1. When a court has imposed a fine, as described in § 16-13-701, the imposition of such a fine constitutes an order to pay the full amount of the fine in accordance with this subchapter.
    2. Following imposition of the fine, the court shall inform the defendant that full payment of the fine is due immediately and shall inquire of the defendant what arrangements he or she has made to comply with the court's order to pay the fine.
    3. Without utilizing the provisions of § 16-13-704, the court may allow the defendant a period of time, not to extend beyond the time of the close of the clerk's office on the following day, within which to return to the court and tender payment of the fine.
        1. If the defendant fails to appear as directed, the court shall issue an order of arrest.
        2. The arrest order shall be carried out by the sheriff.
      1. The court may also, upon the defendant's failure to appear, utilize any of the enforcement mechanisms authorized by this subchapter.
      1. If the defendant claims an inability to pay the fine, the court shall inquire into the defendant's ability to pay and shall make a determination of the defendant's financial ability to pay the fine.
      2. If the court finds that the defendant has the financial ability to make immediate payment of the fine in full, the court shall order him or her to pay the fine.
      3. Failure or refusal to pay as ordered by the court shall subject the defendant to imprisonment, as provided in § 16-13-703.
    1. When a corporation is sentenced to pay a fine or costs, it is the duty of the person authorized to make disbursement from the assets of the corporation to pay the fine or costs.
    2. If such disbursements require approval of the board of directors, it is the duty of the board to authorize disbursements to pay the fine or costs.
    3. Failure to comply with the duties imposed by this subsection shall render the person or directors subject to imprisonment under § 16-13-703.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, §§ 2, 4.

Case Notes

Right to Appeal.

City could not rely on the application of this section to claim that defendants' appeal had to be dismissed for the failure of defendants to pay an appeal bond because, even though the court had the right to order installment payments, nothing in this section authorizes a district court to demand payment of the fine as a prerequisite for taking an appeal to circuit court. Velek v. State, 364 Ark. 531, 222 S.W.3d 182 (2006).

16-13-703. Imprisonment.

  1. When a defendant sentenced to pay a fine defaults in the payment thereof, or of any installment, the court, upon its own motion or that of the prosecuting attorney, may require him or her to show cause why he or she should not be imprisoned for nonpayment.
  2. The court may issue a warrant of arrest or summons for his or her appearance.
    1. Unless the defendant shows that his or her default was not attributable to a purposeful refusal to obey the sentence of the court or to a failure on his or her part to make a good-faith effort to obtain the funds required for payment, the court may order the defendant imprisoned in the county jail or other authorized institution designated by the court until the fine or specified part thereof is paid.
      1. The period of imprisonment shall not exceed one (1) day for each forty dollars ($40.00) of the fine, thirty (30) days if the fine was imposed upon conviction of a misdemeanor, or one (1) year if the fine was imposed upon conviction of a felony, whichever is the shorter period.
      2. The total amount of fines owed shall not automatically be reduced by the period of imprisonment, but the court may credit forty dollars ($40.00) for each day of imprisonment against the total fine, excluding any amount owed for restitution, the defendant has been sentenced to pay.
    2. This subsection is in addition to the revocation options contained in § 16-93-308.
  3. If the court determines that the default in payment of the fine is not attributable to the causes specified in subsection (c) of this section, the court may enter an order allowing the defendant additional time for payment, reducing the amount of each installment, or revoking the fine or the unpaid portion thereof in whole or in part.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 4; 2003, No. 1765, § 9; 2013, No. 225, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment inserted “excluding any amount owed for restitution” in (c)(2)(B); and rewrote (c)(3).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Bryan Altman, Comment: Improving the Indigent Defense Crisis Through Decriminalization, 70 Ark. L. Rev. 769 (2017).

Case Notes

Improper Judicial Conduct.

Finding that the judge be removed from office was appropriate, in part because he had contact with probationers when he collected money and such conduct did not pass the test for appearance of impropriety nor did this section cure the appearance of impropriety. A circuit court was not authorized to collect the fine itself and it was clear that the judge's collection of money from defendants in open court would create in reasonable minds a perception that his ability to carry out his judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality, and competence was impaired. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n v. Proctor, 2010 Ark. 38, 360 S.W.3d 61, cert. denied, isability Comm'n, 561 U.S. 1027, 130 S. Ct. 3516, 177 L. Ed. 2d 1093 (2010).

Right to Appeal.

City could not rely on the application of this section to claim that defendants' appeal had to be dismissed for the failure of defendants to pay an appeal bond because, even though this section authorizes imprisonment for failure to pay a fine, nothing in it authorizes a district court to demand payment of the fine as a prerequisite for taking an appeal to circuit court. Velek v. State, 364 Ark. 531, 222 S.W.3d 182 (2006).

16-13-704. Installment payments — Definition.

    1. If the court concludes that the defendant has the ability to pay the fine, but that requiring the defendant to make immediate payment in full would cause a severe and undue hardship for the defendant and the defendant's dependents, the court may authorize payment of the fine by means of installment payments in accordance with this subchapter.
      1. When a court authorizes payment of a fine by means of installment payments, it shall issue, without a separate disclosure hearing, an order that the fine be paid in full by a date certain and that in default of payment, the defendant must appear in court to explain the failure to pay.
      2. In fixing the date of payment, the court shall issue an order which will complete payment of the fine as promptly as possible without creating a severe and undue hardship for the defendant and the defendant's dependents.
    2. When a person is authorized to pay a fine on an installment basis, any court cost assessed under § 9-15-202(d) or § 16-10-305(h) shall be collected from the initial installment payment first.
      1. In addition to the fine and any other assessments authorized by this subchapter, an installment fee of five dollars ($5.00) per month shall be assessed on each person who is authorized to pay a fine on an installment basis.
      2. This fee shall be collected in full each month in which a defendant makes an installment payment.
      3. This fee shall accrue each month that a defendant does not make an installment payment and the fine has not been paid in full.
        1. One-half (½) of the installment fee collected in circuit court shall be remitted by the tenth day of each month to the Administration of Justice Funds Section of the Office of Administrative Services of the Department of Finance and Administration, on a form provided by that office, for deposit into the Judicial Fine Collection Enhancement Fund established by § 16-13-712.
        2. The other half of the installment fee shall be remitted by the tenth day of each month to the county treasurer to be deposited into a fund entitled the “circuit court automation fund” to be used solely for circuit court-related technology.
        1. Expenditures from the circuit court automation fund shall be approved by the administrative circuit judge of each judicial circuit and shall be authorized and paid under the state laws governing the appropriation and payment of county expenditures.
        2. Expenditures may be made for indirect expenses related to implementation of new court-related technology, including overtime pay, personnel or travel expenses, and technology-related supplies.
        3. Funds in each county in a judicial district may be pooled for expenditure pursuant to a circuit-wide technology plan approved by the administrative circuit judge.
      1. One-half (½) of the installment fee collected in district court shall be remitted by the tenth day of each month to the Administration of Justice Funds Section, on a form provided by that section, for deposit into the Judicial Fine Collection Enhancement Fund established by § 16-13-712.
      2. The other half of the installment fee collected in district court shall be remitted by the tenth day of each month to the city treasurer of the city in which the district court is located to be deposited into a fund entitled the “district court automation fund” to be used solely for district court-related technology.
      3. In any district court which is funded solely by the county, the other half of this fee shall be remitted by the tenth day of each month to the county treasurer of the county in which the district court is located to be deposited into the district court automation fund to be used solely for district court-related technology.
        1. Expenditures from the district court automation fund shall be approved by a district judge and shall be authorized and paid under state laws governing the appropriation and payment of county or municipal expenditures by the governing body or, if applicable, governing bodies, that contribute to the expenses of a district court.
        2. Expenditures may be made for indirect expenses related to implementation of new court-related technology, including overtime pay, personnel or travel expenses, and technology-related supplies.
        1. In circuit court only, an installment fee of an additional five dollars ($5.00) per month shall also be assessed on the first day of each month on each person who is ordered to pay a fine on an installment basis with the additional five dollars ($5.00) to be remitted to the collecting official to be used to defray the cost of fine collection.
        2. In district court only, an installment fee of an additional five dollars ($5.00) per month shall also be assessed on the first day of each month on each person who is ordered to pay a fine on an installment basis with the additional five dollars ($5.00) to be remitted by the tenth day of each month to the Administration of Justice Funds Section on a form provided by that section for deposit into the State Administration of Justice Fund.
  1. Any defendant who has been authorized by the court to pay a fine by installments shall be considered to have irrevocably appointed the clerk of the court as his or her agent upon whom all papers affecting his or her liability may be served, and the clerk shall forthwith notify the defendant thereof by ordinary mail at his or her last known address.
  2. “Ability to pay” means that the resources of the defendant, including all available income and resources, are sufficient to pay the fine and provide the defendant and his or her dependents with a reasonable subsistence compatible with health and decency.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 3; 2001, No. 1809, § 13; 2003, No. 1185, § 94; 2003, No. 1765, § 10; 2005, No. 1934, § 7; 2007, No. 663, § 32; 2011, No. 1138, §§ 1, 2; 2011, No. 1218, § 2; 2013, No. 282, § 9; 2017, No. 583, § 4.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment deleted “or city court” following “district court” in (b)(3)(A); deleted former (b)(3)(B)(ii) and (b)(3)(E); and made related changes.

The 2011 amendment by No. 1138 inserted (b)(3)(E).

The 2011 amendment by No. 1218 rewrote (b)(2)(B) and (b)(3)(D).

The 2013 amendment redesignated (b)(3)(E) as (b)(3)(E)(i); substituted “is ordered to” for “is authorized to” in (b)(3)(E)(i); and added (b)(3)(E)(ii).

The 2017 amendment added (a)(3).

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

Case Notes

Due Process.

Circuit court properly denied the city a directed verdict in a class action alleging that the assessment of installment fees in Little Rock District Court, Second Division violated due process in charging installment fees even if the fine was paid off early. The lack of notice, as established by the evidence at trial, precluded satisfaction of due process; there was no evidence showing that plaintiff mother was advised of a refund or reconsideration of the fee, but instead, she was simply told by the court cashier that she had to pay the entire sum. City of Little Rock v. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 34, 592 S.W.3d 633 (2020).

In a class action alleging that the assessment of installment fees in Little Rock District Court, Second Division violated due process, an appeal under Ark. R. Crim. P. 36 would not have provided an adequate procedure for the return of an illegal fee because an appeal would have placed defendant at risk of a harsher sentence solely to avoid the imposition of the unlawfully assessed installment fee. City of Little Rock v. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 34, 592 S.W.3d 633 (2020).

Circuit court properly denied the city a directed verdict in a class action alleging that the assessment of installment fees in Little Rock District Court, Second Division violated due process because the installment fee policy constituted a governmental policy or custom to which municipal liability could attach; the district court judge consulted with deputy city attorneys and others in implementing the policy and the policy was automatically applied to all district court defendants on an installment plan. City of Little Rock v. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 34, 592 S.W.3d 633 (2020).

Illegal Fee.

Due process violation arising from a district court judge's installment fee policy could be imputed to the city because the judge was an employee of the city since the Little Rock District Court had not yet been reorganized as a state district court at the times relevant to the case; the Little Rock District Court was not part of the state district court program at the time of the events alleged in the complaint. City of Little Rock v. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 34, 592 S.W.3d 633 (2020).

Right to Appeal.

City could not rely on the application of this section to claim that defendants' appeal had to be dismissed for the failure of defendants to pay an appeal bond because, even though the court had the right to order installment payments, nothing in this section authorizes a district court to demand payment of the fine as a prerequisite for taking an appeal to circuit court. Velek v. State, 364 Ark. 531, 222 S.W.3d 182 (2006).

16-13-705. Personal checks.

  1. The court shall accept personal checks drawn in the favor of a designated official, as provided in § 16-13-709, in payment of any fine or associated charge assessed by the court if the person issuing the check furnishes satisfactory proof of residence in this state and if the personal check is drawn on a banking institution located in this state.
    1. If any personal check offered in payment pursuant to this section is returned without payment, for any reason, a reasonable charge for the returned check, not to exceed the actual costs incurred by the court or designated agency, may be imposed to recover processing and collection costs.
    2. This charge may be added to, and become part of, any underlying obligation.
  2. The acceptance of a personal check pursuant to this section constitutes payment of the obligation owed to the court to the extent of the amount of the check as of the date of acceptance when, but not before, the check is duly paid.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 5.

Case Notes

Right to Appeal.

City could not rely on the application of this section to claim that defendants' appeal had to be dismissed for the failure of defendants to pay an appeal bond because, even though the court had the right to order installment payments, nothing in this section authorizes a district court to demand payment of the fine as a prerequisite for taking an appeal to circuit court. Velek v. State, 364 Ark. 531, 222 S.W.3d 182 (2006).

16-13-706. Credit or debit card payments.

  1. The court or the agency designated under § 16-13-709 or § 16-92-118 may accept payment of fines and associated costs by an approved credit card or debit card.
    1. The court or designated agency may enter into contracts with credit card companies and pay those companies fees normally charged by those companies for allowing the court to accept their credit cards in payment as authorized by subsection (a) of this section.
    2. When the offender pays fines or court costs by an approved credit card or debit card, the court may assess the offender a transaction fee.
    1. All courts are authorized to enroll for service with and accept payments from a third-party entity for the acceptance and collection of fines and associated costs with an approved credit card for which the third-party entity may charge the offender a transaction fee.
    2. The State of Arkansas or any of its political subdivisions shall not charge a transaction fee for electronic payments of a court-ordered fine paid through a third-party entity.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 6; 2003, No. 1765, § 11; 2009, No. 328, § 3; 2009, No. 782, § 2; 2011, No. 1218, § 3.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment by No. 328 inserted “card or debit” in (a) and (b)(2); inserted “or § 16-92-188” in (a); and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2009 amendment by No. 782 rewrote (b)(2); and added (c).

The 2011 amendment substituted “transaction fee” for “service or convenience fee” in (b)(2); substituted “transaction fee” for “service or convenience fee if the credit card company will allow the charge” in (c)(1); and substituted “a transaction fee” for “an access fee” in (c)(2).

Case Notes

Right to Appeal.

City could not rely on the application of this section to claim that defendants' appeal had to be dismissed for the failure of defendants to pay an appeal bond because, even though the court had the right to order installment payments, nothing in this section authorizes a district court to demand payment of the fine as a prerequisite for taking an appeal to circuit court. Velek v. State, 364 Ark. 531, 222 S.W.3d 182 (2006).

16-13-707. Lien on property.

  1. When a defendant sentenced to pay a fine defaults in the payment thereof or of any installment, the fine may be collected by any means authorized for the enforcement of money judgments in civil actions.
  2. A judgment that the defendant pay a fine shall constitute a lien on the real and personal property of the defendant in the same manner and to the same extent as a money judgment in a civil action.
  3. A judgment entered by a district court shall not become a lien against real property unless a certified copy of the judgment, showing the name of the judgment debtor and the date and amount thereof, shall be filed in the office of the circuit clerk of the county in which the land is situated.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 7; 2001, No. 1809, § 14; 2003, No. 1765, § 12.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Case Notes

Right to Appeal.

City could not rely on the application of this section to claim that defendants' appeal had to be dismissed for the failure of defendants to pay an appeal bond because, even though the court could collect the fine by any means authorized for the enforcement of money judgments in civil actions for the failure to pay a fine, nothing in this section authorizes the district court to demand payment of the fine as a prerequisite for taking an appeal to circuit court. Velek v. State, 364 Ark. 531, 222 S.W.3d 182 (2006).

16-13-708. Revocation of registration or license.

  1. The court may certify in writing to the Department of Finance and Administration that a debtor has failed to make satisfactory arrangements for the payment of fines and request the department to revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew the debtor's motor vehicle registration or driver's license.
  2. For driver's license revocation, the court must provide the department with the debtor's full name, social security number, and last known address.
  3. For motor vehicle registration revocation, the court must provide the department with the debtor's full name and the license plate number or vehicle identification number of the debtor's vehicle.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 8.

16-13-709. Responsibility for collection.

        1. The quorum court of each county of the state shall designate a county official, agency, or department which shall be primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in the circuit courts of this state.
        2. All fines collected each month in circuit court by the designated county official, agency, or department shall be disbursed by the fifth working day of the following month to the State Administration of Justice Fund, the county administration of justice fund, and the appropriate county fund, state entity, or state agency as provided by law.
        3. The sheriff shall remain responsible for collecting bail or money deposited in lieu of bail on behalf of defendants discharged from incarceration pursuant to law in circuit court.
        1. The quorum court may delegate the responsibility for the collection of delinquent fines assessed in circuit court to a private contractor.
        2. The contractor may receive, under a written contract, a commission on delinquent fines collected for circuit court.
        1. The commission agreed to be received by the private contractor shall be a portion of the total fine owed by a defendant.
        2. The court shall credit the defendant with the gross amount remitted to the private contractor.
        3. The private contractor shall remit the gross amounts collected to the county official, agency, or department designated under subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section on at least a monthly basis.
        4. Payment of the commission shall be through the county claims process.
        5. The county treasurer shall make a pro rata disbursement of the remaining fines to the State Administration of Justice Fund, the county administration of justice fund, and the appropriate county fund, state entity, or state agency as provided by law.
        1. The governing body or, if applicable, each governing body of a political subdivision which contributes to the expenses of a district court shall designate a county, town, or city official, agency, or department who shall be primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in the district courts of this state.
        2. All fines collected each month in district court or a department of district court by the designated county, town, or city official, agency, or department shall be disbursed by the tenth working day of the following month pursuant to § 16-17-707.
      1. The chief of police of the town or city in which a district court is located shall remain responsible for collecting bail or money deposited in lieu of bail on behalf of defendants discharged from incarceration pursuant to law in district court.
        1. The governing body or, if applicable, each governing body of a political subdivision which contributes to the expenses of a district court may delegate the responsibility for the collection of delinquent fines assessed in district court to a private contractor.
        2. The contractor may receive under a written contract a commission on delinquent fines collected for district court.
        3. The commission agreed to be received by the private contractor shall be a portion of the total fine owed by a defendant.
        4. The court shall credit the defendant with the gross amount remitted to the private contractor.
        5. The private contractor shall remit the gross amount collected to the county, town, or city official, agency, or department designated under subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section on a monthly basis.
        6. The commission expense shall be apportioned among each governing body of a political subdivision which contributes to the expenses of a district court in proportion to the gross amount of fines collected for that political subdivision.
        7. Payment of the commission shall be according to accounting procedures prescribed by law.
        8. The remainder of fines received shall be disbursed pro rata under this section and §§ 16-10-209, 16-10-308, and 16-17-707.
    1. “Delinquent” means any fines assessed in the circuit courts or district courts of this state which have not been paid as ordered for a period of ninety (90) days or three (3) payments, either consecutive or concurrent, since payment was ordered or since last partial payment was received.
    2. A copy of the ordinance making the designation shall be provided to the Administrative Office of the Courts.
    1. If a private contractor is selected to collect delinquent fines, then to ensure the integrity of the court and to protect the county, town, or city, the contractor shall register with the Secretary of State and shall file with the Secretary of State a surety bond or certificate of deposit.
    2. The amount of the surety bond or certificate of deposit shall be fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
    3. The county, town, city, or any person suffering damage by reason of the acts or omissions of the contractor may bring action on the bond for damages.
    4. A contractor shall be ineligible to provide such services if the owner, operator, partner, or employee has been convicted of a felony.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 9; 1997, No. 941, § 2; 1999, No. 1081, § 10; 2001, No. 1809, § 15; 2003, No. 1185, § 95; 2003, No. 1765, § 13; 2005, No. 1934, § 8; 2007, No. 663, § 33.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As amended in 2001, subdivision (a)(1)(A) provided:

“on or before January 1, 2002.”

As amended in 2001, subdivision (a)(2)(A) provided:

“on or before January 1, 2002.”

Pursuant to § 1-2-207, this section is set out as amended by Acts 2003, No. 1765, § 13. This section was also amended by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 96, effective Jan. 1, 2005, amended (a)(2) to read as follows:

“(2)(A) The quorum court of each county of the state or the governing body of the city in which the court is located, or both, on or before January 1 of each year, shall designate a county or city official, agency, department, or private contractor who shall be primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in the district courts or city courts of this state.

“(B)(i) In the event the quorum court or the governing body of the city in which the court is located, or both, delegates such responsibility to a private contractor, such contractor may receive, pursuant to state accounting laws, a portion agreed upon in advance by the quorum court or the governing body of the city in which the court is located, or both, as commission for the collection of any and all delinquent fines assessed in the district courts or city courts of this state.

“(C) ‘Delinquent’ means any fines assessed in the circuit courts, district courts or city courts of this state which have not been paid as ordered for a period of ninety (90) days or three (3) payments, either consecutive or concurrent, since payment was ordered or since last partial payment was received.”

Amendments. The 2005 amendment added (a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(1)(A)(iii), (a)(2)(A)(ii), (a)(2)(B) and (a)(2)(C) and made related changes; redesignated former (a)(2)(B) and (a)(2)(C)(i)-(vii) as present (a)(2)(D) and (a)(2)(B)(iii)-(ix); rewrote present (a)(1)(C)(v); deleted references to “police court” throughout this section, substituted “pro rata under this section and” for “under” in (a)(2)(D)(ix); and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2007 amendment inserted “town” preceding “or city” throughout the section; rewrote (a)(1)(A)(ii) and (a)(1)(C)(v); in (a)(2)(A)(i), deleted “or the governing body of the city in which a city court is located” following “district court” and “city courts, or police courts” preceding “of this state”; deleted former (a)(2)(B) and (a)(2)(C)(viii) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly; deleted “or city court” twice in (a)(2)(B) and once in (a)(2)(C)(i); deleted “or the governing body of the city in which a city court is located” following “district court” in (a)(2)(C)(i); added “of this section” in (a)(2)(C)(v); substituted “§§ 16-10-209, 16-10-308, and 16-17-707” for “§§ 14-44-108, 14-45-106, 16-10-209, 16-10-308, 16-17-707 and 16-18-104” in present (a)(2)(C)(viii); deleted “or city courts” following “district courts” in (a)(3); and made related changes.

The 2009 amendment, in (a)(2), inserted “or the sheriff” in (a)(2)(C), inserted “and by mutual agreement” in (a)(2)(D)(i), deleted “and 16-18-104” following “16-17-707” in (a)(2)(D)(ix), and made related and minor stylistic changes.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-13-710. Automated collection procedures.

The Administrative Office of the Courts shall have the responsibility to assist circuit courts and district courts in the assessment and collection of fines and the management and reporting of fine revenue.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 11; 2001, No. 1809, § 16; 2003, No. 1185, § 97; 2003, No. 1765, § 14; 2007, No. 663, § 34.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment deleted “and city courts” following “district courts” and made a related change.

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 97: Jan. 1, 2005, by its own terms.

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-13-711. Form of orders.

When an order assessing a fine or penalty is entered, information on the order shall include, but is not limited to, the defendant's name, current address, social security number, driver's license number, name and address of employment, amount of fine, and the agreed upon payment terms and conditions.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 10.

16-13-712. Judicial Fine Collection Enhancement Fund.

  1. There is hereby created on the books of the Treasurer of State the “Judicial Fine Collection Enhancement Fund”, into which the time-payment fees established by § 16-13-704 shall be deposited.
    1. From the revenues deposited into the fund, the Administrative Office of the Courts shall purchase computer hardware to make available to entities designated in § 16-13-709 and responsible for fine collection in each county in order to assist with the assessment, collection, and reporting of fines.
    2. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall also purchase or develop computer software to provide for the uniform assessment, collection, management, and reporting of fines.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 11.

Subchapter 8 — [Reserved.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 951, § 1, provided:

“First Judicial Circuit.

“(a) The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 1 and presently held by L.T. Simes, II shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(b) The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 2 and presently held by Harvey Yates shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.

“(c) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 1 and presently held by Bentley Story shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 3.

“(d) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Kathleen Bell shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 4.

“(e) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as the Juvenile Division and presently held by Baird Kinney shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 5.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided:

“The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided:

“Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1893, No. 56, § 12: effective on passage.

Acts 1911, No. 138, § 10: Aug. 1, 1911.

Acts 1921, No. 3, § 5: effective on passage. Emergency declared. Approved Jan. 20, 1921.

Acts 1955, No. 74, § 3: July 1, 1955.

Acts 1967, No. 12, § 4: Jan. 26, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly of the State of Arkansas hereby finds and determines that the matters affected by this Act have a direct relation to the smooth, efficient and timely administration of justice in the counties affected, and that in order for the judges of the courts so affected to properly schedule their case loads for the terms of Court established by this Act, it is necessary that this Act become effective immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby found and declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in full force from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1967, No. 56, §§ 3, 4: July 1, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “There is a possibility that the 66th General Assembly will be extended, in which event considerable confusion could evolve concerning the effective date of legislation which does not contain an emergency clause. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared and this act shall be in effect from and after the date of passage.” Approved Feb. 9, 1967.

Acts 1979, No. 556, § 8: Mar. 23, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that since the redistricting of the circuit and chancery courts in the State, the dates set for the beginning of terms of the circuit courts of the various counties comprising the First Circuit-Chancery Court Circuit are not appropriate and the beginning term dates in some of the counties in such circuit are in conflict with the beginning term dates of other counties in such circuit; that it is essential to the effective and efficient administration of justice in the First Circuit-Chancery Court Circuit that dates be prescribed by law for the commencement of the terms of the circuit courts in all counties comprising the First Circuit-Chancery Court Circuit; that this Act is designed to establish such dates and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 8: Mar. 27, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the juvenile division of chancery court is to be created to replace the juvenile court system provided for in Act 14 of 1987 and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to insure that there is an orderly and efficient administration of the juvenile justice system of this state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-13-901. Composition.

The First Judicial Circuit shall be composed of the counties of Cross, Lee, Monroe, Phillips, St. Francis, and Woodruff.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-902. Terms of court.

    1. The terms of court of the Circuit Court of Cross County in the First Judicial District shall commence on the fourth Monday in January.
    2. The term of court shall be for one (1) year.
    3. Grand and petit juries will serve