Article 1. Division of Motor Vehicles.

§ 20-1. Division of Motor Vehicles established.

The Division of Motor Vehicles of the Department of Transportation is established. This Chapter sets out the powers and duties of the Division.

History. 1941, c. 36, s. 1; 1949, c. 1167; 1973, c. 476, s. 193; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; c. 863; 1987, c. 827, s. 2; c. 847, s. 1; 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 756, s. 1.

Local Modification.

Dare: 1995, c. 196, s. 1; (As to Chapter 20) city of Charlotte: 2001-88; (As to Chapter 20) city of Salisbury: 2003-130.

Editor’s Note.

As to the inapplicability of the contested case provisions of Chapter 150B to the Department of Transportation, except as provided in G.S. 136-29 , see G.S. 150B-1(e) .

Session Laws 2012-85, s. 12, provides: “When the Division of Motor Vehicles has completed the implementation of the Division’s Next Generation Secure Driver License System, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall certify to the Revisor of Statutes that the Division of Motor Vehicles has completed the implementation. When making the certification, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall reference S.L. 2011-35, S.L. 2011-228, and the session law number of this act.” On August 21, 2019, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles certified to the Revisor of Statutes that the Next Generation Secure Driver License System was fully implemented in January 2016.

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 34.28, provides: “The Department of Transportation and the Department of Public Safety shall not transfer any personnel or functions of the License & Theft Bureau of the Department of Transportation’s Division of Motor Vehicles or enter into any agreement regarding transfer of personnel or functions of the License & Theft Bureau until passage of an act of the General Assembly authorizing the transfer.”

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 1.1, provides: “This act shall be known as the ‘Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2013.’ ”

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 38.2, provides: “Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2013-2015 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2013-2015 fiscal biennium.”

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 38.5, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2019-231, s. 4.14(a)-(c), provides: “(a) Expand Performance Dashboard. — The Department of Transportation shall expand its performance dashboard available on the Department’s home page of the Department’s Web site to track the following information about the Division of Motor Vehicles:

“(1) The number of conventional hybrid vehicle new registrations issued per month and year-to-date.

“(2) The number of conventional hybrid vehicle registrations renewed per month and year-to-date.

“(3) The total number of conventional hybrid vehicles currently registered.

“(4) The number of plug-in hybrid vehicle new registrations issued per month and year-to-date.

“(5) The number of plug-in hybrid vehicle registrations renewed per month and year-to-date.

“(6) The total number of plug-in hybrid vehicles currently registered.

“(7) The number of plug-in electric vehicle new registrations issued per month and year-to-date.

“(8) The number of plug-in electric vehicle registrations renewed per month and year-to-date.

“(9) The total number of plug-in electric vehicles currently registered.

“(b) Definitions. — For purposes of this section: (i) a ‘conventional hybrid vehicle’ means a vehicle that uses both a motor fuel engine and an electric motor that cannot be plugged in and recharged, (ii) a ‘plug-in hybrid vehicle’ means a vehicle that uses both a motor fuel engine and an electric motor with a battery that may be recharged by plugging into an outlet or charging station, and (iii) a ‘plug-in electric vehicle’ means a vehicle that exclusively uses an on-board battery that may be recharged by plugging into an outlet or charging station.

“(c) Implementation Date. — The expansion of the Department’s performance dashboard required under subsection (a) of this section shall be completed by January 1, 2020.”

Session Laws 2019-231, s. 5.3, provides: “Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2019-2021 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2019-2021 fiscal biennium.”

Session Laws 2019-231, s. 5.5, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2021-138, s. 19(b), (c), effective September 2, 2021, provides: “(b) In order to raise public awareness about resisting, delaying, and obstructing law enforcement officers and encourage North Carolina residents to interact with law enforcement officers safely, the Department of Public Safety shall create a targeted social media campaign and television commercials that address the concerns of not resisting arrest and raising public awareness about resisting, delaying, and obstructing law enforcement officers. DPS shall also make available on its internet website a public service announcement containing legally accurate information regarding the public’s responsibilities during traffic stops and other interactions with law enforcement.

“(c) The Department of Public Safety shall provide to the Division of Motor Vehicles an internet link to the public service announcement authorized by subsection (b) of this section, which the Division of Motor Vehicles shall make available on its internet website. In addition, the Division of Motor Vehicles shall broadcast the public service announcement authorized by subsection (b) of this section on monitors at drivers license office locations across the State.”

Session Laws 2021-138, s. 22(a), is a severability clause.

Legal Periodicals.

For note on the conflict between the North Carolina Motor Vehicle Act and the UCC, see 65 N.C.L. Rev. 1156 (1987).

For legislative survey on motor vehicle law, see 22 Campbell L. Rev. 253 (2000).

§ 20-2. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles; rules.

  1. Commissioner and Assistants. —  The Division of Motor Vehicles shall be administered by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, who shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation. The Commissioner shall be paid an annual salary to be fixed by the Governor and allowed traveling expenses as allowed by law.In any action, proceeding, or matter of any kind, to which the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles is a party or in which he may have an interest, all pleadings, legal notices, proof of claim, warrants for collection, certificates of tax liability, executions, and other legal documents, may be signed and verified on behalf of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles by the Assistant Commissioner of Motor Vehicles or by any director or assistant director of any section of the Division of Motor Vehicles or by any other agent or employee of the Division so authorized by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.
  2. Rules. —  The Commissioner may adopt rules to implement this Chapter. Chapter 150B of the General Statutes governs the adoption of rules by the Commissioner.

History. 1941, c. 36, s. 2; 1945, c. 527; 1955, c. 472; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1983, c. 717, s. 5; 1983 (Reg. Sess., 1984), c. 1034, s. 164; 1991, c. 477, s. 4; 2012-142, s. 25.1 (b).

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2021-185, s. 11.5(a), provides: “The Division of Motor Vehicles may amend, extend, or adopt emergency rules to modify road test requirements, including 19A NCAC 03B.0201, Driver's License Examination and Online Renewal (emergency amendment effective July 22, 2020), implemented by the Division in accordance with subsection (g) of Section 3.20 of S.L. 2020-97, as enacted by Section 3 of S.L. 2021-13. Notwithstanding the expiration dates in G.S. 150B-21.1 A(d)(4) or subsection (g) of Section 3.20 of S.L. 2020-97, as enacted by Section 3 of S.L. 2021-13, emergency rules amended, extended, or adopted in accordance with this section shall expire 30 days after Executive Order No. 116 is rescinded or December 31, 2022, whichever is earlier.”

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2012-142, s. 25.1(b), effective July 1, 2012, substituted “Governor and allowed traveling” for “General Assembly in the Current Operations Appropriations Act and allowed his traveling” in the last sentence of the first paragraph of subsection (a). For applicability, see Editor’s note.

§ 20-3. Organization of Division.

The Commissioner, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation, shall organize and administer the Division in such manner as he may deem necessary to conduct the work of the Division.

History. 1941, c. 36, s. 3; 1975, c. 716, s. 5.

§ 20-3.1. Purchase of additional airplanes.

The Division of Motor Vehicles shall not purchase additional airplanes without the express authorization of the General Assembly.

History. 1963, c. 911, s. 11/2; 1971, c. 198; 1975, c. 716, s. 5.

§ 20-4. [Repealed]

Repealed by Session Laws 2002-190, s. 4, effective January 1, 2003.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2002-190, s. 1, provides: “All statutory authority, powers, duties, and functions, including rulemaking, budgeting, purchasing, records, personnel, personnel positions, salaries, property, and unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, reserves, support costs, and other funds allocated to the Department of Transportation, Division of Motor Vehicles Enforcement Section, for the regulation and enforcement of commercial motor vehicles, oversize and overweight vehicles, motor carrier safety, and mobile and manufactured housing are transferred to and vested in the Department of Crime Control and Public Safety. This transfer has all the elements of a Type I transfer as defined in G.S. 143A-6 .

“The Department of Crime Control and Public Safety shall be considered a continuation of the transferred portion of the Department of Transportation, Division of Motor Vehicles Enforcement Section, for the purpose of succession to all rights, powers, duties, and obligations of the Enforcement Section and of those rights, powers, duties, and obligations exercised by the Department of Transportation, Division of Motor Vehicles on behalf of the Enforcement Section. Where the Department of Transportation, the Division of Motor Vehicles, or the Enforcement Section, or any combination thereof are referred to by law, contract, or other document, that reference shall apply to the Department of Crime Control and Public Safety.

“All equipment, supplies, personnel, or other properties rented or controlled by the Department of Transportation, Division of Motor Vehicles Enforcement Section for the regulation and enforcement of commercial motor vehicles, oversize and overweight vehicles, motor carrier safety, and mobile and manufactured housing shall be administered by the Department of Crime Control and Public Safety.”

Session Laws 2002-190, s. 17, provides: “The Governor shall resolve any dispute between the Department of Transportation and the Department of Crime Control and Public Safety concerning the implementation of this act [Session Laws 2002-190].”

§ 20-4.01. Definitions.

Unless the context requires otherwise, the following definitions apply throughout this Chapter to the defined words and phrases and their cognates:

  1. Airbag. — A motor vehicle inflatable occupant restraint system device that is part of a supplemental restraint system.

    (1a) Alcohol. — Any substance containing any form of alcohol, including ethanol, methanol, propanol, and isopropanol.

    (1b) Alcohol Concentration. — The concentration of alcohol in a person, expressed either as:

    1. Grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood; or
    2. Grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.

      The results of a defendant’s alcohol concentration determined by a chemical analysis of the defendant’s breath or blood shall be reported to the hundredths. Any result between hundredths shall be reported to the next lower hundredth.

      (1c) All-Terrain Vehicle or ATV. — A motorized vehicle 50 inches or less in width that is designed to travel on three or more low-pressure tires and manufactured for off-highway use. The terms “all-terrain vehicle” or “ATV” do not include a golf cart or a utility vehicle, as defined in this section, or a riding lawn mower.

      (1d) Business District. — The territory prescribed as such by ordinance of the Board of Transportation.

  2. Canceled. — As applied to drivers’ licenses and permits, a declaration that a license or permit which was issued through error or fraud, or to which G.S. 20-15(a) applies, is void and terminated. (2a) Class A Motor Vehicle. — A combination of motor vehicles that meets either of the following descriptions:
    1. Has a combined GVWR of at least 26,001 pounds and includes as part of the combination a towed unit that has a GVWR of at least 10,001 pounds.
    2. Has a combined GVWR of less than 26,001 pounds and includes as part of the combination a towed unit that has a GVWR of at least 10,001 pounds.

      (2b) Class B Motor Vehicle. — Any of the following:

      a. A single motor vehicle that has a GVWR of at least 26,001 pounds.

      b. A combination of motor vehicles that includes as part of the combination a towing unit that has a GVWR of at least 26,001 pounds and a towed unit that has a GVWR of less than 10,001 pounds.

      (2c) Class C Motor Vehicle. — Any of the following:

      a. A single motor vehicle not included in Class B.

      b. A combination of motor vehicles not included in Class A or Class B.

  3. Repealed by Session Laws 1979, c. 667, s. 1. (3a) Chemical Analysis. — A test or tests of the breath, blood, or other bodily fluid or substance of a person to determine the person’s alcohol concentration or presence of an impairing substance, performed in accordance with G.S. 20-139.1 , including duplicate or sequential analyses.

    (3b) Chemical Analyst. — A person granted a permit by the Department of Health and Human Services under G.S. 20-139.1 to perform chemical analyses.

    (3c) Commercial Drivers License (CDL). — A license issued by a state to an individual who resides in the state that authorizes the individual to drive a class of commercial motor vehicle. A “nonresident commercial drivers license (NRCDL)” is issued by a state to an individual who resides in a foreign jurisdiction.

    (3d) Commercial Motor Vehicle. — Any of the following motor vehicles that are designed or used to transport passengers or property:

    1. A Class A motor vehicle that has a combined GVWR of at least 26,001 pounds and includes as part of the combination a towed unit that has a GVWR of at least 10,001 pounds.
    2. A Class B motor vehicle.
    3. A Class C motor vehicle that meets either of the following descriptions:
      1. Is designed to transport 16 or more passengers, including the driver.
      2. Is transporting hazardous materials and is required to be placarded in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 172, Subpart F.
    4. Repealed by Session Laws 1999, c. 330, s. 9, effective December 1, 1999.
  4. Commissioner. — The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.

    (4a) Conviction. — A conviction for an offense committed in North Carolina or another state:

    1. In-State. When referring to an offense committed in North Carolina, the term means any of the following:
      1. A final conviction of a criminal offense, including a no contest plea.
      2. A determination that a person is responsible for an infraction, including a no contest plea.
      3. An unvacated forfeiture of cash in the full amount of a bond required by Article 26 of Chapter 15A of the General Statutes.
      4. A third or subsequent prayer for judgment continued within any five-year period.
      5. Any prayer for judgment continued if the offender holds a commercial drivers license or if the offense occurs in a commercial motor vehicle.
    2. Out-of-State. When referring to an offense committed outside North Carolina, the term means any of the following:
      1. An unvacated adjudication of guilt.
      2. A determination that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of original jurisdiction or an authorized administrative tribunal.
      3. An unvacated forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to secure the person’s appearance in court.
      4. A violation of a condition of release without bail, regardless of whether or not the penalty is rebated, suspended, or probated.
      5. A final conviction of a criminal offense, including a no contest plea.
      6. Any prayer for judgment continued, including any payment of a fine or court costs, if the offender holds a commercial drivers license or if the offense occurs in a commercial motor vehicle.

        (4b) Counterfeit supplemental restraint system component. — A replacement supplemental restraint system component, including an airbag, that displays a mark identical to, or substantially similar to, the genuine mark of a motor vehicle manufacturer or a supplier of parts to the manufacturer of a motor vehicle, without authorization from the manufacturer or supplier.

        (4c) Crash. — Any event that results in injury or property damage attributable directly to the motion of a motor vehicle or its load. The terms collision, accident, and crash and their cognates are synonymous.

  5. Dealer. — Every person engaged in the business of buying, selling, distributing, or exchanging motor vehicles, trailers, or semitrailers in this State, and having an established place of business in this State.The terms “motor vehicle dealer,” “new motor vehicle dealer,” and “used motor vehicle dealer” as used in Article 12 of this Chapter have the meaning set forth in G.S. 20-286 . (5a) Dedicated natural gas vehicle. — A four-wheeled motor vehicle that meets each of the following requirements:
    1. Is made by a manufacturer primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways and meets National Highway Traffic Safety Administration standards included in 49 C.F.R. § 571.
    2. Has not been modified from original manufacturer specifications with regard to power train or any manner of powering the vehicle.
    3. Is powered solely by natural gas.
    4. Is rated at not more than 8,500 pounds unloaded gross vehicle weight.
    5. Has a maximum speed capability of at least 65 miles per hour.

      (5b) Disqualification. — A withdrawal of the privilege to drive a commercial motor vehicle.

  6. Division. — The Division of Motor Vehicles acting directly or through its duly authorized officers and agents.
  7. Driver. — The operator of a vehicle, as defined in subdivision (25). The terms “driver” and “operator” and their cognates are synonymous.

    (7a) Electric Assisted Bicycle. — A bicycle with two or three wheels that is equipped with a seat or saddle for use by the rider, fully operable pedals for human propulsion, and an electric motor of no more than 750 watts, whose maximum speed on a level surface when powered solely by such a motor is no greater than 20 miles per hour.

    (7b) Electric Personal Assistive Mobility Device. — A self-balancing nontandem two-wheeled device, designed to transport one person, with a propulsion system that limits the maximum speed of the device to 15 miles per hour or less.

    (7c) Employer. — Any person who owns or leases a commercial motor vehicle or assigns a person to drive a commercial motor vehicle and would be subject to the alcohol and controlled substance testing provisions of 49 C.F.R. § 382 and also includes any consortium or third-party administrator administering the alcohol and controlled substance testing program on behalf of owner-operators subject to the provisions of 49 C.F.R. § 382.

  8. Essential Parts. — All integral and body parts of a vehicle of any type required to be registered hereunder, the removal, alteration, or substitution of which would tend to conceal the identity of the vehicle or substantially alter its appearance, model, type, or mode of operation.
  9. Established Place of Business. — Except as provided in G.S. 20-286 , the place actually occupied by a dealer or manufacturer at which a permanent business of bargaining, trading, and selling motor vehicles is or will be carried on and at which the books, records, and files necessary and incident to the conduct of the business of automobile dealers or manufacturers shall be kept and maintained.
  10. Explosives. — Any chemical compound or mechanical mixture that is commonly used or intended for the purpose of producing an explosion and which contains any oxidizing and combustive units or other ingredients in such proportions, quantities, or packing that an ignition by fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonator of any part of the compound or mixture may cause such a sudden generation of highly heated gases that the resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructible effects on contiguous objects or of destroying life or limb.
  11. Farm Tractor. — Every motor vehicle designed and used primarily as a farm implement for drawing plows, mowing machines, and other implements of husbandry.

    (11a) For-Hire Motor Carrier. — A person who transports passengers or property by motor vehicle for compensation.

  12. Foreign Vehicle. — Every vehicle of a type required to be registered hereunder brought into this State from another state, territory, or country, other than in the ordinary course of business, by or through a manufacturer or dealer and not registered in this State.

    (12a) Fuel cell electric vehicle. — A four-wheeled motor vehicle that does not have the ability to be propelled by a gasoline engine and that meets each of the following requirements:

    1. Is made by a manufacturer primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways and meets National Highway Traffic Safety Administration standards included in 49 C.F.R. § 571.
    2. Has not been modified from original manufacturer specifications with regard to power train or any manner of powering the vehicle.
    3. Uses hydrogen and a fuel cell to produce electricity on board to power an electric motor to propel the vehicle.
    4. Is rated at not more than 8,500 pounds unloaded gross vehicle weight.
    5. Has a maximum speed capability of at least 65 miles per hour.

      (12b) Golf Cart. — A vehicle designed and manufactured for operation on a golf course for sporting or recreational purposes and that is not capable of exceeding speeds of 20 miles per hour.

      (12c) Gross Combination Weight Rating (GCWR). — Defined in 49 C.F.R. § 390.5.

      (12d) Gross Combined Weight (GCW). — The total weight of a combination (articulated) motor vehicle, including passengers, fuel, cargo, and attachments.

      (12e) Gross Vehicle Weight (GVW). — The total weight of a vehicle, including passengers, fuel, cargo, and attachments.

      (12f) Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR). — The value specified by the manufacturer as the maximum loaded weight a vehicle is capable of safely hauling. The GVWR of a combination vehicle is the GVWR of the power unit plus the GVWR of the towed unit or units. When a vehicle is determined by an enforcement officer to be structurally altered in any way from the manufacturer’s original design in an attempt to increase the hauling capacity of the vehicle, the GVWR of that vehicle shall be deemed to be the greater of the license weight or the total weight of the vehicle or combination of vehicles for the purpose of enforcing this Chapter. For the purpose of classification of commercial drivers license and skills testing, the manufacturer’s GVWR shall be used.

      (12g) Hazardous Materials. — Any material that has been designated as hazardous under 49 U.S.C. § 5103 and is required to be placarded under Subpart F of Part 172 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, or any quantity of a material listed as a select agent or toxin under Part 73 of Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

      (12h) High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). — A four-wheel drive vehicle produced for military or government use and commonly referred to as a “HMMWV” or “Humvee”.

  13. Highway. — The entire width between property or right-of-way lines of every way or place of whatever nature, when any part thereof is open to the use of the public as a matter of right for the purposes of vehicular traffic. The terms “highway” and “street” and their cognates are synonymous.
  14. House Trailer. — Any trailer or semitrailer designed and equipped to provide living or sleeping facilities and drawn by a motor vehicle. This term shall not include a manufactured home as defined in subdivision (18a) of this section.

    (14a) Impairing Substance. — Alcohol, controlled substance under Chapter 90 of the General Statutes, any other drug or psychoactive substance capable of impairing a person’s physical or mental faculties, or any combination of these substances.

  15. Implement of Husbandry. — Every vehicle which is designed for agricultural purposes and used exclusively in the conduct of agricultural operations.

    (15a) Inoperable Vehicle. — A motor vehicle that is substantially disassembled and for this reason is mechanically unfit or unsafe to be operated or moved upon a public street, highway, or public vehicular area.

  16. Intersection. — The area embraced within the prolongation of the lateral curblines or, if none, then the lateral edge of roadway lines of two or more highways which join one another at any angle whether or not one such highway crosses the other.Where a highway includes two roadways 30 feet or more apart, then every crossing of each roadway of such divided highway by an intersecting highway shall be regarded as a separate intersection. In the event that such intersecting highway also includes two roadways 30 feet or more apart, then every crossing of two roadways of such highways shall be regarded as a separate intersection.
  17. License. — Any driver’s license or any other license or permit to operate a motor vehicle issued under or granted by the laws of this State including:
    1. Any temporary license or learner’s permit;
    2. The privilege of any person to drive a motor vehicle whether or not such person holds a valid license; and
    3. Any nonresident’s operating privilege.
  18. Local Authorities. — Every county, municipality, or other territorial district with a local board or body having authority to adopt local police regulations under the Constitution and laws of this State.

    (18a) Manufactured Home. — Defined in G.S. 143-143.9(6).

  19. Manufacturer. — Every person, resident, or nonresident of this State, who manufactures or assembles motor vehicles.
  20. Manufacturer’s Certificate. — A certification on a form approved by the Division, signed by the manufacturer, indicating the name of the person or dealer to whom the therein-described vehicle is transferred, the date of transfer and that such vehicle is the first transfer of such vehicle in ordinary trade and commerce. The description of the vehicle shall include the make, model, year, type of body, identification number or numbers, and such other information as the Division may require.
  21. Metal Tire. — Every tire the surface of which in contact with the highway is wholly or partly of metal or other hard, nonresilient material.

    (21a) Repealed by Session Laws 2016-90, s. 13(a), effective December 1, 2016, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date.

    (21b) Motor Carrier. — A for-hire motor carrier or a private motor carrier.

  22. Motorcycle. — A type of passenger vehicle as defined in G.S. 20-4.01(27) .
  23. Motor Vehicle. — Every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle designed to run upon the highways which is pulled by a self-propelled vehicle. Except as specifically provided otherwise, this term shall not include mopeds or electric assisted bicycles. (23a) Neighborhood occupantless vehicle. — A low-speed vehicle that is also a fully autonomous vehicle, designed to be operated without an occupant and used to transport cargo. A fully autonomous vehicle is defined in G.S. 20-400 .

    (23b) Nonfunctional airbag. — A replacement airbag that meets any of the following criteria:

    1. The airbag was previously deployed or damaged.
    2. The airbag has an electric fault that is detected by the vehicle’s airbag diagnostic systems when the installation procedure is completed and the vehicle is returned to the customer who requested the work to be performed or when ownership is intended to be transferred.
    3. The airbag includes a part or object, including a supplemental restraint system component that is installed in a motor vehicle to mislead the owner or operator of the motor vehicle into believing that a functional airbag has been installed.
    4. The airbag is subject to the prohibitions of 49 U.S.C. § 30120(j).
  24. Nonresident. — Any person whose legal residence is in some state, territory, or jurisdiction other than North Carolina or in a foreign country. (24a) Offense Involving Impaired Driving. — Any of the following offenses:
    1. Impaired driving under G.S. 20-138.1 .
    2. Any offense set forth under G.S. 20-141.4 when conviction is based upon impaired driving or a substantially similar offense under previous law.
    3. First or second degree murder under G.S. 14-17 or involuntary manslaughter under G.S. 14-18 when conviction is based upon impaired driving or a substantially similar offense under previous law.
    4. An offense committed in another jurisdiction which prohibits substantially similar conduct prohibited by the offenses in this subsection.
    5. A repealed or superseded offense substantially similar to impaired driving, including offenses under former G.S. 20-138 or G.S. 20-139 .
    6. Impaired driving in a commercial motor vehicle under G.S. 20-138 .2, except that convictions of impaired driving under G.S. 20-138.1 and G.S. 20-138.2 arising out of the same transaction shall be considered a single conviction of an offense involving impaired driving for any purpose under this Chapter.
    7. Habitual impaired driving under G.S. 20-138.5 .A conviction under former G.S. 20-140(c) is not an offense involving impaired driving.

      (24b) On-track equipment. — Any railcar, rolling stock, equipment, vehicle, or other device that is operated on stationary rails.

  25. Operator. — A person in actual physical control of a vehicle which is in motion or which has the engine running. The terms “operator” and “driver” and their cognates are synonymous.

    (25a) Out of Service Order. — A declaration that a driver, a commercial motor vehicle, or a motor carrier operation is out-of-service.

  26. Owner. — A person holding the legal title to a vehicle, or in the event a vehicle is the subject of a chattel mortgage or an agreement for the conditional sale or lease thereof or other like agreement, with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement, and with the immediate right of possession vested in the mortgagor, conditional vendee or lessee, said mortgagor, conditional vendee or lessee shall be deemed the owner for the purpose of this Chapter. For the purposes of this Chapter, the lessee of a vehicle owned by the government of the United States shall be considered the owner of said vehicle.
  27. Passenger Vehicles. —
    1. Ambulances. — Vehicles equipped for transporting wounded, injured, or sick persons.
    2. Autocycle. — A three-wheeled motorcycle that has a steering wheel, pedals, seat safety belts for each occupant, antilock brakes, completely or partially enclosed seating that does not require the operator to straddle or sit astride, and is otherwise manufactured to comply with federal safety requirements for motorcycles.
    3. Child care vehicles. — Vehicles under the direction and control of a child care facility, as defined in G.S. 110-86(3) , and driven by an owner, employee, or agent of the child care facility for the primary purpose of transporting children to and from the child care facility, or to and from a place for participation in an event or activity in connection with the child care facility.
    4. Common carriers of passengers. — Vehicles operated under a certificate of authority issued by the Utilities Commission for operation on the highways of this State between fixed termini or over a regular route for the transportation of persons for compensation.
    5. Excursion passenger vehicles. — Vehicles transporting persons on sight-seeing or travel tours.
    6. For-hire passenger vehicles. — Vehicles transporting persons for compensation. This classification shall not include the following:
      1. Vehicles operated as ambulances.
      2. Vehicles operated by the owner where the costs of operation are shared by the passengers.
      3. Vehicles operated pursuant to a ridesharing arrangement as defined in G.S. 136-44.21 .
      4. Vehicles transporting students for the public school system under contract with the State Board of Education.
      5. Vehicles leased to the United States of America or any of its agencies on a nonprofit basis.
      6. Vehicles used for human service.
      7. Vehicles used for volunteer transportation.
      8. Vehicles operated in a TNC service, excluding vehicles operated in connection with a brokering transportation network company, regulated under Article 10A of Chapter 20 of the General Statutes.
    7. Low-speed vehicle. — A four-wheeled electric vehicle whose top speed is greater than 20 miles per hour but less than 25 miles per hour. g1. Mini-truck. — A motor vehicle designed, used, or maintained primarily for the transportation of property and having four wheels, an engine displacement of 660cc or less, an overall length of 130 inches or less, an overall height of 78 inches or less, and an overall width of 60 inches or less.

      g2. Modified utility vehicle. — A motor vehicle that (i) is manufactured or upfitted by a licensed manufacturer, dealer, or person or business otherwise engaged in vehicle manufacturing or modification for off-road use with equipment required by G.S. 20-121.1(2a), except a vehicle identification number, and (ii) has four wheels, an overall length of 110 inches or greater, an overall width of 58 inches or greater, an overall height of 60 inches or greater, a maximum speed capability of 40 miles per hour or greater, and does not require an operator or passenger to straddle a seat. “Modified utility vehicle” does not include an all-terrain vehicle, golf cart, or utility vehicle, as defined in this section, or a riding lawn mower.

    8. Motorcycles. — Vehicles having a saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contact with the ground, including autocycles, motor scooters, and motor-driven bicycles, but excluding tractors and utility vehicles equipped with an additional form of device designed to transport property, three-wheeled vehicles while being used by law-enforcement agencies, electric assisted bicycles, and mopeds as defined in sub-subdivision d1. of this subdivision.
    9. Motor-driven bicycle. — A vehicle with two or three wheels, a steering handle, one or two saddle seats, pedals, and a motor that cannot propel the vehicle at a speed greater than 20 miles per hour on a level surface. This term shall not include an electric assisted bicycle as defined in subdivision (7a) of this section.
    10. Moped. — A vehicle, other than a motor-driven bicycle or electric assisted bicycle, that has two or three wheels, no external shifting device, a motor that does not exceed 50 cubic centimeters piston displacement and cannot propel the vehicle at a speed greater than 30 miles per hour on a level surface. The motor may be powered by electricity, alternative fuel, motor fuel, or a combination of each.
    11. Motor home or house car. — A vehicular unit, designed to provide temporary living quarters, built into as an integral part, or permanently attached to, a self-propelled motor vehicle chassis or van. The vehicle must provide at least four of the following facilities:   cooking, refrigeration or icebox, self-contained toilet, heating or air conditioning, a portable water supply system including a faucet and sink, separate 110-125 volt electrical power supply, or an LP gas supply.
    12. Private passenger vehicles. — All other passenger vehicles not included in the above definitions.
    13. School activity bus. — A vehicle, generally painted a different color from a school bus, whose primary purpose is to transport school students and others to or from a place for participation in an event other than regular classroom work. The term includes a public, private, or parochial vehicle that meets this description.
    14. School bus. — A vehicle whose primary purpose is to transport school students over an established route to and from school for the regularly scheduled school day, that is equipped with alternately flashing red lights on the front and rear and a mechanical stop signal, that is painted primarily yellow below the roofline, and that bears the plainly visible words “School Bus” on the front and rear. The term includes a public, private, or parochial vehicle that meets this description.
    15. U-drive-it passenger vehicles. — Passenger vehicles included in the definition of U-drive-it vehicles set forth in this section.
  28. Person. — Every individual, firm, partnership, association, corporation, governmental agency, or combination thereof of whatsoever form or character.

    (28a) Personal delivery device. — An electrically powered device intended for transporting cargo that is equipped with automated driving technology that enables device operation with or without the remote support and supervision of a human and that does not exceed (i) a weight of 500 pounds, excluding cargo, (ii) a length of 40 inches, and (iii) a width of 30 inches.

    (28b) Plug-in electric vehicle. — A four-wheeled motor vehicle that does not have the ability to be propelled by a gasoline engine and that meets each of the following requirements:

    1. Is made by a manufacturer primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways and meets National Highway Traffic Safety Administration standards included in 49 C.F.R. § 571.
    2. Has not been modified from original manufacturer specifications with regard to power train or any manner of powering the vehicle.
    3. Is rated at not more than 8,500 pounds unloaded gross vehicle weight.
    4. Has a maximum speed capability of at least 65 miles per hour.
    5. Draws electricity from a battery that has all of the following characteristics:
      1. A capacity of not less than four kilowatt hours.
      2. Capable of being recharged from an external source of electricity.
  29. Pneumatic Tire. — Every tire in which compressed air is designed to support the load.

    (29a) Private Motor Carrier. — A person who transports passengers or property by motor vehicle in interstate commerce and is not a for-hire motor carrier.

  30. Private Road or Driveway. — Every road or driveway not open to the use of the public as a matter of right for the purpose of vehicular traffic.
  31. Property-Hauling Vehicles. —
    1. Vehicles used for the transportation of property.
    2. , c.Repealed by Session Laws 1995 (Regular Session, 1996), c. 756, s. 4.

      d. Semitrailers. — Vehicles without motive power designed for carrying property or persons and for being drawn by a motor vehicle, and so constructed that part of their weight or their load rests upon or is carried by the pulling vehicle.

      e. Trailers. — Vehicles without motive power designed for carrying property or persons wholly on their own structure and to be drawn by a motor vehicle, including “pole trailers” or a pair of wheels used primarily to balance a load rather than for purposes of transportation.

      f. Repealed by Session Laws 1995 (Regular Session, 1996), c. 756, s. 4.

      (31a) Provisional Licensee. — A person under the age of 18 years.

  32. Public Vehicular Area. — Any area within the State of North Carolina that meets one or more of the following requirements:
    1. The area is used by the public for vehicular traffic at any time, including by way of illustration and not limitation any drive, driveway, road, roadway, street, alley, or parking lot upon the grounds and premises of any of the following:
      1. Any public or private hospital, college, university, school, orphanage, church, or any of the institutions, parks or other facilities maintained and supported by the State of North Carolina or any of its subdivisions.
      2. Any service station, drive-in theater, supermarket, store, restaurant, or office building, or any other business, residential, or municipal establishment providing parking space whether the business or establishment is open or closed.
      3. Any property owned by the United States and subject to the jurisdiction of the State of North Carolina. (The inclusion of property owned by the United States in this definition shall not limit assimilation of North Carolina law when applicable under the provisions of Title 18, United States Code, section 13).
    2. The area is a beach area used by the public for vehicular traffic.
    3. The area is a road used by vehicular traffic within or leading to a gated or non-gated subdivision or community, whether or not the subdivision or community roads have been offered for dedication to the public.
    4. The area is a portion of private property used by vehicular traffic and designated by the private property owner as a public vehicular area in accordance with G.S. 20-219.4 . (32a) Ramp Meter. — A traffic control device that consists of a circular red and circular green display placed at a point along an interchange entrance ramp.

      (32b) Recreational Vehicle. — A vehicular type unit primarily designed as temporary living quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use that either has its own motive power or is mounted on, or towed by, another vehicle. The basic entities are camping trailer, fifth-wheel travel trailer, motor home, travel trailer, and truck camper. This term shall not include a manufactured home as defined in G.S. 143-143.9(6). The basic entities are defined as follows:

      a. Camping trailer. — A vehicular portable unit mounted on wheels and constructed with collapsible partial side walls that fold for towing by another vehicle and unfold at the campsite to provide temporary living quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use.

      b. Fifth-wheel trailer. — A vehicular unit mounted on wheels designed to provide temporary living quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use, of a size and weight that does not require a special highway movement permit and designed to be towed by a motorized vehicle that contains a towing mechanism that is mounted above or forward of the tow vehicle’s rear axle.

      c. Motor home. — As defined in G.S. 20-4.01(27) k.

      d. Travel trailer. — A vehicular unit mounted on wheels, designed to provide temporary living quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use, and of a size or weight that does not require a special highway movement permit when towed by a motorized vehicle.

    5. Truck camper. — A portable unit that is constructed to provide temporary living quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use, consisting of a roof, floor, and sides and is designed to be loaded onto and unloaded from the bed of a pickup truck.

      (32c) Regular Drivers License. — A license to drive a commercial motor vehicle that is exempt from the commercial drivers license requirements or a noncommercial motor vehicle.

    1. Flood Vehicle. — A motor vehicle that has been submerged or partially submerged in water to the extent that damage to the body, engine, transmission, or differential has occurred.
    2. Non-U.S.A. Vehicle. — A motor vehicle manufactured outside of the United States and not intended by the manufacturer for sale in the United States.
    3. Reconstructed Vehicle. — A motor vehicle of a type required to be registered hereunder that has been materially altered from original construction due to removal, addition or substitution of new or used essential parts; and includes glider kits and custom assembled vehicles.
    4. Salvage Motor Vehicle. — Any motor vehicle damaged by collision or other occurrence to the extent that the cost of repairs to the vehicle and rendering the vehicle safe for use on the public streets and highways would exceed seventy-five percent (75%) of its fair retail market value, whether or not the motor vehicle has been declared a total loss by an insurer. Repairs shall include the cost of parts and labor. Fair market retail values shall be as found in the NADA Pricing Guide Book or other publications approved by the Commissioner.
    5. Salvage Rebuilt Vehicle. — A salvage vehicle that has been rebuilt for title and registration.
    6. Junk Vehicle. — A motor vehicle which is incapable of operation or use upon the highways and has no resale value except as a source of parts or scrap, and shall not be titled or registered.

      (33a) Relevant Time after the Driving. — Any time after the driving in which the driver still has in his body alcohol consumed before or during the driving.

      (33b) Reportable Crash. — A crash involving a motor vehicle that results in one or more of the following:

      a. Death or injury of a human being.

      b. Total property damage of one thousand dollars ($1,000) or more, or property damage of any amount to a vehicle seized pursuant to G. S. 20-28.3.

      (33c) Reserve components of the Armed Forces of the United States. — The organizations listed in Title 10 United States Code, section 10101, which specifically includes the Army and Air National Guard.

  33. Resident. — Any person who resides within this State for other than a temporary or transitory purpose for more than six months shall be presumed to be a resident of this State; but absence from the State for more than six months shall raise no presumption that the person is not a resident of this State.
  34. Residential District. — The territory prescribed as such by ordinance of the Department of Transportation.
  35. Revocation or Suspension. — Termination of a licensee’s or permittee’s privilege to drive or termination of the registration of a vehicle for a period of time stated in an order of revocation or suspension. The terms “revocation” or “suspension” or a combination of both terms shall be used synonymously.
  36. Road Tractors. — Vehicles designed and used for drawing other vehicles upon the highway and not so constructed as to carry any part of the load, either independently or as a part of the weight of the vehicle so drawn.
  37. Roadway. — That portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the shoulder. In the event a highway includes two or more separate roadways the term “roadway” as used herein shall refer to any such roadway separately but not to all such roadways collectively.
  38. Safety Zone. — Traffic island or other space officially set aside within a highway for the exclusive use of pedestrians and which is so plainly marked or indicated by proper signs as to be plainly visible at all times while set apart as a safety zone.
  39. Security Agreement. — Written agreement which reserves or creates a security interest.
  40. Security Interest. — An interest in a vehicle reserved or created by agreement and which secures payments or performance of an obligation. The term includes but is not limited to the interest of a chattel mortgagee, the interest of a vendor under a conditional sales contract, the interest of a trustee under a chattel deed of trust, and the interest of a lessor under a lease intended as security. A security interest is “perfected” when it is valid against third parties generally. (41a) Serious Traffic Violation. — A conviction of one of the following offenses when operating a commercial or other motor vehicle:
    1. Excessive speeding, involving a single charge of any speed 15 miles per hour or more above the posted speed limit.
    2. Careless and reckless driving.
    3. A violation of any State or local law relating to motor vehicle traffic control, other than a parking violation, arising in connection with a fatal accident.
    4. Improper or erratic lane changes.
    5. Following the vehicle ahead too closely.
    6. Driving a commercial motor vehicle without obtaining a commercial drivers license.
    7. Driving a commercial motor vehicle without a commercial drivers license in the driver’s possession.
    8. Driving a commercial motor vehicle without the proper class of commercial drivers license or endorsements for the specific vehicle group being operated or for the passenger or type of cargo being transported.
    9. Unlawful use of a mobile telephone under G.S. 20-137.4 A or Part 390 or Part 392 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations while operating a commercial motor vehicle.
  41. Solid Tire. — Every tire of rubber or other resilient material which does not depend upon compressed air for the support of the load.
  42. Specially Constructed Vehicles. — Motor vehicles required to be registered under this Chapter and that fit within one of the following categories:
    1. Replica vehicle. — A vehicle, excluding motorcycles, that when assembled replicates an earlier year, make, and model vehicle.
    2. Street rod vehicle. — A vehicle, excluding motorcycles, manufactured prior to 1949 that has been materially altered or has a body constructed from nonoriginal materials.
    3. Custom-built vehicle. — A vehicle, including motorcycles, reconstructed or assembled by a nonmanufacturer from new or used parts that has an exterior that does not replicate or resemble any other manufactured vehicle. This category also includes any motorcycle that was originally sold unassembled and manufactured from a kit or that has been materially altered or that has a body constructed from nonoriginal materials.
  43. Special Mobile Equipment. — Defined in G.S. 105-164.3 . (44a) Specialty Vehicles. — Vehicles of a type required to be registered under this Chapter that are modified from their original construction for an educational, emergency services, or public safety use.
  44. State. — A state, territory, or possession of the United States, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a province of Canada, or the Sovereign Nation of the Eastern Band of the Cherokee Indians with tribal lands, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151, located within the boundaries of the State of North Carolina. For provisions in this Chapter that apply to commercial drivers licenses, “state” means a state of the United States and the District of Columbia.
  45. Street. — A highway, as defined in subdivision (13). The terms “highway” and “street” and their cognates are synonymous.

    (46a) Supplemental restraint system. — A passive inflatable motor vehicle occupant crash protection system designed for use in conjunction with a seat belt assembly as defined in 49 C.F.R. § 571.209, and includes one or more airbags and all components required to ensure that an airbag works as designed by the vehicle manufacturer, including both of the following:

    1. The airbag operates as designed in the event of a crash.
    2. The airbag is designed in accordance with federal motor vehicle safety standards for the specific make, model, and year of the motor vehicle in which it is or will be installed.
  46. Suspension. — Termination of a licensee’s or permittee’s privilege to drive or termination of the registration of a vehicle for a period of time stated in an order of revocation or suspension. The terms “revocation” or “suspension” or a combination of both terms shall be used synonymously.
  47. Truck Tractors. — Vehicles designed and used primarily for drawing other vehicles and not so constructed as to carry any load independent of the vehicle so drawn.

    (48a) (Effective until December 31, 2024) U-drive-it vehicles. — The following vehicles that are either rented to a person, to be operated by that person, or loaned by a franchised motor vehicle dealer, with or without charge, to a customer of that dealer who is having a vehicle serviced or repaired by the dealer:

    1. A private passenger vehicle other than the following:
      1. A private passenger vehicle of nine-passenger capacity or less that is rented for a term of one year or more.
      2. A private passenger vehicle that is rented to public school authorities for driver-training instruction.
    2. A property-hauling vehicle under 7,000 pounds that does not haul products for hire and that is rented for a term of less than one year.
    3. Motorcycles.

      (48a) (Effective December 31, 2024) U-drive-it vehicles. — The following vehicles that are rented to a person, to be operated by that person:

      a. A private passenger vehicle other than the following:

      1. A private passenger vehicle of nine-passenger capacity or less that is rented for a term of one year or more.
      2. A private passenger vehicle that is rented to public school authorities for driver-training instruction.

        b. A property-hauling vehicle under 7,000 pounds that does not haul products for hire and that is rented for a term of less than one year.

        c. Motorcycles.

        (48b) Under the Influence of an Impairing Substance. — The state of a person having his physical or mental faculties, or both, appreciably impaired by an impairing substance.

        (48c) Utility Vehicle. — A motor vehicle that is (i) designed for off-road use and (ii) used for general maintenance, security, agricultural, or horticultural purposes. “Utility vehicle” does not include an all-terrain vehicle or golf cart, as defined in this section, or a riding lawn mower.

  48. Vehicle. — Every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices moved by human power or used exclusively upon fixed rails or tracks; provided, that for the purposes of this Chapter bicycles and electric assisted bicycles shall be deemed vehicles and every rider of a bicycle or an electric assisted bicycle upon a highway shall be subject to the provisions of this Chapter applicable to the driver of a vehicle except those which by their nature can have no application. This term shall not include a device which is designed for and intended to be used as a means of transportation for a person with a mobility impairment, or who uses the device for mobility enhancement, is suitable for use both inside and outside a building, including on sidewalks, and is limited by design to 15 miles per hour when the device is being operated by a person with a mobility impairment, or who uses the device for mobility enhancement. This term shall not include (i) an electric personal assistive mobility device as defined in subdivision (7b) of this section or (ii) a personal delivery device as defined by this section. Unless the context requires otherwise, and except as provided under G.S. 20-109.2 , 47-20.6, or 47-20.7, a manufactured home shall be deemed a vehicle.
  49. Wreckers. — Vehicles with permanently attached cranes used to move other vehicles; provided, that said wreckers shall be equipped with adequate brakes for units being towed.

History. 1973, c. 1330, s. 1; 1975, cc. 94, 208; c. 716, s. 5; c. 743; c. 859, s. 1; 1977, c. 313; c. 464, s. 34; 1979, c. 39; c. 423, s. 1; c. 574, ss. 1-4; c. 667, s. 1; c. 680; 1981, c. 606, s. 3; c. 792, s. 2; 1983, c. 435, s. 8; 1983 (Reg. Sess., 1984), c. 1101, ss. 1-3; 1985, c. 509, s. 6; 1987, c. 607, s. 2; c. 658, s. 1; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1069; c. 1105, s. 1; c. 1112, ss. 1-3; 1989, c. 455, ss. 1, 2; c. 727, s. 219(1); c. 771, ss. 1, 18; 1991, c. 449, s. 2; c. 726, ss. 1-4; 1991 (Reg. Sess., 1992), c. 1015, s. 1; 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994), c. 761, s. 22; 1995, c. 191, s. 1; 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 756, ss. 2-4; 1997-379, s. 5.1; 1997-443, s. 11A.8; 1997-456, s. 27; 1998-149, s. 1; 1998-182, ss. 1, 1.1, 26; 1998-217, s. 62(e); 1999-330, s. 9; 1999-337, s. 28(c)-(e); 1999-406, s. 14; 1999-452, ss. 1-5; 2000-155, s. 9; 2000-173, s. 10(c); 2001-212, s. 2; 2001-341, ss. 1, 2; 2001-356, ss. 1, 2; 2001-441, s. 1; 2001-487, ss. 50(a), 51; 2002-72, s. 19(b); 2002-98, ss. 1-3; 2003-397, s. 1; 2005-282, s. 1; 2005-349, ss. 1-3; 2006-253, s. 8; 2007-56, s. 4; 2007-382, ss. 2, 3; 2007-455, s. 1; 2007-493, s. 1; 2008-156, s. 1; 2009-274, s. 1; 2009-405, ss. 1, 4; 2009-416, ss. 1, 2; 2010-129, s. 1; 2011-95, s. 1; 2011-206, s. 1; 2013-410, s. 47.5; 2014-58, s. 10(a), (c), (d); 2014-115, s. 28.3; 2015-125, s. 1; 2015-163, s. 1; 2015-232, s. 1.1(a); 2015-237, s. 2; 2016-59, s. 1; 2016-90, ss. 12.5(a), 13(a); 2016-94, s. 35.20(a); 2017-69, s. 2.1(a); 2017-102, s. 5.2(a), (b); 2018-27, s. 4.5(b); 2018-42, s. 3(b); 2019-34, s. 1; 2019-36, s. 1; 2019-155, s. 1; 2019-227, s. 1(a), (b); 2020-40, s. 1; 2020-51, s. 1(b); 2020-73, s. 1; 2021-33, s. 1; 2021-179, s. 1.

Subdivision (48a) Set Out Twice.

The first version of subdivision (48a) set out above is effective until December 31, 2024. The second version of subdivision (48a) set out above is effective December 31, 2024.

Cross References.

As to designation of an area of private property as a public vehicular area, see G.S. 20-219.4 .

Editor’s Note.

Subdivisions (0.1), (0.2) and (1) were redesignated as subdivisions (1a), (1b) and (1c) and the subunits of subdivision (33) were renumbered pursuant to Session Laws 1997-456, s. 27 which authorized the Revisor of Statutes to renumber or reletter sections and parts of sections having a number or letter designation that is incompatible with the General Assembly’s computer database.

Subdivisions (48a) and (48b) were designated as such under the direction of the Revisor of Statutes.

Sections 20-138, 20-139, and 20-140(c), referred to in this section, were repealed by Session Laws 1983, c. 435, s. 23.

Session Laws 1999-406, s. 18, states that this act does not obligate the General Assembly to appropriate additional funds, and that this act shall be implemented with funds available or appropriated to the Department of Transportation and the Administrative Office of the Courts.

Subdivisions (5a), defining “Dedicated natural gas vehicle” and (12a), defining “Fuel cell electric vehicle” were originally enacted by Session Laws 2011-206, s. 1, as subdivisions (28b) and (28c), respectively. At the direction of the Revisor of Statutes, they were redesignated to maintain alphabetical order, and former subdivisions (5a) and (12)(a) through (12)(f) were redesignated accordingly.

Session Laws 2015-232, s. 1.1(b), as amended by Session Laws 2018-27, s. 4.5(b) and 2018-42, s. 3(b), and by Session Laws 2020-51, s. 1(b), made the amendments to subdivision (48a) by Session Laws 2015-232, s. 1.1(a), effective August 25, 2015, and expire December 31, 2024.

The bracketed words “[The basic entities are defined as follows:]” were added at the end of the first paragraph of subdivision (32b) at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes. The omission was subsequently corrected in amendment by Session Laws 2017-102, s. 5.2(a).

Session Laws 2017-102, s. 5.2(b) provides: “The Revisor of Statutes is authorized to reletter the definitions in G.S. 20-4.01(27) and G.S. 20-4.01(32b) to place them in alphabetical order. The Revisor of Statutes may conform any citations that change as a result of the relettering.” Pursuant to that authority, sub-subdivisions (27)a. through h. and (32b)a. through e. were reordered to maintain alphabetical order. The reference in subdivision (32b)c. was conformed.

Session Laws 2018-27, s. 5, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2019-36, s. 6, made subdivision (24b), as added by Session Laws 2019-36, s. 1, effective December 1, 2019, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date.

Session Laws 2019-155, s. 4, makes the amendments to this section by Session Laws 2019-155, s. 1, effective October 1, 2019, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date.

Session Laws 2020-73, s. 7, made the enactment of subdivision (28a), the renumbering of former subdivision (28a) as subdivision (28b), and the amendment of subdivision (49) by Session Laws 2020-73, s. 1, effective December 1, 2020, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2003-397, s. 1, effective January 1, 2005, added subdivisions (41a)f. through h.

Session Laws 2006-253, s. 8, effective December 1, 2006, and applicable to offenses committed on or after December 1, 2006, rewrote subdivisions (32) and (45).

Session Laws 2007-56, s. 4, effective May 23, 2007, and applicable to drivers licenses issued or renewed on or after that date, substituted “fraud, or to which G.S. 20-15(a)(3) applies,” for “fraud” in subdivision (2).

Session Laws 2007-382, s. 2, in the first sentence of subdivision (27)d4, inserted “plainly visible” before “words” and deleted “in letters at least 8 inches in height” following “front and rear” at the end of the sentence. For effective date and applicability, see Editor’s note.

Session Laws 2007-382, s. 3, in the first sentence of subdivision (27)d4, inserted “that is painted primarily yellow below the roofline.” For effective date and applicability, see Editor’s note.

Session Laws 2007-455, s. 1, effective December 1, 2007, inserted “gated or non-gated” and inserted “or community” twice in subdivision (32)c.

Session Laws 2007-493, s. 1, effective August 30, 2007, substituted “Any offense set forth” for “Death by vehicle” in subdivision (24a)b. For applicability provisions, see Editor’s note.

Session Laws 2008-156, s. 1, effective August 3, 2008, rewrote subdivision (12c); and added the last sentence in subdivision (45).

Session Laws 2009-274, s. 1, effective July 10, 2009, and applicable to all licenses expiring on or after that date, added subdivision (33c).

Session Laws 2009-405, ss. 1 and 4, effective October 1, 2009, added subdivision (15a) and rewrote subdivision (43).

Session Laws 2009-416, ss. 1, 2, effective March 31, 2010 and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, added subdivision (4a)b 6 and added the language following “commercial motor vehicle” in subsection (7b).

Session Laws 2010-129, s. 1, effective July 21, 2010, added subdivisions (12c) through (12e); and redesignated former subdivision (12c) as subdivision (12f), therein twice deleting “(1 October 2007 Edition)” following “Code of Federal Regulations.”

Session Laws 2011-95, s. 1, effective May 26, 2011, added subdivision (28a).

Session Laws 2011-206, s. 1, effective June 23, 2011, added subdivisions (28b) and (28c).

Session Laws 2013-410, s. 47.5, effective August 23, 2013, rewrote subdivisions (1c) and (48c), which formerly read “All-Terrain Vehicle or ATV. — A motorized off-highway vehicle designed to travel on three or four low-pressure tires, having a seat designed to be straddled by the operator and handlebars for steering control” and “Utility Vehicle. — Vehicle designed and manufactured for general maintenance, security, recreational, and landscaping purposes, but does not include vehicles designed and used primarily for the transportation of persons or property on a street or highway” respectively.

Session Laws 2014-58, s. 10(a), (c), and (d), effective December 1, 2014, inserted subdivision (32a), and redesignated former subdivisions (32a) and (32b) as present subdivisions (32b) and (32c). See Editor’s note for applicability.

Session Laws 2014-115, s. 28.3, effective August 11, 2014, added subdivision (41a)i.

Session Laws 2015-125, s. 1, effective July 1, 2016, substituted “Except as specifically provided otherwise, this term” for “This” in the second sentence of subdivision (23). For applicability, see editor’s note.

Session Laws 2015-163, s. 1, effective October 1, 2015, added subdivision (27)a; renumbered former subdivision (27)a as subdivision (27)a1; and inserted “autocycles” in subdivision (27)d. For applicability, see editor’s note.

Session Laws 2015-232, s. 1.1(a), as amended by Session Laws 2018-27, s. 4.5(b), Session Laws 2018-42, s. 3(b), and Session Laws 2020-51, s. 1(b), inserted “or loaned by a franchised motor vehicle dealer, with or without charge, to a customer of that dealer who is having a vehicle serviced or repaired by the dealer” at the end of the first paragraph of subdivision (48a). For effective date and expiration, see editor’s note.

Session Laws 2015-237, s. 2, effective October 1, 2015, in subdivision (27)b, added the subdivision (27)b.1 through 7 designations, added subdivision (27)b.8, and made minor stylistic changes.

Session Laws 2016-59, s. 1, effective July 1, 2017, added the second sentence in subdivision (14); added subdivision (18a); added the third sentence in subdivision (32b); and added the last sentence in subdivision (49).

Session Laws 2016-90, s. 12.5(a), effective July 11, 2016, in subdivision (27)a., substituted “antilock brakes, completely or partially enclosed seating” for “antilock brakes, air bag protection, completely enclosed seating.”

Session Laws 2016-90, s. 13(a), effective December 1, 2016, added subdivision (7a) and renumbered former subdivisions (7a) and (7b) as subdivisions (7b) and (7c) accordingly; deleted former subdivision (21a) pertaining to mopeds; in subdivision (23), substituted “mopeds or electric assisted bicycles” for “mopeds as defined in G.S. 20-4.01(27) d1”; added subdivision (27)c2.; in subdivision (27)d., substituted “agencies, electric assisted bicycles” for “agencies,” “sub-subdivision d1” for “subdivision d1,” and “subdivision” for “subsection”; rewrote subdivision (27)d1, and, in subdivision (49), substituted “bicycles and electric assisted bicycles shall be deemed vehicles and every rider of a bicycle or an electric assisted bicycle” for “bicycles shall be deemed vehicles and every rider of a bicycle” in the first sentence proviso, and substituted “subdivision (7b) of this section” for “G.S. 20-4.01(7a)” at the end of the last sentence. See editor’s note for applicability.

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 35.20(a), effective July 1, 2016, substituted “G.S. 20-15(a)” for “G.S. 20-15(a)(3)” near the end of subdivision (2). See editor’s note for applicability.

Session Laws 2017-69, s. 2.1(a), effective June 28, 2017, added subdivision (12h).

Session Laws 2017-102, s. 5.2(a), effective July 12, 2017, added “The basic entities are defined as follows” at the end of the introductory paragraph in subdivision (32b).

Session Laws 2019-34, s. 1, effective June 21, 2019, added subsection (27)g1.

Session Laws 2019-36, s. 1, added subdivision (24b). For effective date and applicability, see editor’s note.

Session Laws 2019-155, s. 1, effective October 1, 2019, added subdivisions (1), (4b), (23a) and (46a); and designated former subdivision (4b) as (4c). For effective date and applicability, see editor’s note.

Session Laws 2019-34, s. 1(a) and (b), effective September 27, 2019, inserted ‘does not have the ability to be propelled by a gasoline engine and that‘ in the introductory paragraph of subdivisions (12a) and (28a).

Session Laws 2020-40, s. 1, effective October 1, 2020, added sub-subdivision (27)g2.

Session Laws 2020-73, s. 1, added subdivision (28a); renumbered former subdivision (28a) as subdivision (28b); and, in subdivision (49), added clause (ii) and made related stylistic changes. For effective date and applicability, see editor’s note.

Session Laws 2021-33, s. 1, effective October 1, 2021, in subdivision (27)g2, inserted “or upfitted by a licensed manufacturer, dealer, or person or business otherwise engaged in vehicle manufacturing or modification”, substituted “G.S. 20-121.1(2a)” for “G.S. 20-121.1(2)”, deleted “an engine displacement greater than 2,400 cubic centimeters,” following “has four wheels”, substituted “110” for “142” and “60” for “70”.

Session Laws 2021-179, s. 1, effective December 1, 2021, added subsection (23a) and redesignated former subsection (23a) as (23b).

Legal Periodicals.

For note discussing the definition of “driving” under the North Carolina Safe Roads Act, in light of State v. Fields, 77 N.C. App. 404, 335 S.E.2d 69 (1985), see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 127 (1986).

CASE NOTES

Analysis

I.In General

Constitutionality. —

For case reaffirming the constitutionality of G.S. 20-138.1(a)(2) and subdivision (33a) of this section, see State v. Denning, 316 N.C. 523 , 342 S.E.2d 855, 1986 N.C. LEXIS 2153 (1986).

In construing a homeowners association’s declaration of covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs), property owners’ reliance on G.S. 20-4.01(32a) and (27)d2, and G.S. 20-354.2 (defining travel trailer, camping trailer, motor vehicle, and motor home or house car) was misplaced; the statutes were enacted between six and sixteen years after the association’s CC&Rs (referring to campers and all similar property) were drafted and recorded. The statutory provisions were not material to the issue of the drafters’ intent in 1985 when the CC&Rs were drafted and recorded. Schwartz v. Banbury Woods Homeowners Ass'n, 196 N.C. App. 584, 675 S.E.2d 382, 2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 528 (2009).

Business District. —

As to what constituted a business district within the meaning of subdivision (1) of former G.S. 20-38 , see Mitchell v. Melts, 220 N.C. 793 , 18 S.E.2d 406, 1942 N.C. LEXIS 549 (1942); Hinson v. Dawson, 241 N.C. 714 , 86 S.E.2d 585, 1955 N.C. LEXIS 453 (1955); Black v. Penland, 255 N.C. 691 , 122 S.E.2d 504, 1961 N.C. LEXIS 659 (1961).

Driver. —

Although distinctions may have been made between driving and operating in prior case law and prior statutes regulating motor vehicles, such a distinction is not supportable under G.S. 20-138.1 . Since “driver” is defined in this section simply as an “operator” of a vehicle, the legislature intended the two words to be synonymous. State v. Coker, 312 N.C. 432 , 323 S.E.2d 343, 1984 N.C. LEXIS 1818 (1984).

Although a distinction may have been made between driving and operating in prior case law and statutes regulating vehicles, no such distinction is supportable under this section since a “driver” is defined as an “operator.” It is clear that the legislature intended the two words to be synonymous. State v. Dellinger, 73 N.C. App. 685, 327 S.E.2d 609, 1985 N.C. App. LEXIS 3396 (1985).

Impairing Substance. —

State of North Carolina presented sufficient evidence to prove the elements of driving while under the influence of an impairing substance as defendant collided with the rear end of another vehicle in a restaurant drive-thru, officers noted signs of impairment, defendant admitted to having earlier consumed alprazolam, an officer testified that defendant indicated impairment in a HGN test, and another officer who performed a drug recognition evaluation testified that defendant was impaired by a central nervous system depressant. State v. Fincher, 259 N.C. App. 159, 814 S.E.2d 606, 2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 349 (2018).

Operator includes a person in the driver’s seat of a motor vehicle when the engine is running. State v. Carter, 15 N.C. App. 391, 190 S.E.2d 241, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 1924 (1972).

In a prosecution for driving under the influence and driving while license was revoked, evidence that defendant was seated behind the wheel of a car which had the motor running was sufficient to prove that defendant was the operator of the car under subdivision (25). State v. Turner, 29 N.C. App. 163, 223 S.E.2d 530, 1976 N.C. App. LEXIS 2402 (1976).

Although distinctions may have been made between driving and operating in prior case law and prior statutes regulating motor vehicles, such a distinction is not supportable under G.S. 20-138.1 . Since “driver” is defined in this section simply as an “operator” of a vehicle, the legislature intended the two words to be synonymous. State v. Coker, 312 N.C. 432 , 323 S.E.2d 343, 1984 N.C. LEXIS 1818 (1984).

A horseback rider is an “operator” who is in “control of a vehicle which is in motion” where the horse is ridden upon a street, highway or public vehicular area. State v. Dellinger, 73 N.C. App. 685, 327 S.E.2d 609, 1985 N.C. App. LEXIS 3396 (1985).

Evidence held sufficient for a reasonable jury to infer that defendant, who was found asleep in driver’s seat in car which had run off the road and into a fence, was under the influence of an impairing substance when he drove the vehicle. State v. Mack, 81 N.C. App. 578, 345 S.E.2d 223, 1986 N.C. App. LEXIS 2332 (1986).

Owner. —

This section defines “owner” and former G.S. 20-279.1 defined “owner” in essentially the same way. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hayes, 276 N.C. 620 , 174 S.E.2d 511, 1970 N.C. LEXIS 734 (1970).

A defendant who advanced money for the purchase of a used car as security took a title-retaining contract on the vehicle and permitted its delivery to the purchasers, one of whom was operating it when an accident occurred, could not be liable to the persons injured, since a conditional vendee, lessee, or mortgagor of a motor vehicle is deemed to be the owner, and liability on the part of the defendant could arise only by application of the doctrine of respondeat superior. Such facts do not show the necessary relationship. High Point Sav. & Trust Co. v. King, 253 N.C. 571 , 117 S.E.2d 421, 1960 N.C. LEXIS 684 (1960).

Where the owner of trucks leased them to another corporation under an agreement requiring lessor to carry insurance and maintain the vehicles and giving lessee control over the operation of the trucks with right to use same exclusively for the transportation and delivery of lessee’s goods, the lessor was not a contract carrier within the meaning of the statutes as they stood in 1949, since the lessor merely leased its vehicles and was not a carrier of any kind, and lessee was solely a private carrier, and therefore lessor was not liable for additional assessment at the “for-hire” rates under the statute. Equipment Fin. Corp. v. Scheidt, 249 N.C. 334 , 106 S.E.2d 555, 1959 N.C. LEXIS 354 (1959).

Where the vendee paid the entire purchase price, had exclusive possession and use of the vehicle, obtained the insurance coverage for it, and paid the premium therefor, this sufficed to give him a clear equitable interest in the vehicle, and that equitable interest sufficed, under the particular facts and circumstances, to make him the “owner” of the vehicle within the coverage intent of the policy, interpreted in light of the purpose and intent of Article 9A, the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act of 1953. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 59 N.C. App. 621, 298 S.E.2d 56, 1982 N.C. App. LEXIS 3206 (1982), cert. denied, 307 N.C. 698 , 301 S.E.2d 101, 1983 N.C. LEXIS 1233 (1983).

Except under special circumstances not present in this case, the statute limits the definition of the word “owner” to the person holding legal title. Jenkins v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 324 N.C. 394 , 378 S.E.2d 773, 1989 N.C. LEXIS 254 (1989).

Where evidence established that buyer paid four hundred dollars ($400.00) cash as the total price for a car and took immediate possession of the vehicle, but never received the certificate of title, buyer was not the “owner” of the car as that term is defined in G.S. 20-4.01(26) ; therefore, provision in insurance policy excluding coverage for liability arising from the use of a vehicle “owned” by buyer did not apply. Jenkins v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 324 N.C. 394 , 378 S.E.2d 773, 1989 N.C. LEXIS 254 (1989).

Although a vehicle’s owner gave the vehicle to her son, she never transferred title, and thus at the time of a later accident the owner remained the legal owner of the vehicle; a trial court erred in holding that the owner’s insurance policy terminated when the son’s policy was issued on the same car because the automatic termination clause in the owner’s policy’s only applied if the owner obtained other insurance, and since the owner’s policy and the son’s policy were procured by different persons, the owner’s policy did not automatically terminate. Progressive Am. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 184 N.C. App. 688, 647 S.E.2d 111, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1625 (2007).

Under G.S. 25-2-509(3), a buyer bore the risk of loss of a mobile home that was destroyed by fire for G.S. 20-4.01(26) purposes as: (1) Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hayes, 174 S.E.2d 511 (N.C. 1970), did not apply to the breach of contract case; (2) the risk of loss passed to the buyer on the buyer’s receipt of the mobile home; and (3) when the sales agreement was executed, the buyer accepted the mobile home and the seller made tender of delivery due to an as is, where is clause in the agreement. Singletary v. P & A Invs., Inc., 212 N.C. App. 469, 712 S.E.2d 681, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1055 (2011).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of felony conversion, the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss as the State did not produce sufficient evidence that the alleged victim owned the vehicle because the alleged victim never received title to the vehicle; without title to the vehicle, the alleged victim did not meet the definition of owner; a lien encumbered the vehicle that the alleged victim could not remove; and ownership was essential to establishing the elements of felony conversion. State v. Falana, 254 N.C. App. 329, 802 S.E.2d 582, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 492 (2017).

For purposes of tort law and liability insurance coverage, no ownership passes to the purchaser of a motor vehicle which requires registration until: (1) The owner executes, in the presence of a person authorized to administer oaths, an assignment and warranty of title on the reverse of the certificate of title, including the name and address of the transferee; (2) there is an actual or constructive delivery of the motor vehicle; and (3) the duly assigned certificate of title is delivered to the transferee (or lienholder in secured transactions). Jenkins v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 324 N.C. 394 , 378 S.E.2d 773, 1989 N.C. LEXIS 254 (1989).

Since actual title had not passed, an insurer had to provide coverage to its insured while driving a non-owned vehicle, even though the insured was in the process of buying the vehicle, as North Carolina required actual title to pass for ownership under G.S. 20-4.01(26) ; the insurer was responsible to a passenger who was injured in a collision with a non-owned vehicle being driven by the insured. Hernandez v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 171 N.C. App. 510, 615 S.E.2d 425, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 1360 (2005).

Definition of “Owner” Applies to Article 9A. —

The definition of “owner” in subdivision (26) of this section applies throughout this Chapter, and thus to Article 9A, the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act of 1953, unless the context otherwise requires. It thus must be read into every liability insurance policy within the purview of Article 9A, unless the context otherwise requires. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 59 N.C. App. 621, 298 S.E.2d 56, 1982 N.C. App. LEXIS 3206 (1982), cert. denied, 307 N.C. 698 , 301 S.E.2d 101, 1983 N.C. LEXIS 1233 (1983).

Deletion of “Owner” from G.S. 20-279.1 Was Merely to Avoid Repetition. —

Prior to 1973 the definition of “owner” appeared in G.S. 20-279.1(9) (repealed in 1973), which was applicable solely to Article 9A, the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act of 1953. The General Assembly placed this definition in this section. The apparent purpose was to eliminate unnecessary repetition of this definition in separate articles of this Chapter, not to make the definition inapplicable to Article 9A. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 59 N.C. App. 621, 298 S.E.2d 56, 1982 N.C. App. LEXIS 3206 (1982), cert. denied, 307 N.C. 698 , 301 S.E.2d 101, 1983 N.C. LEXIS 1233 (1983).

One who does not hold legal title to a vehicle cannot obtain owner’s liability insurance thereon. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 67 N.C. App. 1, 312 S.E.2d 656, 1984 N.C. App. LEXIS 3004 (1984).

Public Vehicular Area. —

Evidence held to permit a finding that at the time in question portion of park grounds legally in use as a parking lot was a “public vehicular area” within the meaning and intent of that phrase as used in subdivision (32), so as to permit a conviction under G.S. 20-138.1(a) for impaired driving thereon. State v. Carawan, 80 N.C. App. 151, 341 S.E.2d 96, 1986 N.C. App. LEXIS 2145 (1986).

Evidence held sufficient to permit a finding that handicapped or wheelchair ramp in motel parking lot in front of motel door upon which most of defendant’s car had been stopped was part of a “public vehicular area” within the meaning and intent of that phrase as used in subdivision (32). State v. Mabe, 85 N.C. App. 500, 355 S.E.2d 186, 1987 N.C. App. LEXIS 2609 (1987).

Area where an accident between plaintiff and defendant’s truck occurred was a public vehicular area and not a roadway. The accident occurred in the traffic lane of a parking lot generally open to and used by the public for vehicular traffic upon the premises of a business establishment which provided parking space for its customers. Although the lot was held open for use by the public, there was no evidence that the general public had a legally enforceable right to use the lot. Corns v. Hall, 112 N.C. App. 232, 435 S.E.2d 88, 1993 N.C. App. LEXIS 1061 (1993).

Street in mobile home park, owned by one individual who had divided the property into lots for lease, that was not marked as private, and was available for use by residents, their guests and other visitors, was a public vehicular area within the meaning of subsection (32). State v. Turner, 117 N.C. App. 457, 451 S.E.2d 19, 1994 N.C. App. LEXIS 1261 (1994).

Where the evidence established that a private club was licensed by the State to serve alcohol to guests of members as well as to members themselves, the club’s parking lot could be used as a thoroughfare by members of the general public, there were no signs posted in the club’s parking lot prohibiting the public from parking there and no signs posted stating that the parking lot was private property, nor was there any security or membership cards allowing members exclusive access to the parking lot, the evidence was sufficient to support a peremptory instruction that the club’s parking lot was a “public vehicular area” as a matter of law. State v. Snyder, 343 N.C. 61 , 468 S.E.2d 221, 1996 N.C. LEXIS 152 (1996).

A sign prohibiting loitering in a parking lot did not change the nature of the property; thus, a car wash was still a business providing parking for its customers, and as such, the premises was a “public vehicular area” under this section. State v. Robinette, 124 N.C. App. 212, 476 S.E.2d 387, 1996 N.C. App. LEXIS 995 (1996).

Defendant’s possession of an open container of alcohol in his car in a gas station parking lot was not illegal since a parking lot of a service station was a public vehicular area and the open container law only prohibited open containers on highways and highway right-of-ways. State v. Coleman, 228 N.C. App. 76, 743 S.E.2d 62, 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 672 (2013).

Officer’s belief that possession of an open container of alcohol in a car in a public vehicular area was illegal could not support a Terry stop since the belief was unreasonable given that the open container law was neither novel nor complex and clearly prohibited the possession of an open container only on highways and highway right-of-ways, and the distinction between a highway and a public vehicular area was familiar to law enforcement officers. State v. Coleman, 228 N.C. App. 76, 743 S.E.2d 62, 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 672 (2013).

Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of habitual impaired driving because there was no evidence concerning the ownership of the vacant lot where defendant operated a moped or that the lot had been designated as a public vehicular area by the owner; in order to show an area meets the definition of public vehicular area there must be some evidence demonstrating the property is similar in nature to those examples provided by the General Assembly in the statute. State v. Ricks, 237 N.C. App. 359, 764 S.E.2d 692, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 1147 (2014).

Definition of a public vehicular area contemplates areas generally open to and used by the public for vehicular traffic as a matter of right or areas used for vehicular traffic that are associated with places generally open to and used by the public, such as driveways and parking lots to institutions and businesses open to the public. State v. Ricks, 237 N.C. App. 359, 764 S.E.2d 692, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 1147 (2014).

Even assuming there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to decide whether a vacant lot was a public vehicular area, the trial court erred in abbreviating the definition of public vehicular area in the instructions and by preventing defendant from arguing his position in accordance with the statute; the entire definition of public vehicular area is significant to a determination of whether an area meets the definition, and the examples are not separable from the statute. State v. Ricks, 237 N.C. App. 359, 764 S.E.2d 692, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 1147 (2014).

“Reportable Crash.” —

Defendant was properly convicted of giving false information for a motor vehicle crash report in violation of G.S. 20-279.31(b) because, inter alia, an accident in which defendant was involved was a “reportable crash,” under the provisions of G.S. 20-4.01(33b) . State v. Hernandez, 188 N.C. App. 193, 655 S.E.2d 426, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS 76 (2008).

Contact Not Required for Accident. —

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the two felony hit and run charges was properly denied because contact was not required in order for an accident to occur; and, even if defendant could not have seen behind the trailer and even if there was no contact between the motorcycle’s front tire and the trailer, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to accept a conclusion that defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the vehicle he was driving was involved in a crash and that someone was killed or seriously injured as a result. State v. Gibson, 276 N.C. App. 230, 855 S.E.2d 533, 2021- NCCOA-69, 2021 N.C. App. LEXIS 80 (2021).

Residential District. —

For cases construing earlier statutory definitions of “residential district,” see Reid v. City Coach Co., 215 N.C. 469 , 2 S.E.2d 578, 1939 N.C. LEXIS 296 (1939); Mitchell v. Melts, 220 N.C. 793 , 18 S.E.2d 406, 1942 N.C. LEXIS 549 (1942); Goddard v. Williams, 251 N.C. 128 , 110 S.E.2d 820, 1959 N.C. LEXIS 533 (1959).

Revocation. —

The contention that a revocation remains in effect not only throughout the period stated in the order of revocation but also until the person whose license was revoked applies for a restoration of his license and pays the restoration fee required is contrary to the definition of “revocation” in this section. Ennis v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 612 , 184 S.E.2d 246, 1971 N.C. LEXIS 897 (1971).

Where petitioner, who was driving without his license, was stopped and charged with driving while impaired, and then appeared before a magistrate who revoked his driver’s license for 10 days, petitioner’s license had been validly revoked when he was stopped the next day; thus, he was properly charged with committing a moving violation during a period of revocation by operating a motor vehicle. Eibergen v. Killens, 124 N.C. App. 534, 477 S.E.2d 684, 1996 N.C. App. LEXIS 1148 (1996).

When a person’s driver’s license is suspended or revoked, it is the surrendering of the privilege to drive, not the license card itself, that is of significance. Eibergen v. Killens, 124 N.C. App. 534, 477 S.E.2d 684, 1996 N.C. App. LEXIS 1148 (1996).

As the terms “revoked” and “suspended” with respect to defendant’s driver’s license were used interchangeably in statutes pursuant to G.S. 20-4.01(47) , defendant’s claim that there was a fatal variance between the indictment, which indicated that defendant’s license was revoked, and the proof offered at trial that defendant’s license was suspended, lacked merit. State v. Lloyd, 187 N.C. App. 174, 652 S.E.2d 299, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 2253 (2007), cert. denied, 363 N.C. 586 , 683 S.E.2d 214, 2009 N.C. LEXIS 823 (2009).

“Street.” —

Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence a police officer seized from his vehicle pursuant to a traffic stop because the trial court’s findings supported its conclusion that the officer had reasonable suspicion that defendant had violated G.S. 20-129 by failing to have taillights in proper working order; considering the totality of the circumstances, the officer reasonably believed that a street in an apartment complex was a public road for purposes of G.S. 20-129 (a)(4) and that under the weather conditions at the time of the stop, defendant was required to have his taillights on while his windshield wipers were in use, and the officer’s reasonable, albeit assumed to be mistaken, belief did not render the stop unconstitutional. State v. Hopper, 692 S.E.2d 166, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 641 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010), op. withdrawn, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 1793 (N.C. Ct. App. May 3, 2010), sub. op., 205 N.C. App. 175, 695 S.E.2d 801, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 1156 (2010).

Expunction. —

Inasmuch as felonious speeding to elude arrest is not an offense involving impaired driving per G.S. 20-4.01(24a) , the trial court made an error of law in determining that defendant was ineligible for expunction of the offense of fleeing to elude arrest. State v. Neira, 270 N.C. App. 359, 840 S.E.2d 890, 2020 N.C. App. LEXIS 165 (2020).

Proof of Impaired Driving. —

In a case in which defendant passed a tow truck on the shoulder and struck and killed the victim, the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss the driving while impaired charge because the trooper formed his opinion of impairment entirely through passive observation of defendant, and he did not request defendant to perform any of the several field tests officers often use to gauge a motorist’s impairment; he did not ask defendant if or when he had ingested any impairing substances; and trooper’s observations occurred about five hours after the collision occurred. State v. Nazzal, 270 N.C. App. 345, 840 S.E.2d 881, 2020 N.C. App. LEXIS 166 (2020).

II.Types of Vehicles

Vehicles — Legislative Intent. —

The North Carolina legislature intended the provisions of the traffic laws of North Carolina applicable to the drivers of “vehicles” to apply to horseback riders irrespective of whether a horse is a vehicle. State v. Dellinger, 73 N.C. App. 685, 327 S.E.2d 609, 1985 N.C. App. LEXIS 3396 (1985).

“Commercial Motor Vehicle”. —

The defendant’s contention that he did not violate this section because he was not driving a “commercial motor vehicle” was without merit; the tractor-trailer was a commercial vehicle within the statutory definition although the defendant was driving it for his own private use and although he had detached the trailer portion of the tractor-trailer. State v. Jones, 140 N.C. App. 691, 538 S.E.2d 228, 2000 N.C. App. LEXIS 1257 (2000).

Farm Tractor. —

Farm tractors are not to be considered motor vehicles within the provisions of the Uniform Driver’s License Act or the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act. Brown v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 241 N.C. 666 , 86 S.E.2d 433, 1955 N.C. LEXIS 445 (1955) (decided under repealed G.S. 20-226) .

The Motor Vehicles Act expressly defines a “farm tractor” as a “motor vehicle.” Therefore, an instruction imparting to a farm tractor and trailer on a highway special hazard status per se and rendering a motorist who collides with a farm tractor and trailer on a highway negligent per se, regardless of the circumstances or the conduct of the tractor-trailer operator constituted prejudicial error. Davis v. Gamble, 55 N.C. App. 617, 286 S.E.2d 629, 1982 N.C. App. LEXIS 2241 (1982).

Construing the definitions of “farm tractor” and “vehicle” together in pari materia, it is apparent that the General Assembly intended that while farm tractors are motor implements of husbandry, they were vehicles within the meaning of former G.S. 20-138 when operated upon a highway by one under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs. State v. Green, 251 N.C. 141 , 110 S.E.2d 805, 1959 N.C. LEXIS 528 (1959).

Trucks. —

Trucks, even if used for private purposes, are not private passenger type autos. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Packer, 60 F.3d 1116, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 20236 (4th Cir. 1995).

Motorcycle. —

The definition of the term “motorcycle” in former G.S. 20-38 did not describe the “mailster,” a class of motor vehicle generally known as a “motor scooter.” LeCroy v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 251 N.C. 19 , 110 S.E.2d 463, 1959 N.C. LEXIS 506 (1959).

The statutory definition of the term “motorcycle” has no application in an action based on an insurance contract’s interpretation of the word “automobile.” LeCroy v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 251 N.C. 19 , 110 S.E.2d 463, 1959 N.C. LEXIS 506 (1959).

Statutory definition cited in Anderson v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 197 N.C. 72 , 147 S.E. 693, 1929 N.C. LEXIS 149 (1929) (holding that the expression “motor-driven car” in an insurance policy excluded a motorcycle) .

Electric Scooter Fell Within Statutory Definition of Vehicle. —

Defendant’s electric scooter, which was not self-balancing, with its two wheels in tandem, and which did not fall within the two statutory exceptions from a vehicle under G.S. 20-138.1(e) with regard to horses, bicycles, and lawnmowers or G.S. 20-4.01(49) as to transportation for a person with a mobility impairment, fell within the legislature’s definition of vehicle in G.S. 20-4.01(49) and, because the evidence at trial showed that his breath alcohol concentration following arrest was 0.13, there was sufficient evidence to uphold defendant’s conviction for impaired driving under G.S. 20-138.1 . State v. Crow, 175 N.C. App. 119, 623 S.E.2d 68, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 2747 (2005).

Low-boy trailer and Mack truck were not private passenger motor vehicles as they did not have a pickup body and were not delivery sedans nor panel trucks. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mabe, 342 N.C. 482 , 467 S.E.2d 34, 1996 N.C. LEXIS 21 (1996).

A mobile home is a motor vehicle and is subject to the mandatory provisions of the statutes relating to the registration of motor vehicles in this State. King Homes, Inc. v. Bryson, 273 N.C. 84 , 159 S.E.2d 329, 1968 N.C. LEXIS 561 (1968).

It is clear under North Carolina law that a mobile home is a “motor vehicle” for purposes of the statutes dealing with registration and ownership of motor vehicles. In re Meade, 174 B.R. 49, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 2222 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1994).

Mobile Home Is a Motor Vehicle for Purposes of Perfecting Security Interest. —

Plaintiff’s argument that owner no longer intended to operate her mobile home upon the highway did not nullify defendant’s properly perfected security interest in the mobile home. Peoples Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 103 N.C. App. 762, 407 S.E.2d 251, 1991 N.C. App. LEXIS 936 (1991).

Modular Home. —

Although the title to a modular home is initially acquired through a bill of sale, once installed title must pass by way of a real property deed unlike a mobile home or trailer which passes by transfer of a certificate of origin and motor vehicle title. Briggs v. Rankin, 127 N.C. App. 477, 491 S.E.2d 234, 1997 N.C. App. LEXIS 988 (1997), aff'd, 348 N.C. 686 , 500 S.E.2d 663, 1998 N.C. LEXIS 331 (1998).

Bicycle as Vehicle. —

A bicycle is a vehicle and its rider is a driver within the meaning of the motor vehicle law. Lowe v. Futrell, 271 N.C. 550 , 157 S.E.2d 92, 1967 N.C. LEXIS 1238 (1967); Sadler v. Purser, 12 N.C. App. 206, 182 S.E.2d 850, 1971 N.C. App. LEXIS 1328 (1971); Townsend v. Frye, 30 N.C. App. 634, 228 S.E.2d 56, 1976 N.C. App. LEXIS 2328 , cert. denied, 291 N.C. 178 , 229 S.E.2d 689, 1976 N.C. LEXIS 964 (1976).

Trial court did not err by declining to give the jury the bicyclist’s first proposed special instruction because it was not a correct statement of law, as the statutes the bicyclist relied on were limited to pedestrians, and the ordinary meaning of pedestrian had long been understood to be a person traveling on foot, not a person bicycling, and bicycles were explicitly classified as vehicles, not pedestrians, under G.S. 20-4.01(49) . Barrow v. Sargent, 2021-NCCOA-295, 278 N.C. App. 164, 862 S.E.2d 688, 2021- NCCOA-295, 2021 N.C. App. LEXIS 304 (2021).

The operation of a bicycle upon a public highway is governed by the rules governing motor vehicles insofar as the nature of the vehicle permits. Webb v. Felton, 266 N.C. 707 , 147 S.E.2d 219, 1966 N.C. LEXIS 1425 (1966).

A bicycle is deemed a vehicle, and the rider of a bicycle upon the highway is subject to the applicable provisions of the statutes relating to motor vehicles. Van Dyke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 218 N.C. 283 , 10 S.E.2d 727, 1940 N.C. LEXIS 138 (1940).

A bicycle is a vehicle, and is subject to the provisions of Article 3 of this Chapter, except those which by their nature can have no application. Tarrant v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 221 N.C. 390 , 20 S.E.2d 565, 1942 N.C. LEXIS 474 (1942); Oxendine v. Lowry, 260 N.C. 709 , 133 S.E.2d 687, 1963 N.C. LEXIS 807 (1963).

In interpreting an underinsured motorist excess provision, a bicycle involved in an accident with a car was considered to be a vehicle pursuant to G.S. 20-4.01(49) , since it was operated upon a highway. Sitzman v. Gov't Emples. Ins. Co., 182 N.C. App. 259, 641 S.E.2d 838, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 585 (2007).

Trial court did not err by declining to give the jury the bicyclist’s first proposed special instruction because it was not a correct statement of law, as the statutes the bicyclist relied on were limited to pedestrians, and the ordinary meaning of pedestrian had long been understood to be a person traveling on foot, not a person bicycling, and bicycles were explicitly classified as vehicles, not pedestrians, under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-4.01(49). Barrow v. Sargent, 2021-NCCOA-295, 278 N.C. App. 164, 862 S.E.2d 688, 2021- NCCOA-295, 2021 N.C. App. LEXIS 304 (2021).

Handcart. —

A handcart, being moved solely by human power, is excluded from the category of vehicles defined in subdivision (38) of former G.S. 20-38 (now subdivision (49) of this section). Lewis v. Watson, 229 N.C. 20 , 47 S.E.2d 484, 1948 N.C. LEXIS 409 (1948).

When neither named insured owned a rental car, as defined in G.S. 20-4.04(26), which was being driven by a family member when it was involved in a motor vehicle accident, a trial court erred in granting summary judgment to plaintiff insurer in its declaratory action against defendant insurer because it was impossible to determine which insurer’s policy provided primary coverage due to the identical wording in the “excess” clauses of their respective policies; thus, the “excess” clauses were mutually repugnant and neither clause was given effect. Integon Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 212 N.C. App. 623, 712 S.E.2d 381, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1228 (2011).

School Activity Bus. —

North Carolina Industrial Commission did not have jurisdiction over a driver’s action to recover for the alleged negligence of a local board of education employee in the operation of an activity bus because the waiver of governmental immunity provided in the Tort Claims Act did not apply; the school activity bus did not meet the requirement of the statute that the Commission had jurisdiction over a public school bus or school transportation service vehicle. Irving v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 368 N.C. 609 , 781 S.E.2d 282, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 30 (2016).

Bus the school employee was driving was an activity bus because the evidence showed that at the time in question the bus was not being used to transport a student to and from school for the regularly scheduled school day but was instead being used to transport a student from their place of residence at the school to their place of residence at home, outside of the regularly scheduled school day, on a route which was approximately six and a half hours round trip. Sharpe-Johnson v. Nc Dep't of Pub. Instruction E. N.C. Sch. for the Deaf, 2021-NCCOA-562, 280 N.C. App. 74, 867 S.E.2d 188, 2021- NCCOA-562, 2021 N.C. App. LEXIS 582 (2021).

III.Highways

Construction of Subdivision (13). —

The definition of “highway” in subdivision (13) is to be construed so as to give its terms their plain and ordinary meaning. Smith v. Powell, 293 N.C. 342 , 238 S.E.2d 137, 1977 N.C. LEXIS 940 (1977).

The legislature has provided that, unless the context requires otherwise, the word “highway” is to be given the same connotation in all of the provisions of Chapter 20, whether they be penal, remedial or otherwise. Thus, the well known principles of statutory construction that a penal statute is to be strictly construed and a statute designed to promote safety is to be liberally construed have no application. Smith v. Powell, 293 N.C. 342 , 238 S.E.2d 137, 1977 N.C. LEXIS 940 (1977).

“Highway” Distinguished from Roadway. —

The definitions of “highway” and “roadway,” considered together, show that the legislature in defining “highway” intended to make it clear that the entire “width” between the right-of-way lines is included in a “highway” as distinguished from a “roadway.” Smith v. Powell, 293 N.C. 342 , 238 S.E.2d 137, 1977 N.C. LEXIS 940 (1977).

Definition of “Highway” Is Concerned with Width, Not Depth. —

While it is true that a “highway” or a “street” is not limited to its surface so far as the right of the State to use, maintain and protect it from damage and private use are concerned, and in this sense, it includes not only the entire thickness of the pavement and the prepared base upon which it rests but also so much of the depth as may not unfairly be used as streets are used for the laying therein of drainage systems and conduits for sewer, water and other services, nevertheless, the primary concern of the legislature in defining “highway” as used in Chapter 20 was with the “width,” not the depth. “Width” means “the lineal extent of a thing from side to side.” Smith v. Powell, 293 N.C. 342 , 238 S.E.2d 137, 1977 N.C. LEXIS 940 (1977).

Portion of Sidewalk as Highway. —

The portion of a sidewalk between a street and a filling station, open to the use of the public as a matter of right for the purposes of vehicular traffic, was a “highway” within the meaning of former G.S. 20-138 , prohibiting drunken driving. State v. Perry, 230 N.C. 361 , 53 S.E.2d 288, 1949 N.C. LEXIS 645 (1949).

Portion of Sidewalk Not a Highway. —

Trial court did not err by declining the bicyclist’s proposed instruction on the definition of highway because he failed to show that it was supported by the evidence, as he failed to present evidence supporting the inference that the particular sidewalk upon which he was riding his bicycle was part of the highway, as there was no evidence that the sidewalk was between property or right-of-way lines of the property upon which the road was located, nor was there evidence that the sidewalk was crossed by drivers to access a parking lot open to the public for vehicular traffic. Barrow v. Sargent, 2021-NCCOA-295, 278 N.C. App. 164, 862 S.E.2d 688, 2021- NCCOA-295, 2021 N.C. App. LEXIS 304 (2021).

Trial court did not err by declining the bicyclist’s proposed instruction on the definition of highway because he failed to show that it was supported by the evidence, as he failed to present evidence supporting the inference that the particular sidewalk upon which he was riding his bicycle was part of the highway, as there was no evidence that the sidewalk was between property or right-of-way lines of the property upon which the road was located, nor was there evidence that the sidewalk was crossed by drivers to access a parking lot open to the public for vehicular traffic. Barrow v. Sargent, 2021-NCCOA-295, 278 N.C. App. 164, 862 S.E.2d 688, 2021- NCCOA-295, 2021 N.C. App. LEXIS 304 (2021).

Area beneath Highway Bridge Not “Highway”. —

A petitioner who drove a motor vehicle only within the limits of the area beneath a highway bridge did not drive on a “highway” as that term is used in G.S. 20-16.2 . Smith v. Powell, 293 N.C. 342 , 238 S.E.2d 137, 1977 N.C. LEXIS 940 (1977).

Emergency strip adjacent to interstate highways falls within the literal language of the definition of “highway” as contained in this section. State v. Kelley, 65 N.C. App. 159, 308 S.E.2d 720, 1983 N.C. App. LEXIS 3402 (1983).

Intersection. —

With reference to the right-of-way as between two vehicles approaching and entering an intersection, the law of this State makes no distinction between a “T” intersection and one at which the two highways cross each other completely. Dawson v. Jennette, 278 N.C. 438 , 180 S.E.2d 121, 1971 N.C. LEXIS 988 (1971).

Where one public highway joins another, but does not cross it, the point where they join is an intersection of public highways. Goss v. Williams, 196 N.C. 213 , 145 S.E. 169, 1928 N.C. LEXIS 322 (1928).

When the failure to explain the law so the jury could apply it to the facts is specifically called to the court’s attention by a juror’s request for information, it should tell the jury how to find the intersection of the streets as fixed by statute, and how, when the motorist reaches the intersection, he is required to drive in making a left turn. Pearsall v. Duke Power Co., 258 N.C. 639 , 129 S.E.2d 217, 1963 N.C. LEXIS 448 (1963).

IV.Involving Alcohol

Alcohol Concentration. —

Police officer who had been issued a permit to perform chemical analysis under the authority of G.S. 20-139.1(b) by the Department of Human Resources was permitted by subdivision (0.2) of this section (now subdivision (1b)) to express alcohol concentration in terms of 210 liters of breath, as well as 100 milliliters of blood. State v. Midgett, 78 N.C. App. 387, 337 S.E.2d 117, 1985 N.C. App. LEXIS 4294 (1985).

“Chemical analyst” for purposes of G.S. 20-139.1 includes a person who was validly licensed by the Department of Human Resources to perform chemical analyses immediately prior to the enactment of the Safe Roads Act. To hold otherwise would mean that an individual licensed to perform chemical analyses under one statute would automatically lose his license when the testing procedures are merely recodified in another statute. Obviously the legislature did not intend that result. State v. Dellinger, 73 N.C. App. 685, 327 S.E.2d 609, 1985 N.C. App. LEXIS 3396 (1985).

Driving While Impaired. —

Sufficient evidence supported a conviction of driving while impaired, G.S. 20-138.1 , because a trooper testified that the reading on the Intoxilyzer 5000 rounded down, that he administered the Intoxylizer test two times, and that each administration showed defendant’s BAC to be .08. State v. Arrington, 215 N.C. App. 161, 714 S.E.2d 777, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1739 (2011) (decided under former G.S. 143B-262.4).

Defendant’s impaired driving charge was not dismissed because, (1) under the corpus delicti rule, defendant’s admission was corroborated with a wrecked vehicle, a shoe matching defendant’s shoe in the vehicle’s driver’s side footwell, the absence of others in the area, defendant’s consistent injury, and the lack of another explanation for the wreck, and (2) defendant’s blood alcohol level was above the statutory limit. State v. Hines, 259 N.C. App. 358, 816 S.E.2d 182, 2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 429 (2018).

Context of finding the existence of a grossly aggravating factor based upon a prior driving while impaired conviction in superior court requires an interpretation that a “prior conviction” not be limited to only those not pending on direct appeal in the appellate courts; because there is no language limiting that definition to a “final” conviction or only those not challenged on appeal, the courts have no authority to interpret the statute as imposing such a limitation. State v. Cole, 262 N.C. App. 466, 822 S.E.2d 456, 2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 1154 (2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of driving while impaired because the officer found defendant in the driver’s seat of a stationary vehicle with the engine running, the officer testified that defendant was apparently sleeping, there was a strong odor of alcohol on the defendant’s breath, the defendant’s speech was slurred, officers saw an alcohol bottle between the defendant’s legs, defendant admitted that the defendant had consumed alcohol, defendant’s blood test results indicated that the blood contained alcohol, THC, THCA, amphetamine, and methamphetamine, and defendant refused to submit to an intoxilyzer test. State v. Hoque, 269 N.C. App. 347, 837 S.E.2d 464, 2020 N.C. App. LEXIS 15 (2020).

Offense Involving Impaired Driving — Similar Offense in Another Jurisdiction. —

Although the definitions of “impairment” under North Carolina and New York laws are not identical and the statutes do not “mirror” one another, they are “substantially equivalent”; consequently, the trial court did not err in determining that defendant’s prior conviction under New York law was a grossly aggravating factor in sentencing him under North Carolina law. State v. Parisi, 135 N.C. App. 222, 519 S.E.2d 531, 1999 N.C. App. LEXIS 975 (1999).

Under Influence of Impairing Substance. —

The offense of impaired driving is proven by evidence that defendant drove a vehicle on any highway in this State while his physical or mental faculties, or both, were “appreciably impaired by an impairing substance.” State v. George, 77 N.C. App. 580, 335 S.E.2d 768, 1985 N.C. App. LEXIS 4172 (1985).

Where the tortfeasor rear-ended the injured party’s vehicle, the trial court erred in granting the tortfeasor’s motion for summary judgment on the injured party’s punitive damages claim, because the tortfeasor failed to show that he was not under the influence of an impairing substance under G.S. 20-4.01(14a), where he admitted to drinking two beers and taking three prescription drugs before the accident; the tortfeasor offered no evidence that the prescription drugs, mixed with alcohol, were not an impairing substance. Byrd v. Adams, 152 N.C. App. 460, 568 S.E.2d 640, 2002 N.C. App. LEXIS 1067 (2002).

Admissible trial evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was driving a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of G.S. 20-138.1 ; evidence showing that defendant was under the influence of alcohol included, inter alia: (1) weaving; (2) erratic braking; (3) driving 70 MPH in a 50 MPH zone; (4) the strong odor of alcohol on defendant’s person; (5) defendant’s unsteady balance; and (6) his statement that he had consumed alcohol. United States v. Van Hazel, 468 F. Supp. 2d 792, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94757 (E.D.N.C. 2006).

Lab report of defendant’s blood sample indicated that three of the drugs found in defendant’s blood were listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 90 as Schedule II controlled substances, and therefore were impairing substances under G.S. 20-4.01(14a). State v. Braswell, 222 N.C. App. 176, 729 S.E.2d 697, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 961 (2012).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Trailers designed to run upon the highways and pulled by a self-propelled vehicle are motor vehicles for the purposes of this Chapter. See opinion of the Attorney General to Clyde R. Cook, Jr., Asst. Comm’r of Motor Vehicles, 60 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 90 (1992).

“Public vehicular area” includes streets leading into privately owned trailer parks which rent, lease and sell individual lots. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Henry A. Harkey, Assistant District Attorney, 45 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 284 (1976).

The parking lot of the restaurant is within the definition of “public vehicular area” under subdivision (32) of this section when the restaurant is closed. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. James C. Yeatts, III, Assistant District Attorney, 17-B Judicial District, 52 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 6 (1982).

Section 20-217, a safety statute designed to prevent the passing of a school bus displaying its mechanical stop signal while receiving or discharging passengers, has no application to a “public vehicular area.” See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Alan Leonard, District Attorney, Twenty-Ninth Judicial District, — N.C.A.G. — (Mar. 9, 1987).

Vehicle which is constructive total loss now defined as salvage vehicle under this section. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. James E. Rhodes, Director, Vehicle Registration Section, Division of Motor Vehicles, North Carolina Department of Transportation, — N.C.A.G. — (May 20, 1988).

As to treatment by insurer of wrecked vehicle as constructive total loss, thereby declaring it a total loss, so as to harmonize subdivision (33)(d) and G.S. 20-109.1(a)(1). See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. James E. Rhodes, Director, Vehicle Registration Section, Division of Motor Vehicles, North Carolina Department of Transportation, — N.C.A.G. — (May 20, 1988).

New definition of salvage motor vehicle enacted by Session Laws 1987, c. 607 in subdivision (33)(d) and G.S. 20-109.1 must be read in pari materia. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. James E. Rhodes, Director, Vehicle Registration Section, Division of Motor Vehicles, North Carolina Department of Transportation, — N.C.A.G. — (May 20, 1988).

Private carriers operated by drivers employed in logging operations are entitled to the exemption for “farm” vehicles under G.S. 20-37.16(e)(3) if agricultural or forest products being transported were raised and grown by farmer/forester and he does not engage in business of buying products for resale. Then he and his employees could transport such forest products within 150 miles of farm in vehicles not used in common or contract motor carrier operations without obtaining a commercial driver’s license. Conversely, if forest products were not raised and grown by forester, or he engages in buying forest products for resale, transporting of those products by him or his employees would not be exempt from commercial driver’s license requirements for, as to those forest products, forester was not a farmer. See opinion of Attorney General to Rep. Beverly M. Purdue, 3rd District: Craven, Lenoir, Pamlico Counties, 60 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 30 (1990).

§ 20-4.02. Quadrennial adjustment of certain fees and rates.

  1. Adjustment for Inflation. —  Beginning July 1, 2020, and every four years thereafter, the Division shall adjust the fees and rates imposed pursuant to the statutes listed in this subsection for inflation in accordance with the Consumer Price Index computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The adjustment for per transaction rates in subdivision (8a) of this subsection shall be rounded to the nearest cent and all other adjustments under this subsection shall be rounded to the nearest twenty-five cents (25¢):
    1. G.S. 20-7 .
    2. G.S. 20-11 .
    3. G.S. 20-14 .
    4. G.S. 20-16 .
    5. G.S. 20-26 .
    6. G.S. 20-37.15 .
    7. G.S. 20-37.16 .
    8. G.S. 20-42(b). (8a) G.S. 20-63(h), with respect to the per transaction rates set in that subsection.
    9. G.S. 20-85(a)(1) through (10).
    10. G.S. 20-85.1 .
    11. G.S. 20-87 , except for the additional fee set forth in G.S. 20-87 (6) for private motorcycles.
    12. G.S. 20-88 .
    13. G.S. 20-289 .
    14. G.S. 20-385 .
    15. G.S. 44A-4(b)(1).
  2. Computation. —  In determining the rate of inflation to use when making an adjustment pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the Division shall base the rate on the percent change in the annual Consumer Price Index over the preceding four-year period.
  3. Rules. —  The provisions of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes do not apply to the inflation adjustment required by this section.
  4. Consultation and Publication. —  At least 90 days prior to making an adjustment pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, and notwithstanding any provision of G.S. 12-3.1 to the contrary, the Division shall (i) consult with the Joint Legislative Commission on Governmental Operations, (ii) provide a report to the chairs of the Senate Appropriations Committee on Transportation and the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee on Transportation, and (iii) publish notice of the fees that will be in effect in the offices of the Division and on the Division’s website. After making the adjustment, the Division shall notify the Revisor of Statutes who shall adjust the amounts in statute.
  5. Effective Date. —  Any adjustment to fees or rates under this section applicable to a motor vehicle sold or leased by a motor vehicle dealer, as defined in G.S. 20-286(11), is only applicable to a motor vehicle sale or lease made on or after the effective date of the fee or rate adjustment regardless of the date of submission of a title and registration application for the motor vehicle to the Division. No adjustment to fees or rates under this section applies to a motor vehicle sale or lease made prior to the effective date of the fee or rate adjustment.

History. 2015-241, s. 29.30(s); 2016-120, s. 1; 2018-42, s. 8; 2021-180, s. 41.26.

DMV Quadrennial Fee Adjustment.

G.S. 20-4.02 requires the Division of Motor Vehicles, beginning July 1, 2020, to adjust certain fees and rates every four years, to consult with the Joint Legislative Commission on Governmental Operations, and to report to the chairs of the House and Senate appropriations committees on transportation. Session Laws 2021-180, s. 41.26, effective July 1, 2021, further amended G.S. 20-4.02 (d), directing the Division to notify the Revisor of Statutes of any adjustment, and directing the Revisor to adjust the appropriate amounts in any affected statutes. By letter dated January 24, 2020, the Division of Motor Vehicles advised of a fee increase factor of 7.86%, effective July 1, 2020, and provided a chart displaying the DMV Quadrennial Fee Adjustments affecting G.S. 20-7 , 20-11, 20-14, 20-16, 20-26, 20-37.15, 20-37.16, 20-42(b), 20-63(h), 20-85(a)(1)-(10), 20-85.1, 20-87, 20-88, 20-289, 20-385, and 44A-4(b)(1). Pursuant to the authority granted in G.S. 20-4.02, the Revisor of Statutes has adjusted the fee amounts in the affected statutes to reflect the Division's increase.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 29.30(u), made this section effective July 1, 2020.

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 1.1, provides: “This act shall be known as ‘The Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2015.’ ”

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 33.4, provides: “Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2015-2017 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2015-2017 fiscal biennium.”

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 33.6, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2021-180, s. 1.1, provides: “This act shall be known as the ‘Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2021.’”

Session Laws 2021-180, s. 43.7, is a severability clause.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2016-120, s. 1, effective July 28, 2016, substituted “fees and rates” for “fees” in the section heading; rewrote subsection (a); substituted “making an adjustment” for “adjusting the fees” in subsection (b); substituted “the inflation adjustment” for “the adjustment of fees” in subsection (c); and substituted “making an adjustment” for “adjusting the fees” in subsection (d).

Session Laws 2018-42, s. 8, effective June 22, 2018, added subsection (e).

Session Laws 2021-180, s. 41.26, effective July 1, 2021, in subsection (c), substituted “do” for “shall”; and in subsection (d), in the first sentence, deleted “Department of” preceding “Transportation” the first time it appears, and substituted “website” for “Web site,” and added the last sentence.

§ 20-4.03. Administrative hearing fees.

  1. Authorization. —  The Division is authorized to charge a fee to any person who requests an administrative hearing before the Division in accordance with this Chapter.
  2. Requirements for Requesting a Hearing. —  Any request for an administrative hearing before the Division must be in writing and accompanied by the total applicable administrative hearing fee charged by the Division. An administrative hearing shall not be granted by the Division unless the administrative hearing request complies with the requirements of this subsection. Notwithstanding any provision of this Chapter to the contrary, any pending revocation, suspension, civil penalty assessment, or other adverse action shall not be stayed upon receipt of an administrative hearing request unless the request complies with the requirements of this subsection.
  3. Report. —  Beginning October 1, 2018, and quarterly thereafter, the Division shall submit a report to the Fiscal Research Division of the General Assembly detailing all of the following for each month of the applicable quarter and for each type of administrative hearing:
    1. The total number of administrative hearings.
    2. The total amount of revenue collected.
    3. The total number of fee waivers granted.
    4. The counties where the administrative hearings were held.
    5. The average amount of time required to conduct an administrative hearing, with the time required of hearing officers and the time required of administrative personnel listed separately.

History. 2017-57, s. 34.32(b); 2017-197, s. 7.3(a); 2018-5, s. 34.23(d).

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2014-100, s. 34.9(a), as amended by Session Laws 2017-57, s. 34.32(a), provides: “The Department of Transportation, Division of Motor Vehicles, shall develop a schedule of fees to recover the costs incurred by the Hearings Unit of the Division of Motor Vehicles for the performance of administrative hearings required by law or under rules adopted under G.S. 20-2(b) . The proceeds of the fees developed in accordance with this section shall be deposited in a fund established for the Hearings Unit. Except as otherwise provided by an act of the General Assembly, the Hearings Unit shall be funded solely from the proceeds collected from the fees developed in accordance with this section. The plan and proposed schedule shall address, at a minimum, the following:

“(1) Current hearing process and recommended modifications to achieve cost efficiencies, including proposed revisions to existing laws or rules.

“(2) Historical and projected funding requirements for each category of hearing performed by the Division.

“(3) Schedule of fees and projected receipts.

“(4) Proposed processes and rules for the collection of fees and the refunding of fees for hearings initiated by the Division in which the original decision of the Division is reversed.

“(5) Implementation milestones.”

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 34.32(c), provides: “The Division of Motor Vehicles may adopt temporary rules to implement the provisions of Section 34.9 of S.L. 2014-100, as amended by Section 29.30A of S.L. 2015-241 and subsection (a) of this section. Temporary rules adopted in accordance with this section shall remain in effect until permanent rules that replace the temporary rules become effective.”

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 34.32(d), made this section effective January 1, 2018, and applicable to administrative hearings requested on or after that date.

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 1.1, provides: “This act shall be known as the ‘Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2017.’ ”

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 39.6, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2018-5, s. 34.23(a)-(c), (e), provides: “(a) Revised Budget. — The Office of State Budget and Management, in consultation with the Division of Motor Vehicles, shall adjust the Hearing Unit’s certified budget for the 2018-2019 fiscal year to correctly align total requirements and receipts to reflect the requirement set forth in Section 34.9 of S.L. 2014-100, as amended by Section 29.30A of S.L. 2015-241 and Section 34.32 of S.L. 2017-57, that all functions supporting the Hearing Unit’s operating budget under Fund Code 1304 be fully receipt-supported from the fee proceeds collected by the Hearings Unit.

“(b) Position Elimination. — The Division of Motor Vehicles may eliminate vacant and filled positions to achieve the requirement set forth in subsection (a) of this section. If filled positions are eliminated under this subsection, the Division of Motor Vehicles shall eliminate the positions in accordance with G.S. 126-7.1 . All positions identified by the Division of Motor Vehicles for elimination under this subsection shall be eliminated by no later than October 1, 2018.

“(c) Position Elimination Report. — By October 15, 2018, the Division of Motor Vehicles shall submit a report to the Joint Legislative Transportation Oversight Committee detailing the elimination of any positions under subsection (b) of this section.

“(e) Requirement for Submission of First Hearings Report. — Notwithstanding any provision of G.S. 20-4.03(c), as enacted by subsection (d) of this section, to the contrary, the report required under G.S. 20-4.03(c) for October 1, 2018, shall include all of the information required under G.S. 20-4.03(c) for the period from January 1, 2018, through October 1, 2018.”

Session Laws 2018-5, s. 1.1, provides: “This act shall be known as the ‘Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2018.’ ”

Session Laws 2018-5, s. 39.4, provides: “Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2018-2019 fiscal year, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2018-2019 fiscal year.”

Session Laws 2018-5, s. 39.7, is a severability clause.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2017-197, s. 7.3(a), effective January 1, 2018, in subsection (a) substituted “any person who requests” for “individuals who request.”

Session Laws 2018-5, s. 34.23(d), effective July 1, 2018, added subsection (c).

§ 20-4.04. Division authority to create electronic systems for renewals.

  1. Authorization. —   The Division is authorized to establish and maintain electronic systems and means for renewals of all licenses, permits, certificates, and registrations issued by the Division pursuant to this Chapter for the purposes of administrative efficiency and to modernize Division systems and practices. This authorization does not supersede or modify specific renewal authorizations set out in this Chapter.
  2. Reporting Requirement. —   By December 31, 2021, and annually thereafter, the Division must report to the Joint Legislative Transportation Oversight Committee, the Fiscal Research Division, and the Legislative Analysis Division any electronic system or means for renewal that has been implemented or is in the process of being implemented. This report shall also include any proposed legislative recommendations necessary as conforming changes to the General Statutes.”

History. 2021-180, s. 41.29(a).

Editor's Note.

Session Laws 2021-180, s. 43.8, made this section, as added by Session Laws 2021-180, s. 41.29(a), effective July 1, 2021.

Session Laws 2021-180, s. 41.29(b), provides: “Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, the first report required by G.S. 20-4.04 shall be submitted by March 31, 2022.”

Session Laws 2021-180, s. 1.1, provides: “This act shall be known as the ‘Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2021.’”

Session Laws 2021-180, s. 43.5, provides: “Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2021-2023 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2021-2023 fiscal biennium.”

Session Laws 2021-180, s. 43.7, is a severability clause.

Article 1A. Reciprocity Agreements as to Registration and Licensing.

§ 20-4.1. Declaration of policy.

It is the policy of this State to promote and encourage the fullest possible use of its highway system by authorizing the making and execution of motor vehicle reciprocal registration agreements, arrangements and declarations with other states, provinces, territories and countries with respect to vehicles registered in this and such other states, provinces, territories and countries thus contributing to the economic and social development and growth of this State.

History. 1961, c. 642, s. 1.

§ 20-4.2. Definitions.

As used in this Article:

  1. “Commercial vehicle” means any vehicle which is operated in furtherance of any commercial enterprise.
  2. “Commissioner” means the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of North Carolina.
  3. “Division” means the Division of Motor Vehicles of North Carolina.
  4. “Jurisdiction” means and includes a state, district, territory or possession of the United States, a foreign country and a state or province of a foreign country.
  5. “Properly registered,” as applied to place of registration, means:
    1. The jurisdiction where the person registering the vehicle has his legal residence, or
    2. In the case of a commercial vehicle, including a leased vehicle, the jurisdiction in which it is registered if the commercial enterprise in which such vehicle is used has a place of business therein, and, if the vehicle is most frequently dispatched, garaged, serviced, maintained, operated or otherwise controlled in or from such place of business, and, the vehicle has been assigned to such place of business, or
    3. In the case of a commercial vehicle, including leased vehicles, the jurisdiction where, because of an agreement or arrangement between two or more jurisdictions, or pursuant to a declaration, the vehicle has been registered as required by said jurisdiction.
    4. In case of doubt or dispute as to the proper place of registration of a vehicle, the Division shall make the final determination, but in making such determination, may confer with departments of the other jurisdictions affected.

History. 1961, c. 642, s. 1; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1979, c. 470, s. 2.

§ 20-4.3. Commissioner may make reciprocity agreements, arrangements or declarations.

The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall have the authority to execute or make agreements, arrangements or declarations to carry out the provisions of this Article.

History. 1961, c. 642, s. 1.

§ 20-4.4. Authority for reciprocity agreements; provisions; reciprocity standards.

  1. The Commissioner may enter into an agreement or arrangement for interstate or intrastate operations with the duly authorized representatives of another jurisdiction, granting to vehicles or to owners of vehicles which are properly registered or licensed in such jurisdiction and for which evidence of compliance is supplied, benefits, privileges and exemptions from the payment, wholly or partially, of any taxes, fees, or other charges imposed upon such vehicles or owners with respect to the operation or ownership of such vehicles under the laws of this State. Such an agreement or arrangement shall provide that vehicles properly registered or licensed in this State when operated upon highways of such other jurisdiction shall receive exemptions, benefits and privileges of a similar kind or to a similar degree as are extended to vehicles properly registered or licensed in such jurisdiction when operated in this State. Each such agreement or arrangement shall, in the judgment of the Commissioner, be in the best interest of this State and the citizens thereof and shall be fair and equitable to this State and the citizens thereof, and all of the same shall be determined on the basis and recognition of the benefits which accrue to the economy of this State from the uninterrupted flow of commerce.
  2. When the Commissioner enters into a reciprocal registration agreement or arrangement with another jurisdiction which has a motor vehicle tax, license or fee which is not subject to waiver by a reciprocity agreement, the Commissioner is empowered and authorized to provide as a condition of the agreement or arrangement that owners of vehicles licensed in such other jurisdiction shall pay some equalizing tax or fee to the Division. The failure of any owner or operator of a vehicle to pay the taxes or fees provided in the agreement or arrangement shall prohibit them from receiving any benefits therefrom and they shall be required to register their vehicles and pay taxes as if there was no agreement or arrangement.

History. 1961, c. 642, s. 1; 1971, c. 588; 1975, c. 716, s. 5.

§ 20-4.5. Base-state registration reciprocity.

An agreement or arrangement entered into, or a declaration issued under the authority of this Article may contain provisions authorizing the registration or licensing in another jurisdiction of vehicles located in or operated from a base in such other jurisdiction which vehicles otherwise would be required to be registered or licensed in some other state; and in such event the exemptions, benefits and privileges extended by such agreement, arrangement or declaration shall apply to such vehicles, when properly licensed or registered in such base jurisdiction.

History. 1961, c. 642, s. 1.

§ 20-4.6. [Repealed]

Repealed by Session Laws 1997-122, s. 1.

§ 20-4.7. Extension of reciprocal privileges to lessees authorized.

An agreement or arrangement entered into, or a declaration issued under the authority of this Article, may contain provisions under which a leased vehicle properly registered by the lessor thereof may be entitled, subject to terms and conditions stated therein, to the exemptions, benefits and privileges extended by such agreement, arrangement or declaration.

History. 1961, c. 642, s. 1.

§ 20-4.8. Automatic reciprocity, when.

On and after July 1, 1961, if no agreement, arrangement or declaration is in effect with respect to another jurisdiction as authorized by this Article, any vehicle properly registered or licensed in such other jurisdiction and for which evidence of compliance supplied shall receive, when operated in this State, the same exemptions, benefits and privileges granted by such other jurisdiction to vehicles properly registered in this State. Reciprocity extended under this section shall apply to commercial vehicles only when engaged exclusively in interstate operations.

History. 1961, c. 642, s. 1.

§ 20-4.9. Suspension of reciprocity benefits.

Agreements, arrangements or declarations made under the authority of this Article may include provisions authorizing the Division to suspend or cancel the exemptions, benefits or privileges granted thereunder to a vehicle which is in violation of any of the conditions or terms of such agreements, arrangements or declarations or is in violation of the laws of this State relating to motor vehicles or rules and regulations lawfully promulgated thereunder.

History. 1961, c. 642, s. 1; 1975, c. 716, s. 5.

§ 20-4.10. Agreements to be written, filed and available for distribution.

All agreements, arrangements or declarations or amendments thereto shall be in writing and shall be filed in the office of the Commissioner. Copies thereof shall be made available by the Commissioner upon request and upon payment of a fee therefor in an amount necessary to defray the costs of reproduction thereof.

History. 1961, c. 642, s. 1.

§ 20-4.11. Reciprocity agreements in effect at time of Article.

All reciprocity registration agreements, arrangements and declarations relating to vehicles in force and effect July 1, 1961, shall continue in force and effect until specifically amended or revoked as provided by law or by such agreements or arrangements.

History. 1961, c. 642, s. 1.

§ 20-4.12. Article part of and supplemental to motor vehicle registration law.

This Article shall be, and construed as, a part of and supplemental to the motor vehicle registration law of this State.

History. 1961, c. 642, s. 1.

§§ 20-4.13 through 20-4.17.

Reserved for future codification purposes.

Article 1B. Reciprocal Provisions as to Arrest of Nonresidents.

§ 20-4.18. Definitions.

Unless the context otherwise requires, the following words and phrases, for the purpose of this Article, shall have the following meanings:

  1. Citation. — Any citation, summons, ticket, or other document issued by a law-enforcement officer for the violation of a traffic law, ordinance, rule or regulation.
  2. Collateral or Bond. — Any cash or other security deposited to secure an appearance following a citation by a law-enforcement officer.
  3. Repealed by Session Laws 1979, c. 667, s. 2.
  4. Nonresident. — A person who holds a license issued by a reciprocating state.
  5. Personal Recognizance. — An agreement by a nonresident to comply with the terms of the citation issued to the nonresident.
  6. Reciprocating State. — Any state or other jurisdiction which extends by its laws to residents of North Carolina substantially the rights and privileges provided by this Article.
  7. State. — The State of North Carolina.

History. 1973, c. 736; 1979, c. 667, s. 2; 1981, c. 508; 1999-452, s. 6.

§ 20-4.19. Issuance of citation to nonresident; officer to report noncompliance.

  1. Notwithstanding other provisions of this Chapter, a law-enforcement officer observing a violation of this Chapter or other traffic regulation by a nonresident shall issue a citation as appropriate and shall not, subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, require such nonresident to post collateral or bond to secure appearance for trial, but shall accept such nonresident’s personal recognizance; provided, however, that the nonresident shall have the right upon request to post collateral or bond in a manner provided by law and in such case the provisions of this Article shall not apply.
  2. A nonresident may be required to post collateral or bond to secure appearance for trial if the offense is one which would result in the suspension or revocation of a person’s license under the laws of this State.
  3. Upon the failure of the nonresident to comply with the citation, the clerk of court shall report the noncompliance to the Division. The report of noncompliance shall clearly identify the nonresident; describe the violation, specifying the section of the statute, code, or ordinance violated; indicate the location and date of offense; and identify the vehicle involved.

History. 1973, c. 736; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1991, c. 682, s. 1; 1999-452, s. 7.

§ 20-4.20. Division to transmit report to reciprocating state; suspension of license for noncompliance with citation issued by reciprocating state.

  1. Upon receipt of a report of noncompliance, the Division shall transmit a certified copy of such report to the official in charge of the issuance of licenses in the reciprocating state in which the nonresident resides or by which he is licensed.
  2. When the licensing authority of a reciprocating state reports that a person holding a North Carolina license has failed to comply with a citation issued in such state, the Commissioner shall forthwith suspend such person’s license. The order of suspension shall indicate the reason for the order, and shall notify the person that his license shall remain suspended until he has furnished evidence satisfactory to the Commissioner that he has complied with the terms of the citation which was the basis for the suspension order by appearing before the tribunal to which he was cited and complying with any order entered by said tribunal.
  3. A copy of any suspension order issued hereunder may be furnished to the licensing authority of the reciprocating state.
  4. The Commissioner shall maintain a current listing of reciprocating states hereunder. Such lists shall from time to time be disseminated among the appropriate departments, divisions, bureaus, and agencies of this State; the principal law-enforcement officers of the several counties, cities, and towns of this State; and the licensing authorities in reciprocating states.
  5. The Commissioner shall have the authority to execute or make agreements, arrangements, or declarations to carry out the provisions of this Article.

History. 1973, c. 736; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1979, c. 104.

CASE NOTES

G.S. 20-25 creates no right to appeal a suspension under G.S. 20-4.20(b) . The General Assembly simply has not yet provided for appeals from suspension under G.S. 20-4.20(b) . Palmer v. Wilkins, 73 N.C. App. 171, 325 S.E.2d 697, 1985 N.C. App. LEXIS 3188 (1985).

Article 1C. Drivers License Compact.

§ 20-4.21. Title of Article.

This Article is the Drivers License Compact and may be cited by that name.

History. 1993, c. 533, s. 1.

§ 20-4.22. Commissioner may make reciprocity agreements, arrangements, or declarations.

The Commissioner may execute or make agreements, arrangements, or declarations to implement this Article.

History. 1993, c. 533, s. 1.

§ 20-4.23. Legislative findings and policy.

  1. Findings. —  The General Assembly and the states that are members of the Drivers License Compact find that:
    1. The safety of their streets and highways is materially affected by the degree of compliance with state laws and local ordinances relating to the operation of motor vehicles.
    2. The violation of a law or an ordinance relating to the operation of a motor vehicle is evidence that the violator engages in conduct that is likely to endanger the safety of persons and property.
    3. The continuance in force of a license to drive is predicated upon compliance with laws and ordinances relating to the operation of motor vehicles in whichever jurisdiction the vehicle is operated.
  2. Policy. —  It is the policy of the General Assembly and of each of the states that is a member of the Drivers License Compact to:
    1. Promote compliance with the laws, ordinances, and administrative rules and regulations of a member state relating to the operation of motor vehicles.
    2. Make the reciprocal recognition of licenses to drive and the eligibility for a license to drive more just and equitable by making consideration of overall compliance with motor vehicle laws, ordinances, and administrative rules and regulations a condition precedent to the continuance or issuance of any license that authorizes the holder of the license to operate a motor vehicle in a member state.

History. 1993, c. 533, s. 1.

§ 20-4.24. Reports of convictions; effect of reports.

  1. Reports. —  A state that is a member of the Drivers License Compact shall report to another member state of the compact a conviction for any of the following:
    1. Manslaughter or negligent homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle.
    2. Driving a motor vehicle while impaired.
    3. A felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle was used.
    4. Failure to stop and render aid in the event of a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death or personal injury of another.

      If the laws of a member state do not describe the listed violations in precisely the words used in this subsection, the member state shall construe the descriptions to apply to offenses of the member state that are substantially similar to the ones described.A state that is a member of the Drivers License Compact shall report to another member state of the compact a conviction for any other offense or any other information concerning convictions that the member states agree to report.

  2. Effect. —  A state that is a member of the Drivers License Compact shall treat a report of a conviction received from another member state of the compact as a report of the conduct that resulted in the conviction. For a conviction required to be reported under subsection (a), a member state shall give the same effect to the report as if the conviction had occurred in that state. For a conviction that is not required to be reported under subsection (a), a member state shall give the effect to the report that is required by the laws of that state. G.S. 20-23 governs the effect in this State of convictions that are not required to be reported under subsection (a).

History. 1993, c. 533, s. 1.

§ 20-4.25. Review of license status in other states upon application for license in member state.

Upon application for a license to drive, the licensing authority of a state that is a member of the Drivers License Compact must determine if the applicant has ever held, or currently holds, a license to drive issued by another member state. The licensing authority of the member state where the application is made may not issue the applicant a license to drive if:

  1. The applicant has held a license, but it has been revoked for a violation and the revocation period has not ended. If the revocation period is for more than one year and it has been at least one year since the license was revoked, the licensing authority may allow the applicant to apply for a new license if the laws of the licensing authority’s state permit the application.
  2. The applicant currently holds a license to drive issued by another member state and does not surrender that license.

History. 1993, c. 533, s. 1.

§ 20-4.26. Effect on other laws or agreements.

Except as expressly required by the provisions of this Article, this Article does not affect the right of a member state to the Drivers License Compact to apply any of its other laws relating to licenses to drive to any person or circumstance, nor does it invalidate or prevent any driver license agreement or other cooperative arrangement between a member state and a state that is not a member.

History. 1993, c. 533, s. 1.

§ 20-4.27. Effect on other State driver license laws.

To the extent that this Article conflicts with general driver licensing provisions in this Chapter, this Article prevails. Where this Article is silent, the general driver licensing provisions apply.

History. 1993, c. 533, s. 1.

§ 20-4.28. Administration and exchange of information.

The head of the licensing authority of each member state is the administrator of the Drivers License Compact for that state. The administrators, acting jointly, have the power to formulate all necessary procedures for the exchange of information under this compact. The administrator of each member state shall furnish to the administrator of each other member state any information or documents reasonably necessary to facilitate the administration of this compact.

History. 1993, c. 533, s. 1.

§ 20-4.29. Withdrawal from Drivers License Compact.

A member state may withdraw from the Drivers License Compact. A withdrawal may not become effective until at least six months after the heads of all other member states have received notice of the withdrawal. Withdrawal does not affect the validity or applicability by the licensing authorities of states remaining members of the compact of a report of a conviction occurring prior to the withdrawal.

History. 1993, c. 533, s. 1.

§ 20-4.30. Construction and severability.

This Article shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes. The provisions of this Article are severable; if any part of this Article is declared to be invalid by a court, the invalidity does not affect other parts of this Article that can be given effect without the invalid provision. If the Drivers License Compact is declared invalid by a court in a member state, the compact remains in full force and effect in the remaining member states and in full force and effect for all severable matters in that member state.

History. 1993, c. 533, s. 1.

Article 2. Uniform Driver’s License Act.

§ 20-5. Title of Article.

This Article may be cited as the Uniform Driver’s License Act.

History. 1935, c. 52, s. 31.

CASE NOTES

Legislative Purpose. —

This Article was designed under the police power in furtherance of the safety of the users of the State’s highways. Harrell v. Scheidt, 243 N.C. 735 , 92 S.E.2d 182, 1956 N.C. LEXIS 625 (1956).

And Authority. —

The General Assembly has full authority to prescribe the conditions upon which licenses to operate automobiles are issued, and to designate the agency through which, and the conditions upon which licenses, when issued shall be suspended or revoked. Honeycutt v. Scheidt, 254 N.C. 607 , 119 S.E.2d 777, 1961 N.C. LEXIS 515 (1961).

Division Given Exclusive Power to Issue, Suspend and Revoke Licenses. —

This Article vests exclusively in the State Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles the issuance, suspension and revocation of licenses to operate motor vehicles. Honeycutt v. Scheidt, 254 N.C. 607 , 119 S.E.2d 777, 1961 N.C. LEXIS 515 (1961); Gibson v. Scheidt, 259 N.C. 339 , 130 S.E.2d 679, 1963 N.C. LEXIS 570 (1963).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Authority to Require Documented Proof for Name Changes. — The Division of Motor Vehicles does not have authority to establish a policy to require documented proof from the Register of Deeds or official court documents for name changes on driver’s licenses and identification cards as the only method of establishing a name change. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. William S. Hiatt, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 58 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 4 (1988).

§ 20-6. [Repealed]

Repealed by Session Laws 1973, c. 1330, s. 39.

§ 20-7. Issuance and renewal of drivers licenses.

  1. License Required. —  To drive a motor vehicle on a highway, a person must be licensed by the Division under this Article or Article 2C of this Chapter to drive the vehicle and must carry the license while driving the vehicle. The Division issues regular drivers licenses under this Article and issues commercial drivers licenses under Article 2C. A license authorizes the holder of the license to drive any vehicle included in the class of the license and any vehicle included in a lesser class of license, except a vehicle for which an endorsement is required. To drive a vehicle for which an endorsement is required, a person must obtain both a license and an endorsement for the vehicle. A regular drivers license is considered a lesser class of license than its commercial counterpart.

    The classes of regular drivers licenses and the motor vehicles that can be driven with each class of license are:

    1. Class A. — A Class A license authorizes the holder to drive any of the following:
      1. A Class A motor vehicle that is exempt under G.S. 20-37.16 from the commercial drivers license requirements.
      2. A Class A motor vehicle that has a combined GVWR of less than 26,001 pounds and includes as part of the combination a towed unit that has a GVWR of at least 10,001 pounds.
    2. Class B. — A Class B license authorizes the holder to drive any Class B motor vehicle that is exempt under G.S. 20-37.16 from the commercial drivers license requirements.
    3. Class C. — A Class C license authorizes the holder to drive any of the following:
      1. A Class C motor vehicle that is not a commercial motor vehicle.
      2. When operated by a volunteer member of a fire department, a rescue squad, or an emergency medical service (EMS) in the performance of duty, a Class A or Class B fire-fighting, rescue, or EMS motor vehicle or a combination of these vehicles.
      3. A combination of noncommercial motor vehicles that have a GVWR of more than 10,000 pounds but less than 26,001 pounds. This sub-subdivision does not apply to a Class C license holder less than 18 years of age.

        The Commissioner may assign a unique motor vehicle to a class that is different from the class in which it would otherwise belong.

        A person holding a commercial drivers license issued by another jurisdiction must apply for a transfer and obtain a North Carolina issued commercial drivers license within 30 days of becoming a resident. Any other new resident of North Carolina who has a drivers license issued by another jurisdiction must obtain a license from the Division within 60 days after becoming a resident.

        (a1) Motorcycles and Mopeds. — To drive a motorcycle, a person shall have one of the following:

        (1) A full provisional license with a motorcycle learner’s permit.

        (2) A regular drivers license with a motorcycle learner’s permit.

        (3) A full provisional license with a motorcycle endorsement.

    4. A regular drivers license with a motorcycle endorsement.

      Subsection (a2) of this section sets forth the requirements for a motorcycle learner’s permit. To obtain a motorcycle endorsement, a person shall pay the fee set in subsection (i) of this section. In addition, to obtain an endorsement, a person age 18 or older shall demonstrate competence to drive a motorcycle by passing a knowledge test concerning motorcycles, and by passing a road test or providing proof of successful completion of one of the following:

      (1) The North Carolina Motorcycle Safety Education Program Basic Rider Course or Experienced Rider Course.

      (2) Any course approved by the Commissioner consistent with the instruction provided through the Motorcycle Safety Instruction Program established under G.S. 115D-72 .

      A person less than 18 years of age shall demonstrate competence to drive a motorcycle by passing a knowledge test concerning motorcycles and providing proof of successful completion of one of the following:

      (1) Repealed by Session Laws 2012-85, s. 1, effective July 1, 2012.

      (2) The North Carolina Motorcycle Safety Education Program Basic Rider Course or Experienced Rider Course.

      (3) Any course approved by the Commissioner consistent with the instruction provided through the Motorcycle Safety Instruction Program established under G.S. 115D-72 .

      A person less than 18 years of age with a motorcycle endorsement may not drive a motorcycle with a passenger.

      Neither a drivers license nor a motorcycle endorsement is required to drive a moped.

      (a2) Motorcycle Learner’s Permit. — The following persons are eligible for a motorcycle learner’s permit:

      (1) A person who is at least 16 years old but less than 18 years old and has a full provisional license issued by the Division.

      (2) A person who is at least 18 years old and has a license issued by the Division.

      To obtain a motorcycle learner’s permit, an applicant shall pass a vision test, a road sign test, and a knowledge test specified by the Division. An applicant who is less than 18 years old shall successfully complete the North Carolina Motorcycle Safety Education Program Basic Rider Course or any course approved by the Commissioner consistent with the instruction provided through the Motorcycle Safety Instruction Program established under G.S. 115D-72. A motorcycle learner’s permit expires twelve months after it is issued and may be renewed for one additional six-month period. The holder of a motorcycle learner’s permit may not drive a motorcycle with a passenger. The fee for a motorcycle learner’s permit is the amount set in G.S. 20-7 ( l ) for a learner’s permit.

      (a3) Autocycles. — For purposes of this section, the term “motorcycle” shall not include autocycles. To drive an autocycle, a person shall have a regular drivers license.

  2. Repealed by Session Laws 1993, c. 368, s. 1, c. 533, s. 12. (b1) Application. — To obtain an identification card, learners permit, or drivers license from the Division, a person shall complete an application form provided by the Division, present at least two forms of identification approved by the Commissioner, be a resident of this State, and, except for an identification card, demonstrate his or her physical and mental ability to drive safely a motor vehicle included in the class of license for which the person has applied. At least one of the forms of identification shall indicate the applicant’s residence address. The Division may copy the identification presented or hold it for a brief period of time to verify its authenticity. To obtain an endorsement, a person shall demonstrate his or her physical and mental ability to drive safely the type of motor vehicle for which the endorsement is required.

    The application form shall request all of the following information, and it shall contain the disclosures concerning the request for an applicant’s social security number required by section 7 of the federal Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579:

    1. The applicant’s full name.
    2. The applicant’s mailing address and residence address.
    3. A physical description of the applicant, including the applicant’s sex, height, eye color, and hair color.
    4. The applicant’s date of birth.
    5. The applicant’s valid social security number.
    6. The applicant’s signature.

      The Division shall not issue an identification card, learners permit, or drivers license to an applicant who fails to provide the applicant’s valid social security number.

      (b2) Disclosure of Social Security Number. — The social security number of an applicant is not a public record. The Division may not disclose an applicant’s social security number except as allowed under federal law. A violation of the disclosure restrictions is punishable as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 408, and amendments to that law.

      In accordance with 42 U.S.C. 405 and 42 U.S.C. 666, and amendments thereto, the Division may disclose a social security number obtained under subsection (b1) of this section only as follows:

      (1) For the purpose of administering the drivers license laws.

      (2) To the Department of Health and Human Services, Child Support Enforcement Program for the purpose of establishing paternity or child support or enforcing a child support order.

      (3) To the Department of Revenue for the purpose of verifying taxpayer identity.

      (4) To the Office of Indigent Defense Services of the Judicial Department for the purpose of verifying the identity of a represented client and enforcing a court order to pay for the legal services rendered.

      (5) To each county jury commission for the purpose of verifying the identity of deceased persons whose names should be removed from jury lists.

      (6) To the State Chief Information Officer for the purposes of G.S. 143B-1385 .

    7. To the Department of Commerce, Division of Employment Security, for the purpose of verifying employer and claimant identity.
    8. To the Judicial Department for the purpose of administering the criminal and motor vehicle laws.

      (b3) The Division shall adopt rules implementing the provisions of subsection (b1) of this section with respect to proof of residency in this State. Those rules shall ensure that applicants submit verified or verifiable residency and address information that can be reasonably considered to be valid and that is provided on any of the following:

      (1) A document issued by an agency of the United States or by the government of another nation.

      (2) A document issued by another state.

      (3) A document issued by the State of North Carolina, or a political subdivision of this State. This includes an agency or instrumentality of this State.

      (4) A preprinted bank or other corporate statement.

      (5) A preprinted business letterhead.

      (6) Any other document deemed reliable by the Division.

      (b4) Examples of documents that are reasonably reliable indicators of residency include, but are not limited to, any of the following:

      (1) A pay stub with the payee’s address.

      (2) A utility bill showing the address of the applicant-payor.

      (3) A contract for an apartment, house, modular unit, or manufactured home with a North Carolina address signed by the applicant.

      (4) A receipt for personal property taxes paid.

      (5) A receipt for real property taxes paid to a North Carolina locality.

      (6) A current automobile insurance policy issued to the applicant and showing the applicant’s address.

      (7) A monthly or quarterly financial statement from a North Carolina regulated financial institution.

      (8), (9) Repealed by Session Laws 2015-294, s. 12, effective October 1, 2015, and applicable to contracts entered into on or after that date.

      (b5) The Division rules adopted pursuant to subsection (b3) of this section shall also provide that if an applicant cannot produce any documentation specified in subsection (b3) or (b4) of this section, the applicant, or in the case of a minor applicant a parent or legal guardian of the applicant, may complete an affidavit, on a form provided by the Division and sworn to before an official of the Division, indicating the applicant’s current residence address. The affidavit shall contain the provisions of G.S. 20-15(a) and G.S. 20-17(a)(5) and shall indicate the civil and criminal penalties for completing a false affidavit.

  3. Tests. —  To demonstrate physical and mental ability, a person must pass an examination. The examination may include road tests, vision tests, oral tests, and, in the case of literate applicants, written tests, as the Division may require. The tests must ensure that an applicant recognizes the handicapped international symbol of access, as defined in G.S. 20-37.5 . The Division may not require a person who applies to renew a license that has not expired to take a written test or a road test unless one or more of the following applies:
    1. The person has been convicted of a traffic violation since the person’s license was last issued.
    2. The applicant suffers from a mental or physical condition that impairs the person’s ability to drive a motor vehicle. The Division shall require sign and symbol testing upon initial issuance of a license. The Division shall require vision testing as a part of required in-person, in-office renewals of a license.

      The Division may not require a person who is at least 60 years old to parallel park a motor vehicle as part of a road test. A person shall not use an autocycle to complete a road test under this subsection.

      (c1) Insurance. — The Division may not issue a drivers license to a person until the person has furnished proof of financial responsibility. Proof of financial responsibility shall be in one of the following forms:

      (1) A written certificate or electronically-transmitted facsimile thereof from any insurance carrier duly authorized to do business in this State certifying that there is in effect a nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle liability policy for the benefit of the person required to furnish proof of financial responsibility. The certificate or facsimile shall state the effective date and expiration date of the nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle liability policy and shall state the date that the certificate or facsimile is issued. The certificate or facsimile shall remain effective proof of financial responsibility for a period of 30 consecutive days following the date the certificate or facsimile is issued but shall not in and of itself constitute a binder or policy of insurance.

      (2) A binder for or policy of nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle liability insurance under which the applicant is insured, provided that the binder or policy states the effective date and expiration date of the nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle liability policy.

      The preceding provisions of this subsection do not apply to applicants who do not own currently registered motor vehicles and who do not operate nonfleet private passenger motor vehicles that are owned by other persons and that are not insured under commercial motor vehicle liability insurance policies. In such cases, the applicant shall sign a written certificate to that effect. Such certificate shall be furnished by the Division and may be incorporated into the license application form. Any material misrepresentation made by such person on such certificate shall be grounds for suspension of that person’s license for a period of 90 days.

      For the purpose of this subsection, the term “nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle” has the definition ascribed to it in Article 40 of General Statute Chapter 58.

      The Commissioner may require that certificates required by this subsection be on a form approved by the Commissioner.

      The requirement of furnishing proof of financial responsibility does not apply to a person who applies for a renewal of his or her drivers license.

      Nothing in this subsection precludes any person from showing proof of financial responsibility in any other manner authorized by Articles 9A and 13 of this Chapter.

  4. Repealed by Session Laws 1993, c. 368, s. 1.
  5. Restrictions. —  The Division may impose any restriction it finds advisable on a drivers license. It is unlawful for the holder of a restricted license to operate a motor vehicle without complying with the restriction and is the equivalent of operating a motor vehicle without a license. If any applicant shall suffer from any physical or mental disability or disease that affects his or her operation of a motor vehicle, the Division may require to be filed with it a certificate of the applicant’s condition signed by a medical authority of the applicant’s community designated by the Division. The Division may, in its discretion, require the certificate to be completed and submitted after a license or renewal has been issued based on the applicant’s performance during a road test administered by the Division. Upon submission, the certificate shall be reviewed in accordance with the procedure set forth in G.S. 20-9(g)(3). This certificate shall in all cases be treated as confidential and subject to release under G.S. 20-9(g)(4)h. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent the Division from refusing to issue a license, either restricted or unrestricted, to any person deemed to be incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle based on information observed or received by the Division, including observations during a road test and medical information submitted about the applicant. An applicant may seek review pursuant to G.S. 20-9(g)(4) of a licensing decision made on the basis of a physical or mental disability or disease. This subsection does not prohibit deaf persons from operating motor vehicles who in every other way meet the requirements of this section.
  6. Duration and Renewal of Licenses. —  Drivers licenses shall be issued and renewed pursuant to the provisions of this subsection:
    1. Duration of license for persons under age 18. —  A full provisional license issued to a person under the age of 18 expires 60 days following the person’s twenty-first birthday.
    2. Duration of original license for persons at least 18 years of age or older. —  A drivers license issued to a person at least 18 years old but less than 66 years old expires on the birthday of the licensee in the eighth year after issuance. A drivers license issued to a person at least 66 years old expires on the birthday of the licensee in the fifth year after issuance. A commercial drivers license expires on the birthday of the licensee in the fifth year after issuance. A commercial drivers license that has a vehicles carrying passengers (P) and school bus (S) endorsement issued pursuant to G.S. 20-37.16 expires on the birthday of the licensee in the third year after issuance, if the licensee is certified to drive a school bus in North Carolina. (2a) Duration of renewed licenses. — A renewed drivers license that was issued by the Division to a person at least 18 years old but less than 66 years old expires eight years after the expiration date of the license that is renewed. A renewed drivers license that was issued by the Division to a person at least 66 years old expires five years after the expiration date of the license that is renewed. A renewed commercial drivers license expires five years after the expiration date of the license that is renewed.
    3. Duration of license for certain other drivers. —  The durations listed in subdivisions (1), (2) and (2a) of this subsection are valid unless the Division determines that a license of shorter duration should be issued when the applicant holds valid documentation issued by, or under the authority of, the United States government that demonstrates the applicant’s legal presence of limited duration in the United States. In no event shall a license of limited duration expire later than the expiration of the authorization for the applicant’s legal presence in the United States. A drivers license issued to an H-2A worker expires three years after the date of issuance of the H-2A worker’s visa; provided, if at any time during that three-year period an H-2A worker’s visa duration is not extended by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, the license expires on the date the H-2A worker’s visa expires. For purposes of this subdivision, the term “H-2A worker” means a foreign worker who holds a valid H-2A visa pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a)) and who is legally residing in this State.

      (3a) When to renew. — A person may apply to the Division to renew a license during the 180-day period before the license expires. The Division may not accept an application for renewal made before the 180-day period begins.

      (3b) Renewal for certain members of the Armed Forces of the United States and reserve components of the Armed Forces of the United States.

      1. The Division may renew a drivers license, without limitation on the period of time before the license expires, if the person applying for renewal is a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or of a reserve component of the Armed Forces of the United States and provides orders that place the member on active duty and duty station outside this State.
      2. A person who is a member of a reserve component of the Armed Forces of the United States whose license bears an expiration date that occurred while the person was on active duty outside this State shall be considered to have a valid license until 60 days after the date of release from active duty upon showing proof of the release date, unless the license was rescinded, revoked, or otherwise invalidated under some other provision of law. Notwithstanding the provisions of this sub-subdivision, no license shall be considered valid more than 18 months after the date of expiration.
    4. Renewal by mail. —  The Division may renew by mail a drivers license issued by the Division to a person who meets any of the following descriptions:
      1. Is a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or a reserve component of the Armed Forces of the United States serving on active duty and is stationed outside this State.
      2. Is a resident of this State and has been residing outside the State for at least 30 continuous days.

        When renewing a license by mail, the Division may waive the examination that would otherwise be required for the renewal and may impose any conditions it finds advisable. A license renewed by mail is a temporary license that expires 60 days after the person to whom it is issued returns to this State.

    5. License to be sent by mail. —  The Division shall issue to the applicant a temporary driving certificate valid for 60 days, unless the applicant is applying for renewal by mail under subdivision (4) of this subsection. The temporary driving certificate shall be valid for driving purposes and shall not be valid for identification purposes, except when conducting business with the Division and not otherwise prohibited by federal law. The Division shall produce the applicant’s drivers license at a central location and send it to the applicant by first-class mail at the residence address provided by the applicant, unless the applicant is ineligible for mail delivery by the United States Postal Service at the applicant’s residence. If the United States Postal Service documents that it does not deliver to the residential address provided by the applicant, and the Division has verified the applicant’s residential address by other means, the Division may mail the drivers license to the post office box provided by the applicant. Applicants whose only mailing address prior to July 1, 2008, was a post office box in this State may continue to receive their license at that post office box, provided the applicant’s residential address has been verified by the Division.
    6. Remote renewal or conversion. —  Subject to the following requirements and limitations, the Division may offer remote renewal of a drivers license or remote conversion of a full provisional license issued by the Division:
      1. Requirements. —  To be eligible for remote renewal or conversion under this subdivision, a person must meet all of the following requirements:
        1. The license holder possesses either (i) a valid Class C drivers license or (ii) a valid full provisional license and is at least 18 years old at the time of the remote conversion.
        2. The license holder’s current license includes no restrictions other than a restriction for corrective lenses.
        3. The license holder attests, in a manner designated by the Division, that (i) the license holder is a resident of the State and currently resides at the address on the license to be renewed or converted, (ii) the license holder’s name as it appears on the license to be renewed or converted has not changed, and (iii) all other information required by the Division for an in-person renewal under this Article has been provided completely and truthfully. If the license holder does not currently reside at the address on the license to be renewed or converted, the license holder may comply with the address requirement of this sub-sub-subdivision by providing the address at which the license holder resides at the time of the remote renewal or conversion request.
        4. For a remote renewal, the most recent renewal was an in-person renewal and not a remote renewal under this subdivision.
        5. The license holder is otherwise eligible for renewal or conversion under this subsection.
      2. Waiver of requirements. —  When renewing or converting a drivers license pursuant to this subdivision, the Division may waive the examination and photograph that would otherwise be required for the renewal or conversion.
      3. Duration of remote renewal or conversion. —  A drivers license issued to a person by remote renewal or conversion under this subdivision expires according to the following schedule:
        1. For a person at least 18 years old but less than 66 years old, on the birthday of the licensee in the eighth year after issuance.
        2. For a person at least 66 years old, on the birthday of the licensee in the fifth year after issuance.
      4. Rules. —  The Division shall adopt rules to implement this subdivision.
      5. Federal law. —  Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to supersede any more restrictive provisions for renewal or conversion of drivers licenses prescribed by federal law or regulation.
      6. Definition. —  For purposes of this subdivision, “remote renewal or conversion” means renewal of a drivers license or conversion of a full provisional license by mail, telephone, electronic device, or other secure means approved by the Commissioner.

        (6a) Remote conversion for active duty military. — The Division shall offer remote conversion to the holder of a full provisional license issued under G.S. 20-11 to a resident of this State if the provisional license holder is deployed out-of-state as a member of the Armed Forces of the United States. The Division shall adopt rules to implement this subdivision.

  7. Repealed by Session Laws 1979, c. 667, s. 6.
  8. Repealed by Session Laws 1979, c. 113, s. 1.
  9. Fees. —

    The fee for a regular drivers license is the amount set in the following table multiplied by the number of years in the period for which the license is issued:

    Click to view

    The fee for a motorcycle endorsement is two dollars and fifty-five cents ($2.55) for each year of the period for which the endorsement is issued. The appropriate fee shall be paid before a person receives a regular drivers license or an endorsement.

    (i1) Restoration Fee. — Any person whose drivers license has been revoked pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter, other than G.S. 20-17(a)(2) shall pay a restoration fee of seventy dollars ($70.00). A person whose drivers license has been revoked under G.S. 20-17(a)(2) shall pay a restoration fee of one hundred forty dollars and twenty-five cents ($140.25). The fee shall be paid to the Division prior to the issuance to such person of a new drivers license or the restoration of the drivers license. The restoration fee shall be paid to the Division in addition to any and all fees which may be provided by law. This restoration fee shall not be required from any licensee whose license was revoked or voluntarily surrendered for medical or health reasons whether or not a medical evaluation was conducted pursuant to this Chapter. The seventy dollar ($70.00) fee, and the first one hundred five dollars ($105.00) of the one hundred forty dollar and twenty-five cent ($140.25) fee, shall be deposited in the Highway Fund. Twenty five dollars ($25.00) of the one hundred forty dollar and twenty-five cent ($140.25) fee shall be used to fund a statewide chemical alcohol testing program administered by the Forensic Tests for Alcohol Branch of the Chronic Disease and Injury Section of the Department of Health and Human Services. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a restoration fee assessed pursuant to this subsection may be waived by the Division when (i) the restoration fee remains unpaid for more than 10 years from the date of assessment and (ii) the person responsible for payment of the restoration fee has been issued a drivers license by the Division after the effective date of the revocation for which the restoration fee is owed. The Office of State Budget and Management shall annually report to the General Assembly the amount of fees deposited in the General Fund and transferred to the Forensic Tests for Alcohol Branch of the Chronic Disease and Injury Section of the Department of Health and Human Services under this subsection.

  10. Highway Fund. —  The fees collected under this section and G.S. 20-14 shall be placed in the Highway Fund. (j1) [Maintenance of Organ Donor Registry Internet Site.] — The Division of Motor Vehicles shall retain a portion of five cents ($0.05) collected for the issuance of each drivers license and duplicate license to offset the actual cost of developing and maintaining the online Organ Donor Internet site established pursuant to G.S. 20-43.2 . The remainder of the five cents ($0.05) shall be credited to the License to Give Trust Fund established under G.S. 20-7.4 and shall be used for the purposes authorized under G.S. 20-7.4 and G.S. 20-7.5 .
  11. Repealed by Session Laws 1991, c. 726, s. 5.
  12. Learner’s Permit. —  A person who is at least 18 years old may obtain a learner’s permit. A learner’s permit authorizes the permit holder to drive a specified type or class of motor vehicle while in possession of the permit. A learner’s permit is valid for a period of 18 months after it is issued. The fee for a learner’s permit is twenty-one dollars and fifty cents ($21.50). A learner’s permit may be renewed, or a second learner’s permit may be issued, for an additional period of 18 months. The permit holder must, while operating a motor vehicle over the highways, be accompanied by a person who is licensed to operate the motor vehicle being driven and is seated beside the permit holder.

    ( l -1) Repealed by Session Laws 1991, c. 726, s. 5.

  13. Instruction Permit. —  The Division upon receiving proper application may in its discretion issue a restricted instruction permit effective for a school year or a lesser period to any of the following applicants:
    1. An applicant who is less than 18 years old and is enrolled in a drivers education program that is approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and is offered at a public high school, a nonpublic secondary school, or a licensed drivers training school.
    2. A restricted instruction permit authorizes the holder of the permit to drive a specified type or class of motor vehicle when in possession of the permit, subject to any restrictions imposed by the Division. The restrictions the Division may impose on a permit include restrictions to designated areas and highways and restrictions prohibiting operation except when an approved instructor is occupying a seat beside the permittee. A restricted instruction permit is not required to have a distinguishing number or a picture of the person to whom the permit is issued.
  14. Format. —  A drivers license issued by the Division must be tamperproof and must contain all of the following information:
    1. An identification of this State as the issuer of the license.
    2. The license holder’s full name.
    3. The license holder’s residence address.
    4. A color photograph of the license holder applied to material that is measured by the industry standard of security and durability and is resistant to tampering and reproduction.
    5. A physical description of the license holder, including sex, height, eye color, and hair color.
    6. The license holder’s date of birth.
    7. An identifying number for the license holder assigned by the Division. The identifying number may not be the license holder’s social security number.
    8. Each class of motor vehicle the license holder is authorized to drive and any endorsements or restrictions that apply.
    9. The license holder’s signature.
    10. The date the license was issued and the date the license expires.

      The Commissioner shall ensure that applicants 21 years old or older are issued drivers licenses and special identification cards that are printed in a horizontal format. The Commissioner shall ensure that applicants under the age of 21 are issued drivers licenses and special identification cards that are printed in a vertical format, that distinguishes them from the horizontal format, for ease of identification of individuals under age 21 by members of industries that regulate controlled products that are sale restricted by age and law enforcement officers enforcing these laws.

      At the request of an applicant for a drivers license, a license issued to the applicant must contain the applicant’s race, which shall be designated with the letters “AI” for an applicant who is American Indian.

  15. Repealed by Session Laws 1991, c. 726, s. 5.
  16. The Division must give the clerk of superior court in each county at least 50 copies of the driver license handbook free of charge. The clerk must give a copy to a person who requests it.
  17. Active Duty Military Designation. —  The Division shall develop a military designation for drivers licenses that may, upon request, be granted to North Carolina residents on active duty and to their spouses and dependent children. A drivers license with a military designation on it may be renewed by mail no more than two times during the license holder’s lifetime. A license renewed by mail under this subsection is a permanent license and does not expire when the license holder returns to the State. A drivers license with a military designation on it issued to a person on active duty may be renewed up to one year prior to its expiration upon presentation of military or Department of Defense credentials. (q1) Veteran Military Designation. — The Division shall develop a military designation for drivers licenses and identification cards that may, upon request, be granted to North Carolina residents who are honorably discharged from military service in the Armed Forces of the United States. An applicant requesting this designation must produce a Form DD-214 showing the applicant has been honorably discharged from the Armed Forces of the United States.

    (q2) Deaf or Hard of Hearing Designation. — The Division shall develop, in consultation with the Department of Public Safety, the State Highway Patrol, the Division of Services for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, and pursuant to this subsection, a drivers license designation that may, upon request, be granted to a person who is deaf or hard of hearing. The Division shall comply with the following requirements applicable to the designation:

    1. At the request of a person who is deaf or hard of hearing, the Division shall place a unique symbol on the front of the person’s license. The unique symbol placed on the license shall not include any further descriptor. The Division shall record the designation in the electronic record associated with the person’s drivers license.
    2. At the request of a person who is deaf or hard of hearing, the Division shall enter the drivers license symbol and a descriptor into the electronic record of any motor vehicle registered in the same name of the deaf or hard of hearing person.
    3. For the purposes of this subsection, a person shall be considered to be deaf or hard of hearing if they provide verification or documentation substantiating their hearing loss that is recommended by the Division of Services for the Deaf and the Hard of Hearing as acceptable. The Division of Motor Vehicles shall consult with the Division of Services for the Deaf and the Hard of Hearing to identify acceptable forms of verification that do not result in undue burden to the person requesting the designation of hearing loss. Acceptable documentation shall include any of the following:
      1. Documentation of certification or examination by a medical, health, or audiology professional showing evidence of hearing loss.
      2. Affidavit executed by the person, their parent, or guardian attesting to the person’s hearing loss.
      3. Documentation deemed by the Division of Motor Vehicles to qualify as satisfactory proof of the person’s hearing loss.
    4. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as authorizing the issuance of a drivers license to a person ineligible under G.S. 20-9 .
    5. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as prohibiting the issuance of a drivers license to a person otherwise eligible under the law.
    6. Any individual who chooses to register or not to register shall not be deemed to have waived any protections under the law.
    7. Information collected under this subsection shall only be available to law enforcement and only for the purpose of ensuring mutually safe interactions between law enforcement and persons who are deaf or hard of hearing. It shall not be accessed or used for any other purpose.
    8. The right to make the decision for inclusion or removal of the designation from the database is entirely voluntary and shall only be made by the person who holds the drivers license associated with the designation.
    9. The Division, in conjunction with the Department of Health and Human Services, shall develop a process for removal of the designation authorized by this subsection that is available online, by mail, or in person.
  18. Waiver of Vision Test. —  The following license holders shall be exempt from any required eye exam when renewing a drivers license by mail under either subsection (f) of this section or subsection (q) of this section if, at the time of renewal, the license holder is serving in a combat zone or a qualified hazardous duty zone:
    1. A member of the Armed Forces of the United States.
    2. A member of a reserve component of the Armed Forces of the United States.
  19. Notwithstanding the requirements of subsection (b1) of this section that an applicant present a valid social security number, the Division shall issue a drivers license of limited duration, under subsection (f) of this section, to an applicant present in the United States who holds valid documentation issued by, or under the authority of, the United States government that demonstrates the applicant’s legal presence of limited duration in the United States if the applicant presents that valid documentation and meets all other requirements for a license of limited duration. Notwithstanding the requirements of subsection (n) of this section addressing background colors and borders, a drivers license of limited duration issued under this section shall bear a distinguishing mark or other designation on the face of the license clearly denoting the limited duration of the license.
  20. Use of Bioptic Telescopic Lenses. —
    1. An applicant using bioptic telescopic lenses shall be eligible for a regular Class C drivers license under this section if the applicant meets all of the following:
      1. Demonstrates a visual acuity of at least 20/200 in one or both eyes and a field of 70 degrees horizontal vision with or without corrective carrier lenses, or if the person has vision in one eye only, the person demonstrates a field of at least 40 degrees temporal and 30 degrees nasal horizontal vision.
      2. Demonstrates a visual acuity of at least 20/70 in one or both eyes with the bioptic telescopic lenses and without the use of field expanders.
      3. Provides a report of examination by an ophthalmologist or optometrist, on a form prescribed by the Division, for the Division to determine if all field of vision requirements are met or additional testing is needed.
      4. Successfully passes a road test administered by the Division. This requirement is waived if the applicant is a new resident of North Carolina who has a valid drivers license issued by another jurisdiction that requires a road test.
      5. Meets all other criteria for licensure.
    2. In addition to the requirements listed in subdivision (1) of this subsection, the Division shall require an applicant using bioptic telescopic lenses to successfully complete a behind-the-wheel training and assessment program prescribed by the Division. This requirement is waived if the applicant has successfully completed a behind-the-wheel training and assessment program as a condition of licensure in another jurisdiction.
    3. Applicants using bioptic telescopic lenses shall be eligible for a limited learner’s permit or provisional drivers license issued pursuant to G.S. 20-11 , provided the requirements of this subsection are met and any other required testing or documentation is completed and submitted with the application.
    4. Applicants issued a regular Class C drivers license, limited learner’s permit, or provisional drivers license shall be subject to the following restrictions on the license issued:
      1. The license or permit holder shall not be eligible for any endorsements.
      2. The license or permit shall permit the operation of motor vehicles only during the period beginning one-half hour after sunrise and ending one-half hour before sunset.
    5. Applicants issued a regular Class C drivers license may drive motor vehicles between the period beginning one-half hour before sunset and ending one-half hour after sunrise if the applicant meets the following requirements:
      1. Demonstrates a visual acuity of at least 20/40 in one or both eyes with the bioptic telescopic lenses and without the use of field expanders.
      2. Provides a report of examination by an ophthalmologist or optometrist in accordance with sub-subdivision c. of subdivision (1) of this subsection that does not recommend restricting the applicant to driving a motor vehicle only during the period beginning one-half hour after sunrise and ending one-half hour before sunset.

Class of Regular License Fee for Each Year Class A $5.50 Class B $5.50 Class C $5.50

History. 1935, c. 52, s. 2; 1943, c. 649, s. 1; c. 787, s. 1; 1947, c. 1067, s. 10; 1949, c. 583, ss. 9, 10; c. 826, ss. 1, 2; 1951, c. 542, ss. 1, 2; c. 1196, ss. 1-3; 1953, cc. 839, 1284, 1311; 1955, c. 1187, ss. 2-6; 1957, c. 1225; 1963, cc. 754, 1007, 1022; 1965, c. 410, s. 5; 1967, c. 509; 1969, c. 183; c. 783, s. 1; c. 865; 1971, c. 158; 1973, cc. 73, 705; c. 1057, ss. 1, 3; 1975, c. 162, s. 1; c. 295; c. 296, ss. 1, 2; c. 684; c. 716, s. 5; c. 841; c. 875, s. 4; c. 879, s. 46; 1977, c. 6; c. 340, s. 3; c. 354, s. 1; c. 865, ss. 1, 3; 1979, c. 37, s. 1; c. 113; c. 178, s. 2; c. 667, ss. 3-11, 41; c. 678, ss. 1-3; c. 801, ss. 5, 6; 1981, c. 42; c. 690, ss. 8-10; c. 792, s. 3; 1981 (Reg. Sess., 1982), c. 1257, s. 1; 1983, c. 443, s. 1; 1985, c. 141, s. 4; c. 682, ss. 1, 2; 1987, c. 869, ss. 10, 11; 1989, c. 436, ss. 1, 2; c. 771, s. 5; c. 786, s. 4; 1991, c. 478, s. 1; c. 689, s. 325; c. 726, s. 5; 1991 (Reg. Sess., 1992), c. 1007, s. 27; c. 1030, s. 10; 1993, c. 368, s. 1; c. 533, ss. 2, 3, 12; 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994), c. 595, ss. 1, 2; c. 750, s. 1; c. 761, s. 1.1; 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 675, s. 1; 1997-16, ss. 5, 8, 9; 1997-122, ss. 2, 3; 1997-377, s. 1; 1997-433, s. 4; 1997-443, ss. 11A.122, 32.20; 1997-456, s. 32, 33; 1998-17, s. 1; 1998-149, s. 2; 2000-120, ss. 14, 15; 2000-140, s. 93.1(a); 2001-424, ss. 12.2(b), 27.10A(a)-(d); 2001-513, s. 32(a); 2003-152, ss. 1, 2; 2003-284, s. 36.1; 2004-189, s. 5(a), (c); 2004-203, s. 2; 2005-276, s. 44.1(a), (q); 2005-349, s. 4; 2006-257, ss. 1, 2; 2006-264, s. 35.2; 2007-56, ss. 1-3; 2007-249, s. 1; 2007-350, s. 1; 2007-512, s. 5; 2008-202, ss. 2, 3; 2008-217, s. 1; 2008-221, s. 1; 2009-274, ss. 2, 3; 2009-451, s. 9.5(a); 2009-492, ss. 1, 2; 2010-130, s. 1; 2010-131, ss. 1, 2; 2010-132, s. 1; 2011-35, ss. 1, 2; 2011-183, ss. 21, 127(a); 2011-326, s. 28; 2011-381, s. 2; 2012-78, s. 1; 2012-85, ss. 1, 2; 2012-142, s. 9.16; 2012-145, s. 2.2; 2013-195, s. 2; 2013-231, s. 1; 2013-360, s. 7.10(a); 2014-58, s. 5; 2014-100, s. 34.8(a); 2014-115, s. 56.8(c); 2015-163, s. 2; 2015-238, s. 2.1; 2015-241, ss. 7A.4(b), 29.30(a), 29.30(a1), 29.36; 2015-294, s. 12; 2016-75, s. 1; 2016-90, ss. 6(a), 8(a), 9(a); 2017-191, s. 1; 2018-74, s. 10(a); 2018-145, s. 14; 2019-199, s. 7(a); 2019-227, s. 3(a), (b); 2021-78, s. 12(a); 2021-89, s. 1.

Cross References.

As to jurisdiction of prosecution under this section, see note to G.S. 7A-272 .

As to expiration of H and X endorsements, see G.S. 20-37.16 .

As to criminal record checks of applicants and of current employees who are involved in the manufacture or production of drivers licenses and identification cards, see G.S. 143B-955 .

DMV Quadrennial Fee Adjustment.

G.S. 20-4.02 requires the Division of Motor Vehicles, beginning July 1, 2020, to adjust certain fees and rates every four years, to consult with the Joint Legislative Commission on Governmental Operations, and to report to the chairs of the House and Senate appropriations committees on transportation. Session Laws 2021-180, s. 41.26, effective July 1, 2021, further amended G.S. 20-4.02 (d), directing the Division to notify the Revisor of Statutes of any adjustment, and directing the Revisor to adjust the appropriate amounts in any affected statutes. By letter dated January 24, 2020, the Division of Motor Vehicles advised of a fee increase factor of 7.86%, effective July 1, 2020, and provided a chart displaying the DMV Quadrennial Fee Adjustments affecting G.S. 20-7 , 20-11, 20-14, 20-16, 20-26, 20-37.15, 20-37.16, 20-42(b), 20-63(h), 20-85(a)(1)-(10), 20-85.1, 20-87, 20-88, 20-289, 20-385, and 44A-4(b)(1). Pursuant to the authority granted in G.S. 20-4.02, the Revisor of Statutes has adjusted the fee amounts in the affected statutes to reflect the Division’s increase.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 1985, c. 141, s. 6 provided that the amendment thereby would become effective September 1, 1986. Section 6 further provided that if the Congress of the United States repeals the mandate established by the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 relating to National Uniform Drinking Age of 21 as found in Section 6 of Public Law 98-363, or a court of competent jurisdiction declares the provision to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, then ss. 1, 2, 2.1, 4, and 5 of the act shall expire upon the certification of the Secretary of State that the federal mandate has been repealed or has been invalidated, and the statutes amended by ss. 1, 2, 2.1, 4, and 5 shall revert to the form they would have without the amendments made by these sections.

Session Laws 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1112 would have amended subsections (a) and (i) of this section effective June 1, 1989, through June 30, 1989, so as to make changes regarding the requirements for and entitlements of certain licenses, with certain exceptions for persons holding a Class C license issued before June 1, 1989. Session Laws 1989, c. 771, s. 18, effective June 1, 1989, repealed Session Laws 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1112; therefore, the provisions of c. 1112 never went into effect.

Session Laws 1993, c. 368, which amended this section, in s. 5 provides: “A drivers license or a special identification card issued by the Division of Motor Vehicles before January 1, 1995, and renewed by the Division after that date is considered the first drivers license or special identification card issued by the Division for purposes of determining when the license or card expires.”

Session Laws 1997-16, s. 10 provides that the act does not appropriate funds to the Division to implement the act nor does it obligate the General Assembly to appropriate funds to implement this act.

Session Laws 2001-424, ss. 27.10A(b) to (d) enacted new subsections which the act numbered (b2), (b3), and (b4). As the section already contained a subsection (b2), at the direction of the Reviser of Statutes these subsections have been renumbered (b3), (b4), and (b5).

Session Laws 2004-189, s. 5(c), as amended by Session Laws 2005-276, s. 44.1(q), was codified as G.S. 20-7(j1) at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes.

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 1.2, provides: “This act shall be known as the ‘Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2005.’ ”

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 46.3, provides: “Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2005-2007 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2005-2007 fiscal biennium.”

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 46.5, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2011-35, s. 3, as amended by Session Laws 2012-85, s. 2, which added “Active Duty” to the subsection (q) heading, and added subsection (q1), provides:

“SECTION 3. This act becomes effective on the later of the following dates and applies to drivers licenses issued on or after that date:

“(1) January 1, 2013.

“(2) The first day of a month that is 30 days after the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles certifies to the Revisor of Statutes that the Division of Motor Vehicles has completed the implementation of the Division’s Next Generation Secure Driver License System.” On August 21, 2019, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles certified to the Revisor of Statutes that the Next Generation Secure Driver License System was fully implemented in January 2016.

Session Laws 2012-85, s. 12, provides: “When the Division of Motor Vehicles has completed the implementation of the Division’s Next Generation Secure Driver License System, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall certify to the Revisor of Statutes that the Division of Motor Vehicles has completed the implementation. When making the certification, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall reference S.L. 2011-35, S.L. 2011-228, and the session law number of this act.” On August 21, 2019, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles certified to the Revisor of Statutes that the Next Generation Secure Driver License System was fully implemented in January 2016.

Session Laws 2016-75, s. 2, made the amendment to subsection (n) by Session Laws 2016-75, s. 1, applicable to drivers licenses issued or renewed on or after October 1, 2016.

Session Laws 2016-90, s. 6(f), made the deletion of the former first sentence of subdivision (m)(2), which pertained to applicants for certification as a school bus driver, by Session Laws 2016-90, s. 6(a), applicable to offenses committed on or after January 1, 2017.

Session Laws 2016-90, s. 8(b), provides: “This section becomes effective January 1, 2017. The extended period of validity applies to temporary driving certificates issued on or after that date.”

Session Laws 2017-41, s. 6.1(a), (b), provides: “(a) The General Assembly recognizes that not having a drivers license is a barrier to education, employment, health care, and other community-based activities for older youth in foster care, as defined in G.S. 131D-10.2(9), working toward independence. One of the biggest barriers to accessing a drivers license for such youth is the ability to obtain insurance. Therefore, to assist in this effort, the Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Social Services, shall establish a two-year pilot program that shall reimburse, on a first-come, first-served basis, youth and caregivers’ costs associated with drivers license education, drivers license fees, insurance costs, and any other costs associated with obtaining a drivers license. The Division shall take appropriate steps to ensure proper advertising of the pilot program.

“(b) The Division of Social Services shall report on the pilot project to the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee on Health and Human Services by March 1, 2018.”

Session Laws 2020-3, s. 4.7(a)-(h), as amended by Session Laws 2020-97, ss. 3.15(a), 3.16(a), provides: “(a) Definition. — For purposes of this section, ‘credential’ means any of the following issued by the Division of Motor Vehicles:

“(1) Drivers license.

“(2) Learner’s permit.

“(3) Limited learner’s permit.

“(4) Limited provisional license.

“(5) Full provisional license.

“(6) Commercial drivers license.

“(7) Commercial learner’s permit.

“(8) Temporary driving certificate.

“(9) Special identification card.

“(10) Handicapped placard.

“(11) Vehicle registration.

“(12) Temporary vehicle registration.

“(13) Dealer license plate.

“(14) Transporter plate.

“(15) Loaner/Dealer ‘LD’ plate.

“(16) Vehicle inspection authorization.

“(17) Inspection station license.

“(18) Inspection mechanic license.

“(19) Transportation network company permit.

“(20) Motor vehicle dealer license.

“(21) Sales representative license.

“(22) Manufacturer license.

“(23) Distributor license.

“(24) Wholesaler license.

“(25) Driver training school license.

“(26) Driver training school instructor license.

“(27) Professional housemoving license.

“(b) Extend Validity of Credentials. — Notwithstanding renewal, duration, or expiration provisions of G.S. 20-7 , 20-11, 20-37.6, 20-37.7, 20-37.13, 20-50, 20-66, 20-79, 20-79.02, 20-79.2, 20-183.4B, 20-183.4D, 20-280.3, 20-288, 20-324, and 20-359, or any other provision of law to the contrary, the Division of Motor Vehicles shall extend for a period of five months the validity of any credential that expires on or after March 1, 2020, and before August 1, 2020. The Division shall extend for a period of five months the validity of any credential listed in subdivisions (6), (7), (9), (10), and (18) of subsection (a) of this section that expires on or after March 1, 2020, and before the date 30 days after the date the Governor (i) rescinds Executive Order No. 116 or (ii) issues another executive order lifting restrictions on Division of Motor Vehicles functions. Notwithstanding G.S. 20-37.13(h) and G.S. 20-37.13 A(a), the Division of Motor Vehicles is authorized to waive the requirement that commercial drivers license and commercial learner’s permit holders have a medical examination and certification, as required by federal law, consistent with any waiver of medical qualifications standards issued by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. A credential extended under this section shall expire five months from the date it otherwise expires as prescribed by law prior to this section. However, the subsequent expiration of a credential extended under this section shall occur on the date prescribed by law prior to this section without regard to the extension. The Division shall notify individuals affected by an extension granted under this section, including information on new expiration dates and how the extension affects subsequent renewal and expiration dates.

“(b1) Extension of Intrastate Medical Waivers. — Notwithstanding the limitation on duration of waivers in G.S. 20-37.13 A(b), the Division of Motor Vehicles may extend for up to five months the validity of a medical waiver issued by the Division under G.S. 20-37.13 A if the waiver expires on or after March 1, 2020, and before the date 30 days after the date the Governor (i) rescinds Executive Order No. 116 or (ii) issues another executive order lifting restrictions on Division of Motor Vehicles functions, and the Division’s Medical Review Unit determines the extension is appropriate.

“(c) Driving Eligibility Certificates. — Notwithstanding G.S. 20-11 (n)(3), a driving eligibility certificate dated on or after February 9, 2020, and before March 10, 2020, remains valid and may be accepted by the Division of Motor Vehicles to meet the requirements for a license or permit issued under G.S. 20-11 until 30 days after the date the Governor rescinds Executive Order No. 116 or the date the Division reopens all drivers license offices, whichever is earlier.

“(d) Waive Penalties. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Division shall waive any fines, fees, or penalties associated with failing to renew a credential during the period of time the credential is valid by extension under subsection (b) of this section.

“(e) Motor Vehicle Taxes. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, due dates for motor vehicle taxes that are tied to registration expiration under Article 22A of Chapter 105 of the General Statutes shall be extended to correspond with extended expiration dates under subsection (b) of this section.

“(f) Validity by Extension a Defense. — A person may not be convicted or found responsible for any offense resulting from failure to renew a credential issued by the Division if, when tried for that offense, the person shows that the offense occurred during the period of time the credential is valid by extension under subsection (b) of this section.

“(g) Report. — Within 30 days of the extensions made under subsection (b) of this section, the Division shall submit a report to the Joint Legislative Transportation Oversight Committee and the Fiscal Research Division detailing implementation of this section.

“(h) Effective Date. — This section is effective retroactively to March 1, 2020, and applies to expirations occurring on or after that date.”

Session Laws 2020-3, s. 5, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2020-97, s. 4.5, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2021-78, s. 12(b), made the last two sentences of subdivision (f)(3), as added by Session Laws 2021-78, s. 12(a), effective July 2, 2021, and applicable to applications for licenses submitted on or after that date.

Session Laws 2021-78, s. 14(a), is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2021-185, s. 11.5(a), provides: “The Division of Motor Vehicles may amend, extend, or adopt emergency rules to modify road test requirements, including 19A NCAC 03B.0201, Driver's License Examination and Online Renewal (emergency amendment effective July 22, 2020), implemented by the Division in accordance with subsection (g) of Section 3.20 of S.L. 2020-97, as enacted by Section 3 of S.L. 2021-13. Notwithstanding the expiration dates in G.S. 150B-21.1 A(d)(4) or subsection (g) of Section 3.20 of S.L. 2020-97, as enacted by Section 3 of S.L. 2021-13, emergency rules amended, extended, or adopted in accordance with this section shall expire 30 days after Executive Order No. 116 is rescinded or December 31, 2022, whichever is earlier.”

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2004-189, s. 5.(a), effective November 1, 2004, in subsection (i), under the heading “Fee For Each Year,” substituted “4.30” for “4.25” twice, and substituted “3.05” for “3.00.”

Session Laws 2004-203, s. 2, effective August 17, 2004, in subsection (b1), substituted “an identification card, learners permit, or drivers” for “a drivers,” inserted “except for an identification card” preceding “demonstrate his or her,” and made a related punctuation change.

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 44.1(a), effective October 1, 2005, in subsection (i), in the first paragraph, substituted “$4.00” for “$4.30” and “3.05” in the list of fees; in subsection (i1), substituted “fifty-dollars ($50.00)” for “twenty-five dollars ($25.00)” twice, substituted “seventy-five dollars ($75.00)” for “fifty dollars ($50.00)” and substituted “fifty-dollar ($50.00) fee, and the first fifty dollars ($50.00) of the seventy-five-dollar ($75.00) fee” for “twenty-five dollar ($25.00) fee, and the first twenty-five dollars ($25.00) of the fifty-dollar ($50.00) fee” and “the seventy-five-dollar ($75.00) fee” for “the fifty-dollar ($50.00) fee”; and in subsection ( l ) substituted “fifteen dollars ($15.00)” for “ten dollars ($10.00).”

Session Laws 2005-349, s. 4, effective September 30, 2005, in the next-to-last paragraph of subsection (a), added the first sentence and substituted “Any other” for “A” at the beginning of the second sentence.

Session Laws 2006-257, s. 1, effective January 1, 2007, rewrote subsection (f); and s. 2 added subdivision (f)(5) effective July 1, 2008.

Session Laws 2006-264, s. 35.2, effective August 27, 2006, in subsection (b1), deleted the former second to last paragraph relating to applicants who do not have social security numbers, and in the last paragraph, deleted “either” following “to provide” and “or the applicant’s valid Taxpayer Identification Number” from the end; rewrote subsection (f); and added subsection (s).

Session Laws 2007-56, s. 1, effective retroactively to January 1, 2007, and applicable to drivers licenses issued or renewed on or after that date, rewrote subdivisions (f)(1), (2) and (3), and added subdivisions (f)(2a) and (f)(3a).

Session Laws 2007-249, s. 1, effective July 20, 2007, added subdivision (b2)(4).

Session Laws 2007-512, s. 5, effective October 1, 2007, added subdivision (b2)(5).

Session Laws 2008-202, ss. 2 and 3, effective August 8, 2008, in subdivision (f)(5), added the language beginning “unless the applicant is ineligible for mail delivery” to the end of the subdivision; in subdivision (n)(4), inserted “or a properly applied laser engraved picture on polycarbonate material”; in the second full paragraph in subsection (n), deleted the former first sentence, which read: “The Commissioner may waive the requirement of a color photograph on a license if the license holder proves to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that taking the photograph would violate the license holder’s religious convictions”; and made minor grammatical changes.

Session Laws 2008-221, s. 1, effective September 1, 2008, added subdivisions (a)(3)c.

Session Laws 2009-451, s. 9.5(a), effective July 1, 2009, in subsection (i1), in the first paragraph, substituted “G.S. 20-17(a)(2)” for “G.S. 20-17(2)” in the first sentence, substituted “G.S. 20-17(a)(2) shall pay a restoration fee of seventy-five dollars ($75.00)” for “G.S. 20-17(2) shall pay a restoration fee of seventy-five dollars ($75.00) until the end of the fiscal year in which the cumulative total amount of fees deposited under this subsection in the General Fund exceeds ten million dollars ($10,000,000), and shall pay a restoration fee of fifty dollars ($50.00) thereafter” in the second sentence, and deleted “shall certify to the Department of Transportation and the General Assembly when the cumulative total amount of fees deposited in the General Fund under this subsection exceeds ten million dollars ($10,000,000), and” preceding “shall annually report” in the last sentence; in the second paragraph, inserted “from” near the beginning, “the sum of five hundred thirty-seven thousand four hundred fifty-five dollars ($537,455)” near the middle, and substituted “operating expenses of the Bowles Center for Alcohol Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill” for “the Center for Alcohol Studies Endowment at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, but not to exceed this cumulative total of ten million dollars ($10,000,000)” at the end.

Session Laws 2010-130, s. 1, effective September 1, 2010, in the first paragraph in subsection (i1), in the second sentence, substituted “one hundred dollars ($100.00)” for “seventy-five dollars ($75.00),” in the sixth sentence, substituted “one-hundred-dollar ($100.00) fee” for “seventy-five-dollar ($75.00) fee,” deleted the former seventh sentence, which read: “The remaining twenty-five dollars ($25.00) of the seventy-five-dollar ($75.00) fee shall be deposited in the General Fund of the State,” added the seventh and eighth sentences, and in the last sentence, inserted “and transferred to the Forensic Tests for Alcohol Branch of the Chronic Disease and Injury Section of the Department of Health and Human Services.”

Session Laws 2010-131, ss. 1 and 2, effective January 1, 2011, and applicable to any drivers license issued on or after that date, in subdivisions (f)(2) and (f)(2a), twice substituted “66 years old” for “54 years old.”

Session Laws 2010-132, s. 1, effective December 1, 2010, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, in subdivision (f)(2), added the third sentence, and in the last sentence, substituted “expires on the birthday of the licensee three years after the date of issuance” for “shall expire on the birth date of the licensee three years after the date of issuance”; and added the last sentence in subdivision (f)(2a).

Session Laws 2011-35, ss. 1 and 2, as amended by Session Laws 2011-326, s. 28, added “Active Duty” to the subsection (q) heading; and added subsection (q1). See editor’s note for effective date and applicability.

Session Laws 2011-183, ss. 21 and 127(a), effective June 20, 2011, in subdivision (f)(3b), inserted the first three occurrences of “of the United States”; and in subdivision (f)(4)a., inserted the first occurrence of “of the United States.”; and in subsection (q1), twice substituted “Armed Forces of the United States” for “United States Armed Forces.”

Session Laws 2012-78, s. 1, effective January 1, 2013, added the second sentence in subsection (s). For applicability, see Editor’s note.

Session Laws 2012-85, s. 1, effective July 1, 2012, rewrote subsection (a1); and in the last paragraph, substituted “knowledge test” for “written test” in the first sentence, and substituted the language beginning “complete the North Carolina Motorcycle Safety” for “complete the Motorcycle Safety Foundation Basic Rider Course or the North Carolina Motorcycle Safety Education Program Basic Rider Course” in the second sentence.

Session Laws 2012-142, s. 9.16, as added by Session Laws 2012-145, s. 2.2, effective July 1, 2012, in the second paragraph of subsection (i1), substituted “Effective with the 2011-2012 fiscal year” for “It is the intent of the General Assembly to annually appropriate” at the beginning, and inserted “shall be transferred annually” in the middle.

Session Laws 2013-195, s. 2, effective July 1, 2013, added “and 60 days for a commercial drivers license” in the first sentence of subdivision (f)(5).

Session Laws 2013-231, s. 1, effective July 3, 2013, added subsection (t).

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 7.10(a), effective July 26, 2013, added subdivision (b2)(6).

Session Laws 2014-58, s. 5, effective July 7, 2014, rewrote subdivision (n)(4), which read “A color photograph, or a properly applied laser engraved picture on polycarbonate material, of the license holder, taken by the Division.”

Session Laws 2014-100, s. 34.8(a), added subdivision (f)(6). For effective date and applicability, see Editor’s note.

Session Laws 2014-115, s. 56.8(c), effective August 11, 2014, substituted “Chief Information Officer” for “Controller” in subdivision (b2)(6).

Session Laws 2015-163, s. 2, effective October 1, 2015, added subsection (a3); and added the last sentence of the second paragraph in subsection (c). For applicability, see editor’s note.

Session Laws 2015-238, s. 2.1, effective September 10, 2015, added subdivision (b2)(7).

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 7A.4(b), effective September 18, 2015, rewrote subdivision (b2)(6), which formerly read: “To the Office of the State Chief Information Officer for the purposes of G.S. 143B-426.38 A.”

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 29.30(a), effective October 1, 2015, in subsection (i1), substituted “and the first seventy-five dollars ($75.00) of the one-hundred-dollar ($100.00) fee” for “and the first fifty dollars ($50.00) of the one-hundred-dollar ($100.00) fee” in the sixth sentence, deleted the former seventh sentence, which read: “The remainder of the one-hundred-dollar ($100.00) fee shall be deposited in the General Fund,” and deleted the former last paragraph, relating to operating expenses of the Bowles Center for Alcohol Studies.

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 29.30(a1), effective January 1, 2016, in subsection (i), substituted “$5.00” for “$4.00” throughout the second column of the table, and substituted “two dollars and thirty cents ($2.30)” for “one dollar and seventy-five cents ($1.75)”; in subsection (i1), substituted “sixty-five dollars ($65.00)” for “fifty dollars ($50.00)” and “one-hundred-thirty-dollar ($130.00)” for “one-hundred-dollar ($100.00)” throughout, and substituted “one hundred five dollars ($105.00” for “seventy-five dollars ($75.00)” in the sixth sentence; and substituted “twenty dollars ($20.00)” for “fifteen dollars ($15.00)” in subsection ( l ). For applicability, see editor’s note.

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 29.36, effective July 1, 2015, in subdivision (f)(6), inserted “Subject to the following requirements and limitations,” and rewrote the former last sentence of the introductory paragraph to be a new subdivision (f)(6)f.

Session Laws 2015-294, s. 12, effective October 1, 2015, deleted former subdivisions (b4)(8) and (b4)(9), pertaining to matricula consular or similar documents. For applicability, see editor’s note.

Session Laws 2016-75, s. 1, effective October 1, 2016, substituted “race, which shall be designated with the letters ‘AI’ for an applicant who is American Indian” for “race” near the end of subsection (n). See editor’s note for applicability.

Session Laws 2016-90, s. 6(a), effective January 1, 2017, in subdivision (m)(2), deleted the former first sentence, which read: “An applicant for certification under G.S. 20-218 as a school bus driver” from the beginning of the subdivision. See editor’s note for applicability.

Session Laws 2016-90, s. 8(a), in subdivision (f)(5), substituted “60 days” for “20 days, and 60 days for a commercial drivers license” near the middle of the first sentence, and substituted “purposes and shall not be valid for identification purposes, except when conducting business with the Division and not otherwise prohibited by federal law” for “purposes only and shall not be valid for identification purposes” at the end of the second sentence. See editor’s note for effective date and applicability.

Session Laws 2016-90, s. 9(a), effective October 1, 2016, added the second paragraph in subsection (c).

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 35.20(b), effective July 1, 2016, rewrote subsection (e). See editor’s note for applicability.

Session Laws 2017-191, s. 1, effective January 1, 2018, added subsection (q2).

Session Laws 2018-74, s. 10(a), effective July 1, 2018, substituted “confidential and subject to release under G.S. 20-9(g)(4)h” for “confidential” in subsection (e).

Session Laws 2018-145, s. 14, effective December 27, 2018, added subdivision (b2)(8).

Session Laws 2019-199, s. 7(a), effective October 1, 2019, inserted the next-to-last sentence in subsection (i1).

Session Laws 2019-227, s. 3(a), (b), effective September 27, 2019, in subdivision (f)(6), inserted “or conversion” following “renewal” and “or converted” following “renewed” throughout, inserted “or remote conversion of a full provisional license” in the introductory paragraph, added clause (ii) in sub-sub-subdivision a.1., added the last sentence in sub-sub-subdivision a.3., inserted “For a remote renewal” in sub-sub-subdivision a.4., inserted “or conversion of a full provisional license” in sub-subdivision f.; and made stylistic changes.

Session Laws 2021-78, s. 12(a), added the last two sentences in subdivision (f)(3). For effective date and applicability, see editor’s note.

Session Laws 2021-89, s. 1, effective October 1, 2021, added subdivision (f)(6a).

Legal Periodicals.

For comment on the 1953 amendments, see 31 N.C.L. Rev. 412 (1953).

For survey of 1978 constitutional law, see 57 N.C.L. Rev. 958 (1979).

For 1997 Legislative Survey, see 20 Campbell L. Rev. 491.

For article, “Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law: Should North Carolina Communities Implement 287(g) Authority,” see 86 N.C.L. Rev. 1710 (2008).

CASE NOTES

This section and G.S. 20-35 , being in pari materia, must be construed together, and, if possible, they must be reconciled and harmonized. State v. Tolley, 271 N.C. 459 , 156 S.E.2d 858, 1967 N.C. LEXIS 1221 (1967).

Penalty. —

Any person convicted of operating a motor vehicle over any highway in this State without having first been licensed as such operator, in violation of subsection (a) of this section, is guilty of a misdemeanor; and, under former G.S. 20-35(b), was subject to punishment by imprisonment for a term of not more than six months. The superior court, even if it had jurisdiction in other respects, had no authority to pronounce judgment imposing a prison sentence of two years for this criminal offense. State v. Wall, 271 N.C. 675 , 157 S.E.2d 363, 1967 N.C. LEXIS 1263 (1967).

A violation of this section is not statutorily a lesser included offense of G.S. 20-28 . State v. Cannon, 38 N.C. App. 322, 248 S.E.2d 65, 1978 N.C. App. LEXIS 2175 (1978).

The defendant could not be prosecuted for driving while his license was permanently revoked in violation of G.S. 20-28 because of the prohibition against double jeopardy, where the defendant had previously pled guilty to driving without a license in violation of this section based upon the same event. While a violation of this section is not statutorily a lesser included offense of a violation of G.S. 20-28 , under the “additional facts test” of double jeopardy when applied to the defendant’s offenses, the two offenses were the same both in fact and in law since the evidence that the defendant was driving an automobile while his license had been permanently revoked would sustain a conviction for driving without a license. State v. Cannon, 38 N.C. App. 322, 248 S.E.2d 65, 1978 N.C. App. LEXIS 2175 (1978).

Subsection (i1) of this section does not expressly extend the period of a suspension, cancellation or revocation; it merely provides for the payment of a fee for an administrative act by the Department (now Division). Ennis v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 612 , 184 S.E.2d 246, 1971 N.C. LEXIS 897 (1971).

The contention that a revocation remains in effect not only throughout the period stated in the order of revocation but also until the person whose license was revoked applies for a restoration of his license and pays the restoration fee required by subsection (i1) of this section is contrary to the definition of “revocation” in former G.S. 20-6 [now in G.S. 20-4.01(36) ]. Ennis v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 612 , 184 S.E.2d 246, 1971 N.C. LEXIS 897 (1971).

Driving without a License Is Negligent Per Se. —

Under this section it is negligence per se for one to drive a motor vehicle without a license, but such negligence must be the proximate cause of injury in order to be actionable. Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N.C. 692 , 40 S.E.2d 345, 1946 N.C. LEXIS 322 (1946).

Trial court did not err in admitting testimony that decedent did not have motorcycle endorsement at time of accident. Violation of this section is negligence per se. Ward v. McDonald, 100 N.C. App. 359, 396 S.E.2d 337, 1990 N.C. App. LEXIS 978 (1990), cert. denied, 329 N.C. 505 , 407 S.E.2d 554, 1991 N.C. LEXIS 592 (1991).

Probable Cause for Arrest. —

Where trooper could have placed defendant under arrest for not carrying his driver’s license, but merely choose to ask defendant to step back to the patrol car so that he could check defendant’s license information and so that he could further investigate defendant’s intoxication based upon defendant’s unsteady movements and smell of alcohol and after defendant failed field sobriety tests he was placed under arrest and advised of his rights, the seizure was constitutionally permissible and there was sufficient probable cause for arrest. State v. Johnston, 115 N.C. App. 711, 446 S.E.2d 135, 1994 N.C. App. LEXIS 777 (1994).

Sufficient Evidence Supported Conviction. —

Denial of defendant juvenile’s operating a vehicle without a license under G.S. 20-7(a) charge was supported by sufficient evidence since: (1) defendant admitted at the accident scene that he drove the vehicle that collided with a utility pole; (2) the motor vehicle the officer discovered upon arrival at the accident scene was still warm, which tended to show that the car had recently been driven; (3) the only persons in the vicinity of the accident scene when the officer arrived were defendant and his friends; (4) the wrecked vehicle was registered to defendant’s mother; and (5) there was ample additional evidence showing the trustworthiness of defendant’s admission for purposes of the corpus delicti doctrine. In re A.N.C., 225 N.C. App. 315, 750 S.E.2d 835, 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 127 (2013).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Driving without License as Lesser Included Offense of Driving While License Suspended or Revoked. — See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Charles B. Winberry, Chief District Prosecutor, Seventh Judicial District, 40 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 427 (1970).

§ 20-7.01. [Repealed]

Repealed by Session Laws 1979, c. 667, s. 43.

§ 20-7.1. Notice of change of address or name.

  1. Address. —  A person whose address changes from the address stated on a drivers license must notify the Division of the change within 60 days after the change occurs. If the person’s address changed because the person moved, the person must obtain a duplicate license within that time limit stating the new address. A person who does not move but whose address changes due to governmental action may not be charged with violating this subsection. A person who has provided an e-mail or electronic address to the Division pursuant to G.S. 20-48(a) shall notify the Division of any change or discontinuance of that e-mail or electronic address within 30 days after the change or discontinuance.
  2. Name. —  A person whose name changes from the name stated on a drivers license must notify the Division of the change within 60 days after the change occurs and obtain a duplicate drivers license stating the new name.
  3. Fee. — G.S. 20-14 sets the fee for a duplicate license.

History. 1975, c. 223, s. 1; 1979, c. 970; 1983, c. 521, s. 1; 1997-122, s. 4; 2016-90, s. 10(a).

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2016-90, s. 10(a), effective October 1, 2016, added the last sentence in subsection (a).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

License Must Show Current Address. — See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Edward Powell, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 45 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 194 (1976).

§ 20-7.2. [Repealed]

Repealed by Session Laws 1987, c. 581, s. 2.

§ 20-7.3. Availability of organ, eye, and tissue donor cards at motor vehicle offices.

The Division shall make organ, eye, and tissue donor cards available to interested individuals in each office authorized to issue drivers licenses or special identification cards. The Division shall obtain donor cards from qualified organ, eye, or tissue procurement organizations or tissue banks, as defined in G.S. 130A-412.4(31) . The Division shall offer organ donation information and a donor card to each applicant for a drivers license. The organ donation information shall include the following:

  1. A statement informing the individual that federally designated organ procurement organizations and eye banks have read-only access to the Department-operated Organ Donor Registry Internet site (hereafter “Donor Registry”) listing those individuals who have stated to the Division of Motor Vehicles the individual’s intent to be an organ donor and have an organ donation symbol on the individual’s drivers license or special identification card.
  2. The type of information that will be made available on the Donor Registry.

History. 2001-481, s. 3; 2004-189, s. 3; 2007-538, s. 7.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2004-189, s. 5(c), as amended by Session Laws 2005-276, s. 44.1(q), provides: “The Division of Motor Vehicles shall retain a portion of five cents ($0.05) collected for the issuance of each drivers license and duplicate license to offset the actual cost of developing and maintaining the online Organ Donor Internet site established pursuant to Section 1 of this act. The remainder of the five cents ($0.05) shall be credited to the License to Give Trust Fund established under G.S. 20-7.4 and shall be used for the purposes authorized under G.S. 20-7.4 and G.S. 20-7.5 .”

Session Laws 2007-538, s. 11, provides: “The North Carolina Department of Transportation, Division of Motor Vehicles, in cooperation with the License to Give Trust Fund Commission, shall use available grant-in-aid funds from the State and federal governments and other sources to enhance online access such that donors and prospective donors may update, amend, or revoke information on the donor’s or prospective donor’s drivers license or donor card.”

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2004-189, s. 3, effective January 1, 2005, inserted “organ donation information and” preceding “a donor card” in the third sentence; and added the last sentence and subdivisions (1) and (2).

Session Laws 2007-538, s. 7, effective October 1, 2007, in the second sentence of the introductory paragraph, substituted “G.S. 130A-412.4(31)” for “G.S. 130A-403”; in subdivision (1), substituted “Organ Donor Registry Internet site (hereafter ‘Donor Registry’)” for “Organ Donor Internet site”; and in subdivision (2), substituted “Donor Registry.” for “Organ Donor Internet site.”

§ 20-7.4. License to Give Trust Fund established.

  1. There is established the License to Give Trust Fund. Revenue in the Fund includes amounts credited by the Division as required by law, and other funds. Any surplus in the Fund shall not revert but shall be used for the purposes stated in this section. The Fund shall be kept on deposit with the State Treasurer, as in the case of other State Funds, and may be invested by the State Treasurer in any lawful securities for investment of State funds. The License to Give Trust Fund is subject to oversight by the State Auditor pursuant to Article 5A of Chapter 147 of the General Statutes.
  2. The purposes for which funds may be expended by the License to Give Trust Fund Commission from the License to Give Trust Fund are as follows:
    1. As grants-in-aid for initiatives that educate about and promote organ and tissue donation and health care decision making at life’s end.
    2. Expenses of the License to Give Trust Fund Commission as authorized in G.S. 20-7.5 .

History. 2004-189, s. 4(a); 2015-241, s. 27.8(a); 2015-276, s. 6.5.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2004-189, s. 5(c), as amended by Session Laws 2005-276, s. 44.1(q), provides: “The Division of Motor Vehicles shall retain a portion of five cents ($0.05) collected for the issuance of each drivers license and duplicate license to offset the actual cost of developing and maintaining the online Organ Donor Internet site established pursuant to Section 1 of this act. The remainder of the five cents ($0.05) shall be credited to the License to Give Trust Fund established under G.S. 20-7.4 and shall be used for the purposes authorized under G.S. 20-7.4 and G.S. 20-7.5 .”

Session Laws 2015-276, s. 6.5, repealed Session Laws 2015-241, s. 27.8, which amended this section. Session Laws 2015-276, s. 7, made the repeal effective October 20, 2015, applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, and provides, in part, that “Prosecutions for offenses committed before the effective date of this act are not abated or affected by this act, and the statutes that would be applicable but for this act remain applicable to those prosecutions.”

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 27.8(a), effective September 18, 2015, and applicable to grants awarded on or after that date, amended subdivision (b)(1) by inserting “matching” and adding the second and third sentences, which read: “A grant-in-aid provided pursuant to this subdivision shall be matched on the basis of one dollar ($1.00) in grant funds for every one dollar ($1.00) in nongrant funds. Matching funds shall not include other State funds. The Commission shall not provide a grant under this subdivision until the grantee provides evidence satisfactory to the Commission that the grantee has sufficient nongrant funds to match.” Session Laws 2015-241, s. 27.8(a), was subsequently repealed by Session Laws 2015-276, s. 6.5, effective October 20, 2015. For applicability, see editor’s note.

§ 20-7.5. License to Give Trust Fund Commission established.

  1. There is established the License to Give Trust Fund Commission. The Commission shall be located in the Department of Administration for budgetary and administrative purposes only. The Commission may allocate funds from the License to Give Trust Fund for the purposes authorized in G.S. 20-7.4 . The Commission shall have 15 members, appointed as follows:
    1. Four members by the General Assembly, upon the recommendation of the President Pro Tempore of the Senate:
      1. One representative of Carolina Donor Services.
      2. One representative of LifeShare of The Carolinas.
      3. Two members who have demonstrated an interest in organ and tissue donation and education.
    2. Four members by the General Assembly, upon the recommendation of the Speaker of the House of Representatives:
      1. One representative of The North Carolina Eye Bank, Inc.
      2. One representative of The Carolinas Center for Hospice and End-of-Life Care.
      3. Two members who have demonstrated an interest in promoting advance care planning education.
    3. Seven members by the Governor:
      1. Three members representing organ, tissue, and eye recipients, families of recipients, or families of donors. Of these three, one each from the mountain, heartland, and coastal regions of the State.
      2. One member who is a transplant physician licensed to practice medicine in this State.
      3. One member who has demonstrated an interest in organ and tissue donation and education.
      4. One member who has demonstrated an interest in promoting advance care planning education.
      5. A representative of the North Carolina Department of Transportation.
  2. The Commission shall elect from its membership a chair and a vice-chair for two-year terms. The Secretary of Administration shall provide meeting facilities for the Commission as required by the Chair.
  3. The members of the Commission shall receive per diem and necessary travel and subsistence expenses in accordance with G.S. 138-5 and G.S. 138-6 , as applicable. Per diem, subsistence, and travel expenses of the members shall be paid from the License to Give Trust Fund.
  4. The members of the Commission shall comply with G.S. 14-234 prohibiting conflicts of interest. In addition to the restrictions imposed under G.S. 14-234 , a member shall not vote on, participate in the deliberations of, or otherwise attempt through his or her official capacity to influence the vote on allocations of moneys from the License to Give Trust Fund to a nonprofit entity of which the member is an officer, director, or employee, or to a governmental entity of which the member is an employee or a member of the governing board. A violation of this subsection is a Class 1 misdemeanor.

History. 2004-189, s. 4(b).

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2004-189, s. 5(c), as amended by Session Laws 2005-276, s. 44.1(q), provides: “The Division of Motor Vehicles shall retain a portion of five cents ($0.05) collected for the issuance of each drivers license and duplicate license to offset the actual cost of developing and maintaining the online Organ Donor Internet site established pursuant to Section 1 of this act. The remainder of the five cents ($0.05) shall be credited to the License to Give Trust Fund established under G.S. 20-7.4 and shall be used for the purposes authorized under G.S. 20-7.4 and G.S. 20-7.5 .”

§ 20-7.6. Powers and duties of the License to Give Trust Fund Commission.

The License to Give Trust Fund Commission has the following powers and duties:

  1. Establish general policies and guidelines for awarding grants-in-aid to nonprofit entities to conduct education and awareness activities on organ and tissue donation and advance care planning.
  2. Accept gifts or grants from other sources to further the purposes of the License to Give Trust Fund. Such gifts or grants shall be transmitted to the State Treasurer for credit to the Fund.
  3. Hire staff or contract for other expertise for the administration of the Fund. Expenses related to staffing shall be paid from the License to Give Trust Fund.

History. 2004-189, s. 4(b); 2015-241, s. 27.8(b); 2015-276, s. 6.5.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2004-189, s. 5(c), as amended by Session Laws 2005-276, s. 44.1(q), provides: “The Division of Motor Vehicles shall retain a portion of five cents ($0.05) collected for the issuance of each drivers license and duplicate license to offset the actual cost of developing and maintaining the online Organ Donor Internet site established pursuant to Section 1 of this act. The remainder of the five cents ($0.05) shall be credited to the License to Give Trust Fund established under G.S. 20-7.4 and shall be used for the purposes authorized under G.S. 20-7.4 and G.S. 20-7.5 .”

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 27.8(b), effective September 18, 2015, and applicable to grants awarded on or after that date, amended subdivision (1) by adding “In accordance with G.S. 20-7.4(b) ” at the beginning and inserting “matching” between “awarding” and “grants-in-aid.” Session Laws 2015-241, s. 27.8(b), was subsequently repealed by Session Laws 2015-276, s. 6.5, effective October 20, 2015.

§ 20-8. Persons exempt from license.

The following are exempt from license hereunder:

  1. Any person while operating a motor vehicle the property of and in the service of the Armed Forces of the United States. This shall not be construed to exempt any operators of the United States Civilian Conservation Corps motor vehicles;
  2. Any person while driving or operating any road machine, farm tractor, or implement of husbandry temporarily operated or moved on a highway;
  3. A nonresident who is at least 16 years of age who has in his immediate possession a valid driver’s license issued to him in his home state or country if the nonresident is operating a motor vehicle in this State in accordance with the license restrictions and vehicle classifications that would be applicable to him under the laws and regulations of his home state or country if he were driving in his home state or country. This exemption specifically applies to nonresident military spouses, regardless of their employment status, who are temporarily residing in North Carolina due to the active duty military orders of a spouse.
  4. to (6) Repealed by Session Laws 1979, c. 667, s. 13.

    (7) Any person who is at least 16 years of age and while operating a moped.

History. 1935, c. 52, s. 3; 1963, c. 1175; 1973, c. 1017; 1975, c. 859, s. 2; 1979, c. 574, s. 7; c. 667, s. 13; 1983, c. 436; 2009-274, s. 4.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2009-274, s. 4, effective July 10, 2009, and applicable to all licenses expiring on or after that date, substituted “Armed Forces” for “armed forces” in subdivision (1).

Legal Periodicals.

For survey of 1978 constitutional law, see 57 N.C.L. Rev. 958 (1979).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Exemption for One Driving Farm Tractor Applies Only to One Actually Engaged in Farming Operations. — See opinion of Attorney General to LTC Charles B. Pierce, N.C. State Highway Patrol, 41 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 832 (1972).

§ 20-9. What persons shall not be licensed.

  1. To obtain a regular drivers license, a person must have reached the minimum age set in the following table for the class of license sought:

    Click to view

    G.S. 20-37.13 sets the age qualifications for a commercial drivers license.

  2. The Division shall not issue a drivers license to any person whose license has been suspended or revoked during the period for which the license was suspended or revoked.

    (b1) The Division shall not issue a drivers license to any person whose permit or license has been suspended or revoked under G.S. 20-13.2(c1) during the suspension or revocation period, unless the Division has restored the person’s permit or license under G.S. 20-13.2(c1).

  3. The Division shall not issue a drivers license to any person who is an habitual drunkard or is an habitual user of narcotic drugs or barbiturates, whether or not the use is in accordance with the prescription of a physician.
  4. Repealed by Session Laws 2012-194, s. 8, effective July 17, 2012.
  5. The Division shall not issue a drivers license to any person when in the opinion of the Division the person is unable to exercise reasonable and ordinary control over a motor vehicle while operating the vehicle upon the highways, nor shall a license be issued to any person who is unable to understand highway warnings or direction signs.
  6. The Division shall not issue a drivers license to any person whose license or driving privilege is in a state of cancellation, suspension, or revocation in any jurisdiction, if the acts or things upon which the cancellation, suspension, or revocation in the other jurisdiction was based would constitute lawful grounds for cancellation, suspension, or revocation in this State had those acts or things been done or committed in this State. However, any such cancellation shall not prohibit issuance for a period in excess of 18 months.
  7. The Division may issue a restricted or unrestricted drivers license under the following conditions to an otherwise eligible applicant suffering from a physical or mental disability or disease that affects his or her ability to exercise reasonable and ordinary control of a motor vehicle:
    1. The applicant submits to the Division a certificate in the form prescribed in subdivision (2) of this subsection. The Division may request the certificate at the applicant’s initial application, at any time following the issuance of the license, or at the initial application and any time following the issuance of the license. Until a license issued under this subdivision expires, is cancelled, or is revoked, the license continues in force as long as the licensee presents to the Division a certificate in the form prescribed in subdivision (2) of this subsection at the intervals determined by the Division to be in the best interests of public safety.
    2. The Division may request a signed certificate from a health care provider duly licensed to practice medicine in the United States that the applicant or licensee has submitted to a physical examination by the health care provider. The certificate shall be devised by the Commissioner with the advice of qualified experts in the field of diagnosing and treating physical and mental disabilities and diseases as the Commissioner may select to assist him or her and shall be designed to elicit the maximum medical information necessary to aid in determining whether or not it would be a hazard to public safety to permit the applicant or licensee to operate a motor vehicle, including, if such is the fact, the examining provider’s statement that the applicant or licensee is under medication and treatment and that the applicant’s or licensee’s physical or mental disability or disease is controlled. The certificate shall contain a waiver of privilege and the recommendation of the examining provider to the Commissioner as to whether a license should be issued to the applicant or licensee and whether the applicant or licensee can safely operate a motor vehicle.
    3. The Commissioner is not bound by the recommendation of the examining health care provider but shall give fair consideration to the recommendation in exercising his or her discretion in making licensing decisions, the criterion being whether or not, upon all the evidence, it appears that it is safe to permit the applicant or licensee to operate a motor vehicle. The burden of proof of this fact is upon the applicant or licensee. In deciding whether to issue, restrict, cancel, or deny a license, the Commissioner may be guided by the opinion of experts in the field of diagnosing and treating the specific physical or mental disability or disease suffered by an applicant or licensee and the experts may be compensated for their services on an equitable basis. The Commissioner may also take into consideration any other factors which bear on the issue of public safety.
    4. Whenever a license is restricted, cancelled, or denied by the Commissioner on the basis of a physical or mental disability or disease, the action may be reviewed by a reviewing board upon written request of the applicant or licensee filed with the Division within 10 days after receipt of notice given in accordance with G.S. 20-48 of the action taken. The reviewing board shall consist of the Commissioner or the Commissioner’s authorized representative and at least two medical professionals selected by the Commissioner and duly licensed to practice medicine by the appropriate licensing authority in the State. The medical professionals selected by the Commissioner may be compensated for their services on an equitable basis, including reimbursement for ordinary and necessary travel expenses. The Commissioner or the Commissioner’s authorized representative, plus any two medical professionals selected by the Commissioner, shall constitute a quorum. The procedure for hearings authorized by this section shall be as follows:
      1. Applicants shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing, after reasonable notice of not less than 10 days, before the review board established by this subdivision. The notice shall be in writing and shall be delivered to the applicant in person or sent by certified mail, with return receipt requested. The notice shall state the time, place, and subject of the hearing. If a hearing is requested under this subdivision to contest a restriction placed on a license under subdivision (3) of this subsection, the restriction shall be stayed unless the Division determines there is an imminent threat to public safety if continued unrestricted driving is permitted. No stay shall be granted if a hearing is requested under this subdivision to contest a denial or cancellation of a license under subdivision (3) of this subsection. Nothing in this sub-subdivision authorizes the stay of a restriction placed on a license pursuant to another provision of law.
      2. The review board may compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of such books, records, and papers as it desires at a hearing authorized by this section. Upon request of an applicant or licensee, a subpoena to compel the attendance of any witness or a subpoena duces tecum to compel the production of any books, records, or papers shall be issued by the board. Subpoenas shall be directed to the sheriff of the county where the witness resides or is found and shall be served and returned in the same manner as a subpoena in a criminal case. Fees of the sheriff and witnesses shall be the same as that allowed in the district court in cases before that court and shall be paid in the same manner as other expenses of the Division of Motor Vehicles are paid. In any case of disobedience or neglect of any subpoena served on any person, or the refusal of any witness to testify to any matters regarding which the witness may be lawfully interrogated, the district court or superior court where the disobedience, neglect, or refusal occurs, or any judge thereof, on application by the board, shall compel obedience or punish as for contempt.
      3. A hearing may be continued upon motion of the applicant or licensee for good cause shown with approval of the board or upon order of the board.
      4. The board shall pass upon the admissibility of evidence at a hearing but the applicant or licensee affected may at the time object to the board’s ruling, and, if evidence offered by an applicant or licensee is rejected, the party may proffer the evidence, and the proffer shall be made a part of the record. The board shall not be bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence which prevail in courts of law or equity and may admit and give probative value to evidence which possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs. It may exclude incompetent, immaterial, irrelevant, and unduly repetitious evidence. Uncontested facts may be stipulated by agreement between an applicant or licensee and the board, and evidence relating to stipulated facts may be excluded. All evidence, including records and documents in the possession of the Division of Motor Vehicles or the board, of which the board desires to avail itself shall be made a part of the record. Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts, or by incorporation by reference. The board shall prepare an official record, which shall include testimony and exhibits. A record of the testimony and other evidence submitted shall be taken, but it shall not be necessary to transcribe shorthand notes or electronic recordings unless requested for purposes of court review.
      5. Every decision and order adverse to an applicant or licensee shall be in writing or stated in the record and shall be accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions of law. The findings of fact shall consist of a concise statement of the board’s conclusions on each contested issue of fact. The applicant or licensee shall be notified of the board’s decision in person or by registered mail with return receipt requested. A copy of the board’s decision with accompanying findings and conclusions shall be delivered or mailed upon request to the applicant’s or licensee’s attorney of record or to the applicant or licensee, if he or she has no attorney.
      6. Actions of the reviewing board are subject to judicial review as provided under Chapter 150B of the General Statutes.
      7. Repealed by Session Laws 1977, c. 840.
      8. All records and evidence collected and compiled by the Division and the reviewing board shall not be considered public records within the meaning of Chapter 132 of the General Statutes and may be made available to the public only upon an order of a court of competent jurisdiction. An applicant or licensee may obtain, without a court order, a copy of records and evidence collected and compiled under this subdivision about the applicant or licensee by submitting a written request to the Division, signing any release forms required by the Division, and remitting the required fee set by the Division. All information furnished by, about, or on behalf of an applicant or licensee under this section shall be without prejudice and shall be for the use of the Division, the reviewing board, or the court in administering this section and shall not be used in any manner as evidence, or for any other purposes in any trial, civil or criminal. The prohibition on release and use under this sub-subdivision applies without regard to who authored or produced the information collected, compiled, and used by the Division under this subdivision.
  8. The Division shall not issue a drivers license to an applicant who currently holds a license to drive issued by another state unless the applicant surrenders the license.
  9. The Division shall not issue a drivers license to an applicant who has resided in this State for less than 12 months until the Division has searched the National Sex Offender Public Registry to determine if the person is currently registered as a sex offender in another state. The following applies in this subsection:
    1. If the Division finds that the person is currently registered as a sex offender in another state, the Division shall not issue a drivers license to the person until the person submits proof of registration pursuant to Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes issued by the sheriff of the county where the person resides.
    2. If the person does not appear on the National Sex Offender Public Registry, the Division shall issue a drivers license but shall require the person to sign an affidavit acknowledging that the person has been notified that if the person is a sex offender, then the person is required to register pursuant to Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes.
    3. If the Division is unable to access all states’ information contained in the National Sex Offender Public Registry, but the person is otherwise qualified to obtain a drivers license, then the Division shall issue the drivers license but shall first require the person to sign an affidavit stating that: (i) the person does not appear on the National Sex Offender Public Registry and (ii) acknowledging that the person has been notified that if the person is a sex offender, then the person is required to register pursuant to Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes. The Division shall search the National Sex Offender Public Registry for the person within a reasonable time after access to the Registry is restored. If the person does appear in the National Sex Offender Public Registry, the person is in violation of G.S. 20-30 , and the Division shall immediately revoke the drivers license and shall promptly notify the sheriff of the county where the person resides of the offense.
    4. Any person denied a license or whose license has been revoked by the Division pursuant to this subsection has a right to file a petition within 30 days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in the superior court of the county where the person resides, or to petition the resident judge of the district or judge holding the court of that district, or special or emergency judge holding a court in the district, and the court or judge is hereby vested with jurisdiction. The court or judge shall set the matter for hearing upon 30 days’ written notice to the Division. At the hearing, the court or judge shall take testimony and examine the facts of the case and shall determine whether the petitioner is entitled to a license under this subsection and whether the petitioner is in violation of G.S. 20-30 .

Class of Regular License Minimum Age Class A 18 Class B 18 Class C 16

History. 1935, c. 52, s. 4; 1951, c. 542, s. 3; 1953, c. 773; 1955, c. 118, s. 7; 1967, cc. 961, 966; 1971, c. 152; c. 528, s. 11; 1973, cc. 135, 441; c. 476, s. 128; c. 1331, s. 3; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1979, c. 667, ss. 14, 41; 1983, c. 545; 1987, c. 827, s. 1; 1989, c. 771, s. 7; 1991, c. 726, s. 6; 1993, c. 368, s. 2; c. 533, s. 4; 1999-243, s. 4; 1999-452, s. 8; 2003-14, s. 1; 2006-247, s. 19(c); 2007-182, s. 2; 2012-194, s. 8; 2016-94, s. 35.20(c); 2018-74, s. 10(b); 2018-142, s. 3(a).

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 1989, c. 168, ss. 3 and 4, effective May 30, 1989, would have amended subdivisions (c)(9) and (c)(10) of this section; however, these subdivisions do not exist in this section. The amendment apparently should have been to G.S. 20-118 . Session Laws 2018-142, s. 5, effective December 14, 2018, repealed Session Laws 1989, c. 168, s. 4.

Session Laws 1993, c. 368, which amended this section, in s. 5 provides: “A drivers license or a special identification card issued by the Division of Motor Vehicles before January 1, 1995, and renewed by the Division after that date is considered the first drivers license or special identification card issued by the Division for purposes of determining when the license or card expires.”

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 35.20(h), made the amendments to this section by Session Laws 2016-94, s. 35.20(d), applicable to drivers licenses issued or renewed on or after July 1, 2016 and hearings requested on or after July 1, 2016.

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 1.2, provides: “This act shall be known as the ‘Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2016.’ ”

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 39.4, provides: “Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2016-2017 fiscal year, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2016-2017 fiscal year.”

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 39.7, is a severability clause.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2006-247, s. 19(c), effective December 1, 2006, and applicable to all applications for a drivers license, learner’s permit, instruction permit, or special identification card submitted on or after that date, added subsection (i).

Session Laws 2007-182, s. 2, effective July 5, 2007, substituted “Commission for Public Health” for “Commission for Health Services” seven times in subdivision (g)(4).

Session Laws 2012-194, s. 8, effective July 17, 2012, repealed subsection (d), which read: “No driver’s license shall be issued to any applicant who has been previously adjudged insane or an idiot, imbecile, or feebleminded, and who has not at the time of such application been restored to competency by judicial decree or released from a hospital for the insane or feebleminded upon a certificate of the superintendent that such person is competent, nor then unless the Division is satisfied that such person is competent to operate a motor vehicle with safety to persons and property.”

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 35.20(c), effective July 1, 2016, rewrote subsections (e) and (g). See editor’s note for applicability.

Session Laws 2018-74, s. 10(b), effective July 1, 2018, in sub-subdivision (g)(4)h, inserted “except as authorized in this sub-subdivision” in the third sentence and added the last sentence.

Session Laws 2018-142, s. 3(a), effective December 14, 2018, rewrote the section.

Legal Periodicals.

For note on reporting patients for review of driver’s license, see 48 N.C.L. Rev. 1003 (1970).

For note discussing the extension of the family purpose doctrine to motorcycles and private property, see 14 Wake Forest L. Rev. 699 (1978).

CASE NOTES

Statutes Governing Driving Privileges Civil in Nature. —

Administration of statutes governing the issuance, revocation, suspension and cancellation of driving privileges is civil, rather than penal, in nature. Smith v. Wilkins, 75 N.C. App. 483, 331 S.E.2d 159, 1985 N.C. App. LEXIS 3698 (1985).

Where the law directs suspension, revocation, or nonissuance of a driver’s license, the grounds are convictions for moving violations, or other statutory violations relating to highway safety, or situations where an individual’s capacity to operate a motor vehicle safely are manifestly questionable. Evans v. Roberson, 69 N.C. App. 644, 317 S.E.2d 715, 1984 N.C. App. LEXIS 3529 (1984), rev'd, 314 N.C. 315 , 333 S.E.2d 228, 1985 N.C. LEXIS 1781 (1985).

Alcoholism. —

Findings and conclusions by the Driver License Medical Review Board were sufficient to support its order that petitioner not be granted driving privileges where the board found that petitioner had an alcohol problem; the board gave fair consideration to the recommendation of petitioner’s physician that he be granted driving privileges, but the recommendation did not have to be expressly rejected by the board. McCormick v. Peters, 48 N.C. App. 365, 269 S.E.2d 168, 1980 N.C. App. LEXIS 3236 (1980).

Epilepsy. —

Prior to 1967, subsection (d) of this section prohibited the licensing of anyone who had been diagnosed as having grand mal epilepsy. In 1967 this section was amended to delete the words “grand mal epileptic.” Ormond v. Garrett, 8 N.C. App. 662, 175 S.E.2d 371, 1970 N.C. App. LEXIS 1643 (1970).

The Division of Motor Vehicles was without authority to deny or withhold petitioner’s license to operate a motor vehicle upon the highways of the State where the record showed that once or twice a year petitioner, who suffered from epilepsy, had an epileptic seizure and that with one exception when petitioner blacked out while driving and ran off the road, all the seizures had occurred in his sleep, and all the other evidence tended to show that his seizures were controlled and that he had exercised reasonable and ordinary control over his vehicle while operating it upon the highways. Chesnutt v. Peters, 300 N.C. 359 , 266 S.E.2d 623, 1980 N.C. LEXIS 1070 (1980).

Where the record on appeal contained no evidence that petitioner suffered from an “uncontrolled seizure disorder,” although it did show that petitioner had suffered seizures from time to time, the whole record did not support the finding required by this section that petitioner be suffering from a mental or physical disability that prevents him from exercising reasonable and ordinary control in the operation of a motor vehicle on the highways. Chesnutt v. Peters, 44 N.C. App. 484, 261 S.E.2d 223, 1980 N.C. App. LEXIS 2463 , aff'd, 300 N.C. 359 , 266 S.E.2d 623, 1980 N.C. LEXIS 1070 (1980).

Out-of-State Suspension as Basis for Revocation. —

Under this section the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles must apply the period of revocation of the other state, since the person was a resident of the other state and was subject to and controlled by the laws of that state at the time the offense was committed. Parks v. Howland, 4 N.C. App. 197, 166 S.E.2d 701, 1969 N.C. App. LEXIS 1466 (1969).

Purpose of Subsection (f). —

Subsection (f) is clearly designed to promote public safety on the highways and to protect motorists on North Carolina’s highways from the hazards created by a person who has demonstrated disregard for the rules of safety while operating a motor vehicle. The enactment of laws to assure public safety on the state’s highways is a valid exercise of the police power by the legislature. Smith v. Wilkins, 75 N.C. App. 483, 331 S.E.2d 159, 1985 N.C. App. LEXIS 3698 (1985).

Subsection (f) imposes no durational residency requirement to obtain a North Carolina driver’s license, but requires only that the individual’s license not be in a revoked status in another jurisdiction, and, consequently, does not violate the right to travel under the federal constitution. Smith v. Wilkins, 75 N.C. App. 483, 331 S.E.2d 159, 1985 N.C. App. LEXIS 3698 (1985).

Persons Whose Licenses Are Revoked Elsewhere and Then Move to State. —

All people who, as the result of traffic convictions, have their licenses revoked in other jurisdictions and then move to North Carolina are treated similarly under subsection (f), which is all that is required by the equal protection clause of the U.S. Const., Amend. XIV. Smith v. Wilkins, 75 N.C. App. 483, 331 S.E.2d 159, 1985 N.C. App. LEXIS 3698 (1985).

A petitioner seeking judicial review of a decision of the North Carolina Driver License Medical Review Board must file such petition in the Superior Court of Wake County pursuant to G.S. 150B-45 and may not obtain a hearing under G.S. 20-25 in the superior court of the county in which he resides. Cox v. Miller, 26 N.C. App. 749, 217 S.E.2d 198, 1975 N.C. App. LEXIS 2150 (1975).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Release of Department of Motor Vehicle records. — The Department of Motor Vehicles is required by the Drivers Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 et seq., to redact “personal information” and “highly restricted personal information” from documents, such as accident reports, provided to the public. Otherwise, the requirements of the Public Records Act, G.S. 132-1 et seq., should be complied with by DMV and local law enforcement agencies. Motor vehicle registration information provided by DMV to local taxing authorities should also be provided upon request in accordance with the Public Records Act. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. George Tatum, Commissioner, North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles, 2005 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 1 (02/09/05).

§ 20-9.1. Physicians, psychologists, and other medical providers providing medical information on drivers with physical or mental disabilities or diseases.

  1. Notwithstanding G.S. 8-53 for physicians and G.S. 8-53 .3 for psychologists, or any other law relating to confidentiality of communications between physicians, psychologists, or other medical providers and their patients, a physician, psychologist, or other medical provider duly licensed in the State of North Carolina may disclose after consultation with the patient to the Commissioner information about a patient who has a physical or mental disability or disease that the physician, psychologist, or other medical provider believes may affect the patient’s ability to safely operate a motor vehicle. This information shall be limited to the patient’s name, address, date of birth, and diagnosis.
  2. The information provided to the Commissioner pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be confidential and shall be used only for the purpose of determining the qualifications of the patient to operate a motor vehicle.
  3. A physician, psychologist, or other medical provider disclosing or not disclosing information pursuant to this section, or conducting an evaluation and making a recommendation to the Division regarding a person’s ability to safely operate a motor vehicle, is immune from any civil or criminal liability that might otherwise be incurred or imposed based on the action taken provided that the physician, psychologist, or other medical provider was acting in good faith and without malice. In any proceeding involving liability, good faith and lack of malice are presumed.

History. 1997-464, s. 1; 2016-94, s. 35.20(d).

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 35.20(h), made the amendments to this section by Session Laws 2016-94, s. 35.20(d), applicable to drivers licenses issued or renewed on or after July 1, 2016 and hearings requested on or after July 1, 2016.

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 1.2, provides: “This act shall be known as the ‘Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2016.’ ”

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 39.4, provides: “Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2016-2017 fiscal year, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2016-2017 fiscal year.”

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 39.7, is a severability clause.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 35.20(d), effective July 1, 2016, rewrote the section heading; and rewrote subsections (a) and (c). See editor’s note for applicability.

§ 20-9.2. Selective service system registration requirements.

  1. Any male United States citizen or immigrant who is at least 18 years of age but less than 26 years of age shall be registered in compliance with the requirements of the Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. § 453 (1948), when applying for the issuance, renewal, or duplication of a drivers license, commercial drivers license, or identification card.
  2. The Division shall forward in an electronic format the necessary personal information of the applicants identified in subsection (a) of this section required for registration to the Selective Service System. An application for the issuance, renewal, or duplication of a drivers license, commercial drivers license, or identification card constitutes an affirmation that the applicant has already registered with the Selective Service System or that he authorizes the Division to forward the necessary information to the Selective Service System for registration. The Division shall notify the applicant that his application for the issuance, renewal, or duplication of a drivers license, commercial drivers license, or identification card serves as his consent to be registered with the Selective Service System pursuant to this section.
  3. This section does not apply to special identification cards issued pursuant to G.S. 20-37.7(d)(5) or (6).

History. 2002-162, s. 1; 2014-111, s. 14.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2014-111, s. 14, effective August 6, 2014, added subsection (c).

§ 20-9.3. Notification of requirements for sex offender registration.

The Division shall provide notice to each person who applies for the issuance of a drivers license, learner’s permit, or instruction permit to operate a motor vehicle, and to each person who applies for an identification card, that if the person is a sex offender, then the person is required to register pursuant to Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes.

History. 2006-247, s. 19(b).

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2006-247, s. 19(e), made this section effective December 1, 2006, and applicable to all applications for a drivers license, learner’s permit, instruction permit, or special identification card submitted on or after that date.

§ 20-10. Age limits for drivers of public passenger-carrying vehicles.

It shall be unlawful for any person, whether licensed under this Article or not, who is under the age of 18 years to drive a motor vehicle while in use as a public passenger-carrying vehicle. For purposes of this section, an ambulance when operated for the purpose of transporting persons who are sick, injured, or otherwise incapacitated shall not be treated as a public passenger-carrying vehicle.

No person 14 years of age or under, whether licensed under this Article or not, shall operate any road machine, farm tractor or motor driven implement of husbandry on any highway within this State. Provided any person may operate a road machine, farm tractor, or motor driven implement of husbandry upon a highway adjacent to or running in front of the land upon which such person lives when said person is actually engaged in farming operations.

History. 1935, c. 52, s. 5; 1951, c. 764; 1967, c. 343, s. 4; 1971, c. 1231, s. 1.

Local Modification.

Cumberland: 1965, c. 1152, s. 3.

§ 20-10.1. Mopeds.

It shall be unlawful for any person who is under the age of 16 years to operate a moped as defined in G.S. 20-4.01(27) j. upon any highway or public vehicular area of this State.

History. 1979, c. 574, s. 8; 2002-72, s. 6; 2016-90, s. 13(b); 2017-102, s. 5.2(b).

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2016-90, s. 13(j), made the amendment to this section by Session Laws 2016-90, s. 13(b), applicable to offenses committed on or after December 1, 2016.

Session Laws 2017-102, s. 5.2(b) provides: “The Revisor of Statutes is authorized to reletter the definitions in G.S. 20-4.01(27) and G.S. 20-4.01(32b) to place them in alphabetical order. The Revisor of Statutes may conform any citations that change as a result of the relettering.” Pursuant to that authority, the reference to G.S. 20-4.01(27) d1. in this section was changed to G.S. 20-4.01(27)j.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2016-90, s. 13(b), effective December 1, 2016, substituted “G.S. 20-4.01(27)d1” for “G.S. 105-164.3.” See editor’s note for applicability.

§ 20-11. Issuance of limited learner’s permit and provisional drivers license to person who is less than 18 years old.

  1. Process. —  Safe driving requires instruction in driving and experience. To ensure that a person who is less than 18 years old has both instruction and experience before obtaining a drivers license, driving privileges are granted first on a limited basis and are then expanded in accordance with the following process:
    1. Level 1. — Driving with a limited learner’s permit.
    2. Level 2. — Driving with a limited provisional license.
    3. Level 3. — Driving with a full provisional license.

      A permit or license issued under this section must indicate the level of driving privileges granted by the permit or license.

  2. Level 1. —  A person who is at least 15 years old but less than 18 years old may obtain a limited learner’s permit if the person meets all of the following requirements:
    1. Passes a course of driver education prescribed in G.S. 115C-215 or a course of driver instruction at a licensed commercial driver training school.
    2. Passes a written test administered by the Division.
    3. Has a driving eligibility certificate or a high school diploma or its equivalent.
  3. Level 1 Restrictions. —  A limited learner’s permit authorizes the permit holder to drive a specified type or class of motor vehicle only under the following conditions:
    1. The permit holder must be in possession of the permit.
    2. A supervising driver must be seated beside the permit holder in the front seat of the vehicle when it is in motion. No person other than the supervising driver can be in the front seat.
    3. For the first six months after issuance, the permit holder may drive only between the hours of 5:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m.
    4. After the first six months after issuance, the permit holder may drive at any time.
    5. Every person occupying the vehicle being driven by the permit holder must have a safety belt properly fastened about his or her body, or be restrained by a child passenger restraint system as provided in G.S. 20-137.1(a), when the vehicle is in motion.
    6. The permit holder shall not use a mobile telephone or other additional technology associated with a mobile telephone while operating the motor vehicle on a public street or highway or public vehicular area.
  4. Level 2. —  A person who is at least 16 years old but less than 18 years old may obtain a limited provisional license if the person meets all of the following requirements:
    1. (Effective May 24, 2021 until December 31, 2022)  Has held a limited learner’s permit issued by the Division for at least six months. (1) (Effective December 31, 2022) Has held a limited learner’s permit issued by the Division for at least 12 months.
    2. Has not been convicted of a motor vehicle moving violation or seat belt infraction or a violation of G.S. 20-137.3 during the preceding six months.
    3. Passes a road test administered by the Division or by a commercial driver training school certified by the Division to administer road tests.
    4. Has a driving eligibility certificate or a high school diploma or its equivalent.
    5. Has completed a driving log, on a form approved by the Division, detailing a minimum of 60 hours as the operator of a motor vehicle of a class for which the driver has been issued a limited learner’s permit. The log must show at least 10 hours of the required driving occurred during nighttime hours. No more than 10 hours of driving per week may be counted toward the 60-hour requirement. The driving log must be signed by the supervising driver and submitted to the Division at the time the applicant seeks to obtain a limited provisional license. If the Division has cause to believe that a driving log has been falsified, the limited learner’s permit holder shall be required to complete a new driving log with the same requirements and shall not be eligible to obtain a limited provisional license for six months.
  5. Level 2 Restrictions. —  A limited provisional license authorizes the license holder to drive a specified type or class of motor vehicle only under the following conditions:
    1. The license holder shall be in possession of the license.
    2. The license holder may drive without supervision in any of the following circumstances:
      1. From 5:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.
      2. When driving directly to or from work.
      3. When driving directly to or from an activity of a volunteer fire department, volunteer rescue squad, or volunteer emergency medical service, if the driver is a member of the organization.
    3. The license holder may drive with supervision at any time. When the license holder is driving with supervision, the supervising driver shall be seated beside the license holder in the front seat of the vehicle when it is in motion. The supervising driver need not be the only other occupant of the front seat, but shall be the person seated next to the license holder.
    4. When the license holder is driving the vehicle and is not accompanied by the supervising driver, there may be no more than one passenger under 21 years of age in the vehicle. This limit does not apply to passengers who are members of the license holder’s immediate family or whose primary residence is the same household as the license holder. However, if a family member or member of the same household as the license holder who is younger than 21 years of age is a passenger in the vehicle, no other passengers under 21 years of age, who are not members of the license holder’s immediate family or members of the license holder’s household, may be in the vehicle.
    5. Every person occupying the vehicle being driven by the license holder shall have a safety belt properly fastened about his or her body, or be restrained by a child passenger restraint system as provided in G.S. 20-137.1(a), when the vehicle is in motion.
    6. The license holder shall not use a mobile telephone or other additional technology associated with a mobile telephone while operating the vehicle on a public street or highway or public vehicular area.
  6. Level 3. —  A person who is at least 16 years old but less than 18 years old may obtain a full provisional license if the person meets all of the following requirements:
    1. Has held a limited provisional license issued by the Division for at least six months.
    2. Has not been convicted of a motor vehicle moving violation or seat belt infraction or a violation of G.S. 20-137.3 during the preceding six months.
    3. Has a driving eligibility certificate or a high school diploma or its equivalent.
    4. Has completed a driving log, on a form approved by the Division, detailing a minimum of 12 hours as the operator of a motor vehicle of a class for which the driver is licensed. The log must show at least six hours of the required driving occurred during nighttime hours. The driving log must be signed by the supervising driver for any hours driven outside the provisions of subdivision (e)(2) of this section and submitted to the Division at the time the applicant seeks to obtain a full provisional license. If the Division has cause to believe that a driving log has been falsified, the limited provisional licensee shall be required to complete a new driving log with the same requirements and shall not be eligible to obtain a full provisional license for six months. A person who meets these requirements may obtain a full provisional license by mail.
  7. Level 3 Restrictions. —  The restrictions on Level 1 and Level 2 drivers concerning time of driving, supervision, and passenger limitations do not apply to a full provisional license. However, the prohibition against operating a motor vehicle while using a mobile telephone under G.S. 20-137.3(b) shall apply to a full provisional license.
  8. Exception for Persons 16 to 18 Who Have an Unrestricted Out-of-State License. —  A person who is at least 16 years old but less than 18 years old, who was a resident of another state and has an unrestricted drivers license issued by that state, and who becomes a resident of this State may obtain one of the following upon the submission of a driving eligibility certificate or a high school diploma or its equivalent:
    1. A temporary permit, if the person has not completed a drivers education program that meets the requirements of the Superintendent of Public Instruction but is currently enrolled in a drivers education program that meets these requirements. A temporary permit is valid for the period specified in the permit and authorizes the holder of the permit to drive a specified type or class of motor vehicle when in possession of the permit, subject to any restrictions imposed by the Division concerning time of driving, supervision, and passenger limitations. The period must end within 10 days after the expected completion date of the drivers education program in which the applicant is enrolled.
    2. A full provisional license, if the person has completed a drivers education program that meets the requirements of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, has held the license issued by the other state for at least 12 months, and has not been convicted during the preceding six months of a motor vehicle moving violation, a seat belt infraction, or an offense committed in another jurisdiction that would be a motor vehicle moving violation or seat belt infraction if committed in this State.

      (2a) A full provisional license, if the person has completed a drivers education program that meets the requirements of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, has held both a learner’s permit and a restricted license from another state for at least six months each, the Commissioner finds that the requirements for the learner’s permit and restricted license are comparable to the requirements for a learner’s permit and restricted license in this State, and the person has not been convicted during the preceding six months of a motor vehicle moving violation, a seat belt infraction, or an offense committed in another jurisdiction that would be a moving violation or a seat belt infraction if committed in this State.

    3. A limited provisional license, if the person has completed a drivers education program that meets the requirements of the Superintendent of Public Instruction but either did not hold the license issued by the other state for at least 12 months or was convicted during the preceding six months of a motor vehicle moving violation, a seat belt infraction, or an offense committed in another jurisdiction that would be a motor vehicle moving violation or seat belt infraction if committed in this State.

      (h1) Exception for Persons 16 to 18 Who Have an Out-of-State Restricted License. — A person who is at least 16 years old but less than 18 years old, who was a resident of another state and has a restricted drivers license issued by that state, and who becomes a resident of this State may obtain one of the following:

      (1) A limited provisional license, if the person has completed a drivers education program that meets the requirements of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, held the restricted license issued by the other state for at least 12 months, and whose parent or guardian certifies that the person has not been convicted during the preceding six months of a motor vehicle moving violation, a seat belt infraction, or an offense committed in another jurisdiction that would be a motor vehicle moving violation or seat belt infraction if committed in this State.

      (2) A limited learners permit, if the person has completed a drivers education program that meets the requirements of the Superintendent of Public Instruction but either did not hold the restricted license issued by the other state for at least 12 months or was convicted during the preceding six months of a motor vehicle moving violation, a seat belt infraction, or an offense committed in another jurisdiction that would be a motor vehicle moving violation or seat belt infraction if committed in this State. A person who qualifies for a limited learners permit under this subdivision and whose parent or guardian certifies that the person has not been convicted of a moving violation in the preceding six months shall be deemed to have held a limited learners permit in this State for each month the person held a restricted license in another state.

      (h2) Exception for Persons Age 15 Who Have an Out-of-State Unrestricted or Restricted License. — A person who is age 15, who was a resident of another state, has an unrestricted or restricted drivers license issued by that state, and who becomes a resident of this State may obtain a limited learners permit if the person has completed a drivers education program that meets the requirements of the Superintendent of Public Instruction. A person who qualifies for a limited learners permit under this subsection and whose parent or guardian certifies that the person has not been convicted of a moving violation in the preceding six months shall be deemed to have held a limited learners permit in this State for each month the person held an unrestricted or restricted license in another state.

      (h3) Exception for Persons Less Than Age 18 Who Have a Federally Issued Unrestricted or Restricted License. — A person who is less than age 18, who has an unrestricted or restricted drivers license issued by the federal government, and who becomes a resident of this State may obtain a limited provisional license or a provisional license if the person has completed a drivers education program substantially equivalent to the drivers education program that meets the requirements of the Superintendent of Public Instruction. A person who qualifies for a limited provisional license or a provisional license under this subsection and whose parent or guardian certifies that the person has not been convicted of a moving violation in the preceding six months shall be deemed to have held a limited provisional license or a provisional license in this State for each month the person held an unrestricted or restricted license issued by the federal government.

  9. Application. —  An application for a permit or license authorized by this section must be signed by both the applicant and another person. That person must be:
    1. The applicant’s parent or guardian;
    2. A person approved by the applicant’s parent or guardian; or
    3. A person approved by the Division.
    4. With respect to minors in the legal custody of the county department of social services, any of the following:
      1. A guardian ad litem or attorney advocate appointed to advocate for the minor under G.S. 7B-601 .
      2. The director of the county department of social services or the director’s designee.
      3. If no person listed in sub-subdivision a. or b. of this subdivision is available, the court with continuing jurisdiction over the minor’s placement under G.S. 7B-1000(b).
  10. Duration and Fee. —  A limited learner’s permit expires on the eighteenth birthday of the permit holder. A limited provisional license expires on the eighteenth birthday of the license holder. A limited learner’s permit or limited provisional license issued under this section that expires on a weekend or State holiday shall remain valid through the fifth regular State business day following the date of expiration. A full provisional license expires on the date set under G.S. 20-7(f) . The fee for a limited learner’s permit or a limited provisional license is twenty-one dollars and fifty cents ($21.50). The fee for a full provisional license is the amount set under G.S. 20-7(i) .
  11. Supervising Driver. —  A supervising driver shall be a parent, grandparent, or guardian of the permit holder or license holder or a responsible person approved by the parent or guardian or the Division. A supervising driver shall be a licensed driver who has been licensed for at least five years. At least one supervising driver shall sign the application for a permit or license.
  12. Violations. —  It is unlawful for the holder of a limited learner’s permit, a temporary permit, or a limited provisional license to drive a motor vehicle in violation of the restrictions that apply to the permit or license. Failure to comply with a restriction concerning the time of driving or the presence of a supervising driver in the vehicle constitutes operating a motor vehicle without a license. Failure to comply with the restriction regarding the use of a mobile telephone while operating a motor vehicle is an infraction punishable by a fine of twenty-five dollars ($25.00). Failure to comply with any other restriction, including seating and passenger limitations, is an infraction punishable by a monetary penalty as provided in G.S. 20-176 . Failure to comply with the provisions of subsections (e) and (g) of this section shall not constitute negligence per se or contributory negligence by the driver or passenger in any action for the recovery of damages arising out of the operation, ownership or maintenance of a motor vehicle. Any evidence of failure to comply with the provisions of subdivisions (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) of subsection (e) of this section shall not be admissible in any criminal or civil trial, action, or proceeding except in an action based on a violation of this section. No drivers license points or insurance surcharge shall be assessed for failure to comply with seating and occupancy limitations in subsection (e) of this section. No drivers license points or insurance surcharge shall be assessed for failure to comply with subsection (e) or (g) of this section regarding the use of a mobile telephone while operating a motor vehicle.
  13. Insurance Status. —  The holder of a limited learner’s permit is not considered a licensed driver for the purpose of determining the inexperienced operator premium surcharge under automobile insurance policies.
  14. Driving Eligibility Certificate. —  A person who desires to obtain a permit or license issued under this section must have a high school diploma or its equivalent or must have a driving eligibility certificate. A driving eligibility certificate must meet the following conditions:
    1. The person who is required to sign the certificate under subdivision (4) of this subsection must show that he or she has determined that one of the following requirements is met:
      1. The person is currently enrolled in school and is making progress toward obtaining a high school diploma or its equivalent.
      2. A substantial hardship would be placed on the person or the person’s family if the person does not receive a certificate.
      3. The person cannot make progress toward obtaining a high school diploma or its equivalent. (1a) The person who is required to sign the certificate under subdivision (4) of this subsection also must show that one of the following requirements is met:

        a. The person who seeks a permit or license issued under this section is not subject to subsection (n1) of this section.

        b. The person who seeks a permit or license issued under this section is subject to subsection (n1) of this section and is eligible for the certificate under that subsection.

    2. It must be on a form approved by the Division.
    3. It must be dated within 30 days of the date the person applies for a permit or license issuable under this section.
    4. It must be signed by the applicable person named below:
      1. The principal, or the principal’s designee, of the public school in which the person is enrolled.
      2. The administrator, or the administrator’s designee, of the nonpublic school in which the person is enrolled.
      3. The person who provides the academic instruction in the home school in which the person is enrolled.

        c1. The person who provides the academic instruction in the home in accordance with an educational program found by a court, prior to July 1, 1998, to comply with the compulsory attendance law.

      4. The designee of the board of directors of the charter school in which the person is enrolled.
      5. The president, or the president’s designee, of the community college in which the person is enrolled.

        Notwithstanding any other law, the decision concerning whether a driving eligibility certificate was properly issued or improperly denied shall be appealed only as provided under the rules adopted in accordance with G.S. 115C-12(28), 115D-5(a3), or 115C-566, whichever is applicable, and may not be appealed under this Chapter.

        (n1) Lose Control; Lose License.

        (1) The following definitions apply in this subsection:

        a. Applicable State entity. — The State Board of Education for public schools and charter schools, the State Board of Community Colleges for community colleges, or the Secretary of Administration for nonpublic schools and home schools.

        b. Certificate. — A driving eligibility certificate that meets the conditions of subsection (n) of this section.

        c. Disciplinary action. — An expulsion, a suspension for more than 10 consecutive days, or an assignment to an alternative educational setting for more than 10 consecutive days.

        d. Enumerated student conduct. — One of the following behaviors that results in disciplinary action:

        1. The possession or sale of an alcoholic beverage or an illegal controlled substance on school property.
        2. The bringing, possession, or use on school property of a weapon or firearm that resulted in disciplinary action under G.S. 115C-390.10 or that could have resulted in that disciplinary action if the conduct had occurred in a public school.
        3. The physical assault on a teacher or other school personnel on school property.

          e. School. — A public school, charter school, community college, nonpublic school, or home school.

      6. School administrator. — The person who is required to sign certificates under subdivision (4) of subsection (n) of this section.
      7. School property. — The physical premises of the school, school buses or other vehicles under the school’s control or contract and that are used to transport students, and school-sponsored curricular or extracurricular activities that occur on or off the physical premises of the school.
      8. Student. — A person who desires to obtain a permit or license issued under this section.

        (2) Any student who was subject to disciplinary action for enumerated student conduct that occurred either after the first day of July before the school year in which the student enrolled in the eighth grade or after the student’s fourteenth birthday, whichever event occurred first, is subject to this subsection.

        (3) A student who is subject to this subsection is eligible for a certificate when the school administrator determines that the student has exhausted all administrative appeals connected to the disciplinary action and that one of the following conditions is met:

        a. The enumerated student conduct occurred before the student reached the age of 15, and the student is now at least 16 years old.

        b. The enumerated student conduct occurred after the student reached the age of 15, and it is at least one year after the date the student exhausted all administrative appeals connected to the disciplinary action.

        c. The student needs the certificate in order to drive to and from school, a drug or alcohol treatment counseling program, as appropriate, or a mental health treatment program, and no other transportation is available.

        (4) A student whose permit or license is denied or revoked due to ineligibility for a certificate under this subsection may otherwise be eligible for a certificate if, after six months from the date of the ineligibility, the school administrator determines that one of the following conditions is met:

        a. The student has returned to school or has been placed in an alternative educational setting, and has displayed exemplary student behavior, as defined by the applicable State entity.

        b. The disciplinary action was for the possession or sale of an alcoholic beverage or an illegal controlled substance on school property, and the student subsequently attended and successfully completed, as defined by the applicable State entity, a drug or alcohol treatment counseling program, as appropriate.

History. 1935, c. 52, s. 6; 1953, c. 355; 1955, c. 1187, s. 8; 1963, c. 968, ss. 2, 2A; 1965, c. 410, s. 3; c. 1171; 1967, c. 694; 1969, c. 37; 1973, c. 191, ss. 1, 2; c. 664, ss. 1, 2; 1975, c. 79; c. 716, s. 5; 1979, c. 101; c. 667, ss. 15, 16, 41; 1981 (Reg. Sess., 1982), c. 1257, s. 2; 1989 (Reg. Sess., 1990), c. 1021, s. 11; 1991, c. 689, s. 326; 1993, c. 539, s. 319; 1994, Ex. Sess., c. 24, s. 14(c); 1997-16, s. 1; 1997-443, s. 32.20; 1997-507, s. 1; 1998-149, ss. 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5; 1998-212, s. 9.21(c); 1999-243, ss. 1, 2; 1999-276, s. 1; 1999-387, s. 4; 1999-452, s. 9; 2001-194, s. 1; 2001-487, s. 51.5(a); 2002-73, ss. 1, 2; 2002-159, s. 30; 2005-276, s. 44.1(b); 2006-177, ss. 2-7; 2011-145, s. 28.37(d); 2011-282, s. 15; 2011-381, s. 3; 2011-385, ss. 1-3; 2011-412, s. 3.2; 2015-135, s. 4.2; 2015-241, s. 29.30(b); 2021-24, s. 1; 2021-134, s. 12; 2021-185, s. 15(a).

Subdivision (d)(1) Set Out Twice.

The first version of subdivision (d)(1) set out above is effective until December 31, 2022. The second version of subdivision (d)(1) set out above is effective December 31, 2022.

DMV Quadrennial Fee Adjustment.

G.S. 20-4.02 requires the Division of Motor Vehicles, beginning July 1, 2020, to adjust certain fees and rates every four years, to consult with the Joint Legislative Commission on Governmental Operations, and to report to the chairs of the House and Senate appropriations committees on transportation. Session Laws 2021-180, s. 41.26, effective July 1, 2021, further amended G.S. 20-4.02 (d), directing the Division to notify the Revisor of Statutes of any adjustment, and directing the Revisor to adjust the appropriate amounts in any affected statutes. By letter dated January 24, 2020, the Division of Motor Vehicles advised of a fee increase factor of 7.86%, effective July 1, 2020, and provided a chart displaying the DMV Quadrennial Fee Adjustments affecting G.S. 20-7 , 20-11, 20-14, 20-16, 20-26, 20-37.15, 20-37.16, 20-42(b), 20-63(h), 20-85(a)(1)-(10), 20-85.1, 20-87, 20-88, 20-289, 20-385, and 44A-4(b)(1). Pursuant to the authority granted in G.S. 20-4.02, the Revisor of Statutes has adjusted the fee amounts in the affected statutes to reflect the Division’s increase.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 1997-16, s. 10 provides that this act does not appropriate funds to the Division to implement this act nor does it obligate the General Assembly to appropriate funds to implement this act.

Session Laws 2011-145, s. 1.1, provides: “This act shall be known as the ‘Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2011.’ ”

Session Laws 2011-145, s. 32.5 is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2016-23, s. 6(a)-(c), provides: “(a) Notwithstanding State Board of Education policy, GCS-R-004, or any other provision of law, if a student enrolled in a North Carolina public school or charter school under subsection (a) of Section 5 of this act [S.L. 2016-23, s. 5(a) pertains to the impact on public school student enrollment as a result of certification of the boundary between North Carolina and South Carolina] obtains a beginner’s permit in South Carolina, the student shall be eligible to participate in behind-the-wheel instruction as part of a driver education course offered by the local school administrative unit in which the student is enrolled.

“(b) Notwithstanding G.S. 20-11(b)(1), a student who (i) as a result of the boundary certification becomes a legal resident of North Carolina on the date of the certification and (ii) is enrolled in a South Carolina school district in which his or her residence was located prior to certification or in the South Carolina statewide public charter school district may meet the requirement in G.S. 20-11(b)(1) for obtaining a limited learner’s permit if the student passes a course of driver education offered by the South Carolina high school in which the student is enrolled.

“(c) The Department of Transportation, Division of Motor Vehicles, in collaboration with the State Board of Education, shall develop a procedure for any North Carolina resident who is a student enrolled in a South Carolina school pursuant to the conditions described in subsection (b) of this section to satisfy the driver eligibility certificate requirements of G.S. 20-11 to obtain and continue to hold a limited or full provisional license under this section.”

Session Laws 2016-23, s. 12(a), is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2020-3, s. 4.7(a)-(h), as amended by Session Laws 2020-97, ss. 3.15(a), 3.16(a), provides: “(a) Definition. — For purposes of this section, ‘credential’ means any of the following issued by the Division of Motor Vehicles:

“(1) Drivers license.

“(2) Learner’s permit.

“(3) Limited learner’s permit.

“(4) Limited provisional license.

“(5) Full provisional license.

“(6) Commercial drivers license.

“(7) Commercial learner’s permit.

“(8) Temporary driving certificate.

“(9) Special identification card.

“(10) Handicapped placard.

“(11) Vehicle registration.

“(12) Temporary vehicle registration.

“(13) Dealer license plate.

“(14) Transporter plate.

“(15) Loaner/Dealer ‘LD’ plate.

“(16) Vehicle inspection authorization.

“(17) Inspection station license.

“(18) Inspection mechanic license.

“(19) Transportation network company permit.

“(20) Motor vehicle dealer license.

“(21) Sales representative license.

“(22) Manufacturer license.

“(23) Distributor license.

“(24) Wholesaler license.

“(25) Driver training school license.

“(26) Driver training school instructor license.

“(27) Professional housemoving license.

“(b) Extend Validity of Credentials. — Notwithstanding renewal, duration, or expiration provisions of G.S. 20-7 , 20-11, 20-37.6, 20-37.7, 20-37.13, 20-50, 20-66, 20-79, 20-79.02, 20-79.2, 20-183.4B, 20-183.4D, 20-280.3, 20-288, 20-324, and 20-359, or any other provision of law to the contrary, the Division of Motor Vehicles shall extend for a period of five months the validity of any credential that expires on or after March 1, 2020, and before August 1, 2020. The Division shall extend for a period of five months the validity of any credential listed in subdivisions (6), (7), (9), (10), and (18) of subsection (a) of this section that expires on or after March 1, 2020, and before the date 30 days after the date the Governor (i) rescinds Executive Order No. 116 or (ii) issues another executive order lifting restrictions on Division of Motor Vehicles functions. Notwithstanding G.S. 20-37.13(h) and G.S. 20-37.13 A(a), the Division of Motor Vehicles is authorized to waive the requirement that commercial drivers license and commercial learner’s permit holders have a medical examination and certification, as required by federal law, consistent with any waiver of medical qualifications standards issued by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. A credential extended under this section shall expire five months from the date it otherwise expires as prescribed by law prior to this section. However, the subsequent expiration of a credential extended under this section shall occur on the date prescribed by law prior to this section without regard to the extension. The Division shall notify individuals affected by an extension granted under this section, including information on new expiration dates and how the extension affects subsequent renewal and expiration dates.

“(b1) Extension of Intrastate Medical Waivers. — Notwithstanding the limitation on duration of waivers in G.S. 20-37.13 A(b), the Division of Motor Vehicles may extend for up to five months the validity of a medical waiver issued by the Division under G.S. 20-37.13 A if the waiver expires on or after March 1, 2020, and before the date 30 days after the date the Governor (i) rescinds Executive Order No. 116 or (ii) issues another executive order lifting restrictions on Division of Motor Vehicles functions, and the Division’s Medical Review Unit determines the extension is appropriate.

“(c) Driving Eligibility Certificates. — Notwithstanding G.S. 20-11 (n)(3), a driving eligibility certificate dated on or after February 9, 2020, and before March 10, 2020, remains valid and may be accepted by the Division of Motor Vehicles to meet the requirements for a license or permit issued under G.S. 20-11 until 30 days after the date the Governor rescinds Executive Order No. 116 or the date the Division reopens all drivers license offices, whichever is earlier.

“(d) Waive Penalties. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Division shall waive any fines, fees, or penalties associated with failing to renew a credential during the period of time the credential is valid by extension under subsection (b) of this section.

“(e) Motor Vehicle Taxes. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, due dates for motor vehicle taxes that are tied to registration expiration under Article 22A of Chapter 105 of the General Statutes shall be extended to correspond with extended expiration dates under subsection (b) of this section.

“(f) Validity by Extension a Defense. — A person may not be convicted or found responsible for any offense resulting from failure to renew a credential issued by the Division if, when tried for that offense, the person shows that the offense occurred during the period of time the credential is valid by extension under subsection (b) of this section.

“(g) Report. — Within 30 days of the extensions made under subsection (b) of this section, the Division shall submit a report to the Joint Legislative Transportation Oversight Committee and the Fiscal Research Division detailing implementation of this section.

“(h) Effective Date. — This section is effective retroactively to March 1, 2020, and applies to expirations occurring on or after that date.”

Session Laws 2020-3, s. 5, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2020-30, s. 1(a)-(c), provides: “(a) Notwithstanding G.S. 20-11(d)(3), the Division of Motor Vehicles shall waive the requirement that an applicant pass a road test in order to obtain a Level 2 limited provisional license if the applicant meets all other requirements to obtain the license.

“(b) In addition to all other requirements for a Level 3 full provisional license set out in G.S. 20-11 , a Level 2 limited provisional license holder who receives a waiver under subsection (a) of this section must pass a road test administered by the Division in order to obtain a Level 3 full provisional license.

“(c) This section is effective when it becomes law [June 19, 2020] and applies to applications for provisional licenses submitted on or after that date. Subsection (a) of this section expires on the date the Division resumes administering road tests for Level 2 limited provisional license applicants.”

Session Laws 2020-97, s. 4.5, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2021-24, s. 2, as amended by Session Laws 2021-134, s. 12, made the substitution of “six months” for “12 months” in subdivision (d)(1) of this section by Session Laws 2021-24, s. 1, effective May 24, 2021, and applicable to applications for licenses submitted on or after that date, and provided for the expiration of s. 1 on December 31, 2022.

Session Laws 2021-130, s. 11(a), (b) provides: “(a) Notwithstanding G.S. 20-11(n), 115C-12(28), 115C-218.70, 115C-288(k), 115C-566, and 115D-5(a3), a person required to sign a driving eligibility certificate shall issue the driving eligibility certificate without requiring the person to whom it is issued to be making progress toward obtaining a high school diploma or its equivalent, and no school authority shall notify the Division of Motor Vehicles that a person no longer meets the requirements for a driving eligibility certificate because the person is not making progress toward obtaining a high school diploma or its equivalent.

“(b) This section is effective when it becomes law and expires January 30, 2022.”

Session Laws 2021-130, s. 12(a), (b), provides: “(a) Past Performance Revocation Restoration. — The Division of Motor Vehicles shall restore the permit or license of any person whose permit or license was revoked by the Division under G.S. 20-13.2(c1) due to ineligibility for a driving eligibility certificate under G.S. 20-11(n)(1). For restorations granted under this section, the Division shall not charge a restoration fee and the Division must expunge any record of revocation from the person’s driving record.

“(b) This section is effective when it becomes law and applies to revocations resulting from notifications of ineligibility received by the Division dated on or after March 1, 2020, through the effective date of this section.”

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 44.1(b), effective October 1, 2005, substituted “fifteen dollars ($15.00)” for “ten dollars ($10.00)” in subsection (j).

Session Laws 2006-177, ss. 2-7, effective December 1, 2006, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, added subdivisions (c)(6) and (e)(6); inserted “or a violation of G.S. 20-137.3 ” in the middle of subdivisions (d)(2) and (f)(2); added the last sentence in subsection (g); and, in subsection (l), added the third sentence, substituted “subsections (e) and (g)” for “subsection (e)” in the fifth sentence, inserted “of subdivisions (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5)” in the middle of the sixth sentence, and added the last sentence.

Session Laws 2011-145, s. 28.37(d), effective July 1, 2011, updated the section reference in subdivision (b)(1).

Session Laws 2011-282, s. 15, effective June 23, 2011, and applicable beginning with the 2011-2012 school year, substituted “G.S. 115C-390.10” for “G.S. 115C-391(d1)” in subdivision (n1)(1)d.2.

Session Laws 2011-385, ss. 1 through 3, as amended by Session Laws 2011-412, s. 3.2, in sub-subdivisions (e)(2)b. and (e)(2)c., inserted “directly”; and added subdivisions (d)(5) and (f)(4). For effective date and applicability, see editor’s note.

Session Laws 2015-135, s. 4.2, effective October 1, 2015, added subdivision (i)(4).

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 29.30(b), effective January 1, 2016, substituted “twenty dollars ($20.00)” for “fifteen dollars ($15.00)” in the next-to-last sentence of subsection (j). For applicability, see editor’s note.

Session Laws 2021-24, s. 1, substituted “six months” for “12 months” in subdivision (d)(1). For effective date, applicability, and expiration of amendment, see editor’s note.

Session Laws 2021-185, s. 15(a), effective November 23, 2021, rewrote subdivision (d)(3).

Legal Periodicals.

For 1997 legislative survey, see 20 Campbell L. Rev. 491.

CASE NOTES

Conflicting Presumptions. —

While this section created a presumption that plaintiff, mother of the driver, occupying the front passenger seat, had the right to control and direct the operation of the vehicle by her son, who was operating under a learner’s permit, but the facts of the case also implicated a conflicting presumption, namely the rule of law that her husband as owner of the vehicle and a passenger there in the vehicle had the right to control and direct its operation unless he relinquished that right, based on plaintiff’s and her husband’s equal rights to control son’s operation of the vehicle, person who actually exercised the right to control son’s driving would bear responsibility therefor. McFetters v. McFetters, 98 N.C. App. 187, 390 S.E.2d 348, 1990 N.C. App. LEXIS 380 (1990).

Presumption of Control. —

This section creates a presumption that the statutorily approved person occupying the front passenger seat has the right to control and direct the operation of the vehicle. Stanfield v. Tilghman ex rel. Stanfield, 117 N.C. App. 292, 450 S.E.2d 751, 1994 N.C. App. LEXIS 1211 (1994), rev'd, 342 N.C. 389 , 464 S.E.2d 294, 1995 N.C. LEXIS 682 (1995).

While front seat passenger who was a licensed driver was presumed to have “the right to control” the vehicle, this presumption does not translate into an irrebuttable presumption “of control” so as to impute negligence or establish contributory negligence, as a matter of law, without regard for exigent circumstances or general negligence principles. Stanfield v. Tilghman, 342 N.C. 389 , 464 S.E.2d 294, 1995 N.C. LEXIS 682 (1995).

Sanctions imposed under G.S. 1A-1-11 were not an abuse of discretion because the trial court found that there was absolutely no basis in the law for any negligence claim against a backseat passenger where it was not alleged that the passenger had any legal right or duty to control the operation of the motor vehicle driven by an underaged driver who was unlicensed under G.S. 20-11 ; further, there were insufficient allegations to establish a legal basis for liability for any vicarious liability, and plaintiffs’ counsel had signed and certified the complaint as having merit. Harris v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 180 N.C. App. 551, 638 S.E.2d 260, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 2500 (2006).

Statutorily Approved Person May Recover Damages. —

The negligence of a driver, operating an automobile under a valid learner’s permit pursuant to subsection (b), is not imputed to the statutorily approved person who occupies the seat next to the permittee and who has the right to control and direct the permittee’s operation of the car. Therefore, the statutorily approved person is not precluded from recovering damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of the permittee’s sudden negligence. Stanfield v. Tilghman, 342 N.C. 389 , 464 S.E.2d 294, 1995 N.C. LEXIS 682 (1995).

If the permittee’s negligent operation of a vehicle was imputed, in all instances as a matter of law to the supervising adult, such adults, including driver education instructors, would be less inclined to serve as supervisors over a permittee’s practice driving, thus militating against our public policy and practice regarding drivers’ education. Stanfield v. Tilghman, 342 N.C. 389 , 464 S.E.2d 294, 1995 N.C. LEXIS 682 (1995).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

“Lose Control, Lose Your License” Legislation. — The application of G.S. 20-11(n1)(1)d.2. does not require a one-year loss of the driver’s license or learner’s permit for a home school student who used a weapon or firearm in a lawful manner under the supervision of his or her parent/guardian on the property of the parent/guardian. See opinion of Attorney General to R. Glen Peterson, General Counsel, N.C. Department of Administration, 2000 N.C. AG LEXIS 11 (6/5/2000).

§ 20-11.1. [Repealed]

Repealed by Session Laws 1965, c. 410, s. 4.

§ 20-12. [Repealed]

Repealed by Session Laws 1997-16, s. 6.

§ 20-12.1. Impaired supervision or instruction.

  1. It is unlawful for a person to serve as a supervising driver under G.S. 20-7(l) or G.S. 20-11 or as an approved instructor under G.S. 20-7(m) in any of the following circumstances:
    1. While under the influence of an impairing substance.
    2. After having consumed sufficient alcohol to have, at any relevant time after the driving, an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.
  2. An offense under this section is an implied-consent offense under G.S. 20-16.2 .

History. 1977, c. 116, ss. 1, 2; 1981, c. 412, s. 4; c. 747, s. 66; 1983, c. 435, s. 9; 1993, c. 285, s. 2; 1997-16, s. 7; 1997-443, s. 32.20.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 1997-16, s. 10 provides that this act does not appropriate funds to the Division to implement this act nor does it obligate the General Assembly to appropriate funds to implement this act.

§ 20-13. Suspension of license of provisional licensee.

  1. The Division may suspend, with or without a preliminary hearing, the operator’s license of a provisional licensee upon receipt of notice of the licensee’s conviction of a motor vehicle moving violation, in accordance with subsection (b), if the offense was committed while the person was still a provisional licensee. As used in this section, the phrase “motor vehicle moving violation” does not include the offenses listed in the third paragraph of G.S. 20-16(c) for which no points are assessed, nor does it include equipment violations specified in Part 9 of Article 3 of this Chapter. However, if the Division revokes without a preliminary hearing and the person whose license is being revoked requests a hearing before the effective date of the revocation, the licensee retains his license unless it is revoked under some other provision of the law, until the hearing is held, the person withdraws his request, or he fails to appear at a scheduled hearing.
  2. The Division may suspend the license of a provisional licensee as follows:
    1. For the first motor vehicle moving violation, the Division may not suspend the license of the provisional licensee.
    2. For conviction of a second motor vehicle moving violation committed within 12 months of the date the first offense was committed, the Division may suspend the licensee’s license for up to 30 days.
    3. For conviction of a third motor vehicle moving violation committed within 12 months of the date the first offense was committed, the Division may suspend the licensee’s license for up to 90 days.
    4. For conviction of a fourth motor vehicle moving violation committed within 12 months of the date the first offense was committed, the Division may suspend the licensee’s license for up to six months.

      The Division may, in lieu of suspension and with the written consent of the licensee, place the licensee on probation for a period of not more than 12 months on such terms and conditions as the Division sees fit to impose.If the Division suspends the provisional licensee’s license for at least 90 days without a preliminary hearing, the parent, guardian or other person standing in loco parentis of the provisional licensee may request a hearing to determine if the provisional licensee’s license should be restored on a probationary status. The Division may wait until one-half the period of suspension has expired to hold the hearing. The Division may place the licensee on probation for up to 12 months on such terms and conditions as the Division sees fit to impose, if the licensee consents in writing to the terms and conditions of probation.

  3. In the event of conviction of two or more motor vehicle moving offenses committed on a single occasion, a licensee shall be charged, for purposes of this section, with only one moving offense, except as otherwise provided.
  4. The suspension provided for in this section is in addition to any other remedies which the Division may have against a licensee under other provisions of law; however, when the license of any person is suspended under this section and at the same time is also suspended under other provisions of law, the suspensions run concurrently.
  5. Repealed by Session Laws 1987, c. 869, s. 14, effective January 1, 1988.

History. 1963, c. 968, s. 1; 1965, c. 897; 1967, c. 295, s. 1; 1971, c. 120, ss. 1, 2; 1973, c. 439; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1979, c. 555, s. 1; 1983, c. 538, ss. 1, 2; 1983 (Reg. Sess., 1984), c. 1101, s. 3; 1987, c. 744, ss. 3, 4; c. 869, s. 14.

CASE NOTES

Where the law directs suspension, revocation, or nonissuance of a driver’s license, the grounds are convictions for moving violations, or other statutory violations relating to highway safety, or situations where an individual’s capacity to operate a motor vehicle safely are manifestly questionable. Evans v. Roberson, 69 N.C. App. 644, 317 S.E.2d 715, 1984 N.C. App. LEXIS 3529 (1984), rev'd, 314 N.C. 315 , 333 S.E.2d 228, 1985 N.C. LEXIS 1781 (1985).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Operation of Vehicle with Improper Taillights Is a Moving Violation. — See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Henry M. Whitesides, Fourteenth Solicitorial District, 41 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 211 (1971).

§ 20-13.1. [Repealed]

Repealed by Session Laws 1979, c. 555, s. 2.

§ 20-13.2. Grounds for revoking provisional license.

  1. The Division must revoke the license of a person convicted of violating the provisions of G.S. 20-138.3 upon receipt of a record of the licensee’s conviction.
  2. If a person is convicted of an offense involving impaired driving and the offense occurs while he is less than 21 years old, his license must be revoked under this section in addition to any other revocation required or authorized by law.
  3. If a person willfully refuses to submit to a chemical analysis pursuant to G.S. 20-16.2 while he is less than 21 years old, his license must be revoked under this section, in addition to any other revocation required or authorized by law. A revocation order entered under authority of this subsection becomes effective at the same time as a revocation order issued under G.S. 20-16.2 for the same willful refusal. (c1) Upon receipt of notification from the proper school authority that a person no longer meets the requirements for a driving eligibility certificate under G.S. 20-11(n), the Division must expeditiously notify the person that his or her permit or license is revoked effective on the tenth calendar day after the mailing of the revocation notice. The Division must revoke the permit or license of that person on the tenth calendar day after the mailing of the revocation notice. Notwithstanding subsection (d) of this section, the length of revocation must last for the following periods:
    1. If the revocation is because of ineligibility for a driving eligibility certificate under G.S. 20-11(n)(1), then the revocation shall last until the person’s eighteenth birthday.
    2. If the revocation is because of ineligibility for a driving eligibility certificate under G.S. 20-11(n1), then the revocation shall be for a period of one year.For a person whose permit or license was revoked due to ineligibility for a driving eligibility certificate under G.S. 20-11(n)(1), the Division must restore a person’s permit or license before the person’s eighteenth birthday, if the person submits to the Division one of the following:

      (1) A high school diploma or its equivalent.

      (2) A driving eligibility certificate as required under G.S. 20-11(n).

      If the Division restores a permit or license that was revoked due to ineligibility for a driving eligibility certificate under G.S. 20-11(n)(1), any record of revocation or suspension shall be expunged by the Division from the person’s driving record. The Division shall not expunge a suspension or revocation record if a person has had a prior expunction from the person’s driving record for any reason.For a person whose permit or license was revoked due to ineligibility for a driving eligibility certificate under G.S. 20-11(n1), the Division shall restore a person’s permit or license before the end of the revocation period, if the person submits to the Division a driving eligibility certificate as required under G.S. 20-11(n).Notwithstanding any other law, the decision concerning whether a driving eligibility certificate was properly issued or improperly denied shall be appealed only as provided under the rules adopted in accordance with G.S. 115C-12(28), 115D-5(a3), or 115C-566, whichever is applicable, and may not be appealed under this Chapter.

      (c2) The Division must revoke the permit or license of a person under the age of 18 upon receiving a record of the person’s conviction for malicious use of an explosive or incendiary device to damage property (G.S. 14-49(b) and (b1)); conspiracy to injure or damage by use of an explosive or incendiary device (G.S. 14-50); making a false report concerning a destructive device in a public building (G.S. 14-69.1(c)); perpetrating a hoax concerning a destructive device in a public building (G.S. 14-69.2(c)); possessing or carrying a dynamite cartridge, bomb, grenade, mine, or powerful explosive on educational property (G.S. 14-269.2(b1)); or causing, encouraging, or aiding a minor to possess or carry a dynamite cartridge, bomb, grenade, mine, or powerful explosive on educational property (G.S. 14-269.2(c1)).

  4. The length of revocation under this section shall be one year. Revocations under this section run concurrently with any other revocations.
  5. Before the Division restores a driver’s license that has been suspended or revoked under any provision of this Article, other than G.S. 20-24.1 , the person seeking to have his driver’s license restored shall submit to the Division proof that he has notified his insurance agent or company of his seeking the restoration and that he is financially responsible. Proof of financial responsibility shall be in one of the following forms:
    1. A written certificate or electronically-transmitted facsimile thereof from any insurance carrier duly authorized to do business in this State certifying that there is in effect a nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle liability policy for the benefit of the person required to furnish proof of financial responsibility. The certificate or facsimile shall state the effective date and expiration date of the nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle liability policy and shall state the date that the certificate or facsimile is issued. The certificate or facsimile shall remain effective proof of financial responsibility for a period of 30 consecutive days following the date the certificate or facsimile is issued but shall not in and of itself constitute a binder or policy of insurance or
    2. A binder for or policy of nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle liability insurance under which the applicant is insured, provided that the binder or policy states the effective date and expiration date of the nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle liability policy.The preceding provisions of this subsection do not apply to applicants who do not own currently registered motor vehicles and who do not operate nonfleet private passenger motor vehicles that are owned by other persons and that are not insured under commercial motor vehicle liability insurance policies. In such cases, the applicant shall sign a written certificate to that effect. Such certificate shall be furnished by the Division and may be incorporated into the restoration application form. Any material misrepresentation made by such person on such certificate shall be grounds for suspension of that person’s license for a period of 90 days.For the purposes of this subsection, the term “nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle” has the definition ascribed to it in Article 40 of General Statute Chapter 58.The Commissioner may require that certificates required by this subsection be on a form approved by the Commissioner. The financial responsibility required by this subsection shall be kept in effect for not less than three years after the date that the license is restored. Failure to maintain financial responsibility as required by this subsection shall be grounds for suspending the restored driver’s license for a period of thirty (30) days. Nothing in this subsection precludes any person from showing proof of financial responsibility in any other manner authorized by Articles 9A and 13 of this Chapter.

History. 1983, c. 435, s. 33; 1987, c. 869, s. 12; 1989, c. 436, s. 3; 1993, c. 285, s. 8; 1995, c. 506, ss. 3, 4, 5; 1997-507, s. 2; 1999-243, s. 3; 1999-257, s. 4; 2013-133, s. 1.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2021-130, s. 12(a), (b), provides: “(a) Past Performance Revocation Restoration. — The Division of Motor Vehicles shall restore the permit or license of any person whose permit or license was revoked by the Division under G.S. 20-13.2(c1) due to ineligibility for a driving eligibility certificate under G.S. 20-11(n)(1). For restorations granted under this section, the Division shall not charge a restoration fee and the Division must expunge any record of revocation from the person’s driving record.

“(b) This section is effective when it becomes law and applies to revocations resulting from notifications of ineligibility received by the Division dated on or after March 1, 2020, through the effective date of this section.”

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2013-133, s. 1, effective December 1, 2013, added the last two sentences in the second paragraph of subsection (c1). For applicability, see Editor’s note.

Legal Periodicals.

For survey on new penalties for criminal behavior in schools, see 22 Campbell L. Rev. 253 (2000).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Regarding the application of this section to three separate groups of drivers based upon when driving privileges were received, see opinion of Attorney General to Michael E. Ward, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, N.C. General Assembly, 1999 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 11 (10/14/99).

§ 20-13.3. Immediate civil license revocation for provisional licensees charged with certain offenses.

  1. Definitions. —  As used in this section, the following words and phrases have the following meanings:
    1. Clerk. — As defined in G.S. 15A-101(2) .
    2. Criminal moving violation. — A violation of Part 9 or 10 of Article 3 of this Chapter which is punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony offense. This term does not include the offenses listed in the third paragraph of G.S. 20-16(c) for which no points are assessed, nor does it include equipment violations specified in Part 9 of Article 3 of this Chapter.
    3. Judicial official. — As defined in G.S. 15A-101(5) .
    4. Provisional licensee. — A person under the age of 18 who has a limited learner’s permit, a limited provisional license, or a full provisional license issued pursuant to G.S. 20-11 .
    5. Revocation report. — A sworn statement by a law enforcement officer containing facts indicating that the conditions of subsection (b) of this section have been met.
  2. Revocations for Provisional Licensees Charged With Criminal Moving Violation. —  A provisional licensee’s permit or license is subject to revocation under this section if a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the provisional licensee has committed a criminal moving violation, the provisional licensee is charged with that offense, and the provisional licensee is not subject to a civil revocation pursuant to G.S. 20-16.5 .
  3. Duty of Law Enforcement Officers to Notify Provisional Licensee and Report to Judicial Officials. —  If a provisional licensee’s permit or license is subject to revocation under this section, the law enforcement officer must execute a revocation report. It is the specific duty of the law enforcement officer to make sure that the report is expeditiously filed with a judicial official as required by this section. If no initial appearance is required on the underlying criminal moving violation at the time of the issuance of the charge, the law enforcement officer must verbally notify the provisional licensee that the provisional licensee’s permit or license is subject to revocation pursuant to this section and must provide the provisional licensee with a written form containing notice of the process for revocation and hearing under this section.

    (c1) Which Judicial Official Must Receive Report. — The judicial official with whom the revocation report must be filed is:

    1. The judicial official conducting the initial appearance on the underlying criminal moving violation.
    2. The clerk of superior court in the county in which the underlying criminal charge has been brought if no initial appearance is required.
  4. Procedure If Report Filed With Judicial Official When Provisional Licensee Is Present. —  If an initial appearance is required, the law enforcement officer must file the revocation report with the judicial official conducting the initial appearance on the underlying criminal moving violation. If a properly executed revocation report concerning a provisional licensee is filed with a judicial official when the person is present before that official, the judicial official shall, after completing any other proceedings involving the provisional licensee, determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the conditions of subsection (b) of this section have been met. If the judicial official determines there is such probable cause, the judicial official shall enter an order revoking the provisional licensee’s permit or license. In addition to setting it out in the order, the judicial official shall personally inform the provisional licensee of the right to a hearing as specified in subsection (d2) of this section and that the provisional licensee’s permit or license remains revoked pending the hearing. The period of revocation is for 30 days and begins at the time the revocation order is issued and continues for 30 additional calendar days. The judicial official shall give the provisional licensee a copy of the revocation order, which shall include the beginning date of the revocation and shall clearly state the final day of the revocation period and the date on which the provisional licensee’s permit or license will again become valid. The provisional licensee shall not be required to surrender the provisional licensee’s permit or license; however, the provisional licensee shall not be authorized to drive at any time or for any purpose during the period of revocation. (d1) Procedure If Report Filed With Clerk of Court When Provisional Licensee Not Present. — When a clerk receives a properly executed report under subdivision (2) of subsection (c1) of this section and the provisional licensee named in the revocation report is not present before the clerk, the clerk shall determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the conditions of subsection (b) of this section have been met. If the clerk determines there is such probable cause, the clerk shall mail to the provisional licensee a revocation order by first-class mail. The order shall inform the provisional licensee that the period of revocation is for 30 days, that the revocation becomes effective on the fourth day after the order is deposited in the United States mail and continues for 30 additional calendar days, of the right to a hearing as specified in subsection (d2) of this section, and that the revocation remains in effect pending the hearing. The provisional licensee shall not be required to surrender the provisional licensee’s permit or license; however, the provisional licensee shall not be authorized to drive at any time or for any purpose during the period of revocation.

    (d2) Hearing Before Magistrate or Judge If Provisional Licensee Contests Validity of Revocation. — A provisional licensee whose permit or license is revoked under this section may request in writing a hearing to contest the validity of the revocation. The request may be made at the time of the person’s initial appearance, or within 10 days of the effective date of the revocation to the clerk or a magistrate designated by the clerk, and may specifically request that the hearing be conducted by a district court judge. The Administrative Office of the Courts must develop a hearing request form for any provisional licensee requesting a hearing. Unless a district court judge is requested, the hearing must be conducted within the county by a magistrate assigned by the chief district court judge to conduct such hearings. If the provisional licensee requests that a district court judge hold the hearing, the hearing must be conducted within the district court district as defined in G.S. 7A-133 by a district court judge assigned to conduct such hearings. The revocation remains in effect pending the hearing, but the hearing must be held within three working days following the request if the hearing is before a magistrate or within ten working days if the hearing is before a district court judge. The request for the hearing must specify the grounds upon which the validity of the revocation is challenged, and the hearing must be limited to the grounds specified in the request. A witness may submit his evidence by affidavit unless he is subpoenaed to appear. Any person who appears and testifies is subject to questioning by the judicial official conducting the hearing, and the judicial official may adjourn the hearing to seek additional evidence if the judicial official is not satisfied with the accuracy or completeness of evidence. The provisional licensee contesting the validity of the revocation may, but is not required to, testify in his own behalf. Unless contested by the person requesting the hearing, the judicial official may accept as true any matter stated in the revocation report. If any relevant condition under subsection (b) of this section is contested, the judicial official must find by the greater weight of the evidence that the condition was met in order to sustain the revocation. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judicial official must enter an order sustaining or rescinding the revocation. The judicial official’s findings are without prejudice to the provisional licensee contesting the revocation and to any other potential party as to any other proceedings, civil or criminal, that may involve facts bearing upon the conditions in subsection (b) of this section considered by the judicial official. The decision of the judicial official is final and may not be appealed in the General Court of Justice. If the hearing is not held and completed within three working days of the written request for a hearing before a magistrate or within ten working days of the written request for a hearing before a district court judge, the judicial official must enter an order rescinding the revocation, unless the provisional licensee contesting the revocation contributed to the delay in completing the hearing. If the provisional licensee requesting the hearing fails to appear at the hearing or any rescheduling thereof after having been properly notified, the provisional licensee forfeits the right to a hearing.

  5. Report to Division. —  The clerk shall notify the Division of the issuance of a revocation order pursuant to this section within two business days of the issuance of the revocation order. The notification shall identify the person whose provisional license has been revoked and specify the beginning and end date of the revocation period.
  6. Effect of Revocations. —  A revocation under this section revokes a provisional licensee’s privilege to drive in North Carolina. Revocations under this section are independent of and run concurrently with any other revocations, except for a revocation pursuant to G.S. 20-16.5 . Any civil revocation issued pursuant to G.S. 20-16.5 for the same underlying conduct as a revocation under this section shall have the effect of terminating a revocation pursuant to this section. No court imposing a period of revocation following conviction for an offense involving impaired driving may give credit for any period of revocation imposed under this section. A person whose license is revoked pursuant to this section is not eligible to receive a limited driving privilege.
  7. Designation of Proceedings. —  Proceedings under this section are civil actions and must be identified by the caption “In the Matter of  _______________ ” and filed as directed by the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  8. No drivers license points or insurance surcharge shall be assessed for a revocation pursuant to this section. Possession of a drivers license revoked pursuant to this section shall not be a violation of G.S. 20-30 .
  9. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall adopt forms to implement this section.

History. 2011-385, s. 4; 2011-412, s. 3.2; 2012-168, s. 3.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2012-168, s. 3, effective October 1, 2012, added subsections (c1), (d1), (d2) and (i); in subsection (c), inserted “Notify Provisional Licensee and” in the subsection heading, deleted “and must take the provisional licensee before a judicial official for an initial appearance” at the end of the first sentence, and added the last sentence; in subsection (d), rewrote the subsection heading, added “If an initial appearance is required” at the beginning of the first sentence, and added the fourth sentence; and added the last sentence in subsection (h). For applicability, see Editor’s note.

§ 20-14. Duplicate licenses.

A person may obtain a duplicate of a license issued by the Division by paying a fee of fourteen dollars ($14.00) and giving the Division satisfactory proof that any of the following has occurred:

  1. The person’s license has been lost or destroyed.
  2. It is necessary to change the name or address on the license.
  3. Because of age, the person is entitled to a license with a different color photographic background or a different color border.
  4. The Division revoked the person’s license, the revocation period has expired, and the period for which the license was issued has not expired.

History. 1935, c. 52, s. 9; 1943, c. 649, s. 2; 1969, c. 783, s. 2; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1979, c. 667, s. 41; 1981, c. 690, s. 11; 1983, c. 443, s. 3; 1991, c. 682, s. 2; c. 689, s. 327; 1991 (Reg. Sess., 1992), c. 1007, s. 28; 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 675, s. 2; 2004-189, s. 5(b); 2005-276, s. 44.1(c); 2015-241, s. 29.30(c).

DMV Quadrennial Fee Adjustment.

G.S. 20-4.02 requires the Division of Motor Vehicles, beginning July 1, 2020, to adjust certain fees and rates every four years, to consult with the Joint Legislative Commission on Governmental Operations, and to report to the chairs of the House and Senate appropriations committees on transportation. Session Laws 2021-180, s. 41.26, effective July 1, 2021, further amended G.S. 20-4.02 (d), directing the Division to notify the Revisor of Statutes of any adjustment, and directing the Revisor to adjust the appropriate amounts in any affected statutes. By letter dated January 24, 2020, the Division of Motor Vehicles advised of a fee increase factor of 7.86%, effective July 1, 2020, and provided a chart displaying the DMV Quadrennial Fee Adjustments affecting G.S. 20-7 , 20-11, 20-14, 20-16, 20-26, 20-37.15, 20-37.16, 20-42(b), 20-63(h), 20-85(a)(1)-(10), 20-85.1, 20-87, 20-88, 20-289, 20-385, and 44A-4(b)(1). Pursuant to the authority granted in G.S. 20-4.02, the Revisor of Statutes has adjusted the fee amounts in the affected statutes to reflect the Division’s increase.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2004-189, s. 5(c), as amended by Session Laws 2005-276, s. 44.1(q), provides: “The Division of Motor Vehicles shall retain a portion of five cents ($0.05) collected for the issuance of each drivers license and duplicate license to offset the actual cost of developing and maintaining the online Organ Donor Internet site established pursuant to Section 1 of this act. The remainder of the five cents ($0.05) shall be credited to the License to Give Trust Fund established under G.S. 20-7.4 and shall be used for the purposes authorized under G.S. 20-7.4 and G.S. 20-7.5 .”

Session Laws 2018-134, 3rd Ex. Sess., s. 1.1, provides: “This act shall be known as ‘The Hurricane Florence Emergency Response Act.’ ”

Session Laws 2018-134, 3rd Ex. Sess., s. 5.5(a)-(c), provides: “(a) Notwithstanding G.S. 20-14 , 20-37.7, 20-85, and 20-88.03, the Governor may waive any fees assessed by the Division of Motor Vehicles under those sections for the following:

“(1) A duplicate drivers license, duplicate commercial drivers license, or duplicate special identification card.

“(2) A special identification card issued to a person for the first time.

“(3) An application for a duplicate or corrected certificate of title.

“(4) A replacement registration plate.

“(5) An application for a duplicate registration card.

“(6) Late payment of a motor vehicle registration renewal fee.

“(b) The waiver authorized under subsection (a) of this section only applies to residents of counties impacted by Hurricane Florence, as determined by the Governor. A resident is allowed a refund of any fee assessed and collected by the Division of Motor Vehicles and waived pursuant to this section. The Division shall post notice of the availability of a refund on its Web site.

“(c) This section is effective when it becomes law and applies to fees assessed or collected on or after September 13, 2018. This section expires December 31, 2018.”

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2004-189, s. 5(b), effective November 1, 2004, substituted “ten dollars and five cents ($10.05)” for “ten dollars ($10.00).”

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 44.1(c), effective October 1, 2005, substituted “ten dollars ($10.00)” for “ten dollars and five cents ($10.05)” in the introductory paragraph.

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 29.30(c), effective January 1, 2016, substituted “thirteen dollars ($13.00)” for “ten dollars ($10.00)”in the introductory language. For applicability, see editor’s note.

§ 20-15. Authority of Division to cancel license or endorsement.

  1. The Division shall have authority to cancel any driver’s license upon determining any of the following:
    1. The licensee was not entitled to the issuance of the license under this Chapter.
    2. The licensee failed to give the required or correct information on the license application or committed fraud in making the application.
    3. The licensee is no longer authorized under federal law to be legally present in the United States.
    4. The licensee suffers from a physical or mental disability or disease that affects his or her ability to safely operate a motor vehicle, as determined by the applicable State or federal law, rule, or regulation.
    5. The licensee has failed to submit the certificate required under G.S. 20-7(e) and G.S. 20-9(g) .
  2. Upon such cancellation, the licensee must surrender the license so cancelled to the Division.
  3. Any person whose license is canceled under this section for failure to give the required or correct information, or for committing fraud, in an application for a commercial drivers license shall be prohibited from reapplying for a commercial drivers license for a period of 60 days from the date of cancellation.
  4. The Division shall have authority to revoke an H endorsement of a commercial drivers license holder if the person with the endorsement is determined by the federal Transportation Security Administration to constitute a security threat, as specified in 49 C.F.R. § 1572.5(d)(4).

History. 1935, c. 52, s. 10; 1943, c. 649, s. 3; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1979, c. 667, s. 41; 2005-349, s. 5; 2007-56, s. 5; 2016-94, s. 35.20(e).

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 35.20(h) made subdivisions (a)(4) and (5), as added by Session Laws 2016-94, s. 35.20(e), applicable to drivers licenses issued or renewed on or after July 1, 2016 and hearings requested on or after July 1, 2016.

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 1.2, provides: “This act shall be known as the ‘Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2016.’ ”

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 39.4, provides: “Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2016-2017 fiscal year, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2016-2017 fiscal year.”

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 39.7, is a severability clause.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2005-349, s. 5, effective September 30, 2005, added “or endorsement” to the section heading and added subsections (c) and (d).

Session Laws 2007-56, s. 5, effective May 23, 2007, and applicable to drivers licenses issued or renewed on or after that date, rewrote subsection (a).

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 35.20(e), effective July 1, 2016, added subdivisions (a)(4) and (a)(5). ee editor’s note for applicability.

§ 20-15.1. Revocations when licensing privileges forfeited.

The Division shall revoke the license of a person whose licensing privileges have been forfeited under G.S. 15A-1331.1 , 50-13.12, and 110-142.2. If a revocation period set by this Chapter is longer than the revocation period resulting from the forfeiture of licensing privileges, the revocation period in this Chapter applies.

History. 1994, Ex. Sess., c. 20, s. 2; 1995, c. 538, s. 2(a); 2012-194, s. 45(b).

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2012-194, s. 45(b), effective July 17, 2012, substituted “G.S. 15A-1331.1” for “G.S. 15A-1331A”.

§ 20-16. Authority of Division to suspend license.

  1. The Division shall have authority to suspend the license of any operator with or without a preliminary hearing upon a showing by its records or other satisfactory evidence that the licensee:
    1. through (4) Repealed by Session Laws 1979, c. 36; (5) Has, under the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, within a three-year period, accumulated 12 or more points, or eight or more points in the three-year period immediately following the reinstatement of a license which has been suspended or revoked because of a conviction for one or more traffic offenses;

      (6) Has made or permitted an unlawful or fraudulent use of such license or a learner’s permit, or has displayed or represented as his own, a license or learner’s permit not issued to him;

      (7) Has committed an offense in another state, which if committed in this State would be grounds for suspension or revocation;

      (8) Has been convicted of illegal transportation of alcoholic beverages;

      (8a) Has been convicted of impaired instruction under G.S. 20-12.1 ;

      (8b) Has violated on a military installation a regulation of that installation prohibiting conduct substantially similar to conduct that constitutes impaired driving under G.S. 20-138.1 and, as a result of that violation, has had his privilege to drive on that installation revoked or suspended after an administrative hearing authorized by the commanding officer of the installation and that commanding officer has general court martial jurisdiction;

      (9) Has, within a period of 12 months, been convicted of (i) two or more charges of speeding in excess of 55 and not more than 80 miles per hour, (ii) one or more charges of reckless driving and one or more charges of speeding in excess of 55 and not more than 80 miles per hour, or (iii) one or more charges of aggressive driving and one or more charges of speeding in excess of 55 and not more than 80 miles per hour;

      (10) Has been convicted of operating a motor vehicle at a speed in excess of 75 miles per hour on a public road or highway where the maximum speed is less than 70 miles per hour;

      (10a) Has been convicted of operating a motor vehicle at a speed in excess of 80 miles per hour on a public highway where the maximum speed is 70 miles per hour; or

      (11) Has been sentenced by a court of record and all or a part of the sentence has been suspended and a condition of suspension of the sentence is that the operator not operate a motor vehicle for a period of time.

      However, if the Division revokes without a preliminary hearing and the person whose license is being revoked requests a hearing before the effective date of the revocation, the licensee retains his license unless it is revoked under some other provision of the law, until the hearing is held, the person withdraws his request, or he fails to appear at a scheduled hearing.

  2. Pending an appeal from a conviction of any violation of the motor vehicle laws of this State, no driver’s license shall be suspended by the Division of Motor Vehicles because of such conviction or because of evidence of the commission of the offense for which the conviction has been had.
  3. The Division shall maintain a record of convictions of every person licensed or required to be licensed under the provisions of this Article as an operator and shall enter therein records of all convictions of such persons for any violation of the motor vehicle laws of this State and shall assign to the record of such person, as of the date of commission of the offense, a number of points for every such conviction in accordance with the following schedule of convictions and points, except that points shall not be assessed for convictions resulting in suspensions or revocations under other provisions of laws: Further, any points heretofore charged for violation of the motor vehicle inspection laws shall not be considered by the Division of Motor Vehicles as a basis for suspension or revocation of driver’s license:

    Click to view

    (e2) If the Division revokes a person’s drivers license pursuant to G.S. 20-17(a)(16), a judge may allow the licensee a limited driving privilege for a period not to exceed the period of revocation. The limited driving privilege shall be issued in the same manner and under the terms and conditions prescribed in G.S. 20-16.1(b)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (g).

Schedule of Point Values Passing stopped school bus 5 Aggressive driving 5 Reckless driving 4 Hit and run, property damage only 4 Following too close 4 Driving on wrong side of road 4 Illegal passing 4 Failure to yield right-of-way to pedestrian pursuant to G.S. 20-158(b)(2)b. 4 Failure to yield right-of-way to bicycle, motor scooter, or motorcycle 4 Running through stop sign 3 Speeding in excess of 55 miles per hour 3 Failing to yield right-of-way 3 Running through red light 3 No driver’s license or license expired more than one year 3 Failure to stop for siren 3 Driving through safety zone 3 No liability insurance 3 Failure to report accident where such report is required 3 Speeding in a school zone in excess of the posted school zone speed limit 3 Failure to properly restrain a child in a restraint or seat belt 2 All other moving violations 2 Littering pursuant to when the littering involves G.S. 14-399 the use of a motor vehicle 1 Schedule of Point Values for Violations While Operating a Commercial Motor Vehicle Passing stopped school bus 8 Rail-highway crossing violation 6 Careless and reckless driving in violation of 6 G.S. 20-140(f) Speeding in violation of 6 G.S. 20-141(j3) Aggressive driving 6 Reckless driving 5 Hit and run, property damage only 5 Following too close 5 Driving on wrong side of road 5 Illegal passing 5 Failure to yield right-of-way to pedestrian pursuant to b. 5 G.S. 20-158(b)(2) Failure to yield right-of-way to bicycle, motor scooter, or motorcycle 5 Running through stop sign 4 Speeding in excess of 55 miles per hour 4 Failing to yield right-of-way 4 Running through red light 4 No driver’s license or license expired more than one year 4 Failure to stop for siren 4 Driving through safety zone 4 No liability insurance 4 Failure to report accident where such report is required 4 Speeding in a school zone in excess of the posted school zone speed limit 4 Possessing alcoholic beverages in the passenger area of a commercial motor vehicle 4 All other moving violations 3 Littering pursuant to when the littering involves the use of a motor vehicle 1 G.S. 14-399 The above provisions of this subsection shall only apply to violations and convictions which take place within the State of North Carolina. The Schedule of Point Values for Violations While Operating a Commercial Motor Vehicle shall not apply to any commercial motor vehicle known as an “aerial lift truck” having a hydraulic arm and bucket station, and to any commercial motor vehicle known as a “line truck” having a hydraulic lift for cable, if the vehicle is owned, operated by or under contract to a public utility, electric or telephone membership corporation or municipality and used in connection with installation, restoration or maintenance of utility services. No points shall be assessed for conviction of the following offenses: Overloads Over length Over width Over height Illegal parking Carrying concealed weapon Improper plates Improper registration Improper muffler Improper display of license plates or dealers’ tags Unlawful display of emblems and insignia Failure to display current inspection certificate. In case of the conviction of a licensee of two or more traffic offenses committed on a single occasion, such licensee shall be assessed points for one offense only and if the offenses involved have a different point value, such licensee shall be assessed for the offense having the greater point value. Upon the restoration of the license or driving privilege of such person whose license or driving privilege has been suspended or revoked because of conviction for a traffic offense, any points that might previously have been accumulated in the driver’s record shall be cancelled. Whenever any licensee accumulates as many as seven points or accumulates as many as four points during a three-year period immediately following reinstatement of his license after a period of suspension or revocation, the Division may request the licensee to attend a conference regarding such licensee’s driving record. The Division may also afford any licensee who has accumulated as many as seven points or any licensee who has accumulated as many as four points within a three-year period immediately following reinstatement of his license after a period of suspension or revocation an opportunity to attend a driver improvement clinic operated by the Division and, upon the successful completion of the course taken at the clinic, three points shall be deducted from the licensee’s conviction record; provided, that only one deduction of points shall be made on behalf of any licensee within any five-year period. When a license is suspended under the point system provided for herein, the first such suspension shall be for not more than 60 days; the second such suspension shall not exceed six months and any subsequent suspension shall not exceed one year. Whenever the driver’s license of any person is subject to suspension under this subsection and at the same time also subject to suspension or revocation under other provisions of laws, such suspensions or revocations shall run concurrently. In the discretion of the Division, a period of probation not to exceed one year may be substituted for suspension or for any unexpired period of suspension under subsections (a)(1) through (a)(10a) of this section. Any violation of probation during the probation period shall result in a suspension for the unexpired remainder of the suspension period. Any accumulation of three or more points under this subsection during a period of probation shall constitute a violation of the condition of probation. (d) Upon suspending the license of any person as authorized in this section, the Division shall immediately notify the licensee in writing and upon his request shall afford him an opportunity for a hearing, not to exceed 60 days after receipt of the request, unless a preliminary hearing was held before his license was suspended. Upon such hearing the duly authorized agents of the Division may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of relevant books and papers and may require a reexamination of the licensee. Upon such hearing the Division shall either rescind its order of suspension, or good cause appearing therefor, may extend the suspension of such license. Provided further upon such hearing, preliminary or otherwise, involving subsections (a)(1) through (a)(10a) of this section, the Division may for good cause appearing in its discretion substitute a period of probation not to exceed one year for the suspension or for any unexpired period of suspension. Probation shall mean any written agreement between the suspended driver and a duly authorized representative of the Division and such period of probation shall not exceed one year, and any violation of the probation agreement during the probation period shall result in a suspension for the unexpired remainder of the suspension period. The authorized agents of the Division shall have the same powers in connection with a preliminary hearing prior to suspension as this subsection provided in connection with hearings held after suspension. These agents shall also have the authority to take possession of a surrendered license on behalf of the Division if the suspension is upheld and the licensee requests that the suspension begin immediately. (e) The Division may conduct driver improvement clinics for the benefit of those who have been convicted of one or more violations of this Chapter. Each driver attending a driver improvement clinic shall pay a fee of seventy dollars ($70.00). (e1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter, if the Division suspends the license of an operator pursuant to subdivisions (a)(9), (a)(10), or (a)(10a) of this section, upon the first suspension only, a district court judge may allow the licensee a limited driving privilege or license for a period not to exceed 12 months, provided he has not been convicted of any other motor vehicle moving violation within the previous 12 months. The limited driving privilege shall be issued in the same manner and under the terms and conditions prescribed in , (2), (3), (4), and (5). G.S. 20-16.1(b)(1)

History. 1935, c. 52, s. 11; 1947, c. 893, ss. 1, 2; c. 1067, s. 13; 1949, c. 373, ss. 1, 2; c. 1032, s. 2; 1953, c. 450; 1955, c. 1152, s. 15; c. 1187, ss. 9-12; 1957, c. 499, s. 1; 1959, c. 1242, ss. 1-2; 1961, c. 460, ss. 1, 2(a); 1963, c. 1115; 1965, c. 130; 1967, c. 16; 1971, c. 234, ss. 1, 2; c. 793, ss. 1, 2; c. 1198, ss. 1, 2; 1973, c. 17, ss. 1, 2; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1977, c. 902, s. 1; 1979, c. 36; c. 667, ss. 18, 41; 1981, c. 412, s. 4; c. 747, ss. 33, 66; 1981 (Reg. Sess., 1982), c. 1256; 1983, c. 435, s. 10; c. 538, ss. 3-5; c. 798; 1983 (Reg. Sess., 1984), c. 1101, s. 4; 1987, c. 744, ss. 1, 2; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 75; 1989, c. 784, s. 9; 1991, c. 682, s. 3; 1999-330, s. 7; 1999-452, s. 10; 2000-109, s. 7(d); 2000-117, s. 2; 2000-155, s. 10; 2001-352, s. 2; 2004-172, s. 3; 2004-193, ss. 2, 3; 2005-276, s. 44.1(d); 2015-241, s. 29.30(d).

Cross References.

As to period of suspension or revocation, see G.S. 20-19 .

DMV Quadrennial Fee Adjustment.

G.S. 20-4.02 requires the Division of Motor Vehicles, beginning July 1, 2020, to adjust certain fees and rates every four years, to consult with the Joint Legislative Commission on Governmental Operations, and to report to the chairs of the House and Senate appropriations committees on transportation. Session Laws 2021-180, s. 41.26, effective July 1, 2021, further amended G.S. 20-4.02 (d), directing the Division to notify the Revisor of Statutes of any adjustment, and directing the Revisor to adjust the appropriate amounts in any affected statutes. By letter dated January 24, 2020, the Division of Motor Vehicles advised of a fee increase factor of 7.86%, effective July 1, 2020, and provided a chart displaying the DMV Quadrennial Fee Adjustments affecting G.S. 20-7 , 20-11, 20-14, 20-16, 20-26, 20-37.15, 20-37.16, 20-42(b), 20-63(h), 20-85(a)(1)-(10), 20-85.1, 20-87, 20-88, 20-289, 20-385, and 44A-4(b)(1). Pursuant to the authority granted in G.S. 20-4.02, the Revisor of Statutes has adjusted the fee amounts in the affected statutes to reflect the Division’s increase.

Editor’s Note.

A reference to subdivisions (a)(1) through (a)(10a) of this section appears in the last paragraph of subsection (c) and in subsection (d). Subdivisions (a)(1) through (a)(4) were repealed by Session Laws 1979, c. 36.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2004-172, s. 3, effective December 1, 2004, in subsection (c), inserted “Failure to yield right-of-way to pedestrian pursuant to G.S. 20-158(b)(2)b. . . . 4” and “Failure to yield right-of-way to bicycle, motor scooter, or motorcycle . . . 4” preceding “Running through stop sign . . . 3” under “Schedule of Point Values,” inserted “Failure to yield right-of-way to pedestrian pursuant to G.S. 20-158(b)(2)b. . . . 5” and “Failure to yield right-of-way to bicycle, motor scooter, or motorcycle . . . 5” preceding “Running through stop sign” under “Schedule of Point Values for Violations While Operating a Commercial Motor Vehicle.”

Session Laws 2004-193, ss. 2 and 3, effective December 1, 2004, in subdivision (a)(9), inserted “(i)” preceding “two or more,” substituted “hour, (ii)” for “hour, or of,” and added “,or (iii) one or more charges of aggressive driving and one or more charges of speeding in excess of 55 and not more than 80 miles per hour” at the end of the sentence; in subsection (c), inserted “Aggressive driving....5” in the “Schedule of Point Values,” and inserted “Aggressive driving....6” in the “Schedule of Point Values for Violations While Operating a Commercial Motor Vehicle.”

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 44.1(d), effective October 1, 2005, substituted “fifty dollars ($50.00)” for “twenty-five dollars ($25.00)” in subsection (e).

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 29.30(d), effective January 1, 2016, substituted “sixty-five dollars ($65.00)” for “fifty dollars ($50.00)” in subsection (e). For applicability, see editor’s note.

Legal Periodicals.

For brief discussion of the 1949 amendments, see 27 N.C.L. Rev. 371, 372 (1949).

For article on administrative hearing for suspension of driver’s license, see 30 N.C.L. Rev. 27 (1951).

For note as to effect of plea of nolo contendere, see 32 N.C.L. Rev. 549 (1954).

For a survey of 1996 developments in constitutional law, see 75 N.C.L. Rev. 2315 (1997).

CASE NOTES

Analysis

I.In General

Operation of Motor Vehicle on Highway Is a Personal Privilege. —

A license to operate motor vehicles on the public highways of North Carolina is a personal privilege and property right which may not be denied a citizen of this State who is qualified therefor under its statutes. In re Donnelly, 260 N.C. 375 , 132 S.E.2d 904, 1963 N.C. LEXIS 727 (1963).

Albeit a Conditional One. —

The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways is a common right, but the exercise of that right may be regulated or controlled in the interest of public safety under the police power of the State. The operation of a motor vehicle on such highways is not a natural right. It is a conditional privilege, which may be suspended or revoked under the police power. Honeycutt v. Scheidt, 254 N.C. 607 , 119 S.E.2d 777, 1961 N.C. LEXIS 515 (1961).

Licensee May Not Be Deprived of Such Privilege except as Provided by Statutes. —

A license to operate a motor vehicle may be suspended or revoked only in accordance with statutory provisions as they are written and construed in this jurisdiction. In re Donnelly, 260 N.C. 375 , 132 S.E.2d 904, 1963 N.C. LEXIS 727 (1963).

A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege in the nature of a right of which the licensee may not be deprived save in the manner and upon the conditions prescribed by statute. Gibson v. Scheidt, 259 N.C. 339 , 130 S.E.2d 679, 1963 N.C. LEXIS 570 (1963).

Power to issue, suspend or revoke a driver’s license is vested exclusively in the Division of Motor Vehicles, subject to review by the superior court and, upon appeal, by the appellate division. Smith v. Walsh, 34 N.C. App. 287, 238 S.E.2d 157, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 1657 (1977).

Power to suspend or revoke a driver’s license is exclusively in the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles, subject to review by the superior court. State v. Warren, 230 N.C. 299 , 52 S.E.2d 879, 1949 N.C. LEXIS 613 (1949).

No Discretionary Power Is Conferred on Superior Court. —

Under subdivision (a)(10) of this section and G.S. 20-19(b), the discretionary authority to suspend petitioner’s license for a period not exceeding 12 months was vested exclusively in the Division of Motor Vehicles. No discretionary power was conferred upon a superior court. Smith v. Walsh, 34 N.C. App. 287, 238 S.E.2d 157, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 1657 (1977).

Where the facts as found by the trial court were in exact conformity with the suspension provisions of subdivision (a)(5), the Department (now Division) had complete authority by law to suspend petitioner’s license, and the superior court judge had no authority to substitute his discretion for that of the Department (now Division). In re Grubbs, 25 N.C. App. 232, 212 S.E.2d 414, 1975 N.C. App. LEXIS 2227 (1975).

When a person is convicted of a criminal offense, the court has no authority to pronounce judgment suspending or revoking his operator’s license or prohibiting him from operating a motor vehicle during a specified period. State v. Cole, 241 N.C. 576 , 86 S.E.2d 203, 1955 N.C. LEXIS 430 (1955).

Judicial Review of Suspensions and Revocations. —

Discretionary suspension and revocations of licenses by the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles are reviewable under G.S. 20-25 , but mandatory revocations under G.S. 20-17 are not so reviewable. In re Wright, 228 N.C. 584 , 46 S.E.2d 696, 1948 N.C. LEXIS 285 (1948). See State v. Cooper, 224 N.C. 100 , 29 S.E.2d 18, 1944 N.C. LEXIS 282 (1944); Winesett v. Scheidt, 239 N.C. 190 , 79 S.E.2d 501, 1954 N.C. LEXIS 351 (1954); Fox v. Scheidt, 241 N.C. 31 , 84 S.E.2d 259, 1954 N.C. LEXIS 534 (1954); State v. Cole, 241 N.C. 576 , 86 S.E.2d 203, 1955 N.C. LEXIS 430 (1955); Harrell v. Scheidt, 243 N.C. 735 , 92 S.E.2d 182, 1956 N.C. LEXIS 625 (1956).

Provisions of Subsection (d) and Other Statutes Satisfy Requirements of Due Process. —

The provisions of G.S. 20-48 , together with the provisions of subsection (d) of this section, relating to the right of review, and the provisions of G.S. 20-25 , relating to the right of appeal, satisfy the requirements of procedural due process. State v. Teasley, 9 N.C. App. 477, 176 S.E.2d 838, 1970 N.C. App. LEXIS 1391 , cert. denied, 277 N.C. 459 , 177 S.E.2d 900, 1970 N.C. LEXIS 635 (1970); State v. Atwood, 27 N.C. App. 445, 219 S.E.2d 521, 1975 N.C. App. LEXIS 1878 (1975), rev'd, 290 N.C. 266 , 225 S.E.2d 543, 1976 N.C. LEXIS 1055 (1976).

Former Subdivision (a)(5) Unconstitutional. —

Before its amendment in 1959, subdivision (a)(5) of this section provided for suspension of the license of a driver who was “an habitual violator of the traffic laws.” This provision was held to be an unconstitutional grant of legislative power to the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles, since it did not contain any fixed standard or guide to which the Department (now Division) must conform but on the contrary left it to the sole discretion of the Commissioner of the Department (now Division) to determine when a driver was an habitual violator of the traffic laws. Harvel v. Scheidt, 249 N.C. 699 , 107 S.E.2d 549, 1959 N.C. LEXIS 416 (1959) (holding also that a point system set up and used by the Department (now Division) did not furnish an adequate standard or guide) .

Where the law directs suspension, revocation, or nonissuance of a driver’s license, the grounds are convictions for moving violations, or other statutory violations relating to highway safety, or situations where an individual’s capacity to operate a motor vehicle safely are manifestly questionable. Evans v. Roberson, 69 N.C. App. 644, 317 S.E.2d 715, 1984 N.C. App. LEXIS 3529 (1984), rev'd, 314 N.C. 315 , 333 S.E.2d 228, 1985 N.C. LEXIS 1781 (1985).

II.Specific Offenses

Enumerated Offenses Are “Moving Violations”. —

The legislature considered the enumerated offenses in this section, including “no operator’s (now ‘driver’s’) license,” to be moving violations. Underwood v. Howland, 274 N.C. 473 , 164 S.E.2d 2, 1968 N.C. LEXIS 802 (1968).

Revocation or Suspension Not Mandatory for Reckless Driving. —

The offense of reckless driving in violation of G.S. 20-140 is not an offense for which, upon conviction, the revocation or suspension of an operator’s license is mandatory. In re Bratton, 263 N.C. 70 , 138 S.E.2d 809, 1964 N.C. LEXIS 767 (1964).

Subdivision (a)(9) of This Section Did Not Repeal by Implication G.S. 20-17(6). —

Section 20-17(6) authorizing the mandatory revocation of a driver’s license upon two convictions of reckless driving within a 12-month period was not repealed by implication by the subsequent enactment of subdivision (a)(9) of this section authorizing the discretionary suspension of a driver’s license upon one or more convictions of reckless driving and one or more convictions of speeding in excess of 44 (now 55) mph and not more than 75 (now 80) mph, within a 12-month period. Person v. Garrett, 280 N.C. 163 , 184 S.E.2d 873, 1971 N.C. LEXIS 1110 (1971).

Effect of Point System on Subdivision (a)(9). —

The provisions of the 1959 amendment, establishing the point system, did not purport to repeal, modify or change in any manner the provisions of subdivision (a)(9) of this section. Honeycutt v. Scheidt, 254 N.C. 607 , 119 S.E.2d 777, 1961 N.C. LEXIS 515 (1961).

Hence, in canceling the points accumulated over the period stipulated in subsection (c) of this section, upon which a suspension may be ordered, such cancellation does not cancel or change the number of convictions upon which a license may be suspended under the provisions of subdivision (a)(9). Honeycutt v. Scheidt, 254 N.C. 607 , 119 S.E.2d 777, 1961 N.C. LEXIS 515 (1961).

The Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles properly suspends a motor vehicle operator’s license upon proof that the licensee had been convicted of speeding 60 miles per hour in a 50-mile-per-hour zone on two separate occasions within a 12-month period, even though one of the occasions had theretofore been used as the basis for a prior suspension of the license. Honeycutt v. Scheidt, 254 N.C. 607 , 119 S.E.2d 777, 1961 N.C. LEXIS 515 (1961).

Conviction of Drunken Driving in Another State. —

Upon a receipt of notification from the highway department of another state that a resident of this State had there been convicted of drunken driving, the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles has the right to suspend the driving license of such person. In re Wright, 228 N.C. 301 , 45 S.E.2d 370, 1947 N.C. LEXIS 324 (1947).

Failure to Appear for Trial for Driving Under the Influence in Another State. —

Motorist who received citation for driving under the influence in South Carolina and then forfeited bond by not appearing in court had his driver’s license properly revoked even though no warrant was issued. Sykes v. Hiatt, 98 N.C. App. 688, 391 S.E.2d 834, 1990 N.C. App. LEXIS 450 (1990).

Revocation of License in Another State. —

North Carolina Department of Transportation Division of Motor Vehicles may suspend the license of a driver whose license was suspended in another state, even though it was later reinstated in that state. Olive v. Faulkner, 148 N.C. App. 187, 557 S.E.2d 642, 2001 N.C. App. LEXIS 1267 (2001).

III.Judicial Proceedings

Conviction Must Be Followed by Appealable Judgment. —

In view of the provision in G.S. 20-24(c) to the effect that a “conviction,” when used in this Article, shall mean a final conviction, it would seem that before a license may be revoked pursuant to the provisions of this section, there must be a conviction of two or more offenses enumerated in subdivision (a)(9) of this section, followed by a judgment from which an appeal might have been or may be taken. Barbour v. Scheidt, 246 N.C. 169 , 97 S.E.2d 855, 1957 N.C. LEXIS 395 (1957).

Conviction Is Not Final Where Prayer for Judgment Is Continued on Payment of Costs. —

Where, in prosecutions for speeding, prayer for judgment is continued upon payment of the costs, there are no final convictions within the purview of G.S. 20-24(c), and defendant’s license to drive may not be revoked pursuant to this section. Barbour v. Scheidt, 246 N.C. 169 , 97 S.E.2d 855, 1957 N.C. LEXIS 395 (1957).

Judgment in Excess of Jurisdiction of Court. —

A judgment of the superior court requiring a defendant to surrender his license to drive a motor vehicle and prohibiting him from operating such vehicles for a specified period is in excess of the jurisdiction of such court and is void. State v. Cooper, 224 N.C. 100 , 29 S.E.2d 18, 1944 N.C. LEXIS 282 (1944).

A provision in a judgment in a prosecution for violation of a statutory provision regulating the operation of motor vehicles, that defendant’s license be surrendered and that defendant not operate a motor vehicle on the public highways for a stipulated period, is void and will be stricken on appeal. State v. Warren, 230 N.C. 299 , 52 S.E.2d 879, 1949 N.C. LEXIS 613 (1949).

Court May Make Surrender of License a Condition to Suspension of Sentence. —

While the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles is given the exclusive authority to suspend or revoke a driver’s license, a court, either upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, may make the surrender of defendant’s driver’s license a condition upon which prison sentence or other penalty is suspended. Winesett v. Scheidt, 239 N.C. 190 , 79 S.E.2d 501, 1954 N.C. LEXIS 351 (1954).

IV.Administrative Proceedings

Suspension of License a Civil Proceeding. —

A proceeding to suspend an operator’s license under this section is civil and not criminal in its nature. Honeycutt v. Scheidt, 254 N.C. 607 , 119 S.E.2d 777, 1961 N.C. LEXIS 515 (1961).

Section Construed with G.S. 20-23 . —

This section and G.S. 20-23 are parts of the same statute relating to the same subject matter and must be construed in pari materia. In re Wright, 228 N.C. 584 , 46 S.E.2d 696, 1948 N.C. LEXIS 285 (1948).

This section is the real source of authority. Section 20-23 prescribes a rule of evidence and adds the power of revocation, when this section is the basis of action. In re Wright, 228 N.C. 584 , 46 S.E.2d 696, 1948 N.C. LEXIS 285 (1948).

Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Not Conferred. —

The words “other satisfactory evidence” in this section refer to the form of notice of conviction in another state, and confer no extraterritorial jurisdiction of the offense itself. In re Donnelly, 260 N.C. 375 , 132 S.E.2d 904, 1963 N.C. LEXIS 727 (1963).

This section and G.S. 20-23 do not contemplate a suspension or revocation of license by reason of a conviction in North Carolina of an alleged offense committed beyond its borders. In re Donnelly, 260 N.C. 375 , 132 S.E.2d 904, 1963 N.C. LEXIS 727 (1963).

But Evidence Relative to Offenses outside State May Be Considered. —

It is proper for the Department’s (now Division’s) hearing agent to hear and consider evidence bearing on guilt and innocence, among other things, relative to offenses outside the State, as assist him in reaching a decision in the exercise of discretionary authority. In re Donnelly, 260 N.C. 375 , 132 S.E.2d 904, 1963 N.C. LEXIS 727 (1963).

Effect of Conviction or Plea of Nolo Contendere to Offense Requiring Mandatory Revocation. —

Where the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles suspends or revokes a driver’s license under the provisions of this section, the Department (now Division) must notify the licensee, and upon request afford him a hearing which is de novo, with right of appeal as prescribed by this section, and where the Department (now Division) elects to proceed under this section, it may not contend that the licensee has no right of appeal because of a conviction of or a plea of nolo contendere to an offense requiring mandatory revocation of license. Winesett v. Scheidt, 239 N.C. 190 , 79 S.E.2d 501, 1954 N.C. LEXIS 351 (1954).

Division Not Required to Have Valid Warrant or Valid Judgment in Files. —

This section authorizes the Department (now Division) to suspend the license of any driver with or without preliminary hearing upon a showing by its records that the licensee has committed an enumerated offense. It does not require the Department (now Division) to have in its files a “valid warrant” nor a “valid judgment” before it is authorized to take action. Tilley v. Garrett, 8 N.C. App. 556, 174 S.E.2d 617, 1970 N.C. App. LEXIS 1610 (1970).

“Satisfactory Evidence”. —

This section uses the phrase “satisfactory evidence.” Satisfactory evidence is such as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is equivalent to sufficient evidence, which is defined to be such evidence as in amount is adequate to justify the court or jury in adopting the conclusion in support of which it was adduced. Winesett v. Scheidt, 239 N.C. 190 , 79 S.E.2d 501, 1954 N.C. LEXIS 351 (1954).

Admissibility of Division Records. —

The records of the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles, properly authenticated, are competent for the purpose of establishing the status of a person’s operator’s license and driving privilege. State v. Rhodes, 10 N.C. App. 154, 177 S.E.2d 754, 1970 N.C. App. LEXIS 1214 (1970).

A defendant is entitled to have the contents of the official record of the status of his driver’s license limited, if he so requests, to the formal parts thereof, including the certification and seal, plus the fact that under official action of the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles the defendant’s license was in a state of revocation or suspension on the date he is charged with committing the offense under G.S. 20-28 . State v. Rhodes, 10 N.C. App. 154, 177 S.E.2d 754, 1970 N.C. App. LEXIS 1214 (1970).

Burden of Proof. —

In the administrative hearing under subsection (d) of this section the burden of proof is upon the Department (now Division) to show “good cause” for extending the suspension of petitioner’s license. Joyner v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 226 , 182 S.E.2d 553, 1971 N.C. LEXIS 771 (1971).

Upon the hearing held under subsection (d) of this section the burden is upon the Department (now Division) to show that petitioner has willfully refused to take the test. Joyner v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 226 , 182 S.E.2d 553, 1971 N.C. LEXIS 771 (1971).

Right of Licensee to Be Confronted by and Cross-Examine Adverse Witness. —

At the administrative hearing, under subsection (d) of this section, the licensee has the right to be confronted by any witness whose testimony is used against him and to cross-examine the witness if he so desires. However, this is a right which the licensee waives if he does not assert it in apt time. Joyner v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 226 , 182 S.E.2d 553, 1971 N.C. LEXIS 771 (1971).

When Licensee Entitled to Review. —

A licensee is entitled to a review whenever the suspension, cancellation, or revocation of a license is made in the discretion of the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles, whether under this section, or G.S. 20-23 , or any other provision of the statute. Carmichael v. Scheidt, 249 N.C. 472 , 106 S.E.2d 685, 1959 N.C. LEXIS 366 (1959).

Remedy for Improper Deprivation of License. —

If a person has been improperly deprived of his license by the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles due to mistake in law or fact, his remedy is to apply for a hearing as provided by subsection (d) of this section, or by petitioning the superior court pursuant to G.S. 20-25 . At a hearing under either of these statutory provisions, he would be permitted to show that the suspension was erroneous. One cannot contemptuously ignore the quasi-judicial determinations made by the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles. Beaver v. Scheidt, 251 N.C. 671 , 111 S.E.2d 881, 1960 N.C. LEXIS 533 (1960).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Operation of Vehicle with Improper Taillights Carries Two Points as a Moving Violation. — See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Henry M. Whitesides, Fourteenth Solicitorial District, 41 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 211 (1971).

§ 20-16.01. Double penalties for offenses committed while operating a commercial motor vehicle.

Any person who commits an offense for which points may be assessed pursuant to the Schedule of Point Values for Violations While Operating a Commercial Motor Vehicle as provided in G.S. 20-16(c) may be assessed double the amount of any fine or penalty authorized by statute.

History. 1999-330, s. 8.

Editor’s Note.

The number of this section was assigned by the Revisor of Statutes, the number in Session Laws 1999-330, s. 10 having been 20-16A.

§ 20-16.1. Mandatory suspension of driver’s license upon conviction of excessive speeding; limited driving permits for first offenders.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Article, the Division shall suspend for a period of 30 days the license of any driver without preliminary hearing on receiving a record of the driver’s conviction of either (i) exceeding by more than 15 miles per hour the speed limit, either within or outside the corporate limits of a municipality, if the person was also driving at a speed in excess of 55 miles per hour at the time of the offense, or (ii) driving at a speed in excess of 80 miles per hour at the time of the offense.
    1. Upon a first conviction only of violating subsection (a), the trial judge may when feasible allow a limited driving privilege or license to the person convicted for proper purposes reasonably connected with the health, education and welfare of the person convicted and his family. For purposes of determining whether conviction is a first conviction, no prior offense occurring more than seven years before the date of the current offense shall be considered. The judge may impose upon such limited driving privilege any restrictions as in his discretion are deemed advisable including, but not limited to, conditions of days, hours, types of vehicles, routes, geographical boundaries and specific purposes for which limited driving privilege is allowed. Any such limited driving privilege allowed and restrictions imposed thereon shall be specifically recorded in a written judgment which shall be as near as practical to that hereinafter set forth and shall be signed by the trial judge and shall be affixed with the seal of the court and shall be made a part of the records of the said court. A copy of said judgment shall be transmitted to the Division of Motor Vehicles along with any driver’s license in the possession of the person convicted and a notice of the conviction. Such permit issued hereunder shall be valid for 30 days from the date of issuance by trial court. Such permit shall constitute a valid license to operate motor vehicles of the class or type that would be allowed by the person’s license if it were not currently revoked upon the streets and highways of this or any other state in accordance with the restrictions noted thereon and shall be subject to all provisions of law relating to driver’s license, not by their nature, rendered inapplicable.
    2. The judgment issued by the trial judge as herein permitted shall as near as practical be in form and content as follows: Click to view
    3. Upon conviction of such offense outside the jurisdiction of this State the person so convicted may apply to a district court judge of the district or set of districts as defined in G.S. 7A-41.1(a) in which he resides for limited driving privileges hereinbefore defined. Upon such application the judge shall have the authority to issue such limited driving privileges in the same manner as if he were the trial judge.
    4. Any violation of the restrictive driving privileges as set forth in the judgment of the trial judge allowing such privileges shall constitute the offense of driving while license has been suspended as set forth in G.S. 20-28 . Whenever a person is charged with operating a motor vehicle in violation of the restrictions, the limited driving privilege shall be suspended pending the final disposition of the charge.
    5. This section is supplemental and in addition to existing law and shall not be construed so as to repeal any existing provision contained in the General Statutes of North Carolina.
  2. Upon conviction of a similar second or subsequent offense which offense occurs within one year of the first or prior offense, the license of such operator shall be suspended for 60 days, provided such first or prior offense occurs subsequent to July 1, 1953.
  3. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Article, the Division shall suspend for a period of 60 days the license of any driver without preliminary hearing on receiving a record of such driver’s conviction of having violated the laws against speeding described in subsection (a) and of having violated the laws against reckless driving on the same occasion as the speeding offense occurred.
  4. The provisions of this section shall not prevent the suspension or revocation of a license for a longer period of time where the same may be authorized by other provisions of law.
  5. Repealed by Session Laws 1987, c. 869, s. 14.
  6. Any judge granting limited driving privileges under this section shall, prior to granting such privileges, be furnished proof and be satisfied that the person being granted such privileges is financially responsible. Proof of financial responsibility shall be in one of the following forms:
    1. A written certificate or electronically-transmitted facsimile thereof from any insurance carrier duly authorized to do business in this State certifying that there is in effect a nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle liability policy for the benefit of the person required to furnish proof of financial responsibility. The certificate or facsimile shall state the effective date and expiration date of the nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle liability policy and shall state the date that the certificate or facsimile is issued. The certificate or facsimile shall remain effective proof of financial responsibility for a period of 30 consecutive days following the date the certificate or facsimile is issued but shall not in and of itself constitute a binder or policy of insurance or
    2. A binder for or policy of nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle liability insurance under which the applicant is insured, provided that the binder or policy states the effective date and expiration date of the nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle liability policy.The preceding provisions of this subsection do not apply to applicants who do not own currently registered motor vehicles and who do not operate nonfleet private passenger motor vehicles that are owned by other persons and that are not insured under commercial motor vehicle liability insurance policies. In such cases, the applicant shall sign a written certificate to that effect. Such certificate shall be furnished by the Division. Any material misrepresentation made by such person on such certificate shall be grounds for suspension of that person’s license for a period of 90 days.For the purpose of this subsection “nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle” has the definition ascribed to it in Article 40 of General Statute Chapter 58.The Commissioner may require that certificates required by this subsection be on a form approved by the Commissioner. Such granting of limited driving privileges shall be conditioned upon the maintenance of such financial responsibility during the period of the limited driving privilege. Nothing in this subsection precludes any person from showing proof of financial responsibility in any other manner authorized by Articles 9A and 13 of this Chapter.

IN THE GENERAL COURT STATE OF NORTH OF JUSTICE CAROLINA RESTRICTED DRIVING COUNTY OF PRIVILEGES This cause coming on to be heard and being heard before the Honorable , Judge presiding, and it appearing to the court that the defendant, , has been convicted of the offense of excessive speeding in violation of , and it further appearing to the court that the defendant should be issued a restrictive driving license and is entitled to the issuance of a restrictive driving privilege under and by the authority of ; G.S. 20-16.1(a) G.S. 20-16.1(b) Now, therefore, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the defendant be allowed to operate a motor vehicle under the following conditions and under no other circumstances. Name: Race: Sex: Height: Weight: Color of Hair: Color of Eyes: Birth Date: Driver’s License Number: Signature of Licensee: Conditions of Restriction: Type of Vehicle: Geographic Restrictions: Hours of Restriction: Other Restrictions: This limited license shall be effective from to subject to further orders as the court in its discretion may deem necessary and proper. This the day of , (Judge Presiding)

History. 1953, c. 1223; 1955, c. 1187, s. 15; 1959, c. 1264, s. 4; 1965, c. 133; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; c. 763; 1979, c. 667, ss. 19, 41; 1983, c. 77; 1987, c. 869, ss. 13, 14; 1989, c. 436, s. 4; 770, s. 57; 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 652, s. 2; 1999-456, s. 59; 2004-199, s. 13(a).

Cross References.

As to mandatory revocation of license for refusal to submit to chemical test to determine alcoholic content of blood, see G.S. 20-16.2 .

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2004-199, s. 13(a), effective August 17, 2004, substituted “a district court judge” for “the resident judge of the superior court” in the first sentence of subsection (b)(3).

CASE NOTES

The operation of a motor vehicle on a public highway is not a natural right. It is a conditional privilege which the State in the interest of public safety acting under its police power may regulate or control, and the State may suspend or revoke the driver’s license. Shue v. Scheidt, 252 N.C. 561 , 114 S.E.2d 237, 1960 N.C. LEXIS 609 (1960).

This section was enacted to promote highway safety by providing for the mandatory suspension of a driver’s license upon conviction of excessive speeding and reckless driving. Shue v. Scheidt, 252 N.C. 561 , 114 S.E.2d 237, 1960 N.C. LEXIS 609 (1960).

And Not to Punish Licensee. —

The suspension or revocation of a driver’s license is no part of the punishment for the violation or violations of traffic laws. The purpose of the suspension or revocation of a driver’s license is to protect the public and not to punish the licensee. Shue v. Scheidt, 252 N.C. 561 , 114 S.E.2d 237, 1960 N.C. LEXIS 609 (1960).

It Applies to Violation of G.S. 20-141(d) . —

This section applies where a driver is convicted of driving his passenger automobile at a speed of 75 miles per hour on a public highway in a 45-mile-per-hour speed zone established under subsection (d) of G.S. 20-141 . Shue v. Scheidt, 252 N.C. 561 , 114 S.E.2d 237, 1960 N.C. LEXIS 609 (1960).

Where the law directs suspension, revocation, or nonissuance of a driver’s license, the grounds are convictions for moving violations, or other statutory violations relating to highway safety, or situations where an individual’s capacity to operate a motor vehicle safely are manifestly questionable. Evans v. Roberson, 69 N.C. App. 644, 317 S.E.2d 715, 1984 N.C. App. LEXIS 3529 (1984), rev'd, 314 N.C. 315 , 333 S.E.2d 228, 1985 N.C. LEXIS 1781 (1985).

Nolo Contendere Has Same Effect as Conviction. —

As a basis for suspension or revocation of an operator’s license, a plea of nolo contendere has the same effect as a conviction or plea of guilty of such offense. Gibson v. Scheidt, 259 N.C. 339 , 130 S.E.2d 679, 1963 N.C. LEXIS 570 (1963).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Limited Driving Privilege May Not Be Extended to Cover Discretionary Revocation by Division. — Subsection (b) applies to offenses of speeding 71 mph through 75 mph, speeds in excess of 75 mph, and speeds in excess of 80 mph. When a limited permit is issued pursuant to subsection (b) of this section by the court upon conviction or a plea of guilty to a speeding charge requiring a mandatory 30-day revocation and such speed is such as to give rise to a discretionary revocation by the Division of Motor Vehicles for a greater period, the limited driving privilege issued by the court may not be extended to cover the revocation by the Division of Motor Vehicles. See Opinion of Attorney General to Mr. E. Burt Aycock, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, 45 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 112 (1975).

§ 20-16.2. Implied consent to chemical analysis; mandatory revocation of license in event of refusal; right of driver to request analysis.

  1. Basis for Officer to Require Chemical Analysis; Notification of Rights. —  Any person who drives a vehicle on a highway or public vehicular area thereby gives consent to a chemical analysis if charged with an implied-consent offense. Any law enforcement officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that the person charged has committed the implied-consent offense may obtain a chemical analysis of the person.Before any type of chemical analysis is administered the person charged shall be taken before a chemical analyst authorized to administer a test of a person’s breath or a law enforcement officer who is authorized to administer chemical analysis of the breath, who shall inform the person orally and also give the person a notice in writing that:
    1. You have been charged with an implied-consent offense. Under the implied-consent law, you can refuse any test, but your drivers license will be revoked for one year and could be revoked for a longer period of time under certain circumstances, and an officer can compel you to be tested under other laws.
    2. Repealed by Session Laws 2006-253, s. 15, effective December 1, 2006, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date.
    3. The test results, or the fact of your refusal, will be admissible in evidence at trial.
    4. Your driving privilege will be revoked immediately for at least 30 days if you refuse any test or the test result is 0.08 or more, 0.04 or more if you were driving a commercial vehicle, or 0.01 or more if you are under the age of 21.
    5. After you are released, you may seek your own test in addition to this test.
    6. You may call an attorney for advice and select a witness to view the testing procedures remaining after the witness arrives, but the testing may not be delayed for these purposes longer than 30 minutes from the time you are notified of these rights. You must take the test at the end of 30 minutes even if you have not contacted an attorney or your witness has not arrived.

      (a1) Meaning of Terms. — Under this section, an “implied-consent offense” is an offense involving impaired driving, a violation of G.S. 20-141.4(a2), or an alcohol-related offense made subject to the procedures of this section. A person is “charged” with an offense if the person is arrested for it or if criminal process for the offense has been issued.

  2. Unconscious Person May Be Tested. —  If a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has committed an implied-consent offense, and the person is unconscious or otherwise in a condition that makes the person incapable of refusal, the law enforcement officer may direct the taking of a blood sample or may direct the administration of any other chemical analysis that may be effectively performed. In this instance the notification of rights set out in subsection (a) and the request required by subsection (c) are not necessary.
  3. Request to Submit to Chemical Analysis. —  A law enforcement officer or chemical analyst shall designate the type of test or tests to be given and may request the person charged to submit to the type of chemical analysis designated. If the person charged willfully refuses to submit to that chemical analysis, none may be given under the provisions of this section, but the refusal does not preclude testing under other applicable procedures of law.

    (c1) Procedure for Reporting Results and Refusal to Division. — Whenever a person refuses to submit to a chemical analysis, a person has an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more, or a person’s drivers license has an alcohol concentration restriction and the results of the chemical analysis establish a violation of the restriction, the law enforcement officer and the chemical analyst shall without unnecessary delay go before an official authorized to administer oaths and execute an affidavit(s) stating that:

    1. The person was charged with an implied-consent offense or had an alcohol concentration restriction on the drivers license;
    2. A law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person had committed an implied-consent offense or violated the alcohol concentration restriction on the drivers license;
    3. Whether the implied-consent offense charged involved death or critical injury to another person, if the person willfully refused to submit to chemical analysis;
    4. The person was notified of the rights in subsection (a); and
    5. The results of any tests given or that the person willfully refused to submit to a chemical analysis.

      If the person’s drivers license has an alcohol concentration restriction, pursuant to G.S. 20-19(c3), and an officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person has violated a provision of that restriction other than violation of the alcohol concentration level, the officer and chemical analyst shall complete the applicable sections of the affidavit and indicate the restriction which was violated. The officer shall immediately mail the affidavit(s) to the Division. If the officer is also the chemical analyst who has notified the person of the rights under subsection (a), the officer may perform alone the duties of this subsection.

  4. Consequences of Refusal; Right to Hearing before Division; Issues. —  Upon receipt of a properly executed affidavit required by subsection (c1), the Division shall expeditiously notify the person charged that the person’s license to drive is revoked for 12 months, effective on the thirtieth calendar day after the mailing of the revocation order unless, before the effective date of the order, the person requests in writing a hearing before the Division. Except for the time referred to in G.S. 20-16.5 , if the person shows to the satisfaction of the Division that his or her license was surrendered to the court, and remained in the court’s possession, then the Division shall credit the amount of time for which the license was in the possession of the court against the 12-month revocation period required by this subsection. If the person properly requests a hearing, the person retains his or her license, unless it is revoked under some other provision of law, until the hearing is held, the person withdraws the request, or the person fails to appear at a scheduled hearing. The hearing officer may subpoena any witnesses or documents that the hearing officer deems necessary. The person may request the hearing officer to subpoena the charging officer, the chemical analyst, or both to appear at the hearing if the person makes the request in writing at least three days before the hearing. The person may subpoena any other witness whom the person deems necessary, and the provisions of G.S. 1A-1 , Rule 45, apply to the issuance and service of all subpoenas issued under the authority of this section. The hearing officer is authorized to administer oaths to witnesses appearing at the hearing. The hearing shall be conducted in the county where the charge was brought, and shall be limited to consideration of whether:
    1. The person was charged with an implied-consent offense or the driver had an alcohol concentration restriction on the drivers license pursuant to G.S. 20-19 ;
    2. A law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person had committed an implied-consent offense or violated the alcohol concentration restriction on the drivers license;
    3. The implied-consent offense charged involved death or critical injury to another person, if this allegation is in the affidavit;
    4. The person was notified of the person’s rights as required by subsection (a); and
    5. The person willfully refused to submit to a chemical analysis. If the Division finds that the conditions specified in this subsection are met, it shall order the revocation sustained. If the Division finds that any of the conditions (1), (2), (4), or (5) is not met, it shall rescind the revocation. If it finds that condition (3) is alleged in the affidavit but is not met, it shall order the revocation sustained if that is the only condition that is not met; in this instance subsection (d1) does not apply to that revocation. If the revocation is sustained, the person shall surrender his or her license immediately upon notification by the Division.

      (d1) Consequences of Refusal in Case Involving Death or Critical Injury. — If the refusal occurred in a case involving death or critical injury to another person, no limited driving privilege may be issued. The 12-month revocation begins only after all other periods of revocation have terminated unless the person’s license is revoked under G.S. 20-28 , 20-28.1, 20-19(d), or 20-19(e). If the revocation is based on those sections, the revocation under this subsection begins at the time and in the manner specified in subsection (d) for revocations under this section. However, the person’s eligibility for a hearing to determine if the revocation under those sections should be rescinded is postponed for one year from the date on which the person would otherwise have been eligible for the hearing. If the person’s driver’s license is again revoked while the 12-month revocation under this subsection is in effect, that revocation, whether imposed by a court or by the Division, may only take effect after the period of revocation under this subsection has terminated.

  5. Right to Hearing in Superior Court. —  If the revocation for a willful refusal is sustained after the hearing, the person whose license has been revoked has the right to file a petition in the superior court district or set of districts defined in G.S. 7A-41.1 , where the charges were made, within 30 days thereafter for a hearing on the record. The superior court review shall be limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s findings of fact and whether the conclusions of law are supported by the findings of fact and whether the Commissioner committed an error of law in revoking the license. (e1) Limited Driving Privilege after Six Months in Certain Instances. — A person whose driver’s license has been revoked under this section may apply for and a judge authorized to do so by this subsection may issue a limited driving privilege if:
    1. At the time of the refusal the person held either a valid drivers license or a license that had been expired for less than one year;
    2. At the time of the refusal, the person had not within the preceding seven years been convicted of an offense involving impaired driving;
    3. At the time of the refusal, the person had not in the preceding seven years willfully refused to submit to a chemical analysis under this section;
    4. The implied consent offense charged did not involve death or critical injury to another person;
    5. The underlying charge for which the defendant was requested to submit to a chemical analysis has been finally disposed of:
      1. Other than by conviction; or
      2. By a conviction of impaired driving under G.S. 20-138.1 , at a punishment level authorizing issuance of a limited driving privilege under G.S. 20-179.3 (b), and the defendant has complied with at least one of the mandatory conditions of probation listed for the punishment level under which the defendant was sentenced;
    6. Subsequent to the refusal the person has had no unresolved pending charges for or additional convictions of an offense involving impaired driving;
    7. The person’s license has been revoked for at least six months for the refusal; and
    8. The person has obtained a substance abuse assessment from a mental health facility and successfully completed any recommended training or treatment program.

      Except as modified in this subsection, the provisions of G.S. 20-179.3 relating to the procedure for application and conduct of the hearing and the restrictions required or authorized to be included in the limited driving privilege apply to applications under this subsection. If the case was finally disposed of in the district court, the hearing shall be conducted in the district court district as defined in G.S. 7A-133 in which the refusal occurred by a district court judge. If the case was finally disposed of in the superior court, the hearing shall be conducted in the superior court district or set of districts as defined in G.S. 7A-41.1 in which the refusal occurred by a superior court judge. A limited driving privilege issued under this section authorizes a person to drive if the person’s license is revoked solely under this section or solely under this section and G.S. 20-17(2). If the person’s license is revoked for any other reason, the limited driving privilege is invalid.

  6. Notice to Other States as to Nonresidents. —  When it has been finally determined under the procedures of this section that a nonresident’s privilege to drive a motor vehicle in this State has been revoked, the Division shall give information in writing of the action taken to the motor vehicle administrator of the state of the person’s residence and of any state in which the person has a license.
  7. Repealed by Session Laws 1973, c. 914.
  8. Repealed by Session Laws 1979, c. 423, s. 2.
  9. Right to Chemical Analysis before Arrest or Charge. —  A person stopped or questioned by a law enforcement officer who is investigating whether the person may have committed an implied consent offense may request the administration of a chemical analysis before any arrest or other charge is made for the offense. Upon this request, the officer shall afford the person the opportunity to have a chemical analysis of his or her breath, if available, in accordance with the procedures required by G.S. 20-139.1(b). The request constitutes the person’s consent to be transported by the law enforcement officer to the place where the chemical analysis is to be administered. Before the chemical analysis is made, the person shall confirm the request in writing and shall be notified:
    1. That the test results will be admissible in evidence and may be used against you in any implied consent offense that may arise;
    2. Your driving privilege will be revoked immediately for at least 30 days if the test result is 0.08 or more, 0.04 or more if you were driving a commercial vehicle, or 0.01 or more if you are under the age of 21.
    3. That if you fail to comply fully with the test procedures, the officer may charge you with any offense for which the officer has probable cause, and if you are charged with an implied consent offense, your refusal to submit to the testing required as a result of that charge would result in revocation of your driving privilege. The results of the chemical analysis are admissible in evidence in any proceeding in which they are relevant.

History. 1963, c. 966, s. 1; 1965, c. 1165; 1969, c. 1074, s. 1; 1971, c. 619, ss. 3-6; 1973, c. 206, ss. 1, 2; cc. 824, 914; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1977, c. 812; 1979, c. 423, s. 2; 1979, 2nd Sess., c. 1160; 1981, c. 412, s. 4; c. 747, s. 66; 1983, c. 87; c. 435, s. 11; 1983 (Reg. Sess., 1984), c. 1101, ss. 5-8; 1987, c. 797, s. 3; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, ss. 76, 77; c. 1112; 1989, c. 771, ss. 13, 14, 18; 1991, c. 689, s. 233.1(c); 1993, c. 285, ss. 3, 4; 1995, c. 163, s. 1; 1997-379, ss. 3.1-3.3; 1998-182, s. 28; 1999-406, ss. 1, 10; 2000-155, s. 5; 2006-253, s. 15; 2007-493, ss. 25, 27; 2011-119, s. 1; 2021-134, s. 9(a); 2021-185, s. 11.

Cross References.

For definition of “public vehicular area,” see G.S. 20-4.01(32) .

As to the availability of test records, see G.S. 20-27 .

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 1999-406, s. 18, states that this act does not obligate the General Assembly to appropriate additional funds, and that this act shall be implemented with funds available or appropriated to the Department of Transportation and the Administrative Office of the Courts.

Session Laws 2021-134, s. 9(d), as amended by Session Laws 2021-185, s. 11, made the substitution of “thirtieth” for “tenth” in the first sentence of subsection (d) of this section by Session Laws 2021-134, s. 9(a), effective February 1, 2022, and applicable to notifications of revocations mailed by the Division of Motor Vehicles on or after that date.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2006-253, s. 15, effective December 1, 2006, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, rewrote the section.

Session Laws 2007-493, s. 25, effective August 30, 2007, inserted “district or set of districts defined in G.S. 7A-41.1 , where the charges were made, within 30 days thereafter” in the first sentence of subsection (e).

Session Laws 2007-493, s. 27, effective December 1, 2007, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, substituted “concentration of 0.15” for “concentration of 0.16” in the introductory paragraph of subsection (c1).

Session Laws 2011-119, s. 1, effective December 1, 2011, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, inserted “a violation of G.S. 20-141.4(a2)” in subsection (a1).

Session Laws 2021-134, s. 9(a), substituted “thirtieth” for “tenth” in subsection (d). For effective date and applicability, see editor’s note.

Legal Periodicals.

For comment on chemical tests and implied consent, see 42 N.C.L. Rev. 841 (1964).

For article on tests for intoxication, see 45 N.C.L. Rev. 34 (1966).

For survey of 1978 law on criminal procedure, see 57 N.C.L. Rev. 1007 (1979).

For survey of 1979 law on criminal procedure, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1404 (1980).

For note discussing North Carolina’s validation of the warrantless seizure of blood from an unconscious suspect, in light of State v. Hollingsworth, 77 N.C. App. 36, 334 S.E.2d 463 (1985), see 21 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1071 (1986).

For note, “North Carolina and Pretrial Civil Revocation of an Impaired Driver’s License and the Double Jeopardy Clause,” see 18 Campbell L. Rev. 391 (1996).

For a survey of 1996 developments in constitutional law, see 75 N.C.L. Rev. 2315 (1997).

CASE NOTES

Analysis

I.In General

Editor’s Note. —

Many of the cases annotated below were decided under this section as it read prior to the 1993 amendment which reduced the blood alcohol content for driving while impaired and related offenses from 0.10 to 0.08.

Because this section imposes a penalty, it must be strictly construed. Price v. North Carolina Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 36 N.C. App. 698, 245 S.E.2d 518, 1978 N.C. App. LEXIS 2612 , cert. denied, 295 N.C. 551 , 248 S.E.2d 728, 1978 N.C. LEXIS 1041 (1978).

Construction with G.S. 20-138.1 . —

A civil superior court determination, on appeal from an administrative hearing, pursuant to this section, regarding an allegation of willful refusal, estops the relitigation of that same issue in a defendant’s criminal prosecution for DWI. The district attorney and the Attorney General both represent the interests of the people of North Carolina, regardless of whether it be the district attorney in a criminal trial court or the Attorney General in a civil or criminal appeal. State v. Summers, 351 N.C. 620 , 528 S.E.2d 17, 2000 N.C. LEXIS 351 (2000).

Though this section must be read in conjunction with G.S. 20-139.1 to determine the procedures governing the administering of chemical analyses, this section, and that statute alone, sets forth the procedures governing notification of rights pursuant to a chemical analysis. Nicholson v. Killens, 116 N.C. App. 473, 448 S.E.2d 542, 1994 N.C. App. LEXIS 1067 (1994).

Evidence In License Revocation Hearing Not Subject To Exclusionary Rule. —

Whether or not law enforcement officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop a driver, the evidence that resulted from the stop was not subject to the exclusionary rule; evidence in a license revocation hearing is not subject to the exclusionary rule. Hartman v. Robertson, 208 N.C. App. 692, 703 S.E.2d 811, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 2422 (2010).

Consent Deemed Given. —

Anyone who operates a motor vehicle upon the highways of the State is deemed to have given consent to a breathalyzer test. State v. Allen, 14 N.C. App. 485, 188 S.E.2d 568, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 2160 (1972).

Purpose of Procedures. —

The administrative procedures provided for in this section are designed to promote breathalyzer tests as a valuable tool for law-enforcement officers in their enforcing the laws against driving under the influence while also protecting the rights of the State’s citizens. Rice v. Peters, 48 N.C. App. 697, 269 S.E.2d 740, 1980 N.C. App. LEXIS 3306 (1980).

The purpose of administering the breathalyzer test is to produce an accurate result. State v. Moore, 41 N.C. App. 131, 254 S.E.2d 191, 1979 N.C. App. LEXIS 2371 (1979).

The purpose of the statute is fulfilled when the arrestee is given the option to submit or refuse to submit to a breathalyzer test and his decision is made after having been advised of his rights in a manner provided by the statute. Rice v. Peters, 48 N.C. App. 697, 269 S.E.2d 740, 1980 N.C. App. LEXIS 3306 (1980).

Option to Refuse Is Not Constitutionally Mandated. —

This section only “coerces” a breathalyzer test in the limited instances in which the law-enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the driver has violated the law. In such situations the State could constitutionally require that the driver submit to an examination without any option to refuse. Montgomery v. North Carolina DMV, 455 F. Supp. 338, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16177 (W.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1979).

The State is not constitutionally required to give an accused an option to refuse the breathalyzer test. Etheridge v. Peters, 45 N.C. App. 358, 263 S.E.2d 308, 1980 N.C. App. LEXIS 2672 , aff'd, 301 N.C. 76 , 269 S.E.2d 133, 1980 N.C. LEXIS 1144 (1980).

Effect of Refusal. —

Persons being requested to submit to chemical analysis do not have to be informed that a refusal can result in the denial of their right to seek a limited driving privilege as a part of the notification requirement of this section. Nowell v. Killens, 119 N.C. App. 567, 459 S.E.2d 37, 1995 N.C. App. LEXIS 535 (1995).

Nor Is It Impermissible for State to Allow Option. —

It is not impermissible nor a violation of equal protection of the laws for the State to allow drivers an option of refusing a breathalyzer examination that could be constitutionally required in exchange for risking license suspension of six months if the proper procedures are followed and the officer has probable cause to believe that the accused has driven a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (now has committed an implied-consent offense). Montgomery v. North Carolina DMV, 455 F. Supp. 338, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16177 (W.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1979).

The statutory distinction under this section is based on whether a motorist refuses to submit to a breath test. Since the motorist may not be subjected to such a test unless, pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, the law-enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person had been driving or operating a motor vehicle upon a highway or public vehicular area while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (now had committed an implied-consent offense), the State could have required that the motorist submit to the test without any refusal option and without any infringement of the constitutional rights against self-incrimination or against unreasonable searches and seizures. Montgomery v. North Carolina DMV, 455 F. Supp. 338, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16177 (W.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1979).

Unconscious Driver. —

Requiring the arrest of an unconscious driver would serve no sensible purpose; in such a case, the formal requirements of subsection (a) of this section are not meant to apply. State v. Hollingsworth, 77 N.C. App. 36, 334 S.E.2d 463, 1985 N.C. App. LEXIS 4036 (1985).

In a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter and driving under the influence, the performance of a blood alcohol test on blood seized from an unconscious defendant pursuant to subsection (b) of this section did not violate the defendant’s rights under U.S. Const., Amend. IV and N.C. Const., Art. 1, § 20, relating to search and seizure, because of (1) the existence of probable cause to arrest; (2) the limited nature of the intrusion upon the person; and (3) the destructibility of the evidence. State v. Hollingsworth, 77 N.C. App. 36, 334 S.E.2d 463, 1985 N.C. App. LEXIS 4036 (1985).

Where defendant was already sedated and unconscious when a police officer arrived at a hospital to obtain a blood sample for chemical analysis such that officer did not advise defendant of his right to refuse the test, the trial court properly concluded that defendant was rendered unconscious by the doctors based solely on a medical decision to treat him, that the officer had nothing to do with this decision, and that defendant’s statutory rights were not violated in that the officer who conducted the chemical analysis complied with the requirements of this section and G.S. 20-139.1 . State v. Garcia-Lorenzo, 110 N.C. App. 319, 430 S.E.2d 290, 1993 N.C. App. LEXIS 516 (1993).

Trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to suppress blood draw evidence a police officer collected from a nurse because the record did not affirmatively show that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe defendant, who was unconscious during the blood draw, committed the implied consent offense of driving while intoxicated; the record did not affirmatively show that defendant was intoxicated while he drove, but it raised a question as to whether defendant became very intoxicated. State v. Romano, 247 N.C. App. 212, 785 S.E.2d 168, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 430 (2016), modified, aff'd, 369 N.C. 678 , 800 S.E.2d 644, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 398 (2017).

Based on the United States Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment precedent regarding consent, the blood draw from defendant could not be justified under subsection (b) as a per se categorical exception to the warrant requirement; the implied-consent statute, as well as a person’s decision to drive on public roads, are factors to consider when analyzing whether a suspect has consented to a blood draw, but the statute alone does not create a per se exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Romano, 369 N.C. 678 , 800 S.E.2d 644, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 398 (2017).

Treating subsection (b) as an irrevocable rule of implied consent does not comport with the consent exception to the warrant requirement because such treatment does not require an analysis of the voluntariness of consent based on the totality of the circumstances. State v. Romano, 369 N.C. 678 , 800 S.E.2d 644, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 398 (2017).

Trial court correctly suppressed defendant’s blood sample because subsection (b) was unconstitutional as applied to defendant since it permitted a warrantless search that violated the Fourth Amendment; blood draws could only be performed after obtaining a warrant, valid consent from the defendant, or under exigent circumstances with probable cause, but the officer who took possession of defendant’s blood did not get a warrant, and there were no exigent circumstances. State v. Romano, 369 N.C. 678 , 800 S.E.2d 644, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 398 (2017).

Notice. —

Police officer’s placement of written rights form with defendant’s emergency room chart was tantamount to “giving” defendant notice in writing; in light of the treatment defendant was receiving for his injuries, there was effectively no other means by which the notice could have been given to him. State v. Lovett, 119 N.C. App. 689, 460 S.E.2d 177, 1995 N.C. App. LEXIS 624 (1995).

Reasonable Grounds Synonymous with Probable Cause. —

In determining whether a charging officer had reasonable grounds to believe a petitioner committed an implied consent offense within the meaning of this section, the term reasonable grounds should be viewed as synonymous with probable cause. Moore v. Hodges, 116 N.C. App. 727, 449 S.E.2d 218, 1994 N.C. App. LEXIS 1122 (1994).

This section does not limit the introduction of other competent evidence as to a defendant’s alcohol concentration, including other chemical tests. This statute allows other competent evidence of a defendant’s blood alcohol level in addition to that obtained from chemical analysis pursuant to this section and G.S. 20-139.1 . State v. Drdak, 330 N.C. 587 , 411 S.E.2d 604, 1992 N.C. LEXIS 6 (1992).

Relation to DWI Charge. —

The decision by Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to rescind the revocation of defendant’s driver’s license was independent of, and inconsequential to, defendant’s criminal trial for driving while impaired (DWI). State v. O'Rourke, 114 N.C. App. 435, 442 S.E.2d 137, 1994 N.C. App. LEXIS 377 (1994).

Reasonable Grounds Driver Committed Implied-Consent Offense. —

Superior court did not err in affirming the decision of the North Carolina DMV to revoke a driver’s license under G.S. 20-16.2 because the superior court’s findings of fact supported the conclusion of law that a law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the driver had committed an implied-consent offense; competent evidence supported the findings that the driver stopped past an intersection midway into it then turned right onto a road and that the officer followed the driver and estimated his speed was 65 in a 45 mph zone at the time of the initial stop. Hartman v. Robertson, 208 N.C. App. 692, 703 S.E.2d 811, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 2422 (2010).

Defendant’s Subjective Understanding Not Key. —

Admissibility of the results of a chemical analysis test are not conditioned on a defendant’s subjective understanding of the information disclosed to him pursuant to the requirements of the statute, and as long as the rights are disclosed to a defendant, the requirements of the statute are satisfied and it is immaterial whether the defendant comprehends them; in this case, the officer complied with the statute when he read defendant his rights in English and provided him written form copies of those rights, and thus the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. State v. Kap Mung, 251 N.C. App. 311, 795 S.E.2d 284, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 1324 (2016).

Collateral Estoppel — Privity of Parties. —

The state is collaterally estopped from litigating issues in a criminal DWI case when those exact issues have been relitigated in a civil license revocation hearing with the Attorney General representing the DMV in superior court; defendant was found to have not refused to take the breathalyzer test in the earlier proceeding, so that the results of the single breath analysis were inadmissible, and privity of parties existed, as both the Attorney General and the District Attorney represent the same party, which is the people of the State of North Carolina. State v. Summers, 132 N.C. App. 636, 513 S.E.2d 575, 1999 N.C. App. LEXIS 275 (1999), aff'd, 351 N.C. 620 , 528 S.E.2d 17, 2000 N.C. LEXIS 351 (2000).

Revocation of driving privileges was not barred by collateral estoppel. The dismissal of a driver’s criminal case due to a violation of his right to have a witness present during the chemical test did not reach the issue of whether his refusal to take the test was willful under G.S. 20-16.2(d). Powers v. Tatum, 196 N.C. App. 639, 676 S.E.2d 89, 2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 527 (2009).

Propriety of an initial stop of is not within the statutorily-prescribed purview of a license revocation hearing because reasonable and articulable suspicion for an initial stop is not an issue to be reviewed pursuant to G.S. 20-16.2 ; according to G.S. 20-16.2 , the only inquiry with respect to the law enforcement officer is the requirement that he or she have reasonable grounds to believe that the person had committed an implied-consent offense. Hartman v. Robertson, 208 N.C. App. 692, 703 S.E.2d 811, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 2422 (2010).

The quantum of proof necessary to establish probable cause to arrest in criminal driving while impaired cases and civil license revocation proceedings, notwithstanding the different burdens on the remaining elements, is virtually identical. Brower v. Killens, 122 N.C. App. 685, 472 S.E.2d 33, 1996 N.C. App. LEXIS 552 (1996).

No Right to Have Witness Present. —

Procedures for obtaining the blood sample did not have to comply with the requirements of this section because defendant refused a breath test of his blood alcohol level, and defendant did not have a right to have a witness present. State v. Shepley, 237 N.C. App. 174, 764 S.E.2d 658, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 1124 (2014).

Modification of Rights Form. —

Arresting officer’s modification of the rights form related to a material requirement under G.S. 20-16.2(c1) — namely, whether petitioner submitted to breathalyzer testing. The officer’s failure to modify the rights form in front of a magistrate or official authorized to administer oaths stripped the DMV of jurisdiction to revoke petitioner’s driver’s license. Wolski v. N.C. DMV, 252 N.C. App. 422, 798 S.E.2d 152, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 184 (2017).

II.Administration of Test

Administration of breathalyzer test is not dependent upon the legality of the arrest, but hinges solely upon the law-enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving or operating a motor vehicle on a highway or public vehicular area while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (now committed an implied-consent offense). State v. Eubanks, 283 N.C. 556 , 196 S.E.2d 706, 1973 N.C. LEXIS 1004 (1973); State v. Stewardson, 32 N.C. App. 344, 232 S.E.2d 308, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 1926 , cert. denied, 292 N.C. 643 , 235 S.E.2d 64, 1977 N.C. LEXIS 1166 (1977); In re Gardner, 39 N.C. App. 567, 251 S.E.2d 723, 1979 N.C. App. LEXIS 2554 (1979).

Subsection (a) of this section provides that administration of the breathalyzer test hinges solely upon the law-enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been operating a motor vehicle on the highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (now committed an implied-consent offense), and not upon the illegality of the arrest for that offense. In re Pinyatello, 36 N.C. App. 542, 245 S.E.2d 185, 1978 N.C. App. LEXIS 2543 (1978).

Officers Authorized to Request Test. —

Subsection (c) of this section does not provide that the “arresting officer” (now charging officer) is the sole person authorized to request that the petitioner submit to the test. The phrase “arresting officer” (now charging officer) merely distinguishes between the two law-enforcement officers present at the administration of the test and makes it clear that the breathalyzer operator who gives the warning set out in subsection (a) of this section is not the officer authorized to request that the petitioner take the test. Oldham v. Miller, 38 N.C. App. 178, 247 S.E.2d 767, 1978 N.C. App. LEXIS 2125 (1978).

Considering the 1973 amendments to subsections (a) and (c) of this section together it is clear that the modification in subsection (c) that changed the phrase “law-enforcement officer” to “arresting officer” (now charging officer) was designed to distinguish between the law-enforcement officer with reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect was driving under the influence of alcohol (now committed an implied-consent offense) and the law-enforcement officer who is to administer the test and give the warning. Oldham v. Miller, 38 N.C. App. 178, 247 S.E.2d 767, 1978 N.C. App. LEXIS 2125 (1978).

State was required, pursuant to G.S. 20-16.2 and 20-139.1, to re-advise the defendant of the defendant’s implied consent rights before requesting the defendant take a blood test; the state’s failure to adhere to these statutory requirements required suppression of the results of the blood test. State v. Williams, 234 N.C. App. 445, 759 S.E.2d 350, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 604 (2014).

Notice of Rights. —

Where defendant was convicted of driving while impaired, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress intoxilyzer test results, as the police officer’s placing of a copy of defendant’s rights in front of defendant was sufficient to comply with G.S. 20-16.2(a), even though the officer did not physically hand the copy to defendant. State v. Thompson, 154 N.C. App. 194, 571 S.E.2d 673, 2002 N.C. App. LEXIS 1399 (2002).

Notice of Rights Need Not Precede Request to Submit to Test. —

Subsection (c) of this section does not require that the accused be requested to submit to a breathalyzer test after being informed of his statutory rights. Rice v. Peters, 48 N.C. App. 697, 269 S.E.2d 740, 1980 N.C. App. LEXIS 3306 (1980).

One Request by Officer Sufficient. —

Petitioner’s contention that he did not willfully refuse to submit to a chemical analysis at the request of the charging officer since the officer did not request any additional chemical analysis after the first test was completed was without merit, as the statutes require the charging officer to request a chemical analysis based on sequential breath samples, not a sequence of requests for separate chemical analyses, and thus officer’s original request that petitioner submit to a chemical analysis was sufficient to comply with the requirements of subsection (c) of this section. Tolbert v. Hiatt, 95 N.C. App. 380, 382 S.E.2d 453, 1989 N.C. App. LEXIS 774 (1989).

Accused Need Not Be Warned That Results May Be Used against Him. —

An accused subjected to a blood or breath test need not be warned that the results may be used against him. State v. Sykes, 20 N.C. App. 467, 201 S.E.2d 544, 1974 N.C. App. LEXIS 2469 , aff'd, 285 N.C. 202 , 203 S.E.2d 849, 1974 N.C. LEXIS 936 (1974).

As breathalyzer results are not testimonial evidence, Miranda warnings are not required prior to administering a breathalyzer. State v. White, 84 N.C. App. 111, 351 S.E.2d 828, 1987 N.C. App. LEXIS 2454 (1987).

But before the test is administered, an accused must be permitted to call an attorney and to select a witness to observe testing procedures. State v. Sykes, 20 N.C. App. 467, 201 S.E.2d 544, 1974 N.C. App. LEXIS 2469 , aff'd, 285 N.C. 202 , 203 S.E.2d 849, 1974 N.C. LEXIS 936 (1974).

Right to Blood Test. —

The trial court acted within its discretion in rejecting the defendant’s allegation that he had requested and been denied a blood test, where the defendant was given an opportunity to use the telephone to make certain calls to his girlfriend and attorney and could have called, but did not call, a medical expert or hospital for the purposes of conducting a blood test. State v. Tappe, 139 N.C. App. 33, 533 S.E.2d 262, 2000 N.C. App. LEXIS 801 (2000).

Right to Have a Witness to Breathalyzer Test. —

To deny a defendant access to a witness to observe his breathalyzer test when the State’s sole evidence of the offense of driving while impaired is the personal observations of the authorities would constitute a flagrant violation of defendant’s constitutional right to obtain witnesses under N.C. Const., Art. 1, § 23 as a matter of law and would require that the charges be dismissed. State v. Ferguson, 90 N.C. App. 513, 369 S.E.2d 378, 1988 N.C. App. LEXIS 620 (1988).

Where officer refused defendant’s unequivocal request that his wife be permitted to observe his taking of breathalyzer test, the trial court erred in admitting the results of the breathalyzer test at trial; fact that defendant later did take the breathalyzer, after he was first refused permission to have his wife witness the test, could not be construed to be a waiver of his right to have a witness. State v. Myers, 118 N.C. App. 452, 455 S.E.2d 492, 1995 N.C. App. LEXIS 234 (1995).

Although a witness who arrived to observe intoxilyzer testing failed to specifically tell the front desk why she was at the police station, defendant’s G.S. 20-16.2(a) right to have the witness present during the test was violated as the arresting officer knew the witness was en route, the witness timely arrived at the police station, and the witness made a reasonable effort to make her presence known. State v. Hatley, 190 N.C. App. 639, 661 S.E.2d 43, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS 1013 (2008).

Defendant’s suppression motion was improperly denied where: (1) after being arrested, defendant chose to have a witness present under G.S. 20-16.2(a); (2) in the presence of the arresting officer, defendant made contact with his selected witness by telephone and asked her to come and witness the administration of the Intoxilyzer test; (3) less than 20 minutes later, his witness arrived at the public safety center; and (4) despite multiple attempts to obtain access to defendant, the witness was not present when the Intoxilyzer test was administered, because she was still being told to wait in the lobby. State v. Buckheit, 223 N.C. App. 269, 735 S.E.2d 345, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 1254 (2012).

No Right to Have Witness Present. —

Because defendant’s blood draw was performed pursuant to a valid search warrant, defendant did not have a constitutional right to have a witness present for the blood draw, and the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the blood evidence and dismiss the impaired driving charge. State v. Chavez, 237 N.C. App. 475, 767 S.E.2d 581, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 1206 (2014).

Failure to Indicate Desire to Have Witness as Waiver. —

Petitioner, having failed to indicate at the time he refused to take breathalyzer examination test that he desired to have a witness present, waived his statutory right to delay the test until after his witness arrived, even if the witness arrived within the 30-minute period. McDaniel v. DMV, 96 N.C. App. 495, 386 S.E.2d 73, 1989 N.C. App. LEXIS 1026 (1989), cert. denied, 326 N.C. 364 , 389 S.E.2d 815, 1990 N.C. LEXIS 143 (1990).

The effect of subsection (a) of this section is to require a defendant to exercise his rights in a timely manner. State v. Lloyd, 33 N.C. App. 370, 235 S.E.2d 281, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 2195 (1977).

Subsection (a) Complied with. —

Having placed the information required by subsection (a) in writing before the defendant, the operator was not required to make defendant read it. The operator complied fully with the statute when he orally advised defendant and placed the required information in writing before defendant with the opportunity on defendant’s part to read the same. State v. Carpenter, 34 N.C. App. 742, 239 S.E.2d 596, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 1808 (1977), cert. denied, 294 N.C. 183 , 241 S.E.2d 518, 1978 N.C. LEXIS 1204 (1978).

Where defendant was informed of his rights, signed a form containing those rights and submitted to the chemical analysis, defendant was adequately notified of his rights as required by subsection (a). State v. Watson, 122 N.C. App. 596, 472 S.E.2d 28, 1996 N.C. App. LEXIS 483 (1996).

Right to Counsel. —

When a defendant was arrested for driving while impaired, his right to consult with counsel as specified in G.S. 20-16.2(a)(6) controlled over the right stated in G.S. 15A-105(5) because anyone who accepted the privilege of driving on North Carolina’s highways consented to the use of a breathalyzer test and had no constitutional right to consult a lawyer to void that consent; thus, so defendant had no right to consult counsel other than that provided for in G.S. 20-16.2(a)(6). State v. Rasmussen, 158 N.C. App. 544, 582 S.E.2d 44, 2003 N.C. App. LEXIS 1219 (2003).

When defendant was arrested for driving while impaired, his right to consult with counsel as specified in G.S. 20-16.2(a)(6) was not violated because he did not unambiguously identify the person who was present as his witness to the breathalyzer test as his attorney and did not affirmatively ask to speak to her before the test was administered. State v. Rasmussen, 158 N.C. App. 544, 582 S.E.2d 44, 2003 N.C. App. LEXIS 1219 (2003).

Officer was not required to wait for the full 30 minutes under G.S. 20-16.2(a)(6) before administering a breathalyzer test as a driver gave no clear indication that the driver wanted to call an attorney; the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the driver had committed an implied consent offense based on the combination of the driver’s evasion of a checkpoint, the odor of alcohol surrounding the driver, and a brief conversation with the driver. White v. Tippett, 187 N.C. App. 285, 652 S.E.2d 728, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 2359 (2007).

Time Limit on Right to Call Attorney and Select Witness. —

The 30-minute time limit referred to by subdivision (a)(6) of this section applies both to the purpose of calling an attorney and to the purpose of selecting a witness to view the testing procedure. Seders v. Powell, 298 N.C. 453 , 259 S.E.2d 544, 1979 N.C. LEXIS 1375 (1979).

The fact that as a matter of grace the legislature has given defendant the right to refuse to submit to chemical analysis, and suffer the consequences for refusing, does not convert this step in the investigation into a critical stage in the prosecution entitling defendant to more than the 30 minutes provided in the statute to secure a lawyer. Otherwise, defendant would be able to delay the analysis until its results would be of doubtful value. State v. Howren, 312 N.C. 454 , 323 S.E.2d 335, 1984 N.C. LEXIS 1806 (1984).

The 30-minute grace period is available only when a petitioner intends to exercise his rights to call an attorney or have a witness present under the statute. Rock v. Hiatt, 103 N.C. App. 578, 406 S.E.2d 638, 1991 N.C. App. LEXIS 881 (1991).

The 30-minute period from the advising of rights is a matter of legislative grace. In re Vallender, 81 N.C. App. 291, 344 S.E.2d 62, 1986 N.C. App. LEXIS 2273 (1986).

The breathalyzer test will be delayed a maximum of 30 minutes from the time defendant is notified of his rights. State v. Lloyd, 33 N.C. App. 370, 235 S.E.2d 281, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 2195 (1977).

The purpose of the 30-minute delay is to allow the defendant, who exercises his rights, a reasonable but limited amount of time to procure the presence of a lawyer, doctor, nurse or witness. State v. Lloyd, 33 N.C. App. 370, 235 S.E.2d 281, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 2195 (1977).

The 1973 amendment of this section which inserted “for this purpose” in the place of “for these purposes” in subdivision (a)(6) did so at the same time that it enumerated three other rights accruing to a driver faced with the prospect of a breathalyzer test. The limiting words were inserted to apply to the single generic right enumerated in subdivision (a)(6) of this section, the right to have advice and support during the testing process, as opposed to the other rights enumerated in the proceeding subdivisions of this section. Seders v. Powell, 298 N.C. 453 , 259 S.E.2d 544, 1979 N.C. LEXIS 1375 (1979).

Time Limit Is Constitutionally Sound. —

Allowing the driver 30 minutes time to decide whether to submit to the test, while providing that he is deemed to have refused at the expiration of the 30 minutes, is a constitutionally sound principle. Etheridge v. Peters, 45 N.C. App. 358, 263 S.E.2d 308, 1980 N.C. App. LEXIS 2672 , aff'd, 301 N.C. 76 , 269 S.E.2d 133, 1980 N.C. LEXIS 1144 (1980).

No Constitutional Right to Confer with Counsel. —

A person enjoys no constitutional right to confer with counsel before deciding whether to submit to the breathalyzer test. Etheridge v. Peters, 45 N.C. App. 358, 263 S.E.2d 308, 1980 N.C. App. LEXIS 2672 , aff'd, 301 N.C. 76 , 269 S.E.2d 133, 1980 N.C. LEXIS 1144 (1980).

The operator of a motor vehicle has no constitutional right to confer with counsel prior to a decision to submit to the breathalyzer test. Seders v. Powell, 298 N.C. 453 , 259 S.E.2d 544, 1979 N.C. LEXIS 1375 (1979).

Section 15A-501(5) Not Applicable to Breathalyzer Tests. —

Section 15A-501(5) which gives a criminal defendant a right to consult with counsel within a reasonable time after arrest, does not apply to breathalyzer tests. It would be incongruous to hold that subdivision (a)(6) of this section requires an accused to select a witness to view for him the testing procedure within 30 minutes but allows a greater period for the purpose of calling an attorney since, in virtually every situation, it would be easier for an accused to contact an attorney by telephone within 30 minutes than to contact anyone else and have them travel to the breathalyzer room to observe the test within that same time period. Seders v. Powell, 298 N.C. 453 , 259 S.E.2d 544, 1979 N.C. LEXIS 1375 (1979).

The legislature did not intend for the “reasonable time” contemplated by G.S. 15A-501(5), a part of the Criminal Procedure Act, to apply to the specialized situation contemplated by this section, a civil matter involving the administrative removal of driving privileges as a result of refusing to submit to a breathalyzer test. When two statutes apparently overlap, it is well established that the statute special and particular shall control over the statute general in nature, even if the general statute is more recent, unless it clearly appears that the legislature intended the general statute to control. Seders v. Powell, 298 N.C. 453 , 259 S.E.2d 544, 1979 N.C. LEXIS 1375 (1979).

Test Administered Whether or Not Requested Persons Have Arrived. —

Even if the defendant does exercise his rights within 30 minutes of notification, the test can and will be administered after the lapse of 30 minutes regardless of whether the requested persons have arrived. State v. Lloyd, 33 N.C. App. 370, 235 S.E.2d 281, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 2195 (1977).

Presence of Counsel During Entire Process Not Required. —

An accused has no absolute right to demand that an attorney view the entire process involved in administering the test, including the preliminary steps necessary to ready the machine itself. State v. Martin, 46 N.C. App. 514, 265 S.E.2d 456, 1980 N.C. App. LEXIS 2859 (1980).

The police are not required to delay testing unless the defendant exercises his rights. State v. Lloyd, 33 N.C. App. 370, 235 S.E.2d 281, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 2195 (1977).

When Delay of Less Than 30 Minutes Permissible. —

This section provides for a delay not in excess of 30 minutes for defendant to exercise his rights, and a delay of less than 30 minutes is permissible where the record is barren of any evidence to support a contention, if made, that a lawyer or witness would have arrived to witness the proceeding had the operator delayed the test to the maximum time of 30 minutes. State v. Buckner, 34 N.C. App. 447, 238 S.E.2d 635, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 1716 (1977).

Subdivision (a)(6) of this section constitutes a maximum of 30 minutes delay for the defendant to obtain a lawyer or witness. It does not require that the administering officer wait 30 minutes before giving the test when the defendant has waived the right to have a lawyer or witness present or when it becomes obvious that defendant does not intend to exercise this right. State v. Buckner, 34 N.C. App. 447, 238 S.E.2d 635, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 1716 (1977).

There was no error in the testing procedures or in the admission of the test results where there was a period of 25 minutes after notification to the defendant of his rights during which the defendant made no effort to exercise rights, and where, at the time the test was administered, the defendant made no effort to exercise his rights. State v. Lloyd, 33 N.C. App. 370, 235 S.E.2d 281, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 2195 (1977).

Test Not Required to Be Administered within 30 Minutes. —

This section does not require that the breathalyzer test be administered within 30 minutes of the time a person’s rights are read to him. Pappas v. North Carolina Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 42 N.C. App. 497, 256 S.E.2d 829, 1979 N.C. App. LEXIS 2777 (1979).

Request Made by Officer to Technician. —

That portion of this section which provides that the test or tests shall be administered upon request of a law-enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this State while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (now committed an implied-consent offense), refers to the request being made by the officer to the technician who will give the test, rather than being directed to the suspect. State v. Randolph, 273 N.C. 120 , 159 S.E.2d 324, 1968 N.C. LEXIS 568 (1968) (decided under this section as it stood before the 1969 amendment).

Person Tested Must Follow Directions of Breathalyzer Operator. —

The full import of subsection (c) of this section requires an operator of a motor vehicle, who has been charged with the offense of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, to take a breathalyzer test, which means the person to be tested must follow the instructions of the breathalyzer operator. A failure to follow such instruction provides an adequate basis for the trial court to conclude that petitioner willfully refused to take a chemical test of breath in violation of law. State v. Moore, 41 N.C. App. 131, 254 S.E.2d 191, 1979 N.C. App. LEXIS 2371 (1979).

Refusal to Remove Object from Mouth. —

Where breathalyzer operator noticed a piece of paper in the corner of petitioner’s mouth and ordered him to remove it, and where petitioner refused, petitioner’s refusal to obey the breathalyzer operator’s instructions was a refusal to take the breathalyzer test under subsection (c) of this section, since a reasonable method for determining that the subject has not “eaten” in 15 minutes is to prohibit him from placing foreign objects in his mouth. Tolbert v. Hiatt, 95 N.C. App. 380, 382 S.E.2d 453, 1989 N.C. App. LEXIS 774 (1989).

Right to Be Readvised Not Triggered. —

Superior court properly refused to suppress intoxilyzer results because the re-advisement requirement was never triggered; the officer’s request that defendant provide another sample for the same chemical analysis of the breath on a second intoxilyzer machine was not one for a subsequent chemical analysis. State v. Cole, 262 N.C. App. 466, 822 S.E.2d 456, 2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 1154 (2018).

Defendant’s Rights Not Denied by Officer’s Statements. —

Where defendant was fully and completely advised of his rights before a breathalyzer test was administered to him, the officer’s error in stating that defendant could have a physician, registered nurse or a qualified technician or qualified person of his own choosing to administer the test under the direction of a law officer instead of stating that defendant could have a qualified person of his own choosing to administer a test or tests in addition to any administered at the direction of the law-enforcement officer did not deny defendant his rights. State v. Green, 27 N.C. App. 491, 219 S.E.2d 529, 1975 N.C. App. LEXIS 1884 (1975).

Trial court’s revocation was based on adequate findings of fact, as the court’s finding that petitioner willfully refused without just cause or excuse to submit to a chemical analysis upon the request of the charging officer was the finding of an ultimate fact, indicating that the court rejected all opposing inferences raised by petitioner’s evidence that the refusal was not willful or was excused, and as such, the court’s finding permitted adequate appellate review of the ultimate fact at issue. Tolbert v. Hiatt, 95 N.C. App. 380, 382 S.E.2d 453, 1989 N.C. App. LEXIS 774 (1989).

Trial court erred in enjoining Commissioner of Motor Vehicles from revoking petitioner’s license on the grounds that proper procedures were not followed in administering the breathalyzer test; the validity of testing procedures is not relevant where a motorist has refused to take the test. In re Rogers, 94 N.C. App. 505, 380 S.E.2d 599, 1989 N.C. App. LEXIS 550 (1989).

III.Revocation of License for Refusal to Take Test

Purpose. —

The administrative punishment of license revocation is designed to promote breathalyzer examinations which provide the State law-enforcement officers with more accurate evidence of possible driving under the influence violations. Montgomery v. North Carolina DMV, 455 F. Supp. 338, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16177 (W.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1979).

Rule of Evidence Did Not Apply. —

Reports of a police officer and sergeant and the affidavit of the officer were properly admitted in a license revocation proceeding as under this rule, the North Carolina Rules of Evidence did not apply to North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicle (DMV) proceedings pursuant to G.S. 20-16.2 ; the Rules of Evidence do not apply to DMV hearings held pursuant to G.S. 20-16.2 .. Johnson v. Robertson, 227 N.C. App. 281, 742 S.E.2d 603, 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 534 (2013).

Revocation of a driver’s license does not deprive the licensee of any fundamental constitutional right. Montgomery v. North Carolina DMV, 455 F. Supp. 338, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16177 (W.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1979).

The evidence sought from a breathalyzer examination is directly related to the State’s need to enforce the laws governing the operation of motor vehicles on the State’s roads. The administrative penalty is appropriately designed to deny a right directly related to the laws whose enforcement may be hindered by refusal to take a breathalyzer examination. Montgomery v. North Carolina DMV, 455 F. Supp. 338, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16177 (W.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1979).

Finding that Driver’s Refusal to Take Intoxilyzer Test Was Unrelated to Right to Have Witness Present. —

Trial court properly determined that a driver refused to take an Intoxilyzer test for reasons unrelated to a violation of his right to have a witness present under G.S. 20-16.2 . By concluding that the driver’s refusal was willful, the trial court resolved any issue of whether the refusal was related to the State’s violation of the driver’s right to have a witness present during chemical analysis. Powers v. Tatum, 196 N.C. App. 639, 676 S.E.2d 89, 2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 527 (2009).

A hearing under subsection (d) of this section satisfies the constitutional due process requirement. Montgomery v. North Carolina DMV, 455 F. Supp. 338, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16177 (W.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1979).

Subsection (d) of this section provides an adequate opportunity for a hearing prior to revocation of a license for failure to submit to a breathalyzer examination. Montgomery v. North Carolina DMV, 455 F. Supp. 338, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16177 (W.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1979).

Motorist whose driver’s license was suspended in a hearing before the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) was not deprived of her due process rights at the hearing because there was nothing in the record that led to the conclusion that the hearing officer, although an employee of the DMV, presented such a hazard of arbitrary decision making that it was violative of due process of law and there was nothing to indicate that the hearing officer was doing anything more than attempting to elicit the truth. Edwards v. Jessup, 2022-NCCOA-157, 2022 N.C. App. LEXIS 192 (March 15, 2022).

Property Rights Not Denied. —

Where plaintiff refused to submit to a breathalyzer examination and later received notice that his driver’s license would be suspended, the plaintiff was not deprived of any property right without procedural due process. Although a notice of revocation was issued prior to a hearing the plaintiff was provided a right to a hearing, before revocation was effectuated. In fact the plaintiff requested and received an administrative hearing a trial de novo in superior court, and consideration of his appeals of the superior court’s decision by both the North Carolina Court of Appeals and the North Carolina Supreme Court prior to actual revocation. Montgomery v. North Carolina DMV, 455 F. Supp. 338, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16177 (W.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1979).

Suspensions for Refusal to Take Test and for Impaired Driving Distinguished. —

The suspension of a license for refusal to submit to a chemical test at the time of an arrest for drunken (now impaired) driving and a suspension which results from a plea of guilty or a conviction of that charge are separate and distinct revocations. Joyner v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 226 , 182 S.E.2d 553, 1971 N.C. LEXIS 771 (1971); Vuncannon v. Garrett, 17 N.C. App. 440, 194 S.E.2d 364, 1973 N.C. App. LEXIS 1378 (1973); Creech v. Alexander, 32 N.C. App. 139, 231 S.E.2d 36, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 1869 , cert. denied, 293 N.C. 589 , 239 S.E.2d 263, 1977 N.C. LEXIS 988 (1977).

The suspension of a license which results from a plea of guilty or a conviction for drunken (now impaired) driving in no way exempts the licensee from the mandatory effects of the 60-day suspension of his license if he willfully refused to take a chemical test. Joyner v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 226 , 182 S.E.2d 553, 1971 N.C. LEXIS 771 (1971); Creech v. Alexander, 32 N.C. App. 139, 231 S.E.2d 36, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 1869 , cert. denied, 293 N.C. 589 , 239 S.E.2d 263, 1977 N.C. LEXIS 988 (1977).

The Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles had authority to suspend for 60 days the limited driving privilege granted a defendant convicted of drunken (now impaired) driving for defendant’s willful refusal to take a breathalyzer test at the time of his arrest. Vuncannon v. Garrett, 17 N.C. App. 440, 194 S.E.2d 364, 1973 N.C. App. LEXIS 1378 (1973).

Where the law directs suspension, revocation, or nonissuance of a driver’s license, some of the grounds are convictions for moving violations, or other statutory violations relating to highway safety, or situations where an individual’s capacity to operate a motor vehicle safely are manifestly questionable. Evans v. Roberson, 69 N.C. App. 644, 317 S.E.2d 715, 1984 N.C. App. LEXIS 3529 (1984), rev'd, 314 N.C. 315 , 333 S.E.2d 228, 1985 N.C. LEXIS 1781 (1985).

Legality of Arrest. —

Subsection (d) of this section makes no reference to any question concerning the legality of the arrest as coming within the scope of the inquiry. In re Gardner, 39 N.C. App. 567, 251 S.E.2d 723, 1979 N.C. App. LEXIS 2554 (1979).

The petitioner’s driving privilege was properly revoked because of his unwillingness to take the breathalyzer test, whether or not his warrantless arrest was legal under G.S. 15A-401 , where the arrest was constitutionally valid by virtue of the fact that the arresting officer had ample information to provide him with probable cause to arrest the petitioner for operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway while under the influence of intoxicants (now committing an implied-consent offense). In re Gardner, 39 N.C. App. 567, 251 S.E.2d 723, 1979 N.C. App. LEXIS 2554 (1979).

This section does not require that a suspected drunk driver submit to a chemical test. It does, however, provide that a suspect who “willfully refuses” a request to submit to the test will have his driving privileges automatically revoked for a period of six months. The standard of “willful refusal” in this context is clear. Once apprised of one’s rights and having received a request to submit, a driver is allowed 30 minutes in which to make a decision. A “willful refusal” occurs whenever a driver (1) is aware that he has a choice to take or to refuse to take the test; (2) is aware of the time limit within which he must take the test; (3) voluntarily elects not to take the test; and (4) knowingly permits the prescribed 30 minute time limit to expire before he elects to take the test. Mathis v. North Carolina DMV, 71 N.C. App. 413, 322 S.E.2d 436, 1984 N.C. App. LEXIS 3849 (1984).

Burden of Proof. —

Under this section, the respondent Commissioner of Motor Vehicles had the burden of proof to show that petitioner willfully refused to submit to a chemical analysis. Rock v. Hiatt, 103 N.C. App. 578, 406 S.E.2d 638, 1991 N.C. App. LEXIS 881 (1991).

The word “refuse” as used in this section means the declination of a request or demand, or the omission to comply with some requirement of law, as the result of a positive intention to disobey. Joyner v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 226 , 182 S.E.2d 553, 1971 N.C. LEXIS 771 (1971).

A defendant’s refusal to submit to an intoxilyzer test can give rise to proceedings to revoke his driver’s license only if it is a willful refusal. State v. Summers, 132 N.C. App. 636, 513 S.E.2d 575, 1999 N.C. App. LEXIS 275 (1999), aff'd, 351 N.C. 620 , 528 S.E.2d 17, 2000 N.C. LEXIS 351 (2000).

Driver’s willful refusal to submit to a chemical analysis could be used to revoke his driver’s license even though the arrest was not in compliance with G.S. 15A-401 (b)(2). Quick v. North Carolina DMV, 125 N.C. App. 123, 479 S.E.2d 226, 1997 N.C. App. LEXIS 6 (1997).

A willful refusal to submit to a chemical test within the meaning of this section occurs where a motorist: (1) is aware that he has a choice to take or to refuse to take the test; (2) is aware of the time limit within which he must take the test; (3) voluntarily elects not to take the test; and (4) knowingly permits the prescribed 30 minute time limit to expire before he elects to take the test. Etheridge v. Peters, 301 N.C. 76 , 269 S.E.2d 133, 1980 N.C. LEXIS 1144 (1980).

One may refuse the test under this section by inaction as well as by words. Refusal, in this context, is the declination of a request or demand, or the omission to comply with some requirement of law, as the result of a positive intention to disobey. A finding that a driver did refuse to take the test is equivalent to a finding that the driver willfully refused to take the test. Mathis v. North Carolina DMV, 71 N.C. App. 413, 322 S.E.2d 436, 1984 N.C. App. LEXIS 3849 (1984).

Delay After Being Informed of Rights Held Refusal to Submit to Test. —

Where the breathalyzer operator once fully informed petitioner of his rights with regard to the breath test, there was no obligation upon him to remind petitioner of the effect of his refusal to submit to the test, and petitioner’s delay in taking the breathalyzer test, was at his own peril even though he stated that he was awaiting his attorney. Therefore, the trial court could properly find, that defendant had refused to submit to the breathalyzer test. Creech v. Alexander, 32 N.C. App. 139, 231 S.E.2d 36, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 1869 , cert. denied, 293 N.C. 589 , 239 S.E.2d 263, 1977 N.C. LEXIS 988 (1977); Seders v. Powell, 39 N.C. App. 491, 250 S.E.2d 690, 1979 N.C. App. LEXIS 2510 , aff'd, 298 N.C. 453 , 259 S.E.2d 544, 1979 N.C. LEXIS 1375 (1979).

Where plaintiff was requested to take the test pursuant to this section and acknowledged an understanding of his rights, and where plaintiff was told of the 30 minute time limit and was repeatedly asked if he would take the test before it expired, plaintiff’s initial 20-minute silence in response to those requests does not toll the 30 minute period. Otherwise, any suspect could evade the possible repercussions of testing by simply refusing to cooperate. Mathis v. North Carolina DMV, 71 N.C. App. 413, 322 S.E.2d 436, 1984 N.C. App. LEXIS 3849 (1984).

The trial court did not err in finding that petitioner willfully refused to submit to a breath test by concluding that the 30 minute waiting period began to run at 1:39 a.m., when he was advised of his rights, instead of 1:54 a.m., when the formal request was made. In re Vallender, 81 N.C. App. 291, 344 S.E.2d 62, 1986 N.C. App. LEXIS 2273 (1986).

Delay of More Than 30 Minutes While Awaiting Attorney. —

Where petitioner’s right to “call an attorney” was satisfied, petitioner had no right to delay the test in excess of 30 minutes while awaiting the arrival of his attorney. His declination to submit to the test was, therefore, a willful refusal under this section. Price v. North Carolina Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 36 N.C. App. 698, 245 S.E.2d 518, 1978 N.C. App. LEXIS 2612 , cert. denied, 295 N.C. 551 , 248 S.E.2d 728, 1978 N.C. LEXIS 1041 (1978); Etheridge v. Peters, 45 N.C. App. 358, 263 S.E.2d 308, 1980 N.C. App. LEXIS 2672 , aff'd, 301 N.C. 76 , 269 S.E.2d 133, 1980 N.C. LEXIS 1144 (1980).

Plaintiff had no right to delay the test in excess of 30 minutes while waiting for his attorney to return his call. His declination to take the breathalyzer test was thus a willful refusal under this section. Seders v. Powell, 39 N.C. App. 491, 250 S.E.2d 690, 1979 N.C. App. LEXIS 2510 , aff'd, 298 N.C. 453 , 259 S.E.2d 544, 1979 N.C. LEXIS 1375 (1979).

Refusal to Provide More Than Two Samples. —

Where petitioner provided two breath samples resulting in readings of .28 and .31 and then refused to provide any more samples, her conduct amounted to a willful refusal under subsection (c) of this section within the meaning of G.S. 20-139.1(b3). Watson v. Hiatt, 78 N.C. App. 609, 337 S.E.2d 871, 1985 N.C. App. LEXIS 4348 (1985).

Failure to Follow Instructions As Willful Refusal. —

Evidence showed that petitioner failed to follow the instructions of the breathalyzer operator where he repeatedly put his fingers in his mouth and failed to blow long enough into the machine to get a sufficient sample; failure to follow the instructions of the breathalyzer operator is an adequate basis for the trial court to conclude that petitioner willfully refused to submit to a chemical analysis. Tedder v. Hodges, 119 N.C. App. 169, 457 S.E.2d 881, 1995 N.C. App. LEXIS 391 (1995).

Right to Full De Novo Review. —

Any person whose driver’s license has been suspended under subsection (d) of this section has the right to a full de novo review by a superior court judge. This means the court must hear the matter on its merits from beginning to end as if no trial or hearing had been held by the Department (now Division) and without any presumption in favor of its decision. Joyner v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 226 , 182 S.E.2d 553, 1971 N.C. LEXIS 771 (1971).

Correct Standard of Review Was Applied. —

Superior court applied the correct standard of review of a license revocation proceeding under this section where it stated that it did not conduct a de novo review of the facts and instead reviewed the record to determine whether there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the Commissioner of the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicle’s findings of fact. Johnson v. Robertson, 227 N.C. App. 281, 742 S.E.2d 603, 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 534 (2013).

Duty of Court to Determine “Willful Refusal.” —

“Willful refusal” to take a breathalyzer test is a necessary requirement under this section and the trial court has the duty of judicially determining this question. Sermons v. Peters, 51 N.C. App. 147, 275 S.E.2d 218, 1981 N.C. App. LEXIS 2187 , cert. denied, 302 N.C. 630 , 280 S.E.2d 441, 1981 N.C. LEXIS 1247 (1981).

Failure of Court to Resolve Evidence of Willful Refusal. —

Where evidence on whether petitioner knowingly permitted the prescribed 30-minute time period to expire before he took the test was conflicting, and the trial court made no attempt to resolve it in its order, trial court erred in determining that petitioner had “willfully refused” to submit to a chemical analysis under this section, and the case would be remanded to the trial court for additional findings based upon the evidence. Rock v. Hiatt, 103 N.C. App. 578, 406 S.E.2d 638, 1991 N.C. App. LEXIS 881 (1991).

Failure of Court to Find Facts. —

Notwithstanding the failure of the trial court to find facts with regard to whether the plaintiff was arrested on reasonable grounds within the meaning of subsection (d) of this section, there was no need to remand for a further finding of facts or to award the plaintiff a new trial, since the facts leading up to the arrest were essentially uncontradicted, and only the conclusion to be drawn from them was disputed. Poag v. Powell, 39 N.C. App. 363, 250 S.E.2d 93, 1979 N.C. App. LEXIS 2488 , cert. denied, 296 N.C. 736 , 254 S.E.2d 178, 1979 N.C. LEXIS 1279 (1979).

Officer’s Sworn Report Is Not Prima Facie Evidence of Refusal to Submit to Test. —

This section does not make the law-enforcement officer’s sworn report prima facie evidence that the arrested person willfully refused to submit to the breathalyzer test. Therefore, if he objects to its introduction, the report cannot be used as evidence against him. Joyner v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 226 , 182 S.E.2d 553, 1971 N.C. LEXIS 771 (1971).

But Is Sufficient in Absence of Timely Objection. —

In the absence of a timely objection as to its introduction, the officer’s sworn report was sufficient evidence to sustain the Department’s (now Division’s) suspension of petitioner’s license. Joyner v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 226 , 182 S.E.2d 553, 1971 N.C. LEXIS 771 (1971).

Trooper’s failure to comply with subsection (a) in the face of petitioner’s refusal to submit resulted in the rescission of the revocation of petitioner’s license. Nicholson v. Killens, 116 N.C. App. 473, 448 S.E.2d 542, 1994 N.C. App. LEXIS 1067 (1994).

Willfulness Found. —

Although the evidence before a superior court was conflicting, the findings of fact 24 and 30 complied with G.S. 1A-1 , N.C. R. Civ. P. 52(a) and were the ultimate findings of fact required to support a conclusion that a driver’s refusal to submit to chemical analysis was willful as defined in G.S. 20-16.2 . The officers asserted that the driver was marked as a refusal after refusing the test because he was innocent, and he testified that he refused the test because his right to have a witness present was violated; however, the driver conceded through finding of fact 30 that he did not know whether or not his witness was present, and therefore did not know that his rights had been violated. Powers v. Tatum, 196 N.C. App. 639, 676 S.E.2d 89, 2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 527 (2009).

Willful Refusal Not Shown. —

Superior court did not err by reversing the administrative decision of the Division of Motor Vehicles hearing officer revoking petitioner’s driver’s license because the evidence did not show that petitioner willfully refused to submit to a chemical analysis, as it was undisputed that when petitioner blew a second time, the breath test machine registered “mouth alcohol” as the result of the sample.

Compliance. —

After being informed and kept apprised of his rights, a driver was given the option to take or refuse an Intoxilyzer test, and the purpose of G.S. 20-16.2 was thus fulfilled. The driver was informed of his statutory rights, given the opportunity to exercise those rights, kept informed of the thirty-minute time period as it elapsed, made aware of the choice he had to take or refuse the test, and provided multiple opportunities to submit to the test; the driver was not marked as a refusal until four minutes past the elapsed time limit. Powers v. Tatum, 196 N.C. App. 639, 676 S.E.2d 89, 2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 527 (2009).

Properly Executed Affidavit Requirement. —

Construing G.S. 20-16.2 strictly, as courts are compelled to do, the plain language of the statute requires that the Division of Motor Vehicles of the Department of Transportation receive a properly executed affidavit that includes all the requirements set forth in G.S. 20-16.2 (c1) before the Division is vested with the authority to revoke a driver’s license pursuant to G.S. 20-16.2. Lee v. Gore, 202 N.C. App. 133, 688 S.E.2d 734, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 90 , superseded, sub. op., 206 N.C. App. 374, 698 S.E.2d 179, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 1564 (2010).

Construing the plain language of G.S. 20-16.2 , the form DHHS 3908 could not be construed as part of the affidavit. Lee v. Gore, 202 N.C. App. 133, 688 S.E.2d 734, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 90 , superseded, sub. op., 206 N.C. App. 374, 698 S.E.2d 179, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 1564 (2010).

There was no evidence that the officer swore before the magistrate in any manner that the driver had willfully refused to submit to the chemical analysis, and the form DHHS 3908 could not serve as a substitute for a properly executed affidavit; therefore, because the Division of Motor Vehicles of the Department of Transportation never received a properly executed affidavit required by G.S. 20-16.2 (c1), the Division had no authority to revoke the driver’s license pursuant to G.S. 20-16.2 , or any other statute. Absent the authority to revoke the driver’s license, there was also no authority pursuant to G.S. 20-16.2 for the Division to conduct a review hearing, or for appellate review in the superior court, and therefore, the rulings of hearing officer and the superior court affirming the revocation of the driver’s license were void. Lee v. Gore, 202 N.C. App. 133, 688 S.E.2d 734, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 90 , superseded, sub. op., 206 N.C. App. 374, 698 S.E.2d 179, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 1564 (2010).

Trial court erred in reversing a suspension of a licensee’s driving privileges by the Division of Motor Vehicles, as a police trooper’s affidavit complied with G.S. 20-16.2(c1), despite a clerical error in his affidavit as to the time when the refusal occurred; time of refusal was not a requirement in the affidavit, and the trial court was bound by the hearing officer’s finding on the time issue. Hoots v. Robertson, 214 N.C. App. 181, 715 S.E.2d 199, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1619 (2011).

Because G.S. 20-16.2(d) required that the DMV receive a properly executed affidavit from law enforcement swearing to a willful refusal to submit to chemical analysis before revoking driving privileges, and the officer failed to check the form indicating that petitioner’s refusal was willful, the DMV lacked the authority to revoke petitioner’s driving privileges. Lee v. Gore, 365 N.C. 227 , 717 S.E.2d 356, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 660 (2011).

Reasonable Grounds to Believe Driver Was Impaired. —

Evidence was sufficient to support the Division of Motor Vehicles’ (DMV) determination that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the driver was driving while impaired, and therefore the superior court erred by reversing the DMV’s decision revoking the driver’s license for refusing to submit to chemical analysis under G.S. 20-16.2 , where the arresting officer observed the driver with glassy, bloodshot eyes and slightly slurred speech, the driver used enough mouthwash to create a strong odor detectable by the officer from outside the car, and he lied to the officer about using the mouthwash. Farrell v. Thomas, 247 N.C. App. 64, 784 S.E.2d 657, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 431 (2016).

Revocation by the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles of a motorist’s driver’s license based on the motorist’s failure to consent to a chemical analysis was appropriate because the officer had a reasonable belief/probable cause that the motorist had been driving the motorist’s vehicle while impaired as the motorist admitted to having fallen asleep while in the motorist’s car in the drive-through lane of a fast food restaurant. Edwards v. Jessup, 2022-NCCOA-157, 2022 N.C. App. LEXIS 192 (March 15, 2022).

Court of Appeals Improperly Reweighed Evidence And Made Credibility Determinations. —

Court of appeals erred in determining that the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles improperly concluded that a driver willfully refused to submit to a chemical analysis because it engaged in the prohibited exercises of reweighing evidence and making witness credibility determinations; the driver was instructed repeatedly about the process of submitting to a valid chemical analysis, and despite those warnings, he remained noncompliant. Brackett v. Thomas, 371 N.C. 121 , 814 S.E.2d 86, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 432 (2018).

IV.Evidence in Prosecution for Drunken Driving

Chemical analyses of blood or breath are not within the protection of U.S. Const., Amend. V and XIV, or N.C. Const., Art. I, § 23, as such chemical analyses are not evidence which is “testimonial” or “communicative” in nature. State v. White, 84 N.C. App. 111, 351 S.E.2d 828, 1987 N.C. App. LEXIS 2454 (1987).

Results of Test Are Not Evidence within Privilege against Self-Incrimination. —

The taking of a breath sample from an accused for the purpose of test is not evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature within the privilege against self-incrimination, and for that reason the requirements of Miranda are inapplicable to a breathalyzer test administered pursuant to the statutes. State v. Sykes, 285 N.C. 202 , 203 S.E.2d 849, 1974 N.C. LEXIS 936 (1974).

Exclusionary Rule Inapplicable. —

It was error to reverse the revocation of a driver’s license due to the exclusion, in criminal proceedings, of evidence derived from an officer’s stop of the driver’s vehicle without reasonable suspicion, because (1) the exclusionary rule did not apply in license revocation proceedings, so the relevant question was whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the driver had been driving while impaired, and (2) ample evidence showed such grounds, as the driver smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, admitted drinking, swayed noticeably on exiting the vehicle, and failed a sobriety test. Combs v. Robertson, 239 N.C. App. 135, 767 S.E.2d 925, 2015 N.C. App. LEXIS 60 (2015).

Admissibility of Results When Test Not Properly Performed. —

Testimony concerning the results of blood tests may be admitted into evidence even though the tests were not performed in accordance with this section and G.S. 20-139.1 under the “other competent evidence” exception contained in G.S. 20-139.1 . State v. Byers, 105 N.C. App. 377, 413 S.E.2d 586, 1992 N.C. App. LEXIS 238 (1992).

Consideration of Alcosensor Results. —

It is permissible to consider the results of alcosensor test in determining whether trooper had reasonable grounds to believe petitioner had committed an implied consent offense. Moore v. Hodges, 116 N.C. App. 727, 449 S.E.2d 218, 1994 N.C. App. LEXIS 1122 (1994).

The State is not limited to evidence of blood alcohol concentration which was procured in accordance with the procedures of this statute; testing pursuant to a search warrant is a type of “other competent evidence” referred to in G.S. 20-139.1 . State v. Davis, 142 N.C. App. 81, 542 S.E.2d 236, 2001 N.C. App. LEXIS 45 (2001).

Failure to Advise Defendant of Rights and to Obtain Consent to Blood Test. —

Trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to suppress blood draw evidence a police officer collected from a nurse who was treating defendant because the officer did not advise defendant of his rights and did not obtain his written or oral consent to the blood test; the State’s post hoc actions did not overcome the presumption that the warrantless search was unreasonable, and it offended the Fourth Amendment and the State Constitution. State v. Romano, 247 N.C. App. 212, 785 S.E.2d 168, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 430 (2016), modified, aff'd, 369 N.C. 678 , 800 S.E.2d 644, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 398 (2017).

Effect of Failure to Advise Defendant of Right to Refuse Test. —

Under this section, failure to advise a defendant of his right to refuse the breathalyzer test does not render the results of the test inadmissible in court. State v. Allen, 14 N.C. App. 485, 188 S.E.2d 568, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 2160 (1972).

Failure by officers to advise defendant of his right to refuse to take a breathalyzer test does not render the result of the test inadmissible in evidence, defendant having impliedly consented to the test by virtue of driving an automobile on the public highways of the State, and the test having been administered after arrest and without the use of force or violence. State v. McCabe, 1 N.C. App. 237, 161 S.E.2d 42, 1968 N.C. App. LEXIS 1051 (1968).

Where the defendant by his voluntary and overt actions makes it clear that he will not voluntarily submit to the breathalyzer test, it is not necessary for the State to present evidence that the defendant was advised of his right to refuse to take the breathalyzer test before evidence of that refusal may be used against him at a trial for driving under the influence, as is allowed pursuant to G.S. 20-139.1 . State v. Simmons, 51 N.C. App. 440, 276 S.E.2d 765, 1981 N.C. App. LEXIS 2246 (1981).

Failure to Advise Defendant of Right to Attorney and Witness. —

Where the State offered no evidence upon the question of whether defendant had been notified of his right to call an attorney and to select a witness to view breathalyzer testing procedures in accordance with subsection (a) of this section, results of the test were inadmissible, and admission of the results over defendant’s objection constituted prejudicial error. State v. Shadding, 17 N.C. App. 279, 194 S.E.2d 55, 1973 N.C. App. LEXIS 1337 , cert. denied, 283 N.C. 108 , 194 S.E.2d 636, 1973 N.C. LEXIS 920 (1973).

Refusal of Test Admissible. —

The failure to warn the defendant that the officer could seek alternate methods of testing did not render defendant’s refusal inadmissible. State v. Davis, 142 N.C. App. 81, 542 S.E.2d 236, 2001 N.C. App. LEXIS 45 (2001).

Failure to Advise Defendant of Right to Additional Test. —

The failure of the State to establish that defendant was accorded the statutory right to have another test, in addition to the others which he was properly accorded, renders the results of the breathalyzer test inadmissible in evidence. State v. Fuller, 24 N.C. App. 38, 209 S.E.2d 805, 1974 N.C. App. LEXIS 1923 (1974).

Where the defendant is not advised of his rights under subsection (a), including, under subdivision (a)(5), the right to have another alcohol concentration test performed by a qualified person of his own choosing, the State’s test is inadmissible in evidence. State v. Gilbert, 85 N.C. App. 594, 355 S.E.2d 261, 1987 N.C. App. LEXIS 2632 (1987).

Results of the breathalyzer test were admissible even though defendant’s initial “commitment” to take the test was obtained before he was advised of his statutory rights embodied in subsection (a) of this section. State v. Sykes, 285 N.C. 202 , 203 S.E.2d 849, 1974 N.C. LEXIS 936 (1974).

Refusal of Test May Not Be Used as Assumption of Guilt. —

This section does not say that if a person refuses to submit to the test, it will be used as an assumption of guilt in court. State v. Mobley, 273 N.C. 471 , 160 S.E.2d 334, 1968 N.C. LEXIS 620 (1968) (decided prior to the 1969 amendment) .

Testimony of Charging Officer. —

It is settled law that the arresting (now charging) officer may testify as to a refusal to take the breathalyzer test at a trial for driving under the influence. State v. Simmons, 51 N.C. App. 440, 276 S.E.2d 765, 1981 N.C. App. LEXIS 2246 (1981).

Defendant’s Incriminating Statements Deemed Harmless Error. —

Admission of evidence that after defendant blew into breathalyzer and was shown the reading, he made statements indicating his disbelief at the result, thus allegedly creating an inference that he had registered a reading in excess of the legal limit on the first test, was harmless in light of other evidence of defendant’s guilt, including his refusal to take a second test. State v. Wike, 85 N.C. App. 516, 355 S.E.2d 221, 1987 N.C. App. LEXIS 2619 , writ denied, 319 N.C. 677 , 356 S.E.2d 773, 1987 N.C. LEXIS 2126 (1987).

Other Officer Not Required to Advise Defendant. —

Subsection (a) does not require an officer, other than the charging officer, to advise defendants of their statutory rights in order for the State to admit into evidence, at the criminal prosecution for driving while impaired, the results of, or refusal to submit to, chemical analysis. State v. Abdereazeq, 122 N.C. App. 727, 471 S.E.2d 445, 1996 N.C. App. LEXIS 548 (1996).

Adequate Advice Given. —

Evidence, including state trooper’s testimony and defendant’s telephone call subsequent to refusal to sign written form, supported trial court’s finding that defendant had been adequately advised of his chemical test rights as required by this section. Gibson v. Faulkner, 132 N.C. App. 728, 515 S.E.2d 452 (1999), decided prior to the 2000 amendment.

Reasonable Grounds Shown. —

The evidence surrounding petitioner’s accident, including the reason for its occurrence, taken with the odor of alcohol about petitioner, her mumbled speech, her admission that she had been drinking liquor earlier, and the results of the alcosensor test were clearly sufficient to give trooper reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner had been driving while impaired. Moore v. Hodges, 116 N.C. App. 727, 449 S.E.2d 218, 1994 N.C. App. LEXIS 1122 (1994).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles May Revoke Limited Driving Privilege Granted by a Court. — See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Joe W. Garrett, Commissioner, N.C. Department of Motor Vehicles, 40 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 414 (1970).

Revocation for Refusal to Submit to Test Is Contingent upon First Having Been Charged for Impaired Driving. — See opinion of Attorney General to Lt. M. S. Niven, 43 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 81 (1973).

Person authorized to administer a chemical test is a breathalyzer operator who holds a permit issued by the Commission for Health Services (now Department of Human Resources) pursuant to G.S. 20-139.1(b). See Opinion of Attorney General to Dr. Arthur J. McBay, Office, Chief Medical Examiner, 42 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 326 (1973).

Advising Accused of Rights. — See opinion of Attorney General to Robert Powell, 41 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 326 (1971).

Running of 30 Minutes Prior to Testing Defendant. — See opinion of Attorney General to LTC Charles B. Pierce, N.C. State Highway Patrol, 41 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 242 (1971).

Suspect Not Entitled to Drive Own Car to Test Site. — A person who requests a prearrest chemical test pursuant to G.S. 20-16.2(i) does not have to be permitted to drive his own vehicle to the test site. See Opinion of Attorney General to Chief P.L. McIver, Garner Police Department, Garner, N.C. 47 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 89 (1977).

Service of Pick-Up Notice. — If a subject upon whom a law-enforcement officer is serving a notice to pick up a driver’s license revoked under G.S. 20-16.2(c) states that he has requested a hearing pursuant to G.S. 20-16.2(d), the officer should not serve the pick-up notice until he has verification from the Department of Motor Vehicles that no valid request for hearing has been made. See opinion of Attorney General to Major John Laws, N.C. State Highway Patrol, 40 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 403 (1969).

§ 20-16.3. Alcohol screening tests required of certain drivers; approval of test devices and manner of use by Department of Health and Human Services; use of test results or refusal.

  1. When Alcohol Screening Test May Be Required; Not an Arrest. —  A law-enforcement officer may require the driver of a vehicle to submit to an alcohol screening test within a relevant time after the driving if the officer has:
    1. Reasonable grounds to believe that the driver has consumed alcohol and has:
      1. Committed a moving traffic violation; or
      2. Been involved in an accident or collision; or
    2. An articulable and reasonable suspicion that the driver has committed an implied-consent offense under G.S. 20-16.2 , and the driver has been lawfully stopped for a driver’s license check or otherwise lawfully stopped or lawfully encountered by the officer in the course of the performance of the officer’s duties. Requiring a driver to submit to an alcohol screening test in accordance with this section does not in itself constitute an arrest.
  2. Approval of Screening Devices and Manner of Use. —  The Department of Health and Human Services is directed to examine and approve devices suitable for use by law-enforcement officers in making on-the-scene tests of drivers for alcohol concentration. For each alcohol screening device or class of devices approved, the Department must adopt regulations governing the manner of use of the device. For any alcohol screening device that tests the breath of a driver, the Department is directed to specify in its regulations the shortest feasible minimum waiting period that does not produce an unacceptably high number of false positive test results.
  3. Tests Must Be Made with Approved Devices and in Approved Manner. —  No screening test for alcohol concentration is a valid one under this section unless the device used is one approved by the Department and the screening test is conducted in accordance with the applicable regulations of the Department as to the manner of its use.
  4. Use of Screening Test Results or Refusal by Officer. —  The fact that a driver showed a positive or negative result on an alcohol screening test, but not the actual alcohol concentration result, or a driver’s refusal to submit may be used by a law-enforcement officer, is admissible in a court, or may also be used by an administrative agency in determining if there are reasonable grounds for believing:
    1. That the driver has committed an implied-consent offense under G.S. 20-16.2 ; and
    2. That the driver had consumed alcohol and that the driver had in his or her body previously consumed alcohol, but not to prove a particular alcohol concentration. Negative results on the alcohol screening test may be used in factually appropriate cases by the officer, a court, or an administrative agency in determining whether a person’s alleged impairment is caused by an impairing substance other than alcohol.

History. 1973, c. 312, s. 1; c. 476, s. 128; 1981, c. 412, s. 4; c. 747, s. 66; 1983, c. 435, s. 12; 2006-253, s. 7.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2006-253, s. 7, effective December 1, 2006, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, rewrote the section and section heading.

CASE NOTES

Consideration of Alcosensor Results. —

It is permissible to consider the results of alcosensor test in determining whether trooper had reasonable grounds to believe petitioner had committed an implied consent offense. Moore v. Hodges, 116 N.C. App. 727, 449 S.E.2d 218, 1994 N.C. App. LEXIS 1122 (1994).

Statutory language that allowed an officer to consider the numerical reading of the Alco-sensor test was supplanted by the current version of the statute, which prohibits the actual alcohol concentration result from being used in determining if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the driver has committed an implied-consent offense; in light of the absence of any numerical reading in the record, the state’s argument would allow law enforcement to evade review when arresting individuals for impaired driving after conducting alcohol screening tests, and the argument was without merit. State v. Overocker, 236 N.C. App. 423, 762 S.E.2d 921, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 1018 (2014).

Defendant was not entitled to suppress evidence from a traffic stop because the trial court’s findings of fact support the court’s conclusions of law that a state trooper had probable cause to arrest defendant for driving while impaired as the trooper noted a strong odor of alcohol coming from defendant’s breath and person, Alco-Sensor tests of defendant using a properly calibrated device were positive for the presence of alcohol, and HGN testing on defendant by the trooper revealed all six relevant indications of impairment. State v. Ezzell, 277 N.C. App. 276, 858 S.E.2d 375, 2021- NCCOA-182, 2021 N.C. App. LEXIS 193 (2021).

Admission Into Evidence. —

Results of defendant’s alcohol screening test were not admissible as substantive evidence of alcohol use in a prosecution for driving while his license was revoked, and could be admitted only as evidence in support of probable cause for the arrest or to show impairment by a substance other than alcohol. State v. Bartlett, 130 N.C. App. 79, 502 S.E.2d 53, 1998 N.C. App. LEXIS 848 (1998).

Alco-sensor test results were not admissible in the event of a rehearing on defendant’s contempt charge under G.S. 5A-11 because the results were used to show that defendant was impaired and that alcohol was the cause of the impairment, and thus the results were inadmissible under G.S. 20-16.3(d). State v. Ford, 164 N.C. App. 566, 596 S.E.2d 846, 2004 N.C. App. LEXIS 1034 (2004).

Admission of Actual Numbers. —

Although the admission of the actual numerical results of defendant’s alco-sensor test during the pre-trial hearing was error, defendant was not entitled to a new trial because the actual numerical results were never admitted into evidence at trial before the jury. State v. Townsend, 236 N.C. App. 456, 762 S.E.2d 898, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 1002 (2014).

In a driving while impaired case, because the trooper only testified to the positive test results from the portable breath tests, without revealing the actual alcohol concentration, his testimony was not erroneously admitted. State v. Wiles, 270 N.C. App. 592, 841 S.E.2d 321, 2020 N.C. App. LEXIS 204 (2020).

Sobriety Checkpoint. —

Order suppressing evidence obtained by roadway checkpoint was error because no evidence suggested that the stated proper purpose of checkpoint (sobriety) was a mask for another, unconstitutional purpose, and as such the trial court was in error in holding that the lack of such evidence required it to exclude the evidence obtained by the stop; from the available evidence, it was clear that the actual purpose of the checkpoint was the same as its stated purpose: to check for sobriety. State v. Burroughs, 185 N.C. App. 496, 648 S.E.2d 561, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1811 (2007).

§ 20-16.3A. Checking stations and roadblocks.

  1. A law-enforcement agency may conduct checking stations to determine compliance with the provisions of this Chapter. If the agency is conducting a checking station for the purposes of determining compliance with this Chapter, it must:
    1. Repealed by Session Laws 2006-253, s. 4, effective December 1, 2006, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date.
    2. Designate in advance the pattern both for stopping vehicles and for requesting drivers that are stopped to produce drivers license, registration, or insurance information. (2a) Operate under a written policy that provides guidelines for the pattern, which need not be in writing. The policy may be either the agency’s own policy, or if the agency does not have a written policy, it may be the policy of another law enforcement agency, and may include contingency provisions for altering either pattern if actual traffic conditions are different from those anticipated, but no individual officer may be given discretion as to which vehicle is stopped or, of the vehicles stopped, which driver is requested to produce drivers license, registration, or insurance information. If officers of a law enforcement agency are operating under another agency’s policy, it must be stated in writing.
    3. Advise the public that an authorized checking station is being operated by having, at a minimum, one law enforcement vehicle with its blue light in operation during the conducting of the checking station.

      (a1) A pattern designated by a law enforcement agency pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall not be based on a particular vehicle type, except that the pattern may designate any type of commercial motor vehicle as defined in G.S. 20-4.01(3d) . The provisions of this subsection shall apply to this Chapter only and are not to be construed to restrict any other type of checkpoint or roadblock which is lawful and meets the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.

  2. An officer who determines there is a reasonable suspicion that an occupant has violated a provision of this Chapter, or any other provision of law, may detain the driver to further investigate in accordance with law. The operator of any vehicle stopped at a checking station established under this subsection may be requested to submit to an alcohol screening test under G.S. 20-16.3 if during the course of the stop the officer determines the driver had previously consumed alcohol or has an open container of alcoholic beverage in the vehicle. The officer so requesting shall consider the results of any alcohol screening test or the driver’s refusal in determining if there is reasonable suspicion to investigate further.
  3. Law enforcement agencies may conduct any type of checking station or roadblock as long as it is established and operated in accordance with the provisions of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of North Carolina.
  4. The placement of checkpoints should be random or statistically indicated, and agencies shall avoid placing checkpoints repeatedly in the same location or proximity. This subsection shall not be grounds for a motion to suppress or a defense to any offense arising out of the operation of a checking station.

History. 1983, c. 435, s. 22; 2006-253, s. 4; 2011-216, s. 1.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2006-253, s. 4, effective December 1, 2006, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, rewrote the section and section heading.

Session Laws 2011-216, s. 1, added subsection (a1). For effective date and applicability, see Editor’s note.

Legal Periodicals.

For comment, “DWI Roadblocks: Are They Constitutional in North Carolina?,” see 21 Wake Forest L. Rev. 779 (1986).

For note, “Blurred Lines: State v. Griffin and the Resulting Uncertainty in North Carolina Courts Regarding the Constitutional Analysis of Traffic Checkpoints,” see 36 N.C. Cent. L. Rev. 130 (2013).

CASE NOTES

Legislative Intent. —

Language of G.S. 20-16.3 A made clear that the legislature did not intend for it to cover all license checks. State v. Tarlton, 146 N.C. App. 417, 553 S.E.2d 50, 2001 N.C. App. LEXIS 941 (2001).

Written Policy Required. —

Trial court did not err by granting defendant’s motion to suppress because the sheriff’s department had no written policy providing guidelines for motor vehicle law checking stations as statutorily mandated and the General Assembly specifically included language in the statute that it shall not be a basis for a motion to suppress, meanwhile excluding the same language in another subsection. State v. White, 232 N.C. App. 296, 753 S.E.2d 698, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 151 , writ denied, 367 N.C. 785 , 766 S.E.2d 627, 2014 N.C. LEXIS 1046 (2014).

Checking Station in Accord with Guidelines. —

Where the findings showed that checking station was conducted in accordance with required guidelines, motion to suppress was not proper. State v. Barnes, 123 N.C. App. 144, 472 S.E.2d 784, 1996 N.C. App. LEXIS 691 (1996).

Sobriety checkpoint complied with G.S. 20-16.3 A because it provided for preliminary screening of every driver and allowed further investigation only if the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver was impaired. State v. Colbert, 146 N.C. App. 506, 553 S.E.2d 221, 2001 N.C. App. LEXIS 972 (2001).

No error occurred from suppressing checkpoint evidence because the well-marked checkpoint was administered under a written plan to check all drivers, under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.3A, at a predetermined location where a large number of intoxicated driving offenses occurred, with predetermined start and end times. State v. Townsend, 236 N.C. App. 456, 762 S.E.2d 898, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 1002 (2014).

Checkpoint for Lawful Purpose. —

An attempt to increase police presence in an affected area while conducting a checkpoint for a recognized lawful purpose was not akin to operating a checkpoint for the general detection of crime. State v. McDonald, 239 N.C. App. 559, 768 S.E.2d 913, 2015 N.C. App. LEXIS 136 (2015).

Based upon the troopers’ testimony, the trial court properly determined the programmatic purpose of the checkpoint was to check for a valid driver’s license and for evidence of impairment and that those purposes were valid programmatic purposes, which were reasonable under the circumstances, and thus, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress on the basis of the checkpoint’s programmatic purpose. State v. Macke, 276 N.C. App. 242, 855 S.E.2d 828, 2021- NCCOA-70, 2021 N.C. App. LEXIS 61 (2021).

Reasonableness of Checkpoint. —

Trial court erred in failing to adequately determine the reasonableness of the checkpoint, as it made no findings concerning the gravity of the public concerns served by the checkpoint, no findings as to whether the checkpoint was appropriately tailored to meets its primary purposes, and no findings addressing whether the location of the checkpoint or the manner it was conducted were subject to supervision. State v. McDonald, 239 N.C. App. 559, 768 S.E.2d 913, 2015 N.C. App. LEXIS 136 (2015).

Permissibility of Monitoring Checkpoint Avoidance. —

It is reasonable and permissible for an officer to monitor a checkpoint’s entrance for vehicles whose drivers may be attempting to avoid the checkpoint. An officer, in conjunction with the totality of the circumstances or the checkpoint plan, may, also, pursue and stop a vehicle which has turned away from a checkpoint within its perimeters for reasonable inquiry to determine why the vehicle turned away. North Carolina’s interest in combating intoxicated drivers outweighs the minimal intrusion that an investigatory stop may impose upon a motorist under these circumstances. State v. Foreman, 351 N.C. 627 , 527 S.E.2d 921, 2000 N.C. LEXIS 349 (2000).

Police officers were not required to follow the requirements of this section where the stop which resulted in defendant/drunk driver’s arrest did not arise pursuant to an impaired driving check but arose as the result of a false report of breaking and entering. State v. Covington, 138 N.C. App. 688, 532 S.E.2d 221, 2000 N.C. App. LEXIS 775 , cert. denied, 352 N.C. 678 , 545 S.E.2d 432, 2000 N.C. LEXIS 812 (2000).

§ 20-16.4. [Repealed]

Repealed by Session Laws 1989, c. 691, s. 4.

§ 20-16.5. Immediate civil license revocation for certain persons charged with implied-consent offenses.

  1. Definitions. —  As used in this section the following words and phrases have the following meanings:
    1. Law Enforcement Officer. — As described in G.S. 20-16.2 (a1).
    2. Clerk. — As defined in G.S. 15A-101(2) .
    3. Judicial Official. — As defined in G.S. 15A-101(5) .
    4. Revocation Report. — A sworn statement by a law enforcement officer and a chemical analyst containing facts indicating that the conditions of subsection (b) have been met, and whether the person has a pending offense for which the person’s license had been or is revoked under this section. When one chemical analyst analyzes a person’s blood and another chemical analyst informs a person of his rights and responsibilities under G.S. 20-16.2 , the report must include the statements of both analysts.
    5. Surrender of a Driver’s License. — The act of turning over to a court or a law-enforcement officer the person’s most recent, valid driver’s license or learner’s permit issued by the Division or by a similar agency in another jurisdiction, or a limited driving privilege issued by a North Carolina court. A person who is validly licensed but who is unable to locate his license card may file an affidavit with the clerk setting out facts that indicate that he is unable to locate his license card and that he is validly licensed; the filing of the affidavit constitutes a surrender of the person’s license.
  2. Revocations for Persons Who Refuse Chemical Analyses or Who Are Charged With Certain Implied-Consent Offenses. —  A person’s driver’s license is subject to revocation under this section if:
    1. A law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed an offense subject to the implied-consent provisions of G.S. 20-16.2 ;
    2. The person is charged with that offense as provided in G.S. 20-16.2 (a);
    3. The law enforcement officer and the chemical analyst comply with the procedures of G.S. 20-16.2 and G.S. 20-139.1 in requiring the person’s submission to or procuring a chemical analysis; and
    4. The person:
      1. Willfully refuses to submit to the chemical analysis;
      2. Has an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within a relevant time after the driving;
      3. Has an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more at any relevant time after the driving of a commercial motor vehicle; or
      4. Has any alcohol concentration at any relevant time after the driving and the person is under 21 years of age. (b1) Precharge Test Results as Basis for Revocation. — Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b), a person’s driver’s license is subject to revocation under this section if:

        (1) The person requests a precharge chemical analysis pursuant to G.S. 20-16.2(i); and

        (2) The person has:

        a. An alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more at any relevant time after driving;

        b. An alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more at any relevant time after driving a commercial motor vehicle; or

        c. Any alcohol concentration at any relevant time after driving and the person is under 21 years of age; and

        (3) The person is charged with an implied-consent offense.

  3. Duty of Law Enforcement Officers and Chemical Analysts to Report to Judicial Officials. —  If a person’s driver’s license is subject to revocation under this section, the law enforcement officer and the chemical analyst must execute a revocation report. If the person has refused to submit to a chemical analysis, a copy of the affidavit to be submitted to the Division under G.S. 20-16.2(c) may be substituted for the revocation report if it contains the information required by this section. It is the specific duty of the law enforcement officer to make sure that the report is expeditiously filed with a judicial official as required by this section.
  4. Which Judicial Official Must Receive Report. —  The judicial official with whom the revocation report must be filed is:
    1. The judicial official conducting the initial appearance on the underlying criminal charge if:
      1. No revocation report has previously been filed; and
      2. At the time of the initial appearance the results of the chemical analysis, if administered, or the reports indicating a refusal, are available.
    2. A judicial official conducting any other proceeding relating to the underlying criminal charge at which the person is present, if no report has previously been filed.
    3. The clerk of superior court in the county in which the underlying criminal charge has been brought if subdivisions (1) and (2) are not applicable at the time the law enforcement officer must file the report.
  5. Procedure if Report Filed with Judicial Official When Person Is Present. —  If a properly executed revocation report concerning a person is filed with a judicial official when the person is present before that official, the judicial official shall, after completing any other proceedings involving the person, determine whether there is probable cause to believe that each of the conditions of subsection (b) has been met. If he determines that there is such probable cause, he shall enter an order revoking the person’s driver’s license for the period required in this subsection. The judicial official shall order the person to surrender his license and if necessary may order a law-enforcement officer to seize the license. The judicial official shall give the person a copy of the revocation order. In addition to setting it out in the order the judicial official shall personally inform the person of his right to a hearing as specified in subsection (g), and that his license remains revoked pending the hearing. The revocation under this subsection begins at the time the revocation order is issued and continues until the person’s license has been surrendered for the period specified in this subsection, and the person has paid the applicable costs. The period of revocation is 30 days, if there are no pending offenses for which the person’s license had been or is revoked under this section. If at the time of the current offense, the person has one or more pending offenses for which his license had been or is revoked under this section, the revocation shall remain in effect until a final judgment, including all appeals, has been entered for the current offense and for all pending offenses. In no event, may the period of revocation under this subsection be less than 30 days. If within five working days of the effective date of the order, the person does not surrender his license or demonstrate that he is not currently licensed, the clerk shall immediately issue a pick-up order. The pick-up order shall be issued to a member of a local law-enforcement agency if the law enforcement officer was employed by the agency at the time of the charge and the person resides in or is present in the agency’s territorial jurisdiction. In all other cases, the pick-up order shall be issued to an officer or inspector of the Division. A pick-up order issued pursuant to this section is to be served in accordance with G.S. 20-29 as if the order had been issued by the Division.
  6. Procedure if Report Filed with Clerk of Court When Person Not Present. —  When a clerk receives a properly executed report under subdivision (d)(3) and the person named in the revocation report is not present before the clerk, the clerk shall determine whether there is probable cause to believe that each of the conditions of subsection (b) has been met. For purposes of this subsection, a properly executed report under subdivision (d)(3) may include a sworn statement by the law enforcement officer along with an affidavit received directly by the Clerk from the chemical analyst. If he determines that there is such probable cause, he shall mail to the person a revocation order by first-class mail. The order shall direct that the person on or before the effective date of the order either surrender his license to the clerk or appear before the clerk and demonstrate that he is not currently licensed, and the order shall inform the person of the time and effective date of the revocation and of its duration, of his right to a hearing as specified in subsection (g), and that the revocation remains in effect pending the hearing. Revocation orders mailed under this subsection become effective on the fourth day after the order is deposited in the United States mail. If within five working days of the effective date of the order, the person does not surrender his license to the clerk or appear before the clerk to demonstrate that he is not currently licensed, the clerk shall immediately issue a pick-up order. The pick-up order shall be issued and served in the same manner as specified in subsection (e) for pick-up orders issued pursuant to that subsection. A revocation under this subsection begins at the date specified in the order and continues until the person’s license has been revoked for the period specified in this subsection and the person has paid the applicable costs. If the person has no pending offenses for which his license had been or is revoked under this section, the period of revocation under this subsection is:
    1. Thirty days from the time the person surrenders his license to the court, if the surrender occurs within five working days of the effective date of the order; or
    2. Thirty days after the person appears before the clerk and demonstrates that he is not currently licensed to drive, if the appearance occurs within five working days of the effective date of the revocation order; or
    3. Forty-five days from the time:
      1. The person’s drivers license is picked up by a law-enforcement officer following service of a pick-up order; or
      2. The person demonstrates to a law-enforcement officer who has a pick-up order for his license that he is not currently licensed; or
      3. The person’s drivers license is surrendered to the court if the surrender occurs more than five working days after the effective date of the revocation order; or
      4. The person appears before the clerk to demonstrate that he is not currently licensed, if he appears more than five working days after the effective date of the revocation order.

        If at the time of the current offense, the person has one or more pending offenses for which his license had been or is revoked under this section, the revocation shall remain in effect until a final judgment, including all appeals, has been entered for the current offense and for all pending offenses. In no event may the period of revocation for the current offense be less than the applicable period of revocation in subdivision (1), (2), or (3) of this subsection. When a pick-up order is issued, it shall inform the person of his right to a hearing as specified in subsection (g), and that the revocation remains in effect pending the hearing. An officer serving a pick-up order under this subsection shall return the order to the court indicating the date it was served or that he was unable to serve the order. If the license was surrendered, the officer serving the order shall deposit it with the clerk within three days of the surrender.

  7. Hearing before Magistrate or Judge if Person Contests Validity of Revocation. —  A person whose license is revoked under this section may request in writing a hearing to contest the validity of the revocation. The request may be made at the time of the person’s initial appearance, or within 10 days of the effective date of the revocation to the clerk or a magistrate designated by the clerk, and may specifically request that the hearing be conducted by a district court judge. The Administrative Office of the Courts must develop a hearing request form for any person requesting a hearing. Unless a district court judge is requested, the hearing must be conducted within the county by a magistrate assigned by the chief district court judge to conduct such hearings. If the person requests that a district court judge hold the hearing, the hearing must be conducted within the district court district as defined in G.S. 7A-133 by a district court judge assigned to conduct such hearings. The revocation remains in effect pending the hearing, but the hearing must be held within three working days following the request if the hearing is before a magistrate or within five working days if the hearing is before a district court judge. The request for the hearing must specify the grounds upon which the validity of the revocation is challenged and the hearing must be limited to the grounds specified in the request. A witness may submit his evidence by affidavit unless he is subpoenaed to appear. Any person who appears and testifies is subject to questioning by the judicial official conducting the hearing, and the judicial official may adjourn the hearing to seek additional evidence if he is not satisfied with the accuracy or completeness of evidence. The person contesting the validity of the revocation may, but is not required to, testify in his own behalf. Unless contested by the person requesting the hearing, the judicial official may accept as true any matter stated in the revocation report. If any relevant condition under subsection (b) is contested, the judicial official must find by the greater weight of the evidence that the condition was met in order to sustain the revocation. At the conclusion of the hearing the judicial official must enter an order sustaining or rescinding the revocation. The judicial official’s findings are without prejudice to the person contesting the revocation and to any other potential party as to any other proceedings, civil or criminal, that may involve facts bearing upon the conditions in subsection (b) considered by the judicial official. The decision of the judicial official is final and may not be appealed in the General Court of Justice. If the hearing is not held and completed within three working days of the written request for a hearing before a magistrate or within five working days of the written request for a hearing before a district court judge, the judicial official must enter an order rescinding the revocation, unless the person contesting the revocation contributed to the delay in completing the hearing. If the person requesting the hearing fails to appear at the hearing or any rescheduling thereof after having been properly notified, he forfeits his right to a hearing.
  8. Return of License. —  After the applicable period of revocation under this section, or if the magistrate or judge orders the revocation rescinded, the person whose license was revoked may apply to the clerk for return of his surrendered license. Unless the clerk finds that the person is not eligible to use the surrendered license, he must return it if:
    1. The applicable period of revocation has passed and the person has tendered payment for the costs under subsection (j); or
    2. The magistrate or judge has ordered the revocation rescinded.

      If the license has expired, he may return it to the person with a caution that it is no longer valid. Otherwise, if the person is not eligible to use the license and the license was issued by the Division or in another state, the clerk must mail it to the Division. If the person has surrendered his copy of a limited driving privilege and he is no longer eligible to use it, the clerk must make a record that he has withheld the limited driving privilege and forward that record to the clerk in the county in which the limited driving privilege was issued for filing in the case file. If the person’s license is revoked under this section and under another section of this Chapter, the clerk must surrender the license to the Division if the revocation under this section can terminate before the other revocation; in such cases, the costs required by subsection (j) must still be paid before the revocation under this section is terminated.

  9. Effect of Revocations. —  A revocation under this section revokes a person’s privilege to drive in North Carolina whatever the source of his authorization to drive. Revocations under this section are independent of and run concurrently with any other revocations. No court imposing a period of revocation following conviction of an offense involving impaired driving may give credit for any period of revocation imposed under this section. A person whose license is revoked pursuant to this section is not eligible to receive a limited driving privilege except as specifically authorized by G.S. 20-16.5(p).
  10. Costs. —  Unless the magistrate or judge orders the revocation rescinded, a person whose license is revoked under this section must pay a fee of one hundred dollars ($100.00) as costs for the action before the person’s license may be returned under subsection (h) of this section. Fifty percent (50%) of the costs collected under this section shall be credited to the General Fund. Twenty-five percent (25%) of the costs collected under this section shall be used to fund a statewide chemical alcohol testing program administered by the Injury Control Section of the Department of Health and Human Services. The remaining twenty-five percent (25%) of the costs collected under this section shall be remitted to the county for the sole purpose of reimbursing the county for jail expenses incurred due to enforcement of the impaired driving laws.
  11. Report to Division. —  Except as provided below, the clerk shall mail a report to the Division:
    1. If the license is revoked indefinitely, within 10 working days of the revocation of the license; and
    2. In all cases, within 10 working days of the return of a license under this section or of the termination of a revocation of the driving privilege of a person not currently licensed.

      The report shall identify the person whose license has been revoked, specify the date on which his license was revoked, and indicate whether the license has been returned. The report must also provide, if applicable, whether the license is revoked indefinitely. No report need be made to the Division, however, if there was a surrender of the driver’s license issued by the Division, a 30-day minimum revocation was imposed, and the license was properly returned to the person under subsection (h) within five working days after the 30-day period had elapsed.

  12. Restoration Fee for Unlicensed Persons. —  If a person whose license is revoked under this section has no valid license, he must pay the restoration fee required by G.S. 20-7 before he may apply for a license from the Division.
  13. Modification of Revocation Order. —  Any judicial official presiding over a proceeding under this section may issue a modified order if he determines that an inappropriate order has been issued.
  14. Exception for Revoked Licenses. —  Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, if the judicial official required to issue a revocation order under this section determines that the person whose license is subject to revocation under subsection (b):
    1. Has a currently revoked driver’s license;
    2. Has no limited driving privilege; and
    3. Will not become eligible for restoration of his license or for a limited driving privilege during the period of revocation required by this section,

      the judicial official need not issue a revocation order under this section. In this event the judicial official must file in the records of the civil proceeding a copy of any documentary evidence and set out in writing all other evidence on which he relies in making his determination.

  15. Designation of Proceedings. —  Proceedings under this section are civil actions, and must be identified by the caption “In the Matter of  _______________ ” and filed as directed by the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  16. Limited Driving Privilege. —  A person whose drivers license has been revoked for a specified period of 30 or 45 days under this section may apply for a limited driving privilege if:
    1. At the time of the alleged offense the person held either a valid drivers license or a license that had been expired for less than one year;
    2. Does not have an unresolved pending charge involving impaired driving except the charge for which the license is currently revoked under this section or additional convictions of an offense involving impaired driving since being charged for the violation for which the license is currently revoked under this section;
    3. The person’s license has been revoked for at least 10 days if the revocation is for 30 days or 30 days if the revocation is for 45 days; and
    4. The person has obtained a substance abuse assessment from a mental health facility and registers for and agrees to participate in any recommended training or treatment program.A person whose license has been indefinitely revoked under this section may, after completion of 30 days under subsection (e) or the applicable period of time under subdivision (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (f), apply for a limited driving privilege. In the case of an indefinite revocation, a judge of the division in which the current offense is pending may issue the limited driving privilege only if the privilege is necessary to overcome undue hardship and the person meets the eligibility requirements of G.S. 20-179.3 , except that the requirements in G.S. 20-179.3 (b)(1)c. and G.S. 20-179.3(e) shall not apply. Except as modified in this subsection, the provisions of G.S. 20-179.3 relating to the procedure for application and conduct of the hearing and the restrictions required or authorized to be included in the limited driving privilege apply to applications under this subsection. Any district court judge authorized to hold court in the judicial district is authorized to issue such a limited driving privilege. A limited driving privilege issued under this section authorizes a person to drive if the person’s license is revoked solely under this section. If the person’s license is revoked for any other reason, the limited driving privilege is invalid.

History. 1983, c. 435, s. 14; 1983 (Reg. Sess., 1984), c. 1101, ss. 11-17; 1985, c. 690, ss. 1, 2; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 80, c. 1112; 1989, c. 771, ss. 15, 16, 18; 1991, c. 689, s. 233.1(a); 1993, c. 285, ss. 5, 6; 1997-379, ss. 3.4-3.8; 1997-443, s. 11A.9; 1997-486, ss. 2-6; 1998-182, ss. 29, 30; 1999-406, s. 13; 2000-140, s. 103A; 2000-155, s. 15; 2001-487, ss. 6, 7; 2003-104, s. 1; 2007-323, s. 30.10(e); 2007-493, s. 17.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 1999-237, s. 11.62(a) provides that the Administrative Office of the Courts shall transfer all funds collected under G.S. 20-16.5(j) that are designated for the chemical alcohol testing program to the Department of Health and Human Services on a monthly basis.

Session Laws 1999-237, s. 11.62(b) provides that any funds collected under G.S. 20-16.5(j) that are designated for the chemical alcohol testing program of the Department of Health and Human Services and are not needed for that program shall be transferred annually to the Governor’s Highway Safety program for grants to local law enforcement agencies for training and enforcement of the laws on driving while impaired. Transferred funds shall be spent within 13 months of receipt of the funds and amounts received by the Governor’s Highway Safety Program shall not revert until the June 30 following the 13-month period.

For an earlier provision on funds collected under subsection (j), see Session Laws 1995-324, s. 26.5.

Session Laws 1999-406, s. 18, states that the act does not obligate the General Assembly to appropriate additional funds, and that the act shall be implemented with funds available or appropriated to the Department of Transportation and the Administrative Office of the Courts.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2007-323, s. 30.10(e), effective August 1, 2007, and applicable to all costs assessed or collected on or after that date, rewrote subsection (j).

Session Laws 2007-493, s. 17, effective August 30, 2007, substituted “law enforcement officer” for “charging officer” throughout the section. For applicability provision, see Editor’s note.

Legal Periodicals.

For note, “North Carolina and Pretrial Civil Revocation of an Impaired Driver’s License and the Double Jeopardy Clause,” see 18 Campbell L. Rev. 391 (1996).

For a survey of 1996 developments in constitutional law, see 75 N.C.L. Rev. 2315 (1997).

For 1997 legislative survey, see 20 Campbell L. Rev. 417.

For article, “Driven to Failure: An Empirical Analysis of Driver’s License Suspension in North Carolina,” see 69 Duke L.J. 1585 (2020).

CASE NOTES

Editor’s Note. —

Many of the cases decided below were decided under this section as it read prior to the 1993 amendment which reduced the blood alcohol content for driving while impaired and related offenses from 0.10 to 0.08.

Constitutionality. —

The summary 10-day revocation required by this section does not violate the equal protection rights guaranteed by the State and federal Constitutions. Henry v. Edmisten, 315 N.C. 474 , 340 S.E.2d 720, 1986 N.C. LEXIS 1883 (1986).

The Safe Roads Act’s prehearing suspension provisions do not deprive persons whose licenses have been suspended for a 10-day period following their failure of a breath analysis test of property without due process of law. Henry v. Edmisten, 315 N.C. 474 , 340 S.E.2d 720, 1986 N.C. LEXIS 1883 (1986).

Because the summary 10-day license revocation under this section upon a person’s failure to pass a breath analysis test is a remedial measure reasonably related to the State’s interest in highway safety, the law of the land is satisfied by judicial review of the State’s action to determine if there is probable cause to believe the conditions justifying revocation exist. The Safe Roads Act provides for such review, as under subsection (e) of this section, before revocation can take place, a detached and impartial judicial officer must scrutinize every condition of revocation to determine if each condition probably has been met. Henry v. Edmisten, 315 N.C. 474 , 340 S.E.2d 720, 1986 N.C. LEXIS 1883 (1986).

The ten-day driver’s license revocation under this section did not constitute punishment as such, and therefore, defendant’s subsequent criminal conviction for DWI did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. State v. Oliver, 343 N.C. 202 , 470 S.E.2d 16, 1996 N.C. LEXIS 270 (1996).

Revocation of one’s driver’s license under this section and subsequent convictions of DWI under G.S. 20-138.1 do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. State v. Rogers, 124 N.C. App. 364, 477 S.E.2d 221, 1996 N.C. App. LEXIS 1070 (1996).

Impact of Double Jeopardy Clause. —

The plaintiff failed to prove that North Carolina’s prior imposition of a thirty-day period of administrative license revocation under G.S. 20-16.5 constituted a criminal punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, U.S. Const. Amend. V, and barred plaintiff’s prosecution for the offense of driving while impaired in violation of G.S. 20-138.1 . Brewer v. Kimel, 256 F.3d 222, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15693 (4th Cir. 2001).

Because a 30-day license revocation is a civil sanction rather than a criminal penalty, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a defendant’s subsequent criminal prosecution for driving while impaired by alcohol. State v. Evans, 145 N.C. App. 324, 550 S.E.2d 853, 2001 N.C. App. LEXIS 639 (2001).

Revocation of defendant’s driver’s license did not constitute jeopardy for double jeopardy purposes because it was not a punishment. State v. Streckfuss, 171 N.C. App. 81, 614 S.E.2d 323, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 1190 (2005).

This section does not require a finding of scienter. Brewer v. Kimel, 256 F.3d 222, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15693 (4th Cir. 2001).

The summary 10-day revocation procedure of this section is not a punishment, but a highway safety measure. Henry v. Edmisten, 315 N.C. 474 , 340 S.E.2d 720, 1986 N.C. LEXIS 1883 (1986).

Duration of 10-Day Revocation. —

Under subsection (e) of this section, the summary 10-day revocation continues until the person has paid the applicable costs and at least 10 days have elapsed from the date the revocation order is issued. Henry v. Edmisten, 315 N.C. 474 , 340 S.E.2d 720, 1986 N.C. LEXIS 1883 (1986) (rejecting the contention that revocation continues until 10 days from the date the revocation order is issued and the date the person has paid the applicable costs, whichever occurs last) .

The thirty-day administrative license revocation provision rationally serves legitimate remedial goals and is not excessive in relation to these goals. Brewer v. Kimel, 256 F.3d 222, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15693 (4th Cir. 2001).

Revocation Proper. —

Where petitioner, who was driving without his license, was stopped and charged with driving while impaired, and then appeared before a magistrate who revoked his driver’s license for 10 days, petitioner’s license had been validly revoked when he was stopped the next day; thus, he was properly charged with committing a moving violation during a period of revocation by operating a motor vehicle. Eibergen v. Killens, 124 N.C. App. 534, 477 S.E.2d 684, 1996 N.C. App. LEXIS 1148 (1996).

Standing to Challenge Section. —

The mere fact that plaintiff suffered the adverse effects of this section in October, 1983, did not give him standing to challenge the statute in federal court after his license had been returned to him. Crow v. North Carolina, 642 F. Supp. 953, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21124 (W.D.N.C. 1986).

Appellate Review Declined Due to Failure to Contest Revocation Appropriately. —

Appellate court declined to address defendant’s argument that the revocation report was not properly executed and was not “expeditiously filed” with the court because defendant failed to contest the validity of the revocation through the means prescribed in G.S. 20-16.5 . State v. Hinchman, 192 N.C. App. 657, 666 S.E.2d 199, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS 1667 (2008).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Expunction of Criminal Records. — Section 15A-146, which prescribes procedures for expunction of criminal records, does not apply to records of civil drivers license revocations maintained by the Division of Motor Vehicles and, therefore, does not require the Division of Motor Vehicles to expunge records of a 30-day drivers license revocation under G.S. 20-16.5 based on the same operation of a vehicle that gave rise to a criminal charge against the driver which is subsequently dismissed. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Mike Bryant, Director, Driver License Section, N.C. Division of Motor Vehicles, (6/13/2001).

§ 20-17. Mandatory revocation of license by Division.

  1. The Division shall forthwith revoke the license of any driver upon receiving a record of the driver’s conviction for any of the following offenses:
    1. Manslaughter (or negligent homicide) resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle.
    2. Either of the following impaired driving offenses:
      1. Impaired driving under G.S. 20-138.1 .
      2. Impaired driving under G.S. 20-138.2 , if the driver’s alcohol concentration level was .06 or higher. For the purposes of this sub-subdivision, the driver’s alcohol concentration level result, obtained by chemical analysis, shall be conclusive and is not subject to modification by any party, with or without approval by the court.
    3. Any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used.
    4. Failure to stop and render aid in violation of G.S. 20-166(a) or (b).
    5. Perjury or the making of a false affidavit or statement under oath to the Division under this Article or under any other law relating to the ownership of motor vehicles.
    6. Conviction, within a period of 12 months, of (i) two charges of reckless driving, (ii) two charges of aggressive driving, or (iii) one or more charges of reckless driving and one or more charges of aggressive driving.
    7. Conviction upon one charge of aggressive driving or reckless driving while engaged in the illegal transportation of intoxicants for the purpose of sale.
    8. Conviction of using a false or fictitious name or giving a false or fictitious address in any application for a drivers license, or learner’s permit, or any renewal or duplicate thereof, or knowingly making a false statement or knowingly concealing a material fact or otherwise committing a fraud in any such application or procuring or knowingly permitting or allowing another to commit any of the foregoing acts.
    9. Any offense set forth under G.S. 20-141.4 .
    10. Repealed by Session Laws 1997-443, s. 19.26(b).
    11. Conviction of assault with a motor vehicle.
    12. A second or subsequent conviction of transporting an open container of alcoholic beverage under G.S. 20-138.7 .
    13. A second or subsequent conviction, as defined in G.S. 20-138.2 A(d), of driving a commercial motor vehicle after consuming alcohol under G.S. 20-138.2A.
    14. A conviction of driving a school bus, school activity bus, or child care vehicle after consuming alcohol under G.S. 20-138.2B.
    15. A conviction of malicious use of an explosive or incendiary device to damage property (G.S. 14-49(b) and (b1)); making a false report concerning a destructive device in a public building (G.S. 14-69.1(c)); perpetrating a hoax concerning a destructive device in a public building (G.S. 14-69.2(c)); possessing or carrying a dynamite cartridge, bomb, grenade, mine, or powerful explosive on educational property (G.S. 14-269.2(b1)); or causing, encouraging, or aiding a minor to possess or carry a dynamite cartridge, bomb, grenade, mine, or powerful explosive on educational property (G.S. 14-269.2(c1)).
    16. A second or subsequent conviction of larceny of motor fuel under G.S. 14-72.5 . A conviction for violating G.S. 14-72.5 is a second or subsequent conviction if at the time of the current offense the person has a previous conviction under G.S. 14-72.5 that occurred in the seven years immediately preceding the date of the current offense.
    17. A third or subsequent conviction of operating a private passenger automobile with prohibited modifications on any highway or public vehicular area under G.S. 20-135.4 (d). A conviction for violating G.S. 20-135.4 (d) is a third or subsequent conviction if at the time of the current infraction the person has two or more previous convictions under G.S. 20-135.4 that occurred in the 12 months immediately preceding the date of the current infraction.
  2. On the basis of information provided by the child support enforcement agency or the clerk of court, the Division shall:
    1. Ensure that no license or right to operate a motor vehicle under this Chapter is renewed or issued to an obligor who is delinquent in making child support payments when a court of record has issued a revocation order pursuant to G.S. 110-142.2 or G.S. 50-13.12 . The obligor shall not be entitled to any other hearing before the Division as a result of the revocation of his license pursuant to G.S. 110-142.2 or G.S. 50-13.12 ; or
    2. Revoke the drivers license of any person who has willfully failed to complete court-ordered community service and a court has issued a revocation order. This revocation shall continue until the Division receives certification from the clerk of court that the person has completed the court-ordered community service. No person whose drivers license is revoked pursuant to this subdivision shall be entitled to any other hearing before the Division as a result of this revocation.

History. 1935, c. 52, s. 12; 1947, c. 1067, s. 14; 1967, c. 1098, s. 2; 1971, c. 619, s. 7; 1973, c. 18, s. 1; c. 1081, s. 3; c. 1330, s. 2; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; c. 831; 1979, c. 667, ss. 20, 41; 1981, c. 412, s. 4; c. 747, s. 66; 1983, c. 435, s. 15; 1989, c. 771, s. 11; 1991, c. 726, s. 7; 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994), c. 761, s. 1; 1995, c. 506, s. 7; c. 538, s. 2(b); 1997-234, s. 3; 1997-443, s. 19.26(b); 1998-182, s. 18; 1999-257, s. 4.1; 2001-352, s. 3; 2001-487, s. 52; 2004-193, ss. 4, 5; 2006-253, s. 22.2; 2007-493, s. 2; 2021-128, s. 2.

Cross References.

As to power to suspend or revoke license generally, see G.S. 20-16 and note.

As to period of suspension or revocation, see G.S. 20-19 .

Editor’s Note.

The subsection (b) designation was assigned by the Revisor of Statutes, the designation in Session Laws 1995, c. 538, s. 2(b) having been subdivision (12); the subsection (a) designation was added as well.

Session Laws 2021-128, s. 4, made subdivision (a)(17) of this section, as added by Session Laws 2021-128, s. 2, effective December 1, 2021, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2004-193, ss. 4 and 5, effective December 1, 2004, rewrote subdivision (a)(6); and inserted “aggressive driving or” preceding “reckless” in subdivision (a)(7).

Session Laws 2006-253, s. 22.2, effective December 1, 2006, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, rewrote subdivision (a)(2)b.

Session Laws 2007-493, s. 2, effective August 30, 2007, substituted “Any offense set forth under G.S. 20-141.4 .” for “Death by vehicle as defined in G.S. 20-141.4 .” in subdivision (a)(9).

Session Laws 2021-128, s. 2, added subdivision (a)(17). For effective date and applicability, see editor’s note.

Legal Periodicals.

For 1997 legislative survey, see 20 Campbell L. Rev. 417.

For survey on new penalties for criminal behavior in schools, see 22 Campbell L. Rev. 253 (2000).

Editor’s Note. —

Many of the cases below were decided prior to the 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994) amendment which lowered the alcohol concentration from 0.10 to 0.08.

CASE NOTES

Analysis

I.In General

Where the law directs suspension, revocation, or nonissuance of a driver’s license, the grounds are convictions for moving violations, or other statutory violations relating to highway safety, or situations where an individual’s capacity to operate a motor vehicle safely are manifestly questionable. Evans v. Roberson, 69 N.C. App. 644, 317 S.E.2d 715, 1984 N.C. App. LEXIS 3529 (1984), rev'd, 314 N.C. 315 , 333 S.E.2d 228, 1985 N.C. LEXIS 1781 (1985).

Revocation of License Not Part of Court’s Punishment. —

The revocation of a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a part of, nor within the limits of, punishment to be fixed by the court wherein the offender is tried. When the conviction has become final, the revocation of the license by the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles is a measure flowing from the police power of the State designed to protect users of the State’s highways. Harrell v. Scheidt, 243 N.C. 735 , 92 S.E.2d 182, 1956 N.C. LEXIS 625 (1956).

Ministerial Duty. —

Mandatory revocation of an operator’s license under this section is the performance of a ministerial duty. Fox v. Scheidt, 241 N.C. 31 , 84 S.E.2d 259, 1954 N.C. LEXIS 534 (1954).

The record of a conviction which has become final suffices to invoke the ministerial duty of performing the mandatory requirement of the statute by the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles. Harrell v. Scheidt, 243 N.C. 735 , 92 S.E.2d 182, 1956 N.C. LEXIS 625 (1956).

The revocation of a license by the Division of Motor Vehicles is nothing more than the performance of a ministerial duty by that administrative agency, and is in no sense a “judgment” that can preclude the superior court from acting on a petition filed in that court pursuant to the habitual offenders provisions of the General Statutes. In re Woods, 33 N.C. App. 86, 234 S.E.2d 45, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 2106 (1977).

No action or order of the court is required to put the revocation of the license into effect. Harrell v. Scheidt, 243 N.C. 735 , 92 S.E.2d 182, 1956 N.C. LEXIS 625 (1956); Barbour v. Scheidt, 246 N.C. 169 , 97 S.E.2d 855, 1957 N.C. LEXIS 395 (1957).

“Forthwith” does not mean the absolute exclusion of any interval of time, but means only that no unreasonable length of time shall intervene before performance. State v. Ball, 255 N.C. 351 , 121 S.E.2d 604, 1961 N.C. LEXIS 605 (1961).

This section does not require the Commissioner (now Division) to act instantaneously. State v. Ball, 255 N.C. 351 , 121 S.E.2d 604, 1961 N.C. LEXIS 605 (1961).

The word “forthwith” in this section does not require instantaneous action but only action within a reasonable length of time. Simpson v. Garrett, 15 N.C. App. 449, 190 S.E.2d 251, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 1938 (1972); State v. Ward, 31 N.C. App. 104, 228 S.E.2d 490, 1976 N.C. App. LEXIS 1913 (1976).

And Action by Division within 11 Days of Notice Reasonably Complied with Section. —

Where the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles acted within 11 days after it received notice of plaintiff’s second conviction for reckless driving, this was reasonable compliance with this section. Simpson v. Garrett, 15 N.C. App. 449, 190 S.E.2d 251, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 1938 (1972).

Injunction Not Available to Plaintiff Who Could Have Prevented Delay in Start of Revocation Period. —

Where the elapse of approximately 15 months between plaintiff’s last conviction for reckless driving and the order of revocation was not caused by defendant, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles or his Department (now Division), but the delay apparently resulted from the failure of the clerk of the court where plaintiff was last convicted to act promptly in forwarding a record of the conviction to the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles, and plaintiff could have prevented any delay in the start of the revocation period by surrendering his license to the clerk and obtaining a receipt therefor at the time of his second conviction, plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief. Simpson v. Garrett, 15 N.C. App. 449, 190 S.E.2d 251, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 1938 (1972).

Applies Only to Conviction in North Carolina Court. —

The mandatory provision of this section applies only to a conviction in a North Carolina court. Carmichael v. Scheidt, 249 N.C. 472 , 106 S.E.2d 685, 1959 N.C. LEXIS 366 (1959).

This section does not specifically require notice, and revocation under this statute is not reviewable in court. State v. Teasley, 9 N.C. App. 477, 176 S.E.2d 838, 1970 N.C. App. LEXIS 1391 , cert. denied, 277 N.C. 459 , 177 S.E.2d 900, 1970 N.C. LEXIS 635 (1970).

The surrendering of his license, and the forwarding of it to the Department (now Division) by the court, gives the licensee sufficient notice that his operator’s license has been revoked. State v. Teasley, 9 N.C. App. 477, 176 S.E.2d 838, 1970 N.C. App. LEXIS 1391 , cert. denied, 277 N.C. 459 , 177 S.E.2d 900, 1970 N.C. LEXIS 635 (1970).

Notice and Record Showing Revocation under Section. —

An official notice and record of “revocation of license” for the specified reason of “conviction of involuntary manslaughter” mailed to a driver by the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles was held to show that the license was revoked under this section rather than suspended under G.S. 20-16 , and did not support a finding by the trial court that the license was suspended under the latter statute. Mintz v. Scheidt, 241 N.C. 268 , 84 S.E.2d 882, 1954 N.C. LEXIS 578 (1954).

Division Not Estopped to Assert That It Acted under Section. —

Where the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles revokes a driver’s license under the mandatory provisions of this section, the Department (now Division) will not be stopped from asserting that it was acting under the provisions of this section by reason of a letter subsequently written to the licensee granting him a hearing under G.S. 20-16(c) [now subsection (d)], since in such instance a hearing is authorized by law. Mintz v. Scheidt, 241 N.C. 268 , 84 S.E.2d 882, 1954 N.C. LEXIS 578 (1954).

Failure to Notify DMV of Change of Address. —

Where there was no court record indicating defendant’s plea, nor the court’s allocution to her, with respect to her guilty plea to a charge of failing to notify the Department of Motor Vehicles of a change of address pursuant to G.S. 20-17 , such was more than a technical non-compliance with the reporting requirements of G.S. 15A-1022 and G.S. 15A-1026 , but instead was sufficient to establish prejudice requiring that the conviction thereunder be vacated and the matter remanded. State v. Glover, 156 N.C. App. 139, 575 S.E.2d 835, 2003 N.C. App. LEXIS 78 (2003).

Plea of Nolo Contendere. —

This section mandatorily required the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles to revoke the petitioner’s license upon receipt of the record from the superior court of his plea of nolo contendere, which in that case for the purposes of that case was equivalent to a conviction on the charge of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor upon the public highways (now impaired driving). Fox v. Scheidt, 241 N.C. 31 , 84 S.E.2d 259, 1954 N.C. LEXIS 534 (1954).

As a basis for suspension or revocation of an operator’s license, a plea of nolo contendere has the same effect as a conviction or plea of guilty of such offense. Gibson v. Scheidt, 259 N.C. 339 , 130 S.E.2d 679, 1963 N.C. LEXIS 570 (1963).

A plea of nolo contendere to a charge of manslaughter resulting from the operation of an automobile supports the revocation of the driver’s license under the mandatory provisions of this section. Mintz v. Scheidt, 241 N.C. 268 , 84 S.E.2d 882, 1954 N.C. LEXIS 578 (1954).

No Contest Plea May Be Used as Prior Conviction. —

The judgment entered on a plea of no contest to a previous charge of driving with a blood alcohol content of .10 percent or more may be used as a prior conviction by the DMV for purposes of revoking a driver’s license. Davis v. Hiatt, 326 N.C. 462 , 390 S.E.2d 338, 1990 N.C. LEXIS 167 (1990).

Certiorari to Review Mandatory Suspension. —

Petitioner whose driving privilege was mandatorily suspended under subdivision (2) of this section (now subdivision (a)(2)) and G.S. 20-19(e) did not have the right to appeal under G.S. 20-25 or under the Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 150B. However, the Superior Court could review the actions of the Commissioner by issuing a writ of certiorari. Davis v. Hiatt, 326 N.C. 462 , 390 S.E.2d 338, 1990 N.C. LEXIS 167 (1990).

Where petitioner, seeking conditional restoration of his driving privileges, pled sufficient facts to show he did not have right to appeal from final decision of DMV, he could then have petitioned for writ of certiorari to have case reviewed by superior court. Thus, superior court had jurisdiction to review case. Penuel v. Hiatt, 100 N.C. App. 268, 396 S.E.2d 85, 1990 N.C. App. LEXIS 977 (1990).

Review of Revocation. —

Mandatory revocations under this section are not reviewable under G.S. 20-25 . In re Wright, 228 N.C. 584 , 46 S.E.2d 696, 1948 N.C. LEXIS 285 (1948); Winesett v. Scheidt, 239 N.C. 190 , 79 S.E.2d 501, 1954 N.C. LEXIS 351 (1954); Fox v. Scheidt, 241 N.C. 31 , 84 S.E.2d 259, 1954 N.C. LEXIS 534 (1954); Harrell v. Scheidt, 243 N.C. 735 , 92 S.E.2d 182, 1956 N.C. LEXIS 625 (1956).

There is no right of judicial review when the revocation is mandatory pursuant to the provisions of this section. In re Austin, 5 N.C. App. 575, 169 S.E.2d 20, 1969 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398 (1969); Rhyne v. Garrett, 18 N.C. App. 565, 197 S.E.2d 235, 1973 N.C. App. LEXIS 1939 (1973).

The mandatory provision of this section is not subject to judicial review. Carmichael v. Scheidt, 249 N.C. 472 , 106 S.E.2d 685, 1959 N.C. LEXIS 366 (1959).

Review of Refusal to Reinstate License. —

Once the right to drive has been mandatorily revoked and a petitioner unsuccessfully seeks to have the license reinstated by the DMV, no superior court review of the denial is mandated unless the denial was arbitrary or illegal, because reinstatement is not a legal right but is an act of grace. Alpiser v. Eagle Pontiac-GMC-Isuzu, Inc., 97 N.C. App. 610, 389 S.E.2d 293, 1990 N.C. App. LEXIS 220 (1990).

Court Order Requiring Conditional Restoration Held Error. —

Where petitioner offered no support for his allegation that the DMV’s denial of a conditional restoration of his license, which had been mandatorily revoked under this section, was an arbitrary and capricious act and was in disregard of the law set forth in G.S. 20-19 , it was error for the superior court to enter an order requiring the DMV to conditionally restore petitioner’s driving privileges. Penuel v. Hiatt, 97 N.C. App. 616, 389 S.E.2d 289, 1990 N.C. App. LEXIS 223 (1990).

II.Impaired Driving

Revocation of a driver’s license is mandatory whenever it is made to appear that the licensee has been found guilty of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic drug (now impaired driving). Parks v. Howland, 4 N.C. App. 197, 166 S.E.2d 701, 1969 N.C. App. LEXIS 1466 (1969); In re Austin, 5 N.C. App. 575, 169 S.E.2d 20, 1969 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398 (1969).

Under G.S. 20-17(a)(2), defendant’s driver’s license was subject to mandatory revocation for one year because she was convicted under G.S. 20-138.1 for driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.16. State v. Benbow, 169 N.C. App. 613, 610 S.E.2d 297, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 687 (2005).

Period of Revocation. —

Where there is mandatory revocation under subdivision (2) of this section (now subdivision (a)(2)), the period of revocation shall be as provided in G.S. 20-19 . Carmichael v. Scheidt, 249 N.C. 472 , 106 S.E.2d 685, 1959 N.C. LEXIS 366 (1959); In re Austin, 5 N.C. App. 575, 169 S.E.2d 20, 1969 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398 (1969).

Evidence that defendant had been convicted of operating an automobile while under the influence of intoxicants (now impaired driving) was competent on the question as to whether a driver’s license issued to defendant had been legally revoked. State v. Stewart, 224 N.C. 528 , 31 S.E.2d 534, 1944 N.C. LEXIS 418 (1944).

Failure to Appear for Trial for Driving Under the Influence in Another State. —

Motorist who received citation for driving under the influence in South Carolina and then forfeited bond by not appearing in court had his driver’s license properly revoked even though no warrant was issued. Sykes v. Hiatt, 98 N.C. App. 688, 391 S.E.2d 834, 1990 N.C. App. LEXIS 450 (1990).

III.Reckless Driving

Provisions mandatory. — The provisions of G.S. 20-17(6) (now subdivision (a)(6)) are mandatory. Snyder v. Scheidt, 246 N.C. 81 , 97 S.E.2d 461, 1957 N.C. LEXIS 372 (1957).

The provisions of subdivision (6) of this section (now subdivision (a)(6)) and G.S. 20-19(f) are mandatory and not discretionary. Simpson v. Garrett, 15 N.C. App. 449, 190 S.E.2d 251, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 1938 (1972).

Section 20-16(a)(9) Did Not Repeal Subdivision (6) now subdivision (a)(6)) of This Section by Implication. —

Subdivision (6) (now subdivision (a)(6)) of this section authorizing the mandatory revocation of a driver’s license upon two convictions of reckless driving within a 12-month period was not repealed by implication by the subsequent enactment of G.S. 20-16(a)(9) authorizing the discretionary suspension of a driver’s license upon one or more convictions of reckless driving and one or more convictions of speeding in excess of 44 (now 55) mph and not more than 75 (now 80) mph within a 12-month period. Person v. Garrett, 280 N.C. 163 , 184 S.E.2d 873, 1971 N.C. LEXIS 1110 (1971).

The word “conviction,” as used in subdivision (6) (now subdivision (a)(6)), refers to a final conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction. Snyder v. Scheidt, 246 N.C. 81 , 97 S.E.2d 461, 1957 N.C. LEXIS 372 (1957).

Date of Offense, Not Date of Conviction, Controls. —

Subdivision (6) (now subdivision (a)(6)) of this section directs the revocation of a driver’s license for one year upon his conviction of two charges of reckless driving committed within a period of 12 months, and if both offenses were committed within a 12-month period, it is immaterial that the conviction of the second offense was entered more than 12 months after the first. The date of the offense, not the date of the conviction, is the determinative factor. Snyder v. Scheidt, 246 N.C. 81 , 97 S.E.2d 461, 1957 N.C. LEXIS 372 (1957).

Notice of Second Conviction Must Precede Revocation. —

The Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles was not authorized under this section to revoke plaintiff’s license before it received notice of his second conviction for reckless driving. Simpson v. Garrett, 15 N.C. App. 449, 190 S.E.2d 251, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 1938 (1972).

Revocation Not Mandatory for Reckless Driving. —

The offense of reckless driving in violation of G.S. 20-140 is not an offense for which, upon conviction, the revocation or suspension of an operator’s license is mandatory. In re Bratton, 263 N.C. 70 , 138 S.E.2d 809, 1964 N.C. LEXIS 767 (1964).

§ 20-17.1. Revocation of license of mental incompetents, alcoholics and habitual users of narcotic drugs.

  1. The Commissioner, upon receipt of notice that any person has been legally adjudicated incompetent or has been involuntarily committed to an institution for the treatment of alcoholism or drug addiction, shall forthwith make inquiry into the facts for the purpose of determining whether such person is competent to operate a motor vehicle. If a person has been adjudicated incompetent under Chapter 35A of the General Statutes, in making an inquiry into the facts, the Commissioner shall consider the clerk of court’s recommendation regarding whether the incompetent person should be allowed to retain his or her driving privilege. Unless the Commissioner is satisfied that such person is competent to operate a motor vehicle with safety to persons and property, he shall revoke such person’s driving privilege. Provided that if such person requests, in writing, a hearing, he shall retain his license until after the hearing, and if the revocation is sustained after such hearing, the person whose driving privilege has been revoked under the provisions of this section, shall have the right to a review by the review board as provided in G.S. 20-9(g)(4) upon written request filed with the Division.
  2. If any person shall be adjudicated as incompetent or is involuntarily committed for the treatment of alcoholism or drug addiction, the clerk of the court in which any such adjudication is made shall forthwith send a certified copy of abstract thereof to the Commissioner.
  3. Repealed by Session Laws 1973, c. 475, s. 31/2.
  4. It is the intent of this section that the provisions herein shall be carried out by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles for the safety of the motoring public. The Commissioner shall have authority to make such agreements as are necessary with the persons in charge of every institution of any nature for the care and treatment of alcoholics or habitual users of narcotic drugs, to effectively carry out the duty hereby imposed and the person in charge of the institutions described above shall cooperate with and assist the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.
  5. Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 8-53 , 8-53.2, and Article 3 of Chapter 122C of the General Statutes, the person or persons in charge of any institution as set out in subsection (a) hereinabove shall furnish such information as may be required for the effective enforcement of this section. Information furnished to the Division of Motor Vehicles as provided herein shall be confidential and the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall be subject to the same penalties and is granted the same protection as is the department, institution or individual furnishing such information. No criminal or civil action may be brought against any person or agency who shall provide or submit to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles or his authorized agents the information as required herein.
  6. Revocations under this section may be reviewed as provided in G.S. 20-9(g)(4).

History. 1947, c. 1006, s. 9; 1953, c. 1300, s. 36; 1955, c. 1187, s. 16; 1969, c. 186, s. 1; c. 1125; 1971, c. 208, ss. 1, 11/2; c. 401, s. 1; c. 767; 1973, c. 475, s. 31/2; c. 1362; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1983, c. 768, s. 3; 1987, c. 720, s. 1; 2008-182, s. 1.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2008-182, s. 1, effective October 1, 2008, and applicable to persons adjudicated incompetent under Chapter 35A of the General Statutes on or after that date, added the second sentence of subsection (a).

Legal Periodicals.

For note on reporting patients for review of driver’s license, see 48 N.C.L. Rev. 1003 (1970).

CASE NOTES

Constitutionality. —

This section is neither vague nor overbroad. Jones v. Penny, 387 F. Supp. 383, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447 (M.D.N.C. 1974).

A legitimate State interest may be rationally advanced by the classification drawn in this section, thus it does not deny equal protection of the laws to those involuntarily committed. Jones v. Penny, 387 F. Supp. 383, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447 (M.D.N.C. 1974).

To decide that those whose institutionalization was legally coerced present, as a class, significantly greater highway safety problems and thus require renewed scrutiny as to driving skills is, whatever its wisdom or efficacy or validity in a particular case, not irrational under the equal protection clause. Jones v. Penny, 387 F. Supp. 383, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447 (M.D.N.C. 1974).

That North Carolina has not chosen in this section to include “all alcoholics and drug addicts” is not irrational. Jones v. Penny, 387 F. Supp. 383, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447 (M.D.N.C. 1974).

This section fairly informs those it affects of the standard against which their conduct will be measured, and thus there is no constitutional infirmity presented. Jones v. Penny, 387 F. Supp. 383, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447 (M.D.N.C. 1974).

The Phrase “Is Satisfied” in Subsection (a). —

This section imparts an objective standard, and the phrase “is satisfied” refers to the conclusion the Commissioner reaches after his inquiry into the facts for the purpose of determining whether such person is competent to operate a motor vehicle with safety to persons and property. Jones v. Penny, 387 F. Supp. 383, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447 (M.D.N.C. 1974).

There is no substantive constitutional right to drive an automobile. Jones v. Penny, 387 F. Supp. 383, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447 (M.D.N.C. 1974).

But once licenses are issued, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood, and suspension of issued licenses thus involves State action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees; in such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by U.S. Const., Amend. XIV. Jones v. Penny, 387 F. Supp. 383, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447 (M.D.N.C. 1974).

Persons involuntarily committed are entitled to notice and hearing before the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles prior to any revocation of their driving privileges. Jones v. Penny, 387 F. Supp. 383, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447 (M.D.N.C. 1974).

The type of “facts” to be looked into and the scope of the “inquiry” are tied to the obvious purpose of this section: to determine driving competency. By themselves they set no standard against which the plaintiff’s privilege is judged. Jones v. Penny, 387 F. Supp. 383, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447 (M.D.N.C. 1974).

Where the law directs suspension, revocation, or nonissuance of a driver’s license, the grounds are convictions for moving violations, or other statutory violations relating to highway safety, or situations where an individual’s capacity to operate a motor vehicle safely are manifestly questionable. Evans v. Roberson, 69 N.C. App. 644, 317 S.E.2d 715, 1984 N.C. App. LEXIS 3529 (1984), rev'd, 314 N.C. 315 , 333 S.E.2d 228, 1985 N.C. LEXIS 1781 (1985).

Period of Revocation. —

The one-year period in G.S. 20-19(f) applies to this section. Jones v. Penny, 387 F. Supp. 383, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447 (M.D.N.C. 1974).

§ 20-17.1A. Restoration of license for person adjudicated to be restored to competency.

If otherwise eligible under G.S. 20-7 and any other applicable provision of law, the Division shall restore the drivers license of a person adjudicated to be restored to competency under G.S. 35A-1130 upon receiving notice from the clerk of court in which the adjudication is made. Nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring the Division to restore the drivers license of a person if (i) the person’s drivers license was revoked because of a conviction or other act requiring revocation and (ii) the person has not met the requirements set forth in this Article for restoration of the person’s drivers license.

History. 2015-165, s. 1.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2015-165, s. 3 made this section effective October 1, 2015.

§ 20-17.2. [Repealed]

Repealed by Session Laws 2006-253, s. 25, effective December 1, 2006, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date.

§ 20-17.3. Revocation for underage purchasers of alcohol.

The Division shall revoke for one year the driver’s license of any person who has been convicted of violating any of the following:

  1. G.S. 18B-302(c), (e), or (f).
  2. G.S. 18B-302(b), if the violation occurred while the person was purchasing or attempting to purchase an alcoholic beverage.
  3. G.S. 18B-302(a1). If the person’s license is currently suspended or revoked, then the revocation under this section shall begin at the termination of that revocation. A person whose license is revoked under this section for a violation of G.S. 18B-302(a1) or G.S. 18B-302(c) shall be eligible for a limited driving privilege under G.S. 20-179.3 .

History. 1983, c. 435, s. 36; 2007-537, s. 3.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2007-537, s. 3, effective December 1, 2007, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, in subdivision (1), substituted “G.S. 18B-302(c), (e), or (f)” for “G.S.18B-302(c)(1), (e), or (f)”; added subdivision (3); added the last sentence of the section; and made minor stylistic and punctuation changes.

§ 20-17.4. Disqualification to drive a commercial motor vehicle.

  1. One Year. —  Any of the following disqualifies a person from driving a commercial motor vehicle for one year if committed by a person holding a commercial drivers license, or, when applicable, committed while operating a commercial motor vehicle by a person who does not hold a commercial drivers license:
    1. A first conviction of G.S. 20-138.1 , driving while impaired, for a holder of a commercial drivers license that occurred while the person was driving a motor vehicle that is not a commercial motor vehicle.
    2. A first conviction of G.S. 20-138.2 , driving a commercial motor vehicle while impaired.
    3. A first conviction of G.S. 20-166 , hit and run.
    4. A first conviction of a felony in the commission of which a commercial motor vehicle was used or the first conviction of a felony in which any motor vehicle is used by a holder of a commercial drivers license.
    5. Refusal to submit to a chemical test when charged with an implied-consent offense, as defined in G.S. 20-16.2 .
    6. A second or subsequent conviction, as defined in G.S. 20-138.2 A(d), of driving a commercial motor vehicle after consuming alcohol under G.S. 20-138.2A.
    7. A civil license revocation under G.S. 20-16.5 , or a substantially similar revocation obtained in another jurisdiction, arising out of a charge that occurred while the person was either operating a commercial motor vehicle or while the person was holding a commercial drivers license.
    8. A first conviction of vehicular homicide under G.S. 20-141.4 or vehicular manslaughter under G.S. 14-18 occurring while the person was operating a commercial motor vehicle.
    9. Driving a commercial motor vehicle during a period when the person’s commercial drivers license is revoked, suspended, cancelled, or the driver is otherwise disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle. (a1) Ten-Day Disqualification. — A person who is convicted for a first offense of driving a commercial motor vehicle after consuming alcohol under G.S. 20-138.2A is disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for 10 days.
  2. Modified Life. —  A person who has been disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for a conviction or refusal described in subsection (a) who, as the result of a separate incident, is subsequently convicted of an offense or commits an act requiring disqualification under subsection (a) is disqualified for life. The Division may adopt guidelines, including conditions, under which a disqualification for life under this subsection may be reduced to 10 years. (b1) Life Without Reduction. — A person is disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for life, without the possibility of reinstatement after 10 years, if that person is convicted of a third or subsequent violation of G.S. 20-138.2 , a fourth or subsequent violation of G.S. 20-138.2 A, or if the person refuses to submit to a chemical test a third time when charged with an implied-consent offense, as defined in G.S. 20-16.2 , that occurred while the person was driving a commercial motor vehicle.
  3. Life. —  A person is disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for life if that person either uses a commercial motor vehicle in the commission of any felony involving the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance, or possession with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance or is the holder of a commercial drivers license at the time of the commission of any such felony.

    (c1) Life. — A person shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for life, without the possibility of reinstatement, if that person has had a commercial drivers license reinstated in the past and is convicted of another major disqualifying offense as defined in 49 C.F.R. § 383.51(b).

    (c2) Life. — A person shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for life, without the possibility of reinstatement, if convicted of a major disqualifying offense as defined in 49 C.F.R. § 383.51(b)(10).

  4. Less Than a Year. —  A person is disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for 60 days if that person is convicted of two serious traffic violations, or 120 days if convicted of three or more serious traffic violations, arising from separate incidents occurring within a three-year period, committed in a commercial motor vehicle or while holding a commercial drivers license. This disqualification shall be in addition to, and shall be served at the end of, any other prior disqualification. For purposes of this subsection, a “serious violation” includes violations of G.S. 20-140(f) and G.S. 20-141(j3).
  5. Three Years. —  A person is disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for three years if that person is convicted of an offense or commits an act requiring disqualification under subsection (a) and the offense or act occurred while the person was transporting a hazardous material that required the motor vehicle driven to be placarded.
  6. Revocation Period. —  A person is disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for the period during which the person’s regular or commercial drivers license is revoked, suspended, or cancelled.
  7. Violation of Out-of-Service Order. —  Any person holding a commercial learner’s permit or commercial drivers license or required to have a commercial learner’s permit or commercial drivers license convicted for violating an out-of-service order, except as described in subsection (h) of this section, shall be disqualified as follows:
    1. A person is disqualified from driving a commercial vehicle for a period of no less than 180 days and no more than one year if convicted of a first violation of an out-of-service order while operating a commercial motor vehicle.
    2. A person is disqualified for a period of no less than two years and no more than five years if convicted of a second violation of an out-of-service order while operating a commercial motor vehicle during any 10-year period, arising from separate incidents.
    3. A person is disqualified for a period of no less than three years and no more than five years if convicted of a third or subsequent violation of an out-of-service order while operating a commercial motor vehicle during any 10-year period, arising from separate incidents.
  8. Violation of Out-of-Service Order; Special Rule for Hazardous Materials and Passenger Offenses. —  Any person holding a commercial learner’s permit or commercial drivers license or required to have a commercial learner’s permit or commercial drivers license convicted for violating an out-of-service order while transporting hazardous materials, as defined in 49 C.F.R. § 383.5, or while operating a commercial vehicle designed or used to transport 16 or more passengers, including the driver, shall be disqualified as follows:
    1. A person is disqualified for a period of no less than 180 days and no more than two years if convicted of a first violation of an out-of-service order while operating a commercial motor vehicle.
    2. A person is disqualified for a period of no less than three years and no more than five years if convicted of a second or subsequent violation of an out-of-service order while operating a commercial motor vehicle during any 10-year period, arising from separate incidents.
    3. A person is disqualified for a period of no less than three years and no more than five years if convicted of a third or subsequent violation of an out-of-service order while operating a commercial motor vehicle during any 10-year period arising from separate incidents.
  9. Disqualification for Out-of-State Violations. —  The Division shall withdraw the privilege to operate a commercial vehicle of any resident of this State or person transferring to this State upon receiving notice of the person’s conviction or Administrative Per Se Notice in another state for an offense that, if committed in this State, would be grounds for disqualification, even if the offense occurred in another jurisdiction prior to being licensed in this State where no action had been taken at that time in the other jurisdiction. The period of disqualification shall be the same as if the offense occurred in this State.
  10. Disqualification of Persons Without Commercial Drivers Licenses. —  Any person convicted of an offense that requires disqualification under this section, but who does not hold a commercial drivers license, shall be disqualified from operating a commercial vehicle in the same manner as if the person held a valid commercial drivers license.
  11. Disqualification for Railroad Grade Crossing Offenses. —  Any person convicted of a violation of G.S. 20-142.1 through G.S. 20-142.5 , when the driver is operating a commercial motor vehicle, shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle as follows:
    1. A person is disqualified for a period of 60 days if convicted of a first violation of a railroad grade crossing offense listed in this subsection.
    2. A person is disqualified for a period of 120 days if convicted during any three-year period of a second violation of any combination of railroad grade crossing offenses listed in this subsection.
    3. A person is disqualified for a period of one year if convicted during any three-year period of a third or subsequent violation of any combination of railroad grade crossing offenses listed in this subsection.
  12. Disqualification for Testing Positive in a Drug or Alcohol Test. —  Upon receipt of notice of a positive drug or alcohol test, or of refusal to participate in a drug or alcohol test, pursuant to G.S. 20-37.19(c), the Division must disqualify a CDL holder from operating a commercial motor vehicle for a minimum of 30 days and until receipt of proof of successful completion of assessment and treatment by a substance abuse professional in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 382.503.
  13. Disqualifications of Drivers Who Are Determined to Constitute an Imminent Hazard. —  The Division shall withdraw the privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle for any resident of this State for a period of 30 days in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 383.52.
  14. Disqualification for Conviction of Criminal Offense That Requires Registration Under the Sex Offender and Public Protection Registration Programs. —  Effective December 1, 2009, except as otherwise provided by this subsection, a person convicted of a violation that requires registration under Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes is disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle that requires a commercial drivers license with a P or S endorsement for the period of time during which the person is required to maintain registration under Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes. If a person who is registered pursuant to Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes on December 1, 2009, also has a valid commercial drivers license with a P or S endorsement that was issued on or before December 1, 2009, then the person is not disqualified under this subsection until that license expires, provided the person does not commit a subsequent offense that requires registration under Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes.
  15. Disqualification for Passing Stopped School Bus. —  Any person whose drivers license is revoked under G.S. 20-217 is disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for the period of time in which the person’s drivers license remains revoked under G.S. 20-217 .

History. 1989, c. 771, s. 3; 1991, c. 726, s. 8; 1993, c. 533, s. 5; 1998-149, s. 3; 1998-182, s. 19; 2000-109, s. 7(e); 2002-72, s. 7; 2003-397, s. 2; 2005-156, s. 2; 2005-349, s. 6; 2007-492, s. 1; 2008-175, s. 1; 2009-416, s. 3; 2009-491, s. 2; 2013-293, s. 3; 2016-90, s. 6(c), (d); 2021-185, s. 9.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1112, s. 12 also enacted a G.S. 20-17.4 , to be effective June 1, 1989, through June 30, 1989, and to provide for mandatory revocation of a Class A or Class B license for drivers convicted of impaired driving in a commercial vehicle. Session Laws 1989, c. 771, s. 18, effective June 1, 1989, repealed Session Laws 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1112; therefore, G.S. 20-17.4 , as enacted by c. 1112, never went into effect.

Session Laws 2016-90, s. 6(f), made the rewriting of subsections (g) and (h) by Session Laws 2016-90, s. 6(c) and (d), applicable to offenses committed on or after January 1, 2017.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2005-156, s. 2, effective December 1, 2005, added subsection ( l ).

Session Laws 2005-349, s. 6, effective September 30, 2005, rewrote subsection (a); added the present second sentence of subsection (d); added “suspended, or cancelled” at the end of subsection (f); in subsection (i), in the first sentence, inserted “or person transferring to this State,” “or Administrative Per Se Notice,” and “even if the offense occurred in another jurisdiction prior to being licensed in this State where no action had been taken at that time in the other jurisdiction”; and added subsection (m).

Session Laws 2007-492, s. 1, effective August 30, 2007, in subsection ( l ), substituted “Based on” for “for Testing Positive in a” in the subsection heading, inserted “or of refusal to participate in a drug or alcohol test,” and substituted “Division must disqualify a CDL holder” for “Division shall disqualify a driver.”

Session Laws 2008-175, s. 1, effective December 1, 2008, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, in subdivision (a)(7), substituted “either operating a commercial motor vehicle or while the person was holding a commercial drivers license” for “operating a commercial motor vehicle”; in subsection (c), inserted “either” and added “or is the holder of a commercial drivers license at the time of the commission of any such felony”; in subsection (d), substituted “arising from separate incidents occurring within a three-year period, committed in a commercial motor vehicle or while holding a commercial drivers license” for “committed in a commercial motor vehicle arising from separate incidents occurring within a three-year period”; and, in subsection ( l ), substituted “for Testing Positive in a” for “Based on” and inserted “for a minimum of 30 days and.”

Session Laws 2009-416, s. 3, effective March 31, 2010, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, added subsection (c1).

Session Laws 2013-293, s. 3, effective December 1, 2013, added subsection (o). For applicability, see Editor’s note.

Session Laws 2016-90, s. 6(c), (d), effective January 1, 2017, rewrote subsections (g) and (h). See editor’s note for applicability.

Session Laws 2021-185, s. 9, effective November 23, 2021, added subsection (c2).

CASE NOTES

Double Jeopardy Violation. —

Prosecuting defendant for driving while impaired subjected him to double jeopardy because his prior one-year commercial driver’s license disqualification under G.S. 20-17.4(a)(7) due to his breath test results was so punitive that it constituted a prior criminal punishment. State v. McKenzie, 225 N.C. App. 208, 736 S.E.2d 591, 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 49 , rev'd, 367 N.C. 112 , 750 S.E.2d 521, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 1019 (2013).

G.S. 20-17.4 is so punitive that it becomes a criminal punishment; therefore, prosecution for driving while impaired subsequent to license disqualification under G.S. 20-17.4 constitutes impermissible double jeopardy. State v. McKenzie, 225 N.C. App. 208, 736 S.E.2d 591, 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 49 , rev'd, 367 N.C. 112 , 750 S.E.2d 521, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 1019 (2013).

§ 20-17.5. Effect of disqualification.

  1. When No Accompanying Revocation. —  A person who is disqualified as the result of a conviction that requires disqualification but not revocation may keep any regular Class C drivers license the person had at the time of the offense resulting in disqualification. If the person had a Class A or Class B regular drivers license or a commercial drivers license when the offense occurred, all of the following apply:
    1. The person must give the license to the court that convicts the person or, if the person is not present when convicted, to the Division.
    2. The person may apply for a regular Class C drivers license.
  2. When Revocation and Disqualification. —  When a person is disqualified as the result of a conviction that requires both disqualification and revocation, all of the following apply:
    1. The person must give any drivers license the person has to the court that convicts the person or, if the person is not present when convicted, to the Division.
    2. The person may obtain limited driving privileges to drive a noncommercial motor vehicle during the revocation period to the extent the law would allow limited driving privileges if the person had been driving a noncommercial motor vehicle when the offense occurred.  The same procedure, eligibility requirements, and mandatory conditions apply to limited driving privileges authorized by this subdivision that would apply if the person had been driving a noncommercial motor vehicle when the offense occurred.
    3. If the disqualification period is longer than the revocation period, the person may apply for a regular Class C drivers license at the end of the revocation period.
  3. Refusal to Take Chemical Test. —  When a person is disqualified for refusing to take a chemical test, all of the following apply:
    1. The person must give any license the person has to a court, a law enforcement officer, or the Division, in accordance with G.S. 20-16.2 and G.S. 20-16.5 .
    2. The person may obtain limited driving privileges to drive a noncommercial motor vehicle during the period the person’s license is revoked for the refusal that disqualified the person to the extent the law would allow limited driving privileges if the person had been driving a noncommercial motor vehicle at the time of the refusal. The same procedure, eligibility requirements, and mandatory conditions apply to limited driving privileges authorized by this subdivision that would apply if the person had been driving a noncommercial motor vehicle at the time of the refusal.
    3. If the disqualification period is longer than the revocation period, the person may apply for a regular Class C drivers license at the end of the revocation period.
  4. Obtaining Class C Regular License. —  A person who is authorized by this section to apply for a regular Class C drivers license and who meets all of the following criteria may obtain a regular Class C drivers license without taking a test:
    1. The person must have had a Class A or Class B regular drivers license or a commercial drivers license when the person was disqualified.
    2. The person’s license must have been issued by the Division.
    3. The person’s license must not have expired by the date the person applies for a regular Class C drivers license.Upon application and payment of the fee set in G.S. 20-14 for a duplicate license, the Division shall issue a person who meets these criteria a regular Class C drivers license.  The license shall include the same endorsements and restrictions as the former Class A regular, Class B regular, or commercial drivers license, to the extent they apply to a regular Class C drivers license.  A regular Class C drivers license issued to a person who meets these criteria expires the same day as the license it replaces.G.S. 20-7 governs the issuance of a regular Class C drivers license to a person who is authorized by this section to apply for a regular Class C drivers license but who does not meet the listed criteria. In accordance with that statute, the Division may require the person to take a test and the person must pay the license fee.
  5. Restoration Fee. —  A person who is disqualified must pay the restoration fee set in G.S. 20-7(i1) the first time any of the following events occurs as a result of the same disqualification:
    1. The Division reinstates a Class A regular drivers license, a Class B regular drivers license, or a commercial drivers license the person had at the time of the disqualification by issuing the person a duplicate license.
    2. The Division issues a Class A regular drivers license, a Class B regular drivers license, or a commercial drivers license to the person.
    3. If the person’s license was revoked because of the conviction or act requiring disqualification, the Division issues a regular Class C drivers license to the person.

      The restoration fee does not apply the second time any of these events occurs as a result of the same disqualification.

History. 1991, c. 726, s. 9.

§ 20-17.6. Restoration of a license after a conviction of driving while impaired or driving while less than 21 years old after consuming alcohol or drugs.

  1. Scope. —  This section applies to a person whose license was revoked as a result of a conviction of any of the following offenses:
    1. G.S. 20-138.1 , driving while impaired (DWI).
    2. G.S. 20-138.2 , commercial DWI.
    3. G.S. 20-138.3 , driving while less than 21 years old after consuming alcohol or drugs.
    4. G.S. 20-138.2 A, driving a commercial motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of greater than 0.00 and less than 0.04, if the person’s drivers license was revoked under G.S. 20-17(a)(13).
    5. G.S. 20-138.2B, driving a school bus, a school activity bus, or a child care vehicle with an alcohol concentration of greater than 0.00, if the person’s drivers license was revoked under G.S. 20-17(a)(14).
  2. Requirement for Restoring License. —  The Division must receive a certificate of completion for a person who is subject to this section before the Division can restore that person’s license. The revocation period for a person who is subject to this section is extended until the Division receives the certificate of completion.
  3. Certificate of Completion. —  To obtain a certificate of completion, a person must have a substance abuse assessment and, depending on the results of the assessment, must complete either an alcohol and drug education traffic (ADET) school or a substance abuse treatment program. The substance abuse assessment must be conducted by one of the entities authorized by the Department of Health and Human Services to conduct assessments. G.S. 122C-142.1 describes the procedure for obtaining a certificate of completion.
  4. Notice of Requirement. —  When a court reports to the Division a conviction of a person who is subject to this section, the Division must send the person written notice of the requirements of this section and of the consequences of failing to comply with these requirements. The notification must include a statement that the person may contact the local area mental health, developmental disabilities, and substance abuse program for a list of agencies and entities in the person’s area that are authorized to make a substance abuse assessment and provide the education or treatment needed to obtain a certificate of completion.
  5. Effect on Limited Driving Privileges. —  A person who is subject to this section is not eligible for limited driving privileges if the revocation period for the offense that caused the person to become subject to this section has ended and the person’s license remains revoked only because the Division has not obtained a certificate of completion for that person. The issuance of limited driving privileges during the revocation period for the offense that caused the person to become subject to this section is governed by the statutes that apply to that offense.

History. 1995, c. 496, ss. 1, 11, 12; 1997-443, s. 11A.118(a); 1998-182, s. 20.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 1995, c. 496, ss. 11 and 12, which substituted “less than 21 years old” for “a provisional licensee” in the catchline and in subdivision (a)(3), were to become effective only if House Bill 353 of the 1995 General Assembly was enacted. House Bill 353 was ratified as Session Laws 1995, c. 506, on July 28, 1995.

CASE NOTES

Indefinite Revocation. —

Although the trial court should have submitted the aggravating factor in G.S. 20-179(c)(2), providing that at the time of the offense, defendant was driving while defendant’s license was revoked, as defined by G.S. 20-28 , and the revocation was an impaired driving revocation under G.S. 20-28 .2(a), the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant’s driving record, admitted by the State, showed that defendant’s driver’s license was indefinitely revoked due to an impaired driving conviction and that the license had not been reinstated, which meant that evidence of the aggravating factor was overwhelming and uncontroverted such that a sentence beyond the statutory maximum could be imposed. State v. Coffey, 189 N.C. App. 382, 658 S.E.2d 73, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS 536 (2008).

§ 20-17.7. Commercial motor vehicle out-of-service fines authorized.

The Secretary of Public Safety may adopt rules implementing fines for violation of out-of-service criteria as defined in 49 C.F.R. § 390.5. These fines may not exceed the schedule of fines adopted by the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Alliance that is in effect on the date of the violations.

History. 1999-330, s. 1; 2002-159, s. 31.5(b); 2002-190, s. 3; 2011-145, s. 19.1(g).

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2002-190, s. 17, provides: “The Governor shall resolve any dispute between the Department of Transportation and the Department of Crime Control and Public Safety concerning the implementation of this act [Session Laws 2002-190].”

Session Laws 2017-108, s. 17.1(a)-(d), provides: “(a) Rule. — Until the effective date of the revised permanent rule that the State Highway Patrol is required to adopt pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, the State Highway Patrol shall implement 14B NCAC 07C .0101 (Safety of Operation and Equipment), as provided in subsection (b) of this section.

“(b) Implementation. — Notwithstanding 14B NCAC 07C .0101, the State Highway Patrol shall exempt covered farm vehicles engaged in intrastate commerce from the requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 390.21.

“(c) Additional Rule-Making Authority. — The State Highway Patrol shall adopt rules to amend 14B NCAC 07C .0101, consistent with subsection (b) of this section.

“(d) Effective Date. — Subsection (b) of this section expires on the date that rules adopted pursuant to subsection (c) of this section become effective. The remainder of this section is effective when it becomes law.”

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2011-145, s. 19.1(g), effective January 1, 2012, substituted “Public Safety” for “Crime Control and Public Safety.”

§ 20-17.8. Restoration of a license after certain driving while impaired convictions; ignition interlock.

  1. Scope. —   This section applies to a person whose license was revoked as a result of a conviction of driving while impaired, G.S. 20-138.1 , and any of the following conditions is met:
    1. The person had an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more.
    2. The person has been convicted of another offense involving impaired driving, which offense occurred within seven years immediately preceding the date of the offense for which the person’s license has been revoked.
    3. The person was sentenced pursuant to G.S. 20-179(f3). For purposes of subdivision (1) of this subsection, the results of a chemical analysis, as shown by an affidavit or affidavits executed pursuant to G.S. 20-16.2(c1), shall be used by the Division to determine that person’s alcohol concentration.

      (a1) Additional Scope. — This section applies to a person whose license was revoked as a result of a conviction of habitual impaired driving, G.S. 20-138.5 .

  2. Ignition Interlock Required. —  Except as provided in subsection (l) of this section, when the Division restores the license of a person who is subject to this section, in addition to any other restriction or condition, it shall require the person to agree to and shall indicate on the person’s drivers license the following restrictions for the period designated in subsection (c):
    1. A restriction that the person may operate only a vehicle that is equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system of a type approved by the Commissioner. The Commissioner shall not unreasonably withhold approval of an ignition interlock system and shall consult with the Division of Purchase and Contract in the Department of Administration to ensure that potential vendors are not discriminated against.
    2. A requirement that the person personally activate the ignition interlock system before driving the motor vehicle.
    3. A requirement that the person not drive with an alcohol concentration of 0.02 or greater.
  3. Length of Requirement. —  The requirements of subsection (b) shall remain in effect for one of the following:
    1. One year from the date of restoration if the original revocation period was one year.
    2. Three years from the date of restoration if the original revocation period was four years.
    3. Seven years from the date of restoration if the original revocation was a permanent revocation.

      (c1) Vehicles Subject to Requirement. — A person subject to this section shall designate in accordance with the policies of the Division any registered vehicles owned by that person that the person operates or intends to operate and have the designated vehicles equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system of a type approved by the Commissioner. The Commissioner shall not issue a license to a person subject to this section until presented with proof of the installation of an ignition interlock system in at least one of the person’s designated vehicles. The Commissioner shall cancel the drivers license of any person subject to this section for operating a vehicle that has not been designated and equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system in accordance with this subsection, or removal of the ignition interlock system from any designated motor vehicle owned by the person, other than when changing ignition interlock providers or upon sale of the designated vehicle.

  4. Effect of Limited Driving Privileges. —  If the person was eligible for and received a limited driving privilege under G.S. 20-179.3 , with the ignition interlock requirement contained in G.S. 20-179.3 (g5), the period of time for which that limited driving privilege was held shall be applied towards the requirements of subsection (c).
  5. Notice of Requirement. —  When a court reports to the Division a conviction of a person who is subject to this section, the Division must send the person written notice of the requirements of this section and of the consequences of failing to comply with these requirements. The notification must include a statement that the person may contact the Division for information on obtaining and having installed an ignition interlock system of a type approved by the Commissioner.
  6. Effect of Violation of Restriction. —  A person subject to this section who violates any of the restrictions of this section commits the offense of driving while license revoked for impaired driving under G.S. 20-28(a1) and is subject to punishment and license revocation as provided in that section. If a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person subject to this section has consumed alcohol while driving or has driven while he has remaining in his body any alcohol previously consumed, the suspected offense of driving while license is revoked is an alcohol-related offense subject to the implied-consent provisions of G.S. 20-16.2 . If a person subject to this section is charged with driving while license revoked by violating a condition of subsection (b) of this section, and a judicial official determines that there is probable cause for the charge, the person’s license is suspended pending the resolution of the case, and the judicial official must require the person to surrender the license. The judicial official must also notify the person that he is not entitled to drive until his case is resolved. An alcohol concentration report from the ignition interlock system shall not be admissible as evidence of driving while license revoked, nor shall it be admissible in an administrative revocation proceeding as provided in subsection (g) of this section, unless the person operated a vehicle when the ignition interlock system indicated an alcohol concentration in violation of the restriction placed upon the person by subdivision (b)(3) of this section.
  7. Effect of Violation of Restriction When Driving While License Revoked Not Charged. —  A person subject to this section who violates any of the restrictions of this section, but is not charged or convicted of driving while license revoked pursuant to G.S. 20-28(a), shall have the person’s license revoked by the Division for a period of one year.
  8. Beginning of Revocation Period. —  If the original period of revocation was imposed pursuant to G.S. 20-19(d) or (e), any remaining period of the original revocation, prior to its reduction, shall be reinstated and the revocation required by subsection (f) or (g) of this section begins after all other periods of revocation have terminated.
  9. Notification of Revocation. —  If the person’s license has not already been surrendered to the court, the Division must expeditiously notify the person that the person’s license to drive is revoked pursuant to subsection (f) or (g) of this section effective on the thirtieth calendar day after the mailing of the revocation order.
  10. Right to Hearing Before Division; Issues. —  If the person’s license is revoked pursuant to subsection (g) of this section, before the effective date of the order issued under subsection (i) of this section, the person may request in writing a hearing before the Division. Except for the time referred to in G.S. 20-16.5 , if the person shows to the satisfaction of the Division that the person’s license was surrendered to the court and remained in the court’s possession, then the Division shall credit the amount of time for which the license was in the possession of the court against the revocation period required by subsection (g) of this section. If the person properly requests a hearing, the person retains the person’s license, unless it is revoked under some other provision of law, until the hearing is held, the person withdraws the request, or the person fails to appear at a scheduled hearing. The hearing officer may subpoena any witnesses or documents that the hearing officer deems necessary. The person may request the hearing officer to subpoena the charging officer, the chemical analyst, or both to appear at the hearing if the person makes the request in writing at least three days before the hearing. The person may subpoena any other witness whom the person deems necessary, and the provisions of G.S. 1A-1 , Rule 45, apply to the issuance and service of all subpoenas issued under the authority of this section. The hearing officer is authorized to administer oaths to witnesses appearing at the hearing. The hearing must be conducted in the county where the charge was brought, except when the evidence of the violation is an alcohol concentration report from an ignition interlock system, the hearing may be conducted in the county where the person resides. The hearing must be limited to consideration of whether both of the following conditions were met:
    1. The drivers license of the person had an ignition interlock requirement.
    2. Any of the following conditions occurred:
      1. The person was driving a vehicle that was not equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system.
      2. The person did not personally activate the ignition interlock system before driving the vehicle.
      3. The person was driving a vehicle in violation of an applicable alcohol concentration restriction prescribed by subdivision (b)(3) of this section.
      4. The person was driving a vehicle that was not designated in accordance with subsection (c1) of this section. If the Division finds that the conditions specified in this subsection are met, it must order the revocation sustained. If the Division finds that the condition of subdivision (1) is not met, or that none of the conditions of subdivision (2) are met, it must rescind the revocation. If the revocation is sustained, the person must surrender the person’s license immediately upon notification by the Division. If the revocation is sustained, the person may appeal the decision of the Division pursuant to G.S. 20-25 .
  11. Restoration After Violation. —  When the Division restores the license of a person whose license was revoked pursuant to subsection (f) or (g) of this section and the revocation occurred prior to completion of time period required by subsection (c) of this section, in addition to any other restriction or condition, it shall require the person to comply with the conditions of subsection (b) of this section until the person has complied with those conditions for the cumulative period of time as set forth in subsection (c) of this section. The period of time for which the person successfully complied with subsection (b) of this section prior to revocation pursuant to subsection (f) or (g) of this section shall be applied towards the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.
  12. Medical Exception to Requirement. —  A person subject to this section solely for the reason set forth in subdivision (a)(1) of this section and who has a medically diagnosed physical condition that makes the person incapable of personally activating an ignition interlock system may request an exception to the requirements of this section from the Division. The Division shall not issue an exception to this section unless the person has submitted to a physical examination by two or more physicians or surgeons duly licensed to practice medicine in this State or in any other state of the United States and unless such examining physicians or surgeons have completed and signed a certificate in the form prescribed by the Division. Such certificate shall be devised by the Commissioner with the advice of those qualified experts in the field of diagnosing and treating physical disorders that the Commissioner may select and shall be designed to elicit the maximum medical information necessary to aid in determining whether or not the person is capable of personally activating an ignition interlock system. The certificate shall contain a waiver of privilege and the recommendation of the examining physician to the Commissioner as to whether the person is capable of personally activating an ignition interlock system.The Commissioner is not bound by the recommendations of the examining physicians but shall give fair consideration to such recommendations in acting upon the request for medical exception, the criterion being whether or not, upon all the evidence, it appears that the person is in fact incapable of personally activating an ignition interlock system. The burden of proof of such fact is upon the person seeking the exception.Whenever an exception is denied by the Commissioner, such denial may be reviewed by a reviewing board upon written request of the person seeking the exception filed with the Division within 10 days after receipt of such denial. The composition, procedures, and review of the reviewing board shall be as provided in G.S. 20-9(g)(4). This subsection shall not apply to persons subject to an ignition interlock requirement under this section for the reasons set forth in subdivision (a)(2) or (a)(3) of this section.

History. 1999-406, s. 3; 2000-155, ss. 1-3; 2001-487, s. 8; 2006-253, ss. 22.3, 22.4; 2007-493, ss. 5, 10, 28; 2009-369, ss. 5, 6; 2011-191, s. 3; 2013-348, s. 1; 2014-108, s. 1(a); 2014-115, s. 61.5; 2015-186, s. 4; 2015-264, s. 86; 2017-176, s. 2(b); 2021-134, s. 9(b)2021-185, s. 11; 2021-182, s. 1(c).

Editor’s Note.

The number of this section was assigned by the Revisor of Statutes, the number in Session Laws 1999-406, s. 3 having been 20-17.7.

Session Laws 1999-406, s. 18, states that the act does not obligate the General Assembly to appropriate additional funds, and that the act shall be implemented with funds available or appropriated to the Department of Transportation and the Administrative Office of the Courts.

Session Laws 2009-369, s. 7, as amended by Session Laws 2014-115, s. 61.5, and as amended by Session Laws 2017-176, s. 2(b), provides: “This act becomes effective December 1, 2009, and applies to applications for reinstatement that occur on or after that date.” Session Laws 2017-176, s. 2(b) repealed the expiration date for amendments by Session Laws 2009-369, ss. 5 and 6, retroactively effective December 1, 2016.

Session Laws 2021-134, s. 9(d), as amended by Session Laws 2021-185, s. 11, made the substitution of “thirtieth” for “tenth” in subsection (i) of this section by Session Laws 2021-134, s. 9(b), effective February 1, 2022, and applicable to notifications of revocations mailed by the Division of Motor Vehicles on or after that date.

Session Laws 2021-182, s. 1(i), provides: “Prosecutions for offenses committed before the effective dates of the subsections of this section are not abated or affected by this section, and the statutes that would be applicable but for this section remain applicable to those prosecutions.”

Session Laws 2021-182, s. 1(j), made the amendments to this section by Session Laws 2021-182, s. 1(c), effective June 1, 2022, and applicaple to limited driving privileges issued and drivers licenses restored on or after that date.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2006-253, ss. 22.3 and 22.4, inserted “Except as provided in subsection ( l ) of this section” at the beginning of subsection (b), and added subsection ( l ). For effective date and applicability, see Editor’s note.

Session Laws 2007-493, s. 10, effective August 30, 2007, substituted “(iii) a violation of G.S. 20-141.4 ” for “(iii) felony death by vehicle, G.S. 20-141.4(a1)” in subdivision (b)(3)c.

Session Laws 2007-493, s. 28, effective December 1, 2007, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, in subsection (a), substituted “concentration of 0.15” for “concentration of 0.16” in subdivision (a)(1), and added the last paragraph of the subsection.

Session Laws 2009-369, ss. 5 and 6, effective December 1, 2009, and applicable to applications for reinstatement that occur on or after that date, added subsection (a1), and in subdivision (b)(3)b., inserted “or subsection (a1)” near the middle.

Session Laws 2011-191, s. 3, effective December 1, 2011, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, added subdivision (a)(3) and made a related grammatical change; and in subdivision (b)(3)b., inserted “or (a)(3) of this section.”

Session Laws 2013-348, s. 1, effective October 1, 2013, in subsection (c1), added the second, fourth, and fifth sentences, and substituted “In order to avoid an undue . . . to that person that is” for “unless the Division determines that one or more specific registered vehicles owned by that person are” in the third sentence; deleted the last two sentences in subsection (f), which read “If a person subject to this section is charged with driving while license revoked by violating the requirements of subsection (c1) of this section, and no other violation of this section is alleged, the court may make a determination at the hearing of the case that the vehicle, on which the ignition interlock system was not installed, was relied upon by another member of that person’s family for transportation and that the vehicle was not in the possession of the person subject to this section, and therefore the vehicle was not required to be equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system. If the court determines that the vehicle was not required to be equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system and the person subject to this section has committed no other violation of this section, the court shall find the person not guilty of driving while license revoked.”; and, in subsection ( l ), inserted “solely for the reason set forth in subdivision (a)(1) of this section and” in the first sentence, and added the last sentence. For applicability, see Editor’s note.

Session Laws 2014-108, s. 1(a), rewrote the former last sentence of the introductory paragraph of subsection (j) as the last two sentences, and added the exception therein. See Editor’s note for effective date and applicability.

Session Laws 2015-186, s. 4, effective December 1, 2015, inserted “for impaired driving” and substituted “G.S. 20-28(a1)” for “G.S. 20-28(a)” in the first sentence of subsection (f). For effective date and applicability, see Editor’s note.

Session Laws 2021-134, s. 9(b), substituted “thirtieth” for “tenth” in subsection (i). For effective date and applicability, see editor’s note.

Session Laws 2021-182, s. 1(c), rewrote the section. For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Legal Periodicals.

For article, “Driven to Failure: An Empirical Analysis of Driver’s License Suspension in North Carolina,” see 69 Duke L.J. 1585 (2020).

CASE NOTES

No Exceptions to Ignition Interlock Device. —

G.S. 20-17.8 does not provide any exceptions to the mandatory ignition interlock device. State v. Benbow, 169 N.C. App. 613, 610 S.E.2d 297, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 687 (2005).

Review Process. —

There is no review process under G.S. 20-17.8 which would allow a defendant to present her arguments to the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV); G.S. 20-17.8 (j) governs appeals of a DMV decision in cases where a person has violated the requirements of G.S. 20-17.8, but it does not govern instances where a person seeks an exemption from the requirement. State v. Benbow, 169 N.C. App. 613, 610 S.E.2d 297, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 687 (2005).

No Right to Appeal Mandatory Revocation. —

There is no right to appeal to a court where the cancellation of the license is mandatory, and the provisions of G.S. 20-17.8 are mandatory; thus, the district court could not review, under G.S. 20-25 , a decision by the Division of Motor Vehicles that decided not to reinstate, without a requisite ignition interlock device, the license of a driver whose license had been suspended for violating G.S. 20-17.8 . State v. Benbow, 169 N.C. App. 613, 610 S.E.2d 297, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 687 (2005).

§ 20-17.8A. Tampering with ignition interlock systems.

Any person who tampers with, circumvents, or attempts to circumvent an ignition interlock device required to be installed on a motor vehicle pursuant to judicial order, statute, or as may be otherwise required as a condition for an individual to operate a motor vehicle, for the purpose of avoiding or altering testing on the ignition interlock device in the operation or attempted operation of a vehicle, or altering the testing results received or results in the process of being received on the ignition interlock device, is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. Each act of tampering, circumvention, or attempted circumvention under this statute shall constitute a separate violation.

History. 2011-381, s. 1.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2011-381, s. 6, made this section effective December 1, 2011, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date. Session Laws 2011-381, s. 6, further provides: “Prosecutions for offenses committed before the effective date of this act [December 1, 2011] are not abated or affected by this act, and the statutes that would be applicable but for this act remain applicable to those prosecutions.”

§ 20-17.9. Revocation of commercial drivers license with a P or S endorsement upon conviction of certain offenses.

The Division shall revoke the commercial drivers license with a P or S endorsement of any person convicted of any offense on or after December 1, 2009, that requires registration under Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes. The person may apply for the issuance of a new commercial drivers license pursuant to this Chapter, but, pursuant to G.S. 20-17.4 , shall remain disqualified from obtaining a commercial drivers license with a P or S endorsement for the period of time during which the person is required to maintain registration.

History. 2009-491, s. 3.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2009-491, s. 7, provides: “This act becomes effective December 1, 2009. This act applies to persons whose initial registration under Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes occurs on or after December 1, 2009, and to persons who are registered under Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes prior to December 1, 2009, and continue to be registered on or after December 1, 2009. The criminal penalties enacted by this act apply to offenses occurring on or after December 1, 2009.”

§ 20-18. Conviction of offenses described in § 20-181 not ground for suspension or revocation.

Conviction of offenses described in G.S. 20-181 shall not be cause for the suspension or revocation of driver’s license under the terms of this Article.

History. 1939, c. 351, s. 2; 1955, c. 913, s. 1; 1979, c. 667, s. 41.

§ 20-19. Period of suspension or revocation; conditions of restoration. [Effective from June 1, 2022, until January 1, 2023]

  1. When a license is suspended under subdivision (8) or (9) of G.S. 20-16(a), the period of suspension shall be in the discretion of the Division and for such time as it deems best for public safety but shall not exceed six months.
  2. When a license is suspended under subdivision (10) of G.S. 20-16(a), the period of suspension shall be in the discretion of the Division and for such time as it deems best for public safety but shall not exceed a period of 12 months.
  3. When a license is suspended under any other provision of this Article which does not specifically provide a period of suspension, the period of suspension shall be not more than one year. (c1) When a license is revoked under subdivision (2) of G.S. 20-17 , and the period of revocation is not determined by subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the period of revocation is one year.

    (c2) When a license is suspended under G.S. 20-17 (a)(14), the period of revocation for a first conviction shall be for 10 days. For a second or subsequent conviction as defined in G.S. 20-138.2 B(d), the period of revocation shall be one year.

    (c3) Restriction; Revocations. — When the Division restores a person’s drivers license which was revoked pursuant to G.S. 20-13.2(a), G.S. 20-23 when the offense involved impaired driving, G.S. 20-23 .2, subdivision (2) of G.S. 20-17(a), subdivision (1) or (9) of G.S. 20-17(a) when the offense involved impaired driving, G.S. 20-138.5 (d), or this subsection, in addition to any other restriction or condition, it shall place the applicable restriction on the person’s drivers license as follows:

    1. For the first restoration of a drivers license for a person convicted of driving while impaired, G.S. 20-138.1 , or a drivers license revoked pursuant to G.S. 20-23 or G.S. 20-23.2 when the offense for which the person’s license was revoked prohibits substantially similar conduct which if committed in this State would result in a conviction of driving while impaired under G.S. 20-138.1 , that the person not operate a vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more at any relevant time after the driving.
    2. For the second or subsequent restoration of a drivers license for a person convicted of driving while impaired, G.S. 20-138.1, or a drivers license revoked pursuant to G.S. 20-23 or G.S. 20-23.2 when the offense for which the person’s license was revoked prohibits substantially similar conduct which if committed in this State would result in a conviction of driving while impaired under G.S. 20-138.1, that the person not operate a vehicle with an alcohol concentration greater than 0.00 at any relevant time after the driving.
    3. For any restoration of a drivers license for a person convicted of driving while impaired in a commercial motor vehicle, G.S. 20-138.2 , habitual impaired driving, G.S. 20-138.5 , felony death by vehicle, G.S. 20-141.4 (a1), manslaughter or negligent homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle when the offense involved impaired driving, or a revocation under this subsection, that the person not operate a vehicle with an alcohol concentration of greater than 0.02 at any relevant time after the driving.

      (3a) For any restoration of a drivers license (i) for a person convicted of driving while less than 21 years old after consuming alcohol or drugs, G.S. 20-138.3 , or (ii) revoked pursuant to G.S. 20-23 or G.S. 20-23.2 when the offense for which the person’s license was revoked prohibits substantially similar conduct which if committed in this State would result in a conviction of driving while less than 21 years old after consuming alcohol or drugs, G.S. 20-138.3 , that the person not operate a vehicle with an alcohol concentration of greater than 0.00 at any relevant time after the driving.

    4. For any restoration of a drivers license revoked pursuant to G.S. 20-23 or G.S. 20-23.2 when the offense for which the person’s license was revoked prohibits substantially similar conduct which if committed in this State would result in a conviction of driving while impaired in a commercial motor vehicle, G.S. 20-138.2, driving while less than 21 years old after consuming alcohol or drugs, G.S. 20-138.3, a violation of G.S. 20-141.4 , or manslaughter or negligent homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle when the offense involved impaired driving, that the person not operate a vehicle with an alcohol concentration of greater than 0.00 at any relevant time after the driving.
    5. For any restoration of a drivers license pursuant to G.S. 20-17.8 requiring an ignition interlock system, that the person not operate a vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.02 or more at any relevant time after the driving during the period that the ignition interlock is required.

      In addition, the person seeking restoration of a license must agree to submit to a chemical analysis in accordance with G.S. 20-16.2 at the request of a law enforcement officer who has reasonable grounds to believe the person is operating a motor vehicle on a highway or public vehicular area while consuming alcohol or at any time while the person has remaining in the person’s body any alcohol or controlled substance previously consumed. The person must also agree that, when requested by a law enforcement officer, the person will agree to be transported by the law enforcement officer to the place where chemical analysis is to be administered.

      The restrictions placed on a license under this subsection shall be in effect (i) seven years from the date of restoration if the person’s license was permanently revoked, (ii) until the person’s twenty-first birthday if the revocation was for a conviction under G.S. 20-138.3, and (iii) three years in all other cases.

      A law enforcement officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has violated a restriction placed on the person’s drivers license shall complete an affidavit pursuant to G.S. 20-16.2 (c1). On the basis of information reported pursuant to G.S. 20-16.2, the Division shall revoke the drivers license of any person who violates a condition of reinstatement imposed under this subsection. An alcohol concentration report from an ignition interlock system shall not be used as the basis for revocation under this subsection. A violation of a restriction imposed under this subsection or the willful refusal to submit to a chemical analysis shall result in a one-year revocation. If the period of revocation was imposed pursuant to subsection (d) or (e), or G.S. 20-138.5(d), any remaining period of the original revocation, prior to its reduction, shall be reinstated and the one-year revocation begins after all other periods of revocation have terminated.

      (c4) Applicable Procedures. — When a person has violated a condition of restoration by refusing a chemical analysis, the notice and hearing procedures of G.S. 20-16.2 apply. When a person has submitted to a chemical analysis and the results show a violation of the alcohol concentration restriction, the notification and hearing procedures of this section apply.

      (c5) Right to Hearing Before Division; Issues. — Upon receipt of a properly executed affidavit required by G.S. 20-16.2(c1), the Division must expeditiously notify the person charged that the person’s license to drive is revoked for the period of time specified in this section, effective on the thirtieth calendar day after the mailing of the revocation order unless, before the effective date of the order, the person requests in writing a hearing before the Division. Except for the time referred to in G.S. 20-16.5 , if the person shows to the satisfaction of the Division that the person’s license was surrendered to the court and remained in the court’s possession, then the Division shall credit the amount of time for which the license was in the possession of the court against the revocation period required by this section. If the person properly requests a hearing, the person retains the person’s license, unless it is revoked under some other provision of law, until the hearing is held, the person withdraws the request, or the person fails to appear at a scheduled hearing. The hearing officer may subpoena any witnesses or documents that the hearing officer deems necessary. The person may request the hearing officer to subpoena the charging officer, the chemical analyst, or both to appear at the hearing if the person makes the request in writing at least three days before the hearing. The person may subpoena any other witness whom the person deems necessary, and the provisions of G.S. 1A-1 , Rule 45, apply to the issuance and service of all subpoenas issued under the authority of this section. The hearing officer is authorized to administer oaths to witnesses appearing at the hearing. The hearing must be conducted in the county where the charge was brought, and must be limited to consideration of whether all of the following conditions exist:

      (1) The charging officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person had violated the alcohol concentration restriction.

      (2) The person was notified of the person’s rights as required by G.S. 20-16.2(a).

      (3) The drivers license of the person had an alcohol concentration restriction.

      (4) The person submitted to a chemical analysis upon the request of the charging officer, and the analysis revealed an alcohol concentration in excess of the restriction on the person’s drivers license.

      If the Division finds that the conditions specified in this subsection are met, it must order the revocation sustained. If the Division finds that any of the conditions (1), (2), (3), or (4) is not met, it must rescind the revocation. If the revocation is sustained, the person must surrender the person’s license immediately upon notification by the Division.

      (c6) Appeal to Court. — There is no right to appeal the decision of the Division. However, if the person properly requested a hearing before the Division under subsection (c5) and the Division held such a hearing, the person may within 30 days of the date the Division’s decision is mailed to the person, petition the superior court of the county in which the hearing took place for discretionary review on the record of the revocation. The superior court may stay the imposition of the revocation only if the court finds that the person is likely to succeed on the merits of the case and will suffer irreparable harm if such a stay is not granted. The stay shall not exceed 30 days. The reviewing court shall review the record only and shall be limited to determining if the Division hearing officer followed proper procedures and if the hearing officer made sufficient findings of fact to support the revocation. There shall be no further appeal.

  4. When a person’s license is revoked under (i) G.S. 20-17(a)(2) and the person has another offense involving impaired driving for which the person has been convicted, which offense occurred within three years immediately preceding the date of the offense for which the person’s license is being revoked, or (ii) G.S. 20-17(a)(9) due to a violation of G.S. 20-141.4(a3), the period of revocation is four years, and this period may be reduced only as provided in this section. The Division may conditionally restore the person’s license after it has been revoked for at least two years under this subsection if the person provides the Division with satisfactory proof that both of the following requirements are met:
    1. The person has not in the period of revocation been convicted in North Carolina or any other state or federal jurisdiction of a motor vehicle offense, an alcoholic beverage control law offense, a drug law offense, or any other criminal offense involving the possession or consumption of alcohol or drugs.
    2. The person is not currently an excessive user of alcohol, drugs, or prescription drugs, or unlawfully using any controlled substance. The person may voluntarily submit themselves to continuous alcohol monitoring for the purpose of proving abstinence from alcohol consumption during a period of revocation immediately prior to the restoration consideration. All of the following requirements apply when providing proof that the requirement set forth in this subdivision has been met:
      1. Monitoring periods of 120 days or longer shall be accepted by the Division as evidence of abstinence if the Division receives sufficient documentation that reflects that the person abstained from alcohol use during the monitoring period.
      2. The continuous alcohol monitoring system shall be a system approved under G.S. 15A-1343.3 .
      3. The Division may establish guidelines for the acceptance of evidence of abstinence under this subdivision. If the Division restores the person’s license, it may place reasonable conditions or restrictions on the person for the duration of the original revocation period.
  5. When a person’s license is revoked under (i) G.S. 20-17(a)(2) and the person has two or more previous offenses involving impaired driving for which the person has been convicted, and the most recent offense occurred within the five years immediately preceding the date of the offense for which the person’s license is being revoked, (ii) G.S. 20-17(a)(2) and the person was sentenced pursuant to G.S. 20-179(f3) for the offense resulting in the revocation, or (iii) G.S. 20-17(a)(9) due to a violation of G.S. 20-141.4(a4), the revocation is permanent. (e1) Notwithstanding subsection (e) of this section, the Division may conditionally restore the license of a person to whom subsection (e) applies after it has been revoked for at least three years under subsection (e) if the person provides the Division with satisfactory proof of all of the following:
    1. In the three years immediately preceding the person’s application for a restored license, the person has not been convicted in North Carolina or in any other state or federal court of a motor vehicle offense, an alcohol beverage control law offense, a drug law offense, or any criminal offense involving the consumption of alcohol or drugs.
    2. The person is not currently an excessive user of alcohol, drugs, or prescription drugs, or unlawfully using any controlled substance. The person may voluntarily submit themselves to continuous alcohol monitoring for the purpose of proving abstinence from alcohol consumption during a period of revocation immediately prior to the restoration consideration. All of the following requirements apply when providing proof that the requirement set forth in this subdivision has been met:
      1. Monitoring periods of 120 days or longer shall be accepted by the Division as evidence of abstinence if the Division receives sufficient documentation that reflects that the person abstained from alcohol use during the monitoring period.
      2. The continuous alcohol monitoring system shall be a system approved under G.S. 15A-1343.3 .
      3. The Division may establish guidelines for the acceptance of evidence of abstinence under this subdivision.

        (e2) Notwithstanding subsection (e) of this section, the Division may conditionally restore the license of a person to whom subsection (e) applies after it has been revoked for at least 24 months under G.S. 20-17(a)(2) if the person provides the Division with satisfactory proof of all of the following:

        (1) The person has not consumed any alcohol for the 12 months preceding the restoration while being monitored by a continuous alcohol monitoring device of a type approved by the Division of Adult Correction and Juvenile Justice of the Department of Public Safety.

        (2) The person has not in the period of revocation been convicted in North Carolina or any other state or federal jurisdiction of a motor vehicle offense, an alcoholic beverage control law offense, a drug law offense, or any other criminal offense involving the possession or consumption of alcohol or drugs.

    3. The person is not currently an excessive user of drugs or prescription drugs.
    4. The person is not unlawfully using any controlled substance.

      (e3) If the Division restores a person’s license under subsection (e1), (e2), or (e4) of this section, it may place reasonable conditions or restrictions on the person for any period up to five years from the date of restoration.

      (e4) When a person’s license is revoked under G.S. 20-138.5(d), the Division may conditionally restore the license of that person after it has been revoked for at least 10 years after the completion of any sentence imposed by the court, if the person provides the Division with satisfactory proof of all of the following:

      (1) In the 10 years immediately preceding the person’s application for a restored license, the person has not been convicted in North Carolina or in any other state or federal court of a motor vehicle offense, an alcohol beverage control law offense, a drug law offense, or any other criminal offense.

      (2) The person is not currently a user of alcohol, unlawfully using any controlled substance, or an excessive user of prescription drugs.

  6. When a license is revoked under any other provision of this Article which does not specifically provide a period of revocation, the period of revocation shall be one year.
  7. When a license is suspended under subdivision (11) of G.S. 20-16(a), the period of suspension shall be for a period of time not in excess of the period of nonoperation imposed by the court as a condition of the suspended sentence; further, in such case, it shall not be necessary to comply with the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act in order to have such license returned at the expiration of the suspension period. (g1) When a license is revoked under subdivision (12) of G.S. 20-17 , the period of revocation is six months for conviction of a second offense and one year for conviction of a third or subsequent offense.

    (g2) When a license is revoked under G.S. 20-17 (a)(16), the period of revocation is 90 days for a second conviction and six months for a third or subsequent conviction. The term “second or subsequent conviction” shall have the same meaning as found in G.S. 20-17(a)(16).

    (g3) When a license is revoked under G.S. 20-17(a)(17), the period of revocation shall be not less than one year.

  8. Repealed by Session Laws 1983, c. 435, s. 17.
  9. When a person’s license is revoked under G.S. 20-17(a)(1) or G.S. 20-17(a)(9), and the offense is one involving impaired driving and a fatality, the revocation is permanent. The Division may, however, conditionally restore the person’s license after it has been revoked for at least five years under this subsection if the person provides the Division with satisfactory proof that both of the following requirements are met:
    1. In the five years immediately preceding the person’s application for a restored license, the person has not been convicted in North Carolina or in any other state or federal court of a motor vehicle offense, an alcohol beverage control law offense, a drug law offense, or any criminal offense involving the consumption of alcohol or drugs.
    2. The person is not currently an excessive user of alcohol or drugs.

      If the Division restores the person’s license, it may place reasonable conditions or restrictions on the person for any period up to seven years from the date of restoration.

  10. The Division is authorized to issue amended revocation orders issued under subsections (d) and (e), if necessary because convictions do not respectively occur in the same order as offenses for which the license may be revoked under those subsections.
  11. Before the Division restores a driver’s license that has been suspended or revoked under G.S. 20-138.5(d), or under any provision of this Article, other than G.S. 20-24.1 , the person seeking to have the person’s driver’s license restored shall submit to the Division proof that the person has notified the person’s insurance agent or company that the person is seeking the restoration and that the person is financially responsible. Proof of financial responsibility shall be in one of the following forms:
    1. A written certificate or electronically-transmitted facsimile thereof from any insurance carrier duly authorized to do business in this State certifying that there is in effect a nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle liability policy for the benefit of the person required to furnish proof of financial responsibility. The certificate or facsimile shall state the effective date and expiration date of the nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle liability policy and shall state the date that the certificate or facsimile is issued. The certificate or facsimile shall remain effective proof of financial responsibility for a period of 30 consecutive days following the date the certificate or facsimile is issued but shall not in and of itself constitute a binder or policy of insurance.
    2. A binder for or policy of nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle liability insurance under which the applicant is insured, provided that the binder or policy states the effective date and expiration date of the nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle liability policy. Subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection do not apply to applicants who do not own currently registered motor vehicles and who do not operate nonfleet private passenger motor vehicles that are owned by other persons and that are not insured under commercial motor vehicle liability insurance policies. In such cases, the applicant shall sign a written certificate to that effect. Such certificate shall be furnished by the Division and may be incorporated into the restoration application form. Any material misrepresentation made by such person on such certificate shall be grounds for suspension of that person’s license for a period of 90 days.

      For the purposes of this subsection, the term “nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle” has the definition ascribed to it in Article 40 of General Statute Chapter 58.

      The Commissioner may require that certificates required by this subsection be on a form approved by the Commissioner. The financial responsibility required by this subsection shall be kept in effect for not less than three years after the date that the license is restored. Failure to maintain financial responsibility as required by this subsection shall be grounds for suspending the restored driver’s license for a period of 30 days. Nothing in this subsection precludes any person from showing proof of financial responsibility in any other manner authorized by Articles 9A and 13 of this Chapter.

History. 1935, c. 52, s. 13; 1947, c. 1067, s. 15; 1951, c. 1202, ss. 2-4; 1953, c. 1138; 1955, c. 1187, ss. 13, 17, 18; 1957, c. 499, s. 2; c. 515, s. 1; 1959, c. 1264, s. 11A; 1969, c. 242; 1971, c. 619, ss. 8-10; 1973, c. 1445, ss. 1-4; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1979, c. 903, ss. 4-6; 1981, c. 412, s. 4; c. 747, ss. 34, 66; 1983, c. 435, s. 17; 1983 (Reg. Sess., 1984), c. 1101, s. 18; 1987, c. 869, s. 12; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1112; 1989, c. 436, s. 5; c. 771, s. 18; 1995, c. 506, s. 8; 1998-182, s. 21; 1999-406, s. 2; 1999-452, ss. 11, 12; 2000-140, ss. 3, 4; 2000-155, s. 6; 2001-352, s. 4; 2007-165, ss. 1(a), (b); 2007-493, ss. 11-14; 2008-187, s. 9; 2009-99, s. 1; 2009-369, ss. 1-4; 2009-500, ss. 1, 2; 2011-145, s. 19.1(h); 2011-191, s. 2; 2014-115, s. 61.5; 2017-176, s. 2(b); 2017-186, s. 2(jjjj); 2021-128, s. 3; 2021-134, s. 9(c); 2021-182, s. 1(d); 2021-185, s. 11.

Section Set Out Three Times.

The section above is effective June 1, 2022 until January 1, 2023. For version of the section effective until June 1, 2022, see the preceding section, also numbered G.S. 20-19 . For version of the section in effect on January 1, 2023, see the following section, also numbered G.S. 20-19 .

Cross References.

As to Division of Adult Correction and Juvenile Justice of the Department of Public Safety establishing regulations for continuous alcohol monitoring systems, see G.S. 15A-1343.3 .

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 1999-406, s. 18, states that the act does not obligate the General Assembly to appropriate additional funds, and that the act shall be implemented with funds available or appropriated to the Department of Transportation and the Administrative Office of the Courts.

Session Laws 2007-493, s. 33, as amended by Session Laws 2009-99, s. 1, provides: “Sections 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31 of this act become effective December 1, 2007, and apply to offenses committed on or after that date. Section 14 of this act applies to persons whose waiting period for a hearing on conditional restoration commences on or after the effective date of this act. The remainder of this act is effective when it becomes law. Prosecutions for offenses committed before the effective date of this act are not abated or affected by this act, and the statutes that would be applicable but for this act remain applicable to those prosecutions.”

Subsection (e), as originally amended by Session Laws 2007-165, s. 1(b), had two subdivisions designated (e)(1) and two subdivisions designated (e)(2). Session Laws 2008-187 corrected the subsection (e) designation scheme.

The amendment by Session Laws 2007-493, s. 14, rewrote subsection (i), and was effective August 30, 2007, and applicable to persons whose waiting period for a hearing on conditional restoration commences on or after that date, pursuant to Session Laws 2007-493, s. 33, as amended by Session Laws 2009-99, s. 1.

Subsection (e), as originally amended by Session Laws 2007-165, s. 1(b), had two subdivisions designated (e)(1) and two subdivisions designated (e)(2). Session Laws 2008-187 corrected the subsection (e) designation scheme.

Session Laws 2009-369, s. 7, as amended by Session Laws 2014-115, s. 61.5, and as amended by Session Laws 2017-176, s. 2(b), provides: “This act becomes effective December 1, 2009, and applies to applications for reinstatement that occur on or after that date.” Session Laws 2017-176, s. 2(b) repealed the expiration date for amendments by Session Laws 2009-369, ss. 1-4, retroactively effective December 1, 2016.

Session Laws 2021-128, s. 3, added a new subsection (c2a). It was redesignated as subsection (g3) at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes.

Session Laws 2021-128, s. 4, made subsection (g3) of this section, as added by Session Laws 2021-128, s. 3, effective December 1, 2021, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date.

Session Laws 2021-134, s. 9(d), as amended by Session Laws 2021-185, s. 11, made the substitution of “thirtieth” for “tenth” in the first sentence of subsection (c5) of this section by Session Laws 2021-134, s. 9(c), effective February 1, 2022, and applicable to notifications of revocations mailed by the Division of Motor Vehicles on or after that date.

Session Laws 2021-182, s. 1(i), provides: “Prosecutions for offenses committed before the effective dates of the subsections of this section are not abated or affected by this section, and the statutes that would be applicable but for this section remain applicable to those prosecutions.”

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2008-187, s. 9, effective August 7, 2008, rewrote subsection (e) as present subsections (e), (e1), (e2), and (e3).

Session Laws 2009-369, ss. 1 through 4, as amended by Session Laws 2014-115, s. 61.5, effective December 1, 2009, and applicable to applications for reinstatement that occur on or after that date, in subsection (c3), in the introductory language, inserted “G.S. 20-138.5(d)”; in subdivision (c3)(3), inserted “habitual impaired driving, G.S. 20-138.5 ”; in the last paragraph of subsection (c3), inserted “or G.S. 20-138.5 (d)”; in subsection (e3) substituted “(e1), (e2), or (e4)” for “(e1) or (e2)”; added subsection (e4); and in subsection (k), inserted “G.S. 20-138.5(d), or under” in the introductory language.

Session Laws 2009-500, ss. 1 and 2, effective for hearings or proceedings occurring on or after December 1, 2009, added the second sentence in subdivisions (d)(2) and (e1)(2); and added subdivisions (d)(2)a.-(d)(2)c and (e1)(2)a.-(e1)(2)c.

Session Laws 2011-145, s. 19.1(h), effective January 1, 2012, substituted “Division of Adult Correction of the Department of Public Safety” for “Department of Correction” in subdivision (e2)(1).

Session Laws 2011-191, s. 2, effective December 1, 2011, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, in subsection (e), inserted (ii), redesignated former (ii) as (iii), and made a related change.

Session Laws 2017-186, s. 2(jjjj), effective December 1, 2017, inserted “and Juvenile Justice” in subdivision (e2)(1).

Session Laws 2021-128, s. 3, added subsection (g3). For effective date, applicability, and redesignation of subsection, see editor’s notes.

Session Laws 2021-134, s. 9(c), substituted “thirtieth” for “tenth” in subsection (c5). For effective date and applicability, see editor’s note.

Session Laws 2021-182, s. 1(d), rewrote the section. For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Legal Periodicals.

For survey of 1978 constitutional law, see 57 N.C.L. Rev. 958 (1979).

CASE NOTES

The power to issue, suspend or revoke a driver’s license is vested exclusively in the Division of Motor Vehicles, subject to review by the superior court and, upon appeal, by the appellate division. Smith v. Walsh, 34 N.C. App. 287, 238 S.E.2d 157, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 1657 (1977).

Under G.S. 20-16(a)(10) and subsection (b) of this section, the discretionary authority to suspend petitioner’s license for a period not exceeding 12 months was vested exclusively in the Division of Motor Vehicles. No discretionary power was conferred upon a superior court. Smith v. Walsh, 34 N.C. App. 287, 238 S.E.2d 157, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 1657 (1977).

Subsection (e) of this section is not overbroad in violation of the Constitution since no conduct within the purview of the phrase “violation of liquor laws of North Carolina,” including the commission of the crime of public drunkenness, is a constitutionally protected activity. In re Harris, 37 N.C. App. 590, 246 S.E.2d 532, 1978 N.C. App. LEXIS 2808 (1978).

Subsection (e) Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague. —

The phrase “liquor laws” in subsection (e) of this section, is not a term so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. In re Harris, 37 N.C. App. 590, 246 S.E.2d 532, 1978 N.C. App. LEXIS 2808 (1978).

In enacting subsection (e) of this section, the legislature was demanding complete compliance with all laws governing the use of drugs, alcohol, and motor vehicles. In re Harris, 37 N.C. App. 590, 246 S.E.2d 532, 1978 N.C. App. LEXIS 2808 (1978).

The purpose of this section is to provide a uniform standard period for the withholding of the privilege to operate a motor vehicle following certain offenses. Wagoner v. Hiatt, 111 N.C. App. 448, 432 S.E.2d 417, 1993 N.C. App. LEXIS 792 (1993).

Violation of “alcoholic beverages laws”. —

The legislature fully intended to include the crime of public drunkenness in the phrase “violation of liquor (now ‘alcoholic beverages’) laws of North Carolina” in subsection (e) of this section. In re Harris, 37 N.C. App. 590, 246 S.E.2d 532, 1978 N.C. App. LEXIS 2808 (1978).

Out-of-State Conviction to Be Counted as Conviction for Purpose of Subsection (e). —

An out-of-state conviction of operating a motor vehicle upon the public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or an impairing drug (now impaired driving) is to be counted as a conviction for the purpose of the operation of the mandatory provision of subsection (e). In re Oates, 18 N.C. App. 320, 196 S.E.2d 596, 1973 N.C. App. LEXIS 1851 (1973).

No Contest Plea May Be Used as Prior Conviction. —

The judgment entered on a plea of no contest to a previous charge of driving with a blood alcohol content of .10 percent or more may be used as a prior conviction by the DMV for purposes of revoking a driver’s license. Davis v. Hiatt, 326 N.C. 462 , 390 S.E.2d 338, 1990 N.C. LEXIS 167 (1990).

Certiorari to Review Mandatory Suspension. —

Petitioner whose driving privilege was mandatorily suspended under G.S. 20-17(2) and G.S. 20-19(e) did not have the right to appeal under G.S. 20-25 or under the Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 150B. However, the superior court could review the actions of the Commissioner by issuing a writ of certiorari. Davis v. Hiatt, 326 N.C. 462 , 390 S.E.2d 338, 1990 N.C. LEXIS 167 (1990).

Where petitioner, seeking conditional restoration of his driving privileges, pled sufficient facts to show he did not have right to appeal from final decision of DMV, he could then have petitioned for writ of certiorari to have case reviewed by superior court. Thus, superior court had jurisdiction to review case. Penuel v. Hiatt, 100 N.C. App. 268, 396 S.E.2d 85, 1990 N.C. App. LEXIS 977 (1990).

Review of Permanent Revocation Under Subsection (e). —

Where the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles permanently revoked plaintiff’s driver’s license for a third offense of driving while under the influence, the departmental action was mandatory, and the superior court was without authority to revoke or make any order with reference thereto. Rhyne v. Garrett, 18 N.C. App. 565, 197 S.E.2d 235, 1973 N.C. App. LEXIS 1939 (1973).

Trial court correctly reviewed the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles’ cancellation of a driver’s conditionally restored driving privileges under a petition for writ of certiorari rather than de novo review because although there was no right to appeal a cancellation or revocation under G.S. 20-25 , the driver could seek certiorari pursuant to G.S. 20-19(e). Cole v. Faulkner, 155 N.C. App. 592, 573 S.E.2d 614, 2002 N.C. App. LEXIS 1589 (2002).

Review of Refusal to Reinstate License. —

Once the right to drive has been mandatorily revoked and a petitioner unsuccessfully seeks to have the license reinstated by the DMV, no superior court review of the denial is mandated unless the denial was arbitrary or illegal, because reinstatement is not a legal right but is an act of grace. Alpiser v. Eagle Pontiac-GMC-Isuzu, Inc., 97 N.C. App. 610, 389 S.E.2d 293, 1990 N.C. App. LEXIS 220 (1990).

The provisions of subsection (f) of this section are mandatory. Snyder v. Scheidt, 246 N.C. 81 , 97 S.E.2d 461, 1957 N.C. LEXIS 372 (1957).

The provisions of G.S. 20-17(6) and subsection (f) of this section are mandatory and not discretionary. Simpson v. Garrett, 15 N.C. App. 449, 190 S.E.2d 251, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 1938 (1972).

Subsection (f)’s one-year period applies to G.S. 20-17.1 . Jones v. Penny, 387 F. Supp. 383, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447 (M.D.N.C. 1974).

Subsections (d) and (j) of this section must be read together, giving consideration both to the legislative intent of ensuring standard penalties for the same offenses and to the policy of preventing circumvention of this section. Wagoner v. Hiatt, 111 N.C. App. 448, 432 S.E.2d 417, 1993 N.C. App. LEXIS 792 (1993).

Division Required to Revoke License for Statutory Period. —

Upon receiving a record of an operator’s or chauffeur’s conviction upon two charges of reckless driving committed within a period of 12 months, the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles is required to forthwith revoke the license of such persons for the statutory period. Simpson v. Garrett, 15 N.C. App. 449, 190 S.E.2d 251, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 1938 (1972).

Where there is mandatory revocation under subdivision (2) of G.S. 20-17 , the period of revocation shall be as provided in this section. Carmichael v. Scheidt, 249 N.C. 472 , 106 S.E.2d 685, 1959 N.C. LEXIS 366 (1959); In re Austin, 5 N.C. App. 575, 169 S.E.2d 20, 1969 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398 (1969).

Effective Date of Revocation. —

A revocation based on a second offense for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic drug (now impaired driving) must be for a period of three (now four) years, and the effective date of the revocation for such period should not begin prior to the date of the second conviction. Likewise, when a license is permanently revoked, the effective date of such revocation should not be earlier than the date of the conviction for the third offense. Carmichael v. Scheidt, 249 N.C. 472 , 106 S.E.2d 685, 1959 N.C. LEXIS 366 (1959).

Period of Suspension Runs from Date of Order by Division. —

When within five days from receipt of notice of conviction the Department (now Division) ordered the revocation of an operator’s license for one year, the revocation was in effect until the same date in the following year, and did not expire one year from the date of conviction or the date of receipt of notice by the Department (now Division). State v. Ball, 255 N.C. 351 , 121 S.E.2d 604, 1961 N.C. LEXIS 605 (1961).

Injunction Not Available to Plaintiff Who Could Have Prevented Delay in Start of Revocation Period. —

Where the elapse of approximately 15 months between plaintiff’s last conviction for reckless driving and the order of revocation was not caused by defendant, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles or his Department (now Division), but the delay apparently resulted from the failure of the clerk of the court where plaintiff was last convicted to act promptly in forwarding a record of the conviction to the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles, and plaintiff could have prevented any delay in the start of the revocation period by surrendering his license to the clerk and obtaining a receipt therefor at the time of his second conviction, plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief. Simpson v. Garrett, 15 N.C. App. 449, 190 S.E.2d 251, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 1938 (1972).

Reinstatement or the receipt of a new license during the revocation period is not a legal right of the defendant, but an act of grace which the General Assembly permits, but does not require, the Department (now Division) to apply. The authority to exercise or apply this act of grace is granted to the Department (now Division), not to the courts. In re Austin, 5 N.C. App. 575, 169 S.E.2d 20, 1969 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398 (1969).

Court Order Requiring Conditional Restoration Held Error. —

Where petitioner offered no support for his allegation that the DMV’s denial of a conditional restoration of his license, which had been mandatorily revoked under G.S. 20-17 , was an arbitrary and capricious act and was in disregard of the law set forth in this section, it was error for the Superior Court to enter an order requiring the DMV to conditionally restore petitioner’s driving privileges. Penuel v. Hiatt, 97 N.C. App. 616, 389 S.E.2d 289, 1990 N.C. App. LEXIS 223 (1990).

Warrant Need Not Charge Second Offense in Order to Support Revocation under Subsection (d). —

Where defendant’s driver’s license had previously been suspended for a period of one year for conviction of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and defendant pleaded guilty to another such offense upon warrant not charging a second offense, the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles, upon receipt of the report of the later conviction, must revoke defendant’s license for the period provided by subsection (d) of this section. Harrell v. Scheidt, 243 N.C. 735 , 92 S.E.2d 182, 1956 N.C. LEXIS 625 (1956).

Right to Inherit from Life Insurance Policies. —

While paternity had to be established for an illegitimate child to inherit from a father who died intestate, North Carolina had no statute requiring that paternity be established for an illegitimate child to benefit from a life insurance policy, and the policy at issue in defendant claimant’s case did not exclude illegitimate children unless paternity had been judicially established. Fort Dearborn Life Ins. Co. v. Turner, 521 F. Supp. 2d 499, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84333 (E.D.N.C. 2007).

§ 20-19. Period of suspension or revocation; conditions of restoration. [Effective January 1, 2023]

  1. When a license is suspended under subdivision (8) or (9) of G.S. 20-16(a), the period of suspension shall be in the discretion of the Division and for such time as it deems best for public safety but shall not exceed six months.
  2. When a license is suspended under subdivision (10) of G.S. 20-16(a), the period of suspension shall be in the discretion of the Division and for such time as it deems best for public safety but shall not exceed a period of 12 months.
  3. When a license is suspended under any other provision of this Article which does not specifically provide a period of suspension, the period of suspension shall be not more than one year. (c1) When a license is revoked under subdivision (2) of G.S. 20-17 , and the period of revocation is not determined by subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the period of revocation is one year.

    (c2) When a license is suspended under G.S. 20-17 (a)(14), the period of revocation for a first conviction shall be for 10 days. For a second or subsequent conviction as defined in G.S. 20-138.2 B(d), the period of revocation shall be one year.

    (c3) Restriction; Revocations. — When the Division restores a person’s drivers license which was revoked pursuant to G.S. 20-13.2(a), G.S. 20-23 when the offense involved impaired driving, G.S. 20-23 .2, subdivision (2) of G.S. 20-17(a), subdivision (1) or (9) of G.S. 20-17(a) when the offense involved impaired driving, G.S. 20-138.5 (d), or this subsection, in addition to any other restriction or condition, it shall place the applicable restriction on the person’s drivers license as follows:

    1. For the first restoration of a drivers license for a person convicted of driving while impaired, G.S. 20-138.1 , or a drivers license revoked pursuant to G.S. 20-23 or G.S. 20-23.2 when the offense for which the person’s license was revoked prohibits substantially similar conduct which if committed in this State would result in a conviction of driving while impaired under G.S. 20-138.1 , that the person not operate a vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more at any relevant time after the driving.
    2. For the second or subsequent restoration of a drivers license for a person convicted of driving while impaired, G.S. 20-138.1, or a drivers license revoked pursuant to G.S. 20-23 or G.S. 20-23.2 when the offense for which the person’s license was revoked prohibits substantially similar conduct which if committed in this State would result in a conviction of driving while impaired under G.S. 20-138.1, that the person not operate a vehicle with an alcohol concentration greater than 0.00 at any relevant time after the driving.
    3. For any restoration of a drivers license for a person convicted of driving while impaired in a commercial motor vehicle, G.S. 20-138.2 , habitual impaired driving, G.S. 20-138.5 , felony death by vehicle, G.S. 20-141.4 (a1), manslaughter or negligent homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle when the offense involved impaired driving, or a revocation under this subsection, that the person not operate a vehicle with an alcohol concentration of greater than 0.02 at any relevant time after the driving.

      (3a) For any restoration of a drivers license (i) for a person convicted of driving while less than 21 years old after consuming alcohol or drugs, G.S. 20-138.3 , or (ii) revoked pursuant to G.S. 20-23 or G.S. 20-23.2 when the offense for which the person’s license was revoked prohibits substantially similar conduct which if committed in this State would result in a conviction of driving while less than 21 years old after consuming alcohol or drugs, G.S. 20-138.3 , that the person not operate a vehicle with an alcohol concentration of greater than 0.00 at any relevant time after the driving.

    4. For any restoration of a drivers license revoked pursuant to G.S. 20-23 or G.S. 20-23.2 when the offense for which the person’s license was revoked prohibits substantially similar conduct which if committed in this State would result in a conviction of driving while impaired in a commercial motor vehicle, G.S. 20-138.2, driving while less than 21 years old after consuming alcohol or drugs, G.S. 20-138.3, a violation of G.S. 20-141.4 , or manslaughter or negligent homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle when the offense involved impaired driving, that the person not operate a vehicle with an alcohol concentration of greater than 0.00 at any relevant time after the driving.
    5. For any restoration of a drivers license pursuant to G.S. 20-17.8 requiring an ignition interlock system, that the person not operate a vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.02 or more at any relevant time after the driving during the period that the ignition interlock is required.

      In addition, the person seeking restoration of a license must agree to submit to a chemical analysis in accordance with G.S. 20-16.2 at the request of a law enforcement officer who has reasonable grounds to believe the person is operating a motor vehicle on a highway or public vehicular area while consuming alcohol or at any time while the person has remaining in the person’s body any alcohol or controlled substance previously consumed. The person must also agree that, when requested by a law enforcement officer, the person will agree to be transported by the law enforcement officer to the place where chemical analysis is to be administered.

      The restrictions placed on a license under this subsection shall be in effect (i) seven years from the date of restoration if the person’s license was permanently revoked, (ii) until the person’s twenty-first birthday if the revocation was for a conviction under G.S. 20-138.3, and (iii) three years in all other cases.

      A law enforcement officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has violated a restriction placed on the person’s drivers license shall complete an affidavit pursuant to G.S. 20-16.2 (c1). On the basis of information reported pursuant to G.S. 20-16.2, the Division shall revoke the drivers license of any person who violates a condition of reinstatement imposed under this subsection. An alcohol concentration report from an ignition interlock system shall not be used as the basis for revocation under this subsection. A violation of a restriction imposed under this subsection or the willful refusal to submit to a chemical analysis shall result in a one-year revocation. If the period of revocation was imposed pursuant to subsection (d) or (e), or G.S. 20-138.5(d), any remaining period of the original revocation, prior to its reduction, shall be reinstated and the one-year revocation begins after all other periods of revocation have terminated.

      (c4) Applicable Procedures. — When a person has violated a condition of restoration by refusing a chemical analysis, the notice and hearing procedures of G.S. 20-16.2 apply. When a person has submitted to a chemical analysis and the results show a violation of the alcohol concentration restriction, the notification and hearing procedures of this section apply.

      (c5) Right to Hearing Before Division; Issues. — Upon receipt of a properly executed affidavit required by G.S. 20-16.2(c1), the Division must expeditiously notify the person charged that the person’s license to drive is revoked for the period of time specified in this section, effective on the thirtieth calendar day after the mailing of the revocation order unless, before the effective date of the order, the person requests in writing a hearing before the Division. Except for the time referred to in G.S. 20-16.5 , if the person shows to the satisfaction of the Division that the person’s license was surrendered to the court and remained in the court’s possession, then the Division shall credit the amount of time for which the license was in the possession of the court against the revocation period required by this section. If the person properly requests a hearing, the person retains the person’s license, unless it is revoked under some other provision of law, until the hearing is held, the person withdraws the request, or the person fails to appear at a scheduled hearing. The hearing officer may subpoena any witnesses or documents that the hearing officer deems necessary. The person may request the hearing officer to subpoena the charging officer, the chemical analyst, or both to appear at the hearing if the person makes the request in writing at least three days before the hearing. The person may subpoena any other witness whom the person deems necessary, and the provisions of G.S. 1A-1 , Rule 45, apply to the issuance and service of all subpoenas issued under the authority of this section. The hearing officer is authorized to administer oaths to witnesses appearing at the hearing. The hearing must be conducted in the county where the charge was brought, and must be limited to consideration of whether all of the following conditions exist:

      (1) The charging officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person had violated the alcohol concentration restriction.

      (2) The person was notified of the person’s rights as required by G.S. 20-16.2(a).

      (3) The drivers license of the person had an alcohol concentration restriction.

      (4) The person submitted to a chemical analysis upon the request of the charging officer, and the analysis revealed an alcohol concentration in excess of the restriction on the person’s drivers license.

      If the Division finds that the conditions specified in this subsection are met, it must order the revocation sustained. If the Division finds that any of the conditions (1), (2), (3), or (4) is not met, it must rescind the revocation. If the revocation is sustained, the person must surrender the person’s license immediately upon notification by the Division.

      (c6) Appeal to Court. — There is no right to appeal the decision of the Division. However, if the person properly requested a hearing before the Division under subsection (c5) and the Division held such a hearing, the person may within 30 days of the date the Division’s decision is mailed to the person, petition the superior court of the county in which the hearing took place for discretionary review on the record of the revocation. The superior court may stay the imposition of the revocation only if the court finds that the person is likely to succeed on the merits of the case and will suffer irreparable harm if such a stay is not granted. The stay shall not exceed 30 days. The reviewing court shall review the record only and shall be limited to determining if the Division hearing officer followed proper procedures and if the hearing officer made sufficient findings of fact to support the revocation. There shall be no further appeal.

  4. When a person’s license is revoked under (i) G.S. 20-17(a)(2) and the person has another offense involving impaired driving for which the person has been convicted, which offense occurred within three years immediately preceding the date of the offense for which the person’s license is being revoked, or (ii) G.S. 20-17(a)(9) due to a violation of G.S. 20-141.4(a3), the period of revocation is four years, and this period may be reduced only as provided in this section. The Division may conditionally restore the person’s license after it has been revoked for at least two years under this subsection if the person provides the Division with satisfactory proof that both of the following requirements are met:
    1. The person has not in the period of revocation been convicted in North Carolina or any other state or federal jurisdiction of a motor vehicle offense, an alcoholic beverage control law offense, a drug law offense, or any other criminal offense involving the possession or consumption of alcohol or drugs.
    2. The person is not currently an excessive user of alcohol, drugs, or prescription drugs, or unlawfully using any controlled substance. The person may voluntarily submit themselves to continuous alcohol monitoring for the purpose of proving abstinence from alcohol consumption during a period of revocation immediately prior to the restoration consideration. All of the following requirements apply when providing proof that the requirement set forth in this subdivision has been met:
      1. Monitoring periods of 120 days or longer shall be accepted by the Division as evidence of abstinence if the Division receives sufficient documentation that reflects that the person abstained from alcohol use during the monitoring period.
      2. The continuous alcohol monitoring system shall be a system approved under G.S. 15A-1343.3 .
      3. The Division may establish guidelines for the acceptance of evidence of abstinence under this subdivision. If the Division restores the person’s license, it may place reasonable conditions or restrictions on the person for the duration of the original revocation period.
  5. When a person’s license is revoked under (i) G.S. 20-17(a)(2) and the person has two or more previous offenses involving impaired driving for which the person has been convicted, and the most recent offense occurred within the five years immediately preceding the date of the offense for which the person’s license is being revoked, (ii) G.S. 20-17(a)(2) and the person was sentenced pursuant to G.S. 20-179(f3) for the offense resulting in the revocation, or (iii) G.S. 20-17(a)(9) due to a violation of G.S. 20-141.4(a4), the revocation is permanent. (e1) Notwithstanding subsection (e) of this section, the Division may conditionally restore the license of a person to whom subsection (e) applies after it has been revoked for at least three years under subsection (e) if the person provides the Division with satisfactory proof of all of the following:
    1. In the three years immediately preceding the person’s application for a restored license, the person has not been convicted in North Carolina or in any other state or federal court of a motor vehicle offense, an alcohol beverage control law offense, a drug law offense, or any criminal offense involving the consumption of alcohol or drugs.
    2. The person is not currently an excessive user of alcohol, drugs, or prescription drugs, or unlawfully using any controlled substance. The person may voluntarily submit themselves to continuous alcohol monitoring for the purpose of proving abstinence from alcohol consumption during a period of revocation immediately prior to the restoration consideration. All of the following requirements apply when providing proof that the requirement set forth in this subdivision has been met:
      1. Monitoring periods of 120 days or longer shall be accepted by the Division as evidence of abstinence if the Division receives sufficient documentation that reflects that the person abstained from alcohol use during the monitoring period.
      2. The continuous alcohol monitoring system shall be a system approved under G.S. 15A-1343.3 .
      3. The Division may establish guidelines for the acceptance of evidence of abstinence under this subdivision.

        (e2) Notwithstanding subsection (e) of this section, the Division may conditionally restore the license of a person to whom subsection (e) applies after it has been revoked for at least 24 months under G.S. 20-17(a)(2) if the person provides the Division with satisfactory proof of all of the following:

        (1) The person has not consumed any alcohol for the 12 months preceding the restoration while being monitored by a continuous alcohol monitoring device of a type approved by the Division of Community Supervision and Reentry of the Department of Adult Correction.

        (2) The person has not in the period of revocation been convicted in North Carolina or any other state or federal jurisdiction of a motor vehicle offense, an alcoholic beverage control law offense, a drug law offense, or any other criminal offense involving the possession or consumption of alcohol or drugs.

    3. The person is not currently an excessive user of drugs or prescription drugs.
    4. The person is not unlawfully using any controlled substance.

      (e3) If the Division restores a person’s license under subsection (e1), (e2), or (e4) of this section, it may place reasonable conditions or restrictions on the person for any period up to five years from the date of restoration.

      (e4) When a person’s license is revoked under G.S. 20-138.5(d), the Division may conditionally restore the license of that person after it has been revoked for at least 10 years after the completion of any sentence imposed by the court, if the person provides the Division with satisfactory proof of all of the following:

      (1) In the 10 years immediately preceding the person’s application for a restored license, the person has not been convicted in North Carolina or in any other state or federal court of a motor vehicle offense, an alcohol beverage control law offense, a drug law offense, or any other criminal offense.

      (2) The person is not currently a user of alcohol, unlawfully using any controlled substance, or an excessive user of prescription drugs.

  6. When a license is revoked under any other provision of this Article which does not specifically provide a period of revocation, the period of revocation shall be one year.
  7. When a license is suspended under subdivision (11) of G.S. 20-16(a), the period of suspension shall be for a period of time not in excess of the period of nonoperation imposed by the court as a condition of the suspended sentence; further, in such case, it shall not be necessary to comply with the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act in order to have such license returned at the expiration of the suspension period. (g1) When a license is revoked under subdivision (12) of G.S. 20-17 , the period of revocation is six months for conviction of a second offense and one year for conviction of a third or subsequent offense.

    (g2) When a license is revoked under G.S. 20-17 (a)(16), the period of revocation is 90 days for a second conviction and six months for a third or subsequent conviction. The term “second or subsequent conviction” shall have the same meaning as found in G.S. 20-17(a)(16).

    (g3) When a license is revoked under G.S. 20-17(a)(17), the period of revocation shall be not less than one year.

  8. Repealed by Session Laws 1983, c. 435, s. 17.
  9. When a person’s license is revoked under G.S. 20-17(a)(1) or G.S. 20-17(a)(9), and the offense is one involving impaired driving and a fatality, the revocation is permanent. The Division may, however, conditionally restore the person’s license after it has been revoked for at least five years under this subsection if the person provides the Division with satisfactory proof that both of the following requirements are met:
    1. In the five years immediately preceding the person’s application for a restored license, the person has not been convicted in North Carolina or in any other state or federal court of a motor vehicle offense, an alcohol beverage control law offense, a drug law offense, or any criminal offense involving the consumption of alcohol or drugs.
    2. The person is not currently an excessive user of alcohol or drugs.

      If the Division restores the person’s license, it may place reasonable conditions or restrictions on the person for any period up to seven years from the date of restoration.

  10. The Division is authorized to issue amended revocation orders issued under subsections (d) and (e), if necessary because convictions do not respectively occur in the same order as offenses for which the license may be revoked under those subsections.
  11. Before the Division restores a driver’s license that has been suspended or revoked under G.S. 20-138.5(d), or under any provision of this Article, other than G.S. 20-24.1 , the person seeking to have the person’s driver’s license restored shall submit to the Division proof that the person has notified the person’s insurance agent or company that the person is seeking the restoration and that the person is financially responsible. Proof of financial responsibility shall be in one of the following forms:
    1. A written certificate or electronically-transmitted facsimile thereof from any insurance carrier duly authorized to do business in this State certifying that there is in effect a nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle liability policy for the benefit of the person required to furnish proof of financial responsibility. The certificate or facsimile shall state the effective date and expiration date of the nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle liability policy and shall state the date that the certificate or facsimile is issued. The certificate or facsimile shall remain effective proof of financial responsibility for a period of 30 consecutive days following the date the certificate or facsimile is issued but shall not in and of itself constitute a binder or policy of insurance.
    2. A binder for or policy of nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle liability insurance under which the applicant is insured, provided that the binder or policy states the effective date and expiration date of the nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle liability policy. Subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection do not apply to applicants who do not own currently registered motor vehicles and who do not operate nonfleet private passenger motor vehicles that are owned by other persons and that are not insured under commercial motor vehicle liability insurance policies. In such cases, the applicant shall sign a written certificate to that effect. Such certificate shall be furnished by the Division and may be incorporated into the restoration application form. Any material misrepresentation made by such person on such certificate shall be grounds for suspension of that person’s license for a period of 90 days.

      For the purposes of this subsection, the term “nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle” has the definition ascribed to it in Article 40 of General Statute Chapter 58.

      The Commissioner may require that certificates required by this subsection be on a form approved by the Commissioner. The financial responsibility required by this subsection shall be kept in effect for not less than three years after the date that the license is restored. Failure to maintain financial responsibility as required by this subsection shall be grounds for suspending the restored driver’s license for a period of 30 days. Nothing in this subsection precludes any person from showing proof of financial responsibility in any other manner authorized by Articles 9A and 13 of this Chapter.

History. 1935, c. 52, s. 13; 1947, c. 1067, s. 15; 1951, c. 1202, ss. 2-4; 1953, c. 1138; 1955, c. 1187, ss. 13, 17, 18; 1957, c. 499, s. 2; c. 515, s. 1; 1959, c. 1264, s. 11A; 1969, c. 242; 1971, c. 619, ss. 8-10; 1973, c. 1445, ss. 1-4; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1979, c. 903, ss. 4-6; 1981, c. 412, s. 4; c. 747, ss. 34, 66; 1983, c. 435, s. 17; 1983 (Reg. Sess., 1984), c. 1101, s. 18; 1987, c. 869, s. 12; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1112; 1989, c. 436, s. 5; c. 771, s. 18; 1995, c. 506, s. 8; 1998-182, s. 21; 1999-406, s. 2; 1999-452, ss. 11, 12; 2000-140, ss. 3, 4; 2000-155, s. 6; 2001-352, s. 4; 2007-165, ss. 1(a), (b); 2007-493, ss. 11-14; 2008-187, s. 9; 2009-99, s. 1; 2009-369, ss. 1-4; 2009-500, ss. 1, 2; 2011-145, s. 19.1(h); 2011-191, s. 2; 2014-115, s. 61.5; 2017-176, s. 2(b); 2017-186, s. 2(jjjj); 2021-128, s. 3; 2021-134, s. 9(c); 2021-180, s. 19C.9(t); 2021-182, s. 1(d); 2021-185, s. 11.

Section Set Out Three Times.

The section above is effective January 1, 2023. For versions of the section in effect until June 1, 2022, and in effect from June 1, 2022 until January 1, 2023, see the preceding sections, also numbered G.S. 20-19 .

Cross References.

As to Division of Adult Correction and Juvenile Justice of the Department of Public Safety establishing regulations for continuous alcohol monitoring systems, see G.S. 15A-1343.3 .

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 1999-406, s. 18, states that the act does not obligate the General Assembly to appropriate additional funds, and that the act shall be implemented with funds available or appropriated to the Department of Transportation and the Administrative Office of the Courts.

Session Laws 2007-493, s. 33, as amended by Session Laws 2009-99, s. 1, provides: “Sections 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31 of this act become effective December 1, 2007, and apply to offenses committed on or after that date. Section 14 of this act applies to persons whose waiting period for a hearing on conditional restoration commences on or after the effective date of this act. The remainder of this act is effective when it becomes law. Prosecutions for offenses committed before the effective date of this act are not abated or affected by this act, and the statutes that would be applicable but for this act remain applicable to those prosecutions.”

Subsection (e), as originally amended by Session Laws 2007-165, s. 1(b), had two subdivisions designated (e)(1) and two subdivisions designated (e)(2). Session Laws 2008-187 corrected the subsection (e) designation scheme.

The amendment by Session Laws 2007-493, s. 14, rewrote subsection (i), and was effective August 30, 2007, and applicable to persons whose waiting period for a hearing on conditional restoration commences on or after that date, pursuant to Session Laws 2007-493, s. 33, as amended by Session Laws 2009-99, s. 1.

Subsection (e), as originally amended by Session Laws 2007-165, s. 1(b), had two subdivisions designated (e)(1) and two subdivisions designated (e)(2). Session Laws 2008-187 corrected the subsection (e) designation scheme.

Session Laws 2009-369, s. 7, as amended by Session Laws 2014-115, s. 61.5, and as amended by Session Laws 2017-176, s. 2(b), provides: “This act becomes effective December 1, 2009, and applies to applications for reinstatement that occur on or after that date.” Session Laws 2017-176, s. 2(b) repealed the expiration date for amendments by Session Laws 2009-369, ss. 1-4, retroactively effective December 1, 2016.

Session Laws 2021-128, s. 3, added a new subsection (c2a). It was redesignated as subsection (g3) at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes.

Session Laws 2021-128, s. 4, made subsection (g3) of this section, as added by Session Laws 2021-128, s. 3, effective December 1, 2021, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date.

Session Laws 2021-134, s. 9(d), as amended by Session Laws 2021-185, s. 11, made the substitution of “thirtieth” for “tenth” in the first sentence of subsection (c5) of this section by Session Laws 2021-134, s. 9(c), effective February 1, 2022, and applicable to notifications of revocations mailed by the Division of Motor Vehicles on or after that date.

Session Laws 2021-180, s. 19C.9(aaaaa), made the amendments to this section by Session Laws 2021-180, s. 19C.9(t), effective January 1, 2023, and further provides: “On and after that date, any references or directives in this act to the Division of Adult Correction and Juvenile Justice, the Section of Adult Correction in the Division of Adult Correction and Juvenile Justice, the Section of Juvenile Justice of the Division of Adult Correction and Juvenile Justice, or the Section of Community Corrections of the Division of Adult Correction and Juvenile Justice shall be construed to apply to the appropriate division of either the Department of Public Safety or the Department of Adult Correction pursuant to the departmental changes enacted by this section.”

Session Laws 2021-180, s. 1.1, provides: “This act shall be known as the ‘Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2021.’”

Session Laws 2021-180, s. 43.7, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2021-182, s. 1(j), made the amendments to this section by Session Laws 2021-182, s. 1(d), effective June 1, 2022, and applicaple to limited driving privileges issued and drivers licenses restored on or after that date.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2008-187, s. 9, effective August 7, 2008, rewrote subsection (e) as present subsections (e), (e1), (e2), and (e3).

Session Laws 2009-369, ss. 1 through 4, as amended by Session Laws 2014-115, s. 61.5, effective December 1, 2009, and applicable to applications for reinstatement that occur on or after that date, in subsection (c3), in the introductory language, inserted “G.S. 20-138.5(d)”; in subdivision (c3)(3), inserted “habitual impaired driving, G.S. 20-138.5 ”; in the last paragraph of subsection (c3), inserted “or G.S. 20-138.5 (d)”; in subsection (e3) substituted “(e1), (e2), or (e4)” for “(e1) or (e2)”; added subsection (e4); and in subsection (k), inserted “G.S. 20-138.5(d), or under” in the introductory language.

Session Laws 2009-500, ss. 1 and 2, effective for hearings or proceedings occurring on or after December 1, 2009, added the second sentence in subdivisions (d)(2) and (e1)(2); and added subdivisions (d)(2)a.-(d)(2)c and (e1)(2)a.-(e1)(2)c.

Session Laws 2011-145, s. 19.1(h), effective January 1, 2012, substituted “Division of Adult Correction of the Department of Public Safety” for “Department of Correction” in subdivision (e2)(1).

Session Laws 2011-191, s. 2, effective December 1, 2011, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, in subsection (e), inserted (ii), redesignated former (ii) as (iii), and made a related change.

Session Laws 2017-186, s. 2(jjjj), effective December 1, 2017, inserted “and Juvenile Justice” in subdivision (e2)(1).

Session Laws 2021-128, s. 3, added subsection (g3). For effective date, applicability, and redesignation of subsection, see editor’s notes.

Session Laws 2021-134, s. 9(c), substituted “thirtieth” for “tenth” in subsection (c5). For effective date and applicability, see editor’s note.

Session Laws 2021-180, s. 19C.9(t), effective January 1, 2023, substituted “Division of Community Supervision and Reentry of the Department of Adult Correction” for “Division of Adult Correction and Juvenile Justice of the Department of Public Safety” in subdivision (e2)(1). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Session Laws 2021-182, s. 1(d), rewrote the section. For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Legal Periodicals.

For survey of 1978 constitutional law, see 57 N.C.L. Rev. 958 (1979).

CASE NOTES

The power to issue, suspend or revoke a driver’s license is vested exclusively in the Division of Motor Vehicles, subject to review by the superior court and, upon appeal, by the appellate division. Smith v. Walsh, 34 N.C. App. 287, 238 S.E.2d 157, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 1657 (1977).

Under G.S. 20-16(a)(10) and subsection (b) of this section, the discretionary authority to suspend petitioner’s license for a period not exceeding 12 months was vested exclusively in the Division of Motor Vehicles. No discretionary power was conferred upon a superior court. Smith v. Walsh, 34 N.C. App. 287, 238 S.E.2d 157, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 1657 (1977).

Subsection (e) of this section is not overbroad in violation of the Constitution since no conduct within the purview of the phrase “violation of liquor laws of North Carolina,” including the commission of the crime of public drunkenness, is a constitutionally protected activity. In re Harris, 37 N.C. App. 590, 246 S.E.2d 532, 1978 N.C. App. LEXIS 2808 (1978).

Subsection (e) Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague. —

The phrase “liquor laws” in subsection (e) of this section, is not a term so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. In re Harris, 37 N.C. App. 590, 246 S.E.2d 532, 1978 N.C. App. LEXIS 2808 (1978).

In enacting subsection (e) of this section, the legislature was demanding complete compliance with all laws governing the use of drugs, alcohol, and motor vehicles. In re Harris, 37 N.C. App. 590, 246 S.E.2d 532, 1978 N.C. App. LEXIS 2808 (1978).

The purpose of this section is to provide a uniform standard period for the withholding of the privilege to operate a motor vehicle following certain offenses. Wagoner v. Hiatt, 111 N.C. App. 448, 432 S.E.2d 417, 1993 N.C. App. LEXIS 792 (1993).

Violation of “alcoholic beverages laws”. —

The legislature fully intended to include the crime of public drunkenness in the phrase “violation of liquor (now ‘alcoholic beverages’) laws of North Carolina” in subsection (e) of this section. In re Harris, 37 N.C. App. 590, 246 S.E.2d 532, 1978 N.C. App. LEXIS 2808 (1978).

Out-of-State Conviction to Be Counted as Conviction for Purpose of Subsection (e). —

An out-of-state conviction of operating a motor vehicle upon the public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or an impairing drug (now impaired driving) is to be counted as a conviction for the purpose of the operation of the mandatory provision of subsection (e). In re Oates, 18 N.C. App. 320, 196 S.E.2d 596, 1973 N.C. App. LEXIS 1851 (1973).

No Contest Plea May Be Used as Prior Conviction. —

The judgment entered on a plea of no contest to a previous charge of driving with a blood alcohol content of .10 percent or more may be used as a prior conviction by the DMV for purposes of revoking a driver’s license. Davis v. Hiatt, 326 N.C. 462 , 390 S.E.2d 338, 1990 N.C. LEXIS 167 (1990).

Certiorari to Review Mandatory Suspension. —

Petitioner whose driving privilege was mandatorily suspended under G.S. 20-17(2) and G.S. 20-19(e) did not have the right to appeal under G.S. 20-25 or under the Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 150B. However, the superior court could review the actions of the Commissioner by issuing a writ of certiorari. Davis v. Hiatt, 326 N.C. 462 , 390 S.E.2d 338, 1990 N.C. LEXIS 167 (1990).

Where petitioner, seeking conditional restoration of his driving privileges, pled sufficient facts to show he did not have right to appeal from final decision of DMV, he could then have petitioned for writ of certiorari to have case reviewed by superior court. Thus, superior court had jurisdiction to review case. Penuel v. Hiatt, 100 N.C. App. 268, 396 S.E.2d 85, 1990 N.C. App. LEXIS 977 (1990).

Review of Permanent Revocation Under Subsection (e). —

Where the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles permanently revoked plaintiff’s driver’s license for a third offense of driving while under the influence, the departmental action was mandatory, and the superior court was without authority to revoke or make any order with reference thereto. Rhyne v. Garrett, 18 N.C. App. 565, 197 S.E.2d 235, 1973 N.C. App. LEXIS 1939 (1973).

Trial court correctly reviewed the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles’ cancellation of a driver’s conditionally restored driving privileges under a petition for writ of certiorari rather than de novo review because although there was no right to appeal a cancellation or revocation under G.S. 20-25 , the driver could seek certiorari pursuant to G.S. 20-19(e). Cole v. Faulkner, 155 N.C. App. 592, 573 S.E.2d 614, 2002 N.C. App. LEXIS 1589 (2002).

Review of Refusal to Reinstate License. —

Once the right to drive has been mandatorily revoked and a petitioner unsuccessfully seeks to have the license reinstated by the DMV, no superior court review of the denial is mandated unless the denial was arbitrary or illegal, because reinstatement is not a legal right but is an act of grace. Alpiser v. Eagle Pontiac-GMC-Isuzu, Inc., 97 N.C. App. 610, 389 S.E.2d 293, 1990 N.C. App. LEXIS 220 (1990).

The provisions of subsection (f) of this section are mandatory. Snyder v. Scheidt, 246 N.C. 81 , 97 S.E.2d 461, 1957 N.C. LEXIS 372 (1957).

The provisions of G.S. 20-17(6) and subsection (f) of this section are mandatory and not discretionary. Simpson v. Garrett, 15 N.C. App. 449, 190 S.E.2d 251, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 1938 (1972).

Subsection (f)’s one-year period applies to G.S. 20-17.1 . Jones v. Penny, 387 F. Supp. 383, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447 (M.D.N.C. 1974).

Subsections (d) and (j) of this section must be read together, giving consideration both to the legislative intent of ensuring standard penalties for the same offenses and to the policy of preventing circumvention of this section. Wagoner v. Hiatt, 111 N.C. App. 448, 432 S.E.2d 417, 1993 N.C. App. LEXIS 792 (1993).

Division Required to Revoke License for Statutory Period. —

Upon receiving a record of an operator’s or chauffeur’s conviction upon two charges of reckless driving committed within a period of 12 months, the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles is required to forthwith revoke the license of such persons for the statutory period. Simpson v. Garrett, 15 N.C. App. 449, 190 S.E.2d 251, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 1938 (1972).

Where there is mandatory revocation under subdivision (2) of G.S. 20-17 , the period of revocation shall be as provided in this section. Carmichael v. Scheidt, 249 N.C. 472 , 106 S.E.2d 685, 1959 N.C. LEXIS 366 (1959); In re Austin, 5 N.C. App. 575, 169 S.E.2d 20, 1969 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398 (1969).

Effective Date of Revocation. —

A revocation based on a second offense for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic drug (now impaired driving) must be for a period of three (now four) years, and the effective date of the revocation for such period should not begin prior to the date of the second conviction. Likewise, when a license is permanently revoked, the effective date of such revocation should not be earlier than the date of the conviction for the third offense. Carmichael v. Scheidt, 249 N.C. 472 , 106 S.E.2d 685, 1959 N.C. LEXIS 366 (1959).

Period of Suspension Runs from Date of Order by Division. —

When within five days from receipt of notice of conviction the Department (now Division) ordered the revocation of an operator’s license for one year, the revocation was in effect until the same date in the following year, and did not expire one year from the date of conviction or the date of receipt of notice by the Department (now Division). State v. Ball, 255 N.C. 351 , 121 S.E.2d 604, 1961 N.C. LEXIS 605 (1961).

Injunction Not Available to Plaintiff Who Could Have Prevented Delay in Start of Revocation Period. —

Where the elapse of approximately 15 months between plaintiff’s last conviction for reckless driving and the order of revocation was not caused by defendant, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles or his Department (now Division), but the delay apparently resulted from the failure of the clerk of the court where plaintiff was last convicted to act promptly in forwarding a record of the conviction to the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles, and plaintiff could have prevented any delay in the start of the revocation period by surrendering his license to the clerk and obtaining a receipt therefor at the time of his second conviction, plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief. Simpson v. Garrett, 15 N.C. App. 449, 190 S.E.2d 251, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 1938 (1972).

Reinstatement or the receipt of a new license during the revocation period is not a legal right of the defendant, but an act of grace which the General Assembly permits, but does not require, the Department (now Division) to apply. The authority to exercise or apply this act of grace is granted to the Department (now Division), not to the courts. In re Austin, 5 N.C. App. 575, 169 S.E.2d 20, 1969 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398 (1969).

Court Order Requiring Conditional Restoration Held Error. —

Where petitioner offered no support for his allegation that the DMV’s denial of a conditional restoration of his license, which had been mandatorily revoked under G.S. 20-17 , was an arbitrary and capricious act and was in disregard of the law set forth in this section, it was error for the Superior Court to enter an order requiring the DMV to conditionally restore petitioner’s driving privileges. Penuel v. Hiatt, 97 N.C. App. 616, 389 S.E.2d 289, 1990 N.C. App. LEXIS 223 (1990).

Warrant Need Not Charge Second Offense in Order to Support Revocation under Subsection (d). —

Where defendant’s driver’s license had previously been suspended for a period of one year for conviction of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and defendant pleaded guilty to another such offense upon warrant not charging a second offense, the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles, upon receipt of the report of the later conviction, must revoke defendant’s license for the period provided by subsection (d) of this section. Harrell v. Scheidt, 243 N.C. 735 , 92 S.E.2d 182, 1956 N.C. LEXIS 625 (1956).

Right to Inherit from Life Insurance Policies. —

While paternity had to be established for an illegitimate child to inherit from a father who died intestate, North Carolina had no statute requiring that paternity be established for an illegitimate child to benefit from a life insurance policy, and the policy at issue in defendant claimant’s case did not exclude illegitimate children unless paternity had been judicially established. Fort Dearborn Life Ins. Co. v. Turner, 521 F. Supp. 2d 499, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84333 (E.D.N.C. 2007).

§ 20-20. [Repealed]

Repealed by Session Laws 1981, c. 938, s. 5.

Cross References.

For present provisions concerning the surrender of an operator’s license which has been revoked or suspended, see G.S. 20-45(b).

§ 20-20.1. Limited driving privilege for certain revocations.

  1. Definitions. —  The following definitions apply in this section:
    1. Limited driving privilege. — A judgment issued by a court authorizing a person with a revoked drivers license to drive under specified terms and conditions.
    2. Nonstandard working hours. — Anytime other than 6:00 A.M. until 8:00 P.M. on Monday through Friday.
    3. Standard working hours. — Anytime from 6:00 A.M. until 8:00 P.M. on Monday through Friday.
    4. Underlying offense. — The offense for which a person’s drivers license was revoked when the person was charged under G.S. 20-28(a), driving with a revoked license, or under G.S. 20-28.1 , committing a motor vehicle moving offense while driving with a revoked license.
  2. Eligibility. —  A person is eligible to apply for a limited driving privilege under this section if all of the following conditions apply:
    1. The person’s license is currently revoked under G.S. 20-28(a) or G.S. 20-28.1 .
    2. The person has complied with the revocation for the period required in subsection (c) of this section immediately preceding the date the person files a petition for a limited driving privilege under this section.
    3. The person’s underlying offense is not an offense involving impaired driving and, if the person’s license is revoked under G.S. 20-28.1 for committing a motor vehicle moving offense while driving with a revoked license, the moving offense is not an offense involving impaired driving.
    4. The revocation period for the underlying offense has expired.
    5. The revocation under G.S. 20-28(a) or G.S. 20-28.1 is the only revocation in effect.
    6. The person is not eligible to receive a limited driving privilege under any other law.
    7. The person has not held a limited driving privilege issued under this section at anytime during the three years prior to the date the person files the current petition.
    8. The person has no pending charges for any motor vehicle offense in this or in any other state and has no unpaid motor vehicle fines or penalties in this or in any other state.
    9. The person’s drivers license issued by another state has not been revoked by that state.
    10. G.S. 20-9(e) or G.S. 20-9(f) does not prohibit the Division from issuing the person a license.
  3. Compliance Period. — The following table sets out the period during which a person must comply with a revocation under G.S. 20-28(a) or G.S. 20-28.1 to be eligible for a limited driving privilege under this section:

    Click to view

  4. Petition. —  A person may apply for a limited driving privilege under this section by filing a petition. A petition filed under this section is separate from the action that resulted in the initial revocation and is a civil action. A petition must be filed in district court in the county of the person’s residence as reflected by the Division’s records or, if the Division’s records are inaccurate, in the county of the person’s actual residence. A person must attach to a petition a copy of the person’s motor vehicle record. A petition must include a sworn statement that the person filing the petition is eligible for a limited driving privilege under this section.A court, for good cause shown, may issue a limited driving privilege to an eligible person in accordance with this section. The costs required under G.S. 7A-305(a) and G.S. 20-20.2 apply to a petition filed under this section. The clerk of court for the court that issues a limited driving privilege under this section must send a copy of the limited driving privilege to the Division.
  5. Scope of Privilege. —  A limited driving privilege restricts the person to essential driving related to one or more of the purposes listed in this subsection. Any driving that is not related to the purposes authorized in this subsection is unlawful even though done at times and upon routes that may be authorized by the privilege. Except as otherwise provided, all driving must be for a purpose and done within the restrictions specified in the privilege.The permissible purposes for a limited driving privilege are:
    1. Travel to and from the person’s place of employment and in the course of employment.
    2. Travel necessary for maintenance of the person’s household.
    3. Travel to provide emergency medical care for the person or for an immediate family member of the person who resides in the same household with the person. Driving related to emergency medical care is authorized at anytime and without restriction as to routes.
  6. Employment Driving in Standard Working Hours. —  The court may authorize driving for employment-related purposes during standard working hours without specifying times and routes for the driving. If the person is required to drive for essential employment-related purposes only during standard working hours, the limited driving privilege must prohibit driving during nonstandard working hours unless the driving is for emergency medical care or for authorized household maintenance. The limited driving privilege must state the name and address of the person’s employer and may, in the discretion of the court, include other information and restrictions applicable to employment-related driving.
  7. Employment Driving in Nonstandard Working Hours. —  If a person is required to drive during nonstandard working hours for an essential employment-related purpose and the person provides documentation of that fact to the court, the court may authorize the person to drive for that purpose during those hours. If the person is self-employed, the documentation must be attached to or made a part of the limited driving privilege. If the person is employed by another, the limited driving privilege must state the name and address of the person’s employer and may, in the discretion of the court, include other information and restrictions applicable to employment-related driving. If the court determines that it is necessary for the person to drive during nonstandard working hours for an employment-related purpose, the court may authorize the person to drive subject to these limitations:
    1. If the person is required to drive to and from a specific place of employment at regular times, the limited driving privilege must specify the general times and routes by which the person may drive to and from work and must restrict driving to those times and routes.
    2. If the person is required to drive to and from work at a specific place but is unable to specify the times during which the driving will occur, the limited driving privilege must specify the general routes by which the person may drive to and from work and must restrict driving to those general routes.
    3. If the person is required to drive to and from work at regular times but is unable to specify the places at which work is to be performed, the limited driving privilege must specify the general times and geographic boundaries within which the person may drive and must restrict driving to those times and boundaries.
    4. If the person can specify neither the times nor places in which the person will be driving to and from work, the limited driving privilege must specify the geographic boundaries within which the person may drive and must restrict driving to those boundaries.
  8. Household Maintenance. —  A limited driving privilege may allow driving for maintenance of the household only during standard working hours. The court, at its discretion, may impose additional restrictions on driving for the maintenance of the household.
  9. Restrictions. —  A limited driving privilege that is not authorized by this section or that does not contain the restrictions required by law is invalid. A limited driving privilege issued under this section is subject to the following conditions:
    1. Financial responsibility. —  A person applying for a limited driving privilege under this section must provide the court proof of financial responsibility acceptable under G.S. 20-16.1(g) and must maintain the financial responsibility during the period of the limited driving privilege.
    2. Alcohol restrictions. —  A person who received a limited driving privilege under this section may not consume alcohol while driving or drive at anytime while the person has remaining in the person’s body any alcohol or controlled substance previously consumed, unless the controlled substance was lawfully obtained and taken in therapeutically appropriate amounts.
    3. Others. —  The court may impose any other reasonable restrictions or conditions necessary to achieve the purposes of this section.
  10. Term and Reinstatement. —  The term of a limited driving privilege issued under this section is the shorter of one year or the length of time remaining in the revocation period imposed under G.S. 20-28(a) or G.S. 20-28.1 . When the term of the limited driving privilege expires, the Division must reinstate the person’s license if the person meets all of the conditions listed in this subsection. The Division may impose restrictions or conditions on the new license in accordance with G.S. 20-7(e) . The conditions are:
    1. Payment of the restoration fee as required under G.S. 20-7(i1).
    2. Providing proof of financial responsibility as required under G.S. 20-7(c1) .
    3. Providing the proof required for reinstatement of a license under G.S. 20-28(c1).
  11. Modification. —  A court may modify or revoke a person’s limited driving privilege issued under this section upon a showing that the circumstances have changed sufficiently to justify modification or revocation. If the judge who issued the privilege is not presiding in the court in which the privilege was issued, a presiding judge in that court may modify or revoke the privilege. The judge must indicate in the order of modification or revocation the reasons for the order or make specific findings indicating the reason for the order and enter those findings in the record of the case. When a court issues an order of modification or revocation, the clerk of court must send a copy of the order to the Division.
  12. Effect of Violation. —  A violation of a limited driving privilege issued under this section constitutes the offense of driving while license revoked under G.S. 20-28 . When a person is charged with operating a motor vehicle in violation of the limited driving privilege, the limited driving privilege is suspended pending the final disposition of the charge.

Revocation Period Compliance Period 1 Year 90 Days 2 Years 1 Year Permanent 2 Years

History. 2007-293, s. 1; 2007-323, s. 30.11(d); 2007-345, s. 9.1(c); 2008-118, s. 2.9(b).

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2007-293, s. 3, made this section effective December 1, 2007, and applicable to revocations that occur before, on, or after December 1, 2007.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2008-118, s. 2.9(b), effective July 1, 2008, substituted “and G.S. 20-20.2 ” for “and (a3)” in the second paragraph of subsection (d).

§ 20-20.2. Processing fee for limited driving privilege.

Upon the issuance of a limited driving privilege by a court under this Chapter, the applicant or petitioner must pay, in addition to any other costs associated with obtaining the privilege, a processing fee of one hundred dollars ($100.00). The applicant or petitioner shall pay this fee to the clerk of superior court in the county in which the limited driving privilege is issued. The fee must be remitted to the State Treasurer and used for support of the General Court of Justice. The failure to pay this fee shall render the privilege invalid.

History. 2007-323, s. 30.11(b); 2007-345, s. 9.1(b).

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2007-323, s. 30.11(e), made this section effective August 1, 2007, and applicable to costs assessed or collected on or after August 1, 2007.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2007-345, s. 9.1(b), effective August 1, 2007, and applicable to costs assessed on or after that date, substituted “a processing fee of one hundred dollars ($100.00)” for “the processing fee imposed under G.S. 7A-305(a3)” at the end of the first sentence, and added the third sentence.

§ 20-21. No operation under foreign license during suspension or revocation in this State.

Any resident or nonresident whose driver’s license or right or privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this State has been suspended or revoked as provided in this Article shall not operate a motor vehicle in this State under a license, permit or registration issued by another jurisdiction or otherwise during such suspension, or after such revocation until a new license is obtained when and as permitted under this Article.

History. 1935, c. 52, s. 15; 1979, c. 667, s. 41.

§ 20-22. Suspending privileges of nonresidents and reporting convictions.

  1. The privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the highways of this State given to a nonresident hereunder shall be subject to suspension or revocation by the Division in like manner and for like cause as a driver’s license issued hereunder may be suspended or revoked.
  2. The Division is further authorized, upon receiving a record of the conviction in this State of a nonresident driver of a motor vehicle of any offense under the motor vehicle laws of this State, to forward a certified copy of such record to the motor vehicle administrator in the state wherein the person so convicted is a resident.

History. 1935, c. 52, s. 16; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1979, c. 667, s. 41.

CASE NOTES

Revocation of Out-of-State License. —

Revocation of defendant’s South Dakota driver’s license for failure to submit to a chemical analysis was permissible. State v. Streckfuss, 171 N.C. App. 81, 614 S.E.2d 323, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 1190 (2005).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Nonresident Convicted in North Carolina Court. — Upon conviction of a nonresident of driving while under the influence in a North Carolina court, his privilege to drive in North Carolina will be revoked. The court may allow a nonresident a limited privilege to operate a motor vehicle in North Carolina. The court should not require nonresidents to surrender driver’s licenses issued by states other than North Carolina. See opinion of Attorney General to Honorable John S. Gardner, District Court Judge, Sixteenth Judicial District, 40 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 420 (1969).

§ 20-23. Revoking resident’s license upon conviction in another state.

The Division may revoke the license of any resident of this State upon receiving notice of the person’s conviction in another state of an offense set forth in G.S. 20-26(a).

History. 1935, c. 52, s. 17; 1971, c. 486, s. 2; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1979, c. 667, s. 22; 1993, c. 533, s. 6.

Cross References.

As to Division’s authority to suspend license, see G.S. 20-16 .

Legal Periodicals.

For note on choice of law rules in North Carolina, see 48 N.C.L. Rev. 243 (1970).

CASE NOTES

Section Construed with G.S. 20-16 and G.S. 20-25 . —

This section, G.S. 20-16 and G.S. 20-25 must be construed in pari materia. In re Wright, 228 N.C. 584 , 46 S.E.2d 696, 1948 N.C. LEXIS 285 (1948).

Section Is Not Mandatory. —

The Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles, under provisions of this section, is merely authorized, not directed, to suspend or revoke the license of any resident of this State upon receiving notice of the conviction of such person in another state of any offense therein which, if committed in this State, would be grounds for the suspension or revocation of the license. Carmichael v. Scheidt, 249 N.C. 472 , 106 S.E.2d 685, 1959 N.C. LEXIS 366 (1959).

Discretion of Division. —

Under the provisions of this section, it is discretionary with the Department (now Division) to suspend or revoke an operator’s license upon receiving notice of his conviction in another state of an offense which, if committed in this State, would be grounds for suspension or revocation. State v. Teasley, 9 N.C. App. 477, 176 S.E.2d 838, 1970 N.C. App. LEXIS 1391 , cert. denied, 277 N.C. 459 , 177 S.E.2d 900, 1970 N.C. LEXIS 635 (1970).

Notice May Be from Any Source. —

This section does not limit the notice of conviction in another state upon which the Department (now Division) may act to notice from a judicial tribunal or other official agency. Under the wording of the statute, from whatever source the notice may come, the Department (now Division) may act. In re Wright, 228 N.C. 584 , 46 S.E.2d 696, 1948 N.C. LEXIS 285 (1948).

Licensee May Show Invalidity of Out-of-State Conviction. —

Where an order of the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles permanently revoking the license of a driver upon a third conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (now impaired driving) was based in part upon notice of the licensee’s conviction of that offense in another state, the licensee had the right to show, if he could, that the proceedings in such other state were irregular, invalid and insufficient to support the reported conviction, and he was entitled to a hearing de novo in the superior court upon his petition for review. The sustaining of a demurrer to such petition was error, petitioner being entitled to an adjudication of the validity of the out-of-state conviction in order to determine whether the revocation should be permanent or for the period of time prescribed by subsection (d) of G.S. 20-19 . Carmichael v. Scheidt, 249 N.C. 472 , 106 S.E.2d 685, 1959 N.C. LEXIS 366 (1959).

Conviction of Drunken Driving. —

Upon a receipt of notification from the highway department of another state that a resident of this State had there been convicted of drunken (now impaired) driving, the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles had the right to suspend the driving license of such person. In re Wright, 228 N.C. 301 , 45 S.E.2d 370, 1947 N.C. LEXIS 324 (1947).

Failure to Appear at Trial for Driving Under the Influence in Another State. —

Motorist who received citation for driving under the influence in South Carolina and then forfeited bond by not appearing in court had his driver’s license properly revoked even though no warrant was issued. Sykes v. Hiatt, 98 N.C. App. 688, 391 S.E.2d 834, 1990 N.C. App. LEXIS 450 (1990).

§ 20-23.1. Suspending or revoking operating privilege of person not holding license.

In any case where the Division would be authorized to suspend or revoke the license of a person but such person does not hold a license, the Division is authorized to suspend or revoke the operating privilege of such a person in like manner as it could suspend or revoke his license if such person held a driver’s license, and the provisions of this Chapter governing suspensions, revocations, issuance of a license, and driving after license suspended or revoked, shall apply in the discretion of the Division in the same manner as if the license has been suspended or revoked.

History. 1955, c. 1187, s. 19; 1969, c. 186, s. 2; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1979, c. 667, s. 41.

CASE NOTES

Driving during Period of Suspension Constitutes Violation of G.S. 20-28 . —

Under the provisions of this section and G.S. 20-28(a), when a person who does not hold a driver’s license has his operating privilege revoked or suspended in the manner and under the conditions prescribed by statute, and while such operating privilege is thus suspended or revoked he drives a motor vehicle upon the highways of this State, he violates G.S. 20-28(a). State v. Newborn, 11 N.C. App. 292, 181 S.E.2d 214, 1971 N.C. App. LEXIS 1507 (1971).

§ 20-23.2. Suspension of license for conviction of offense involving impaired driving in federal court.

Upon receipt of notice of conviction in any court of the federal government of an offense involving impaired driving, the Division is authorized to revoke the driving privilege of the person convicted in the same manner as if the conviction had occurred in a court of this State.

History. 1969, c. 988; 1971, c. 619, s. 11; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1979, c. 903, s. 12; 1981, c. 412, s. 4; c. 747, s. 66; 1983, c. 435, s. 18.

CASE NOTES

Where the law directs suspension, revocation, or nonissuance of a driver’s license, the grounds are convictions for moving violations, or other statutory violations relating to highway safety, or situations where an individual’s capacity to operate a motor vehicle safely are manifestly questionable. Evans v. Roberson, 69 N.C. App. 644, 317 S.E.2d 715, 1984 N.C. App. LEXIS 3529 (1984), rev'd, 314 N.C. 315 , 333 S.E.2d 228, 1985 N.C. LEXIS 1781 (1985).

§ 20-24. When court or child support enforcement agency to forward license to Division and report convictions, child support delinquencies, and prayers for judgment continued.

  1. License. —  A court that convicts a person of an offense that requires revocation of the person’s drivers license or revokes a person’s drivers license pursuant to G.S. 50-13.12 shall require the person to give the court any regular or commercial drivers license issued to that person. A court that convicts a person of an offense that requires disqualification of the person but would not require revocation of a regular drivers license issued to that person shall require the person to give the court any Class A or Class B regular drivers license and any commercial drivers license issued to that person.The clerk of court in a non-IV-D case, and the child support enforcement agency in a IV-D case, shall accept a drivers license required to be given to the court under this subsection. A clerk of court or the child support enforcement agency who receives a drivers license shall give the person whose license is received a copy of a dated receipt for the license. The receipt must be on a form approved by the Commissioner. A revocation or disqualification for which a license is received under this subsection is effective as of the date on the receipt for the license.The clerk of court or the child support enforcement agency shall notify the Division of a license received under this subsection either by forwarding to the Division the license, a record of the conviction for which the license was received, a copy of the court order revoking the license for failure to pay child support for which the license was received, and the original dated receipt for the license or by electronically sending to the Division the information on the license, the record of conviction or court order revoking the license for failure to pay child support, and the receipt given for the license. The clerk of court or the child support enforcement agency must forward the required items unless the Commissioner has given the clerk of court or the child support enforcement agency approval to notify the Division electronically. If the clerk of court or the child support enforcement agency notifies the Division electronically, the clerk of court or the child support enforcement agency must destroy a license received after sending to the Division the required information. The clerk of court or the child support enforcement agency shall notify the Division within 30 days after entry of the conviction or court order revoking the license for failure to pay child support for which the license was received.
  2. Convictions, Court Orders of Drivers License Revocations, and PJCs. —  The clerk of court shall send the Division a record of any of the following:
    1. A conviction of a violation of a law regulating the operation of a vehicle.
    2. A conviction for which the convicted person is placed on probation and a condition of probation is that the person not drive a motor vehicle for a period of time, stating the period of time for which the condition applies.
    3. A conviction of a felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used, when the judgment includes a finding that a motor vehicle was used in the commission of the felony.
    4. A conviction that requires revocation of the drivers license of the person convicted and is not otherwise reported under subdivision (1). (4a) A court order revoking drivers license pursuant to G.S. 50-13.12 .
    5. An order entering prayer for judgment continued in a case involving an alleged violation of a law regulating the operation of a vehicle.The child support enforcement agency shall send the Division a record of any court order revoking drivers license pursuant to G.S. 110-142.2(a)(1).With the approval of the Commissioner, the clerk of court or the child support enforcement agency may forward a record of conviction, court order revoking drivers license, or prayer for judgment continued to the Division by electronic data processing means.

      (b1) In any case in which the Division, for any reason, does not receive a record of a conviction or a prayer for judgment continued until more than one year after the date it is entered, the Division may, in its discretion, substitute a period of probation for all or any part of a revocation or disqualification required because of the conviction or prayer for judgment continued.

  3. Repealed by Session Laws 1991, c. 726, s. 10.
  4. Scope. —  This Article governs drivers license revocation and disqualification. A drivers license may not be revoked and a person may not be disqualified except in accordance with this Article.
  5. Special Information. —  A judgment for a conviction for an offense for which special information is required under this subsection shall, when appropriate, include a finding of the special information. The convictions for which special information is required and the specific information required is as follows:
    1. Homicide. —  If a conviction of homicide involves impaired driving, the judgment must indicate that fact.
    2. G.S. 20-138.1 , Driving While Impaired. —  If a conviction under G.S. 20-138.1 involves a commercial motor vehicle, the judgment must indicate that fact. If a conviction under G.S. 20-138.1 involves a commercial motor vehicle that was transporting a hazardous substance required to be placarded, the judgment must indicate that fact.
    3. G.S. 20-138.2 , Driving Commercial Motor Vehicle While Impaired. —  If the commercial motor vehicle involved in an offense under G.S. 20-138.2 was transporting a hazardous material required to be placarded, a judgment for that offense must indicate that fact.
    4. G.S. 20-166 , Hit and Run. —  If a conviction under G.S. 20-166 involves a commercial motor vehicle, the judgment must indicate that fact. If a conviction under G.S. 20-166 involves a commercial motor vehicle that was transporting a hazardous substance required to be placarded, the judgment must indicate that fact.
    5. Felony Using Commercial Motor Vehicle. —  If a conviction of a felony in which a commercial motor vehicle was used involves the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance, or possession with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance, the judgment must indicate that fact. If a commercial motor vehicle used in a felony was transporting a hazardous substance required to be placarded, the judgment for that felony must indicate that fact.

History. 1935, c. 52, s. 18; 1949, c. 373, ss. 3, 4; 1955, c. 1187, s. 14; 1959, c. 47; 1965, c. 38; 1973, c. 19; 1975, cc. 46, 445; c. 716, s. 5; c. 871, s. 1; 1979, c. 667, s. 41; 1981, c. 416; c. 839; 1983, c. 294, s. 5; c. 435, s. 19; 1985, c. 764, s. 18; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 852, s. 17; 1987, c. 581, s. 1; c. 658, s. 2; 1989, c. 771, s. 10; 1991, c. 726, s. 10; 1993, c. 533, s. 7; 1995, c. 538, s. 2(c).

Local Modification.

Hertford as to subsection (b): 1953, c. 1059; Washington, as to subsection (b): 1953, c. 765.

Cross References.

For present provisions regarding definitions for “conviction”, which were formerly found in subsection (c) of this section, see G.S. 20-4.01(4a) .

CASE NOTES

Jurisdiction to Revoke License. —

A municipal court is without authority to revoke a driver’s license, the power to suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses being vested exclusively in the Department of Revenue, subject to the right of review by the superior court, as provided in G.S. 20-25 . State v. McDaniels, 219 N.C. 763 , 14 S.E.2d 793, 1941 N.C. LEXIS 143 (1941).

Meaning of Forfeiture of Bail or Collateral. —

“Bail” as here used means security for a defendant’s appearance in court to answer a criminal charge there pending. Ordinarily it is evidenced by a bond or recognizance which becomes a record of the court. The forfeiture thereof is a judicial act. In re Wright, 228 N.C. 584 , 46 S.E.2d 696, 1948 N.C. LEXIS 285 (1948).

The mere deposit of security with an arresting officer or magistrate pending issuance and service of warrant, which deposit is retained without the semblance of judicial or legal forfeiture, is not a forfeiture of “bail” within the meaning of subsection (c) of this section. In re Wright, 228 N.C. 584 , 46 S.E.2d 696, 1948 N.C. LEXIS 285 (1948); In re Donnelly, 260 N.C. 375 , 132 S.E.2d 904, 1963 N.C. LEXIS 727 (1963).

Where no warrant is served, no legal action is pending in court; and when no legal action is pending, there can be no valid judgment of forfeiture of bail. In re Donnelly, 260 N.C. 375 , 132 S.E.2d 904, 1963 N.C. LEXIS 727 (1963).

Bond forfeiture held to be equivalent to a conviction of driving while under the influence of an intoxicant. Rhyne v. Garrett, 18 N.C. App. 565, 197 S.E.2d 235, 1973 N.C. App. LEXIS 1939 (1973).

Plea of Nolo Contendere. —

Where the petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of a second offense of operating an automobile upon the public highways of the State while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (now impaired driving), which plea was accepted by the court, for the purposes of that case in that court, such plea was equivalent to a plea of guilty, or conviction by a jury, and subsection (a) of this section required that court to enter a notation of such conviction upon the license of petitioner to operate an automobile in North Carolina, and to compel the surrender to it of such license then held by petitioner, and thereupon to forward the license, together with a record of the conviction, to the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles. Fox v. Scheidt, 241 N.C. 31 , 84 S.E.2d 259, 1954 N.C. LEXIS 534 (1954).

“Final Conviction.” —

Where defendant pleaded guilty to driving without a license, and judge’s order granted a prayer for judgment continued on condition that plaintiff not violate any motor vehicle laws and that plaintiff make a $75.00 contribution to the school board, the condition “that he make a $75.00 contribution to the school board” constituted an invalid condition as it is not restitution and it is not a fine. Thus it is not punishment that would render the judgment a final conviction and require or allow Division of Motor Vehicle to revoke plaintiff’s license. Florence v. Hiatt, 101 N.C. App. 539, 400 S.E.2d 118, 1991 N.C. App. LEXIS 76 (1991).

When Conviction Final. —

The conviction alone, without the imposition of a judgment from which an appeal might be taken, is not a final conviction within the terms of subsection (c). Barbour v. Scheidt, 246 N.C. 169 , 97 S.E.2d 855, 1957 N.C. LEXIS 395 (1957).

A conviction in a criminal case is not final within the meaning of subsection (c) of this section where no judgment is imposed on the verdict, but merely an order is entered continuing prayer for judgment upon payment of costs. Barbour v. Scheidt, 246 N.C. 169 , 97 S.E.2d 855, 1957 N.C. LEXIS 395 (1957).

Trial Court Is Required to Forward Record of Conviction. —

This section requires that the trial courts shall forward to the Department (now Division) a record of the conviction of any person. Tilley v. Garrett, 8 N.C. App. 556, 174 S.E.2d 617, 1970 N.C. App. LEXIS 1610 (1970).

But Court Is Not Required to Forward Warrant and Judgment. —

This section does not require that the warrant and judgment, or certified copies thereof, shall be forwarded by the trial court. Tilley v. Garrett, 8 N.C. App. 556, 174 S.E.2d 617, 1970 N.C. App. LEXIS 1610 (1970).

Forwarding of License as Notice of Revocation. —

The surrendering of his license and forwarding of it to the Department (now Division) by the court gives the licensee sufficient notice that his operator’s license has been revoked. State v. Teasley, 9 N.C. App. 477, 176 S.E.2d 838, 1970 N.C. App. LEXIS 1391 , cert. denied, 277 N.C. 459 , 177 S.E.2d 900, 1970 N.C. LEXIS 635 (1970).

This section designates clerks of court and assistant and deputy clerks of court as agents of the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles for receipt of driver’s licenses in cases where revocation is required. Simpson v. Garrett, 15 N.C. App. 449, 190 S.E.2d 251, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 1938 (1972).

Injunction Not Available to Plaintiff Who Could Have Prevented Delay in Start of Revocation Period. —

Where the elapse of approximately 15 months between plaintiff’s last conviction for reckless driving and the order of revocation was not caused by defendant Commissioner of Motor Vehicles or his Department (now Division), but the delay apparently resulted from the failure of the clerk of the court where plaintiff was last convicted to act promptly in forwarding a record of the conviction to the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles, and plaintiff could have prevented any delay in the start of the revocation period by surrendering his license to the clerk and obtaining a receipt therefor at the time of his second conviction, plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief. Simpson v. Garrett, 15 N.C. App. 449, 190 S.E.2d 251, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 1938 (1972).

Failure to Appear at Trial for Driving Under the Influence in Another State. —

Motorist who received citation for driving under the influence in South Carolina and then forfeited bond by not appearing in court had his driver’s license properly revoked even though no warrant was issued. Sykes v. Hiatt, 98 N.C. App. 688, 391 S.E.2d 834, 1990 N.C. App. LEXIS 450 (1990).

Condition in Order Held Unenforceable. —

Where defendant pleaded guilty to driving without license, the condition in judge’s order that plaintiff make a contribution to the school board was unenforceable surplusage. It was not restitution because the school board was not an aggrieved party. It was not a fine because it was directed to an entity other than the county for use by the public schools. Florence v. Hiatt, 101 N.C. App. 539, 400 S.E.2d 118, 1991 N.C. App. LEXIS 76 (1991).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Surrender of Out-of-State License Not Required. — Upon conviction of a nonresident for a traffic violation for which revocation or suspension of driving privilege is mandatory, the court should not require such nonresident to surrender a driver’s license issued him by his state. See opinion of Attorney General to Honorable John S. Gardner, District Court Judge, Sixteenth Judicial District, 40 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 420 (1969).

§ 20-24.1. Revocation for failure to appear or pay fine, penalty or costs for motor vehicle offenses.

  1. The Division must revoke the driver’s license of a person upon receipt of notice from a court that the person was charged with a motor vehicle offense and he:
    1. failed to appear, after being notified to do so, when the case was called for a trial or hearing; or
    2. failed to pay a fine, penalty, or court costs ordered by the court.Revocation orders entered under the authority of this section are effective on the sixtieth day after the order is mailed or personally delivered to the person.
  2. A license revoked under this section remains revoked until the person whose license has been revoked:
    1. disposes of the charge in the trial division in which he failed to appear when the case was last called for trial or hearing; or
    2. demonstrates to the court that he is not the person charged with the offense; or
    3. pays the penalty, fine, or costs ordered by the court; or
    4. demonstrates to the court that his failure to pay the penalty, fine, or costs was not willful and that he is making a good faith effort to pay or that the penalty, fine, or costs should be remitted.

      Upon receipt of notice from the court that the person has satisfied the conditions of this subsection applicable to his case, the Division must restore the person’s license as provided in subsection (c). In addition, if the person whose license is revoked is not a resident of this State, the Division may notify the driver licensing agency in the person’s state of residence that the person’s license to drive in this State has been revoked.

      (b1) A defendant must be afforded an opportunity for a trial or a hearing within a reasonable time of the defendant’s appearance. Upon motion of a defendant, the court must order that a hearing or a trial be heard within a reasonable time.

  3. If the person satisfies the conditions of subsection (b) that are applicable to his case before the effective date of the revocation order, the revocation order and any entries on his driving record relating to it shall be deleted and the person does not have to pay the restoration fee set by G.S. 20-7(i1). For all other revocation orders issued pursuant to this section, G.S. 50-13.12 or G.S. 110-142.2 , the person must pay the restoration fee and satisfy any other applicable requirements of this Article before the person may be relicensed.
  4. To facilitate the prompt return of licenses and to prevent unjustified charges of driving while license revoked, the clerk of court, upon request, must give the person a copy of the notice it sends to the Division to indicate that the person has complied with the conditions of subsection (b) applicable to his case. If the person complies with the condition before the effective date of the revocation, the notice must indicate that the person is eligible to drive if he is otherwise validly licensed.
  5. As used in this section and in G.S. 20-24.2 , the word offense includes crimes and infractions created by this Chapter.
  6. If a license is revoked under subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section, and for no other reason, the person subject to the order may apply to the court for a limited driving privilege valid for up to one year or until any fine, penalty, or court costs ordered by the court are paid. The court may grant the limited driving privilege in the same manner and under the terms and conditions prescribed in G.S. 20-16.1 . A person is eligible to apply for a limited driving privilege under this subsection only if the person has not had a limited driving privilege granted under this subsection within the three years prior to application.

History. 1985, c. 764, s. 19; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 852, ss. 4-6, 9, 17; 1987, c. 581, s. 4; 1991, c. 682, s. 4; 1993, c. 313, s. 1; 1995, c. 538, s. 2(d); 2020-77, s. 6.5(a).

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2020-77, s. 6.5(b), made subsection (f) of this section, as added by Session Laws 2020-77, s. 6.5(a), effective December 1, 2020, and applicable to applications for limited driving privileges filed on or after that date.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2020-77, s. 6.5(a), added subsection (f). For effective date and applicability, see editor’s note.

Legal Periodicals.

For article, “Driven to Failure: An Empirical Analysis of Driver’s License Suspension in North Carolina,” see 69 Duke L.J. 1585 (2020).

For article, “Fees, Fines, Bail, and the Destitution Pipeline,” see 69 Duke L.J. 1463 (2020).

For article, “Bail in North Carolina,” see 55 Wake Forest L. Rev. 907 (2020).

For article, “The Transparency of Jail Data,” see 55 Wake Forest L. Rev. 821 (2020).

For article, “The Due Process of Bail,” see 55 Wake Forest L. Rev. 757 (2020).

For article, “The Political Patterns of Bail Reform,” see 55 Wake Forest L. Rev. 743 (2020).

For article, “Does Bail Reform Increase Crime? An Empirical Assessment of the Public Safety Implications of Bail Reform in Cook County, Illinois,” see 55 Wake Forest L. Rev. 933 (2020).

§ 20-24.2. Court to report failure to appear or pay fine, penalty or costs.

  1. The court must report to the Division the name of any person charged with a motor vehicle offense under this Chapter who:
    1. Fails to appear to answer the charge as scheduled, unless within 20 days after the scheduled appearance, he either appears in court to answer the charge or disposes of the charge pursuant to G.S. 7A-146 ; or
    2. Fails to pay a fine, penalty, or costs within 40 days of the date specified in the court’s judgment.
  2. The reporting requirement of this section and the revocation mandated by G.S. 20-24 .1 do not apply to offenses in which an order of forfeiture of a cash bond is entered and reported to the Division pursuant to G.S. 20-24 . If an order is sent to the Division by the clerk through clerical mistake or other inadvertence, the clerk’s office that sent the report of noncompliance must withdraw the report and send notice to the Division which shall correct its records accordingly.

History. 1985, c. 764, s. 3; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 852, ss. 3, 17; 1987, c. 581, s. 3; 1991, c. 682, s. 5; 2015-247, s. 1(b).

Editor’s Note.

This section was formerly G.S. 15A-1117 , as enacted by Session Laws 1985, c. 764, s. 3. It was rewritten and recodified as this section by Session Laws 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 852, s. 3, effective September 1, 1986.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2015-247, s. 1(b), effective December 1, 2015, substituted “40 days” for “20 days” in subdivision (a)(2). For applicability, see editor’s note.

§ 20-25. Right of appeal to court.

Any person denied a license or whose license has been canceled, suspended or revoked by the Division, except where such cancellation is mandatory under the provisions of this Article, shall have a right to file a petition within 30 days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in the superior court of the county wherein such person shall reside, or to the resident judge of the district or judge holding the court of that district, or special or emergency judge holding a court in such district in which the violation was committed, and such court or judge is hereby vested with jurisdiction and it shall be its or his duty to set the matter for hearing upon 30 days’ written notice to the Division, and thereupon to take testimony and examine into the facts of the case, and to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to a license or is subject to suspension, cancellation or revocation of license under the provisions of this Article. Provided, a judge of the district court shall have limited jurisdiction under this section to sign and enter a temporary restraining order only.

History. 1935, c. 52, s. 19; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1987, c. 659, s. 1.

CASE NOTES

Power to Suspend or Revoke Licenses Vested Exclusively in Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles. —

By Session Laws 1941, c. 36 (G.S. 20-1, 20-2, 20-3 and 20-4), the power to suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses after July 1, 1941, vested exclusively in the newly created Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles, subject to the same right of review by the superior court as existed prior to that date. State v. Cooper, 224 N.C. 100 , 29 S.E.2d 18, 1944 N.C. LEXIS 282 (1944).

Section Construed with G.S. 20-23 . —

This section and G.S. 20-23 must be construed in pari materia. In re Wright, 228 N.C. 584 , 46 S.E.2d 696, 1948 N.C. LEXIS 285 (1948).

A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege in the nature of a right of which the licensee may not be deprived save in the manner and upon the conditions prescribed by statute. These, under express provisions of this section, include full de novo review by a superior court judge, at the election of the licensee, in all cases except where the suspension or revocation is mandatory. Underwood v. Howland, 274 N.C. 473 , 164 S.E.2d 2, 1968 N.C. LEXIS 802 (1968).

Provisions Satisfy Requirements of Due Process. —

The provisions of G.S. 20-48 , together with the provisions of G.S. 20-16(d), relating to the right of review, and the provisions of this section, relating to the right of appeal, satisfy the requirements of procedural due process. State v. Teasley, 9 N.C. App. 477, 176 S.E.2d 838, 1970 N.C. App. LEXIS 1391 , cert. denied, 277 N.C. 459 , 177 S.E.2d 900, 1970 N.C. LEXIS 635 (1970); State v. Atwood, 27 N.C. App. 445, 219 S.E.2d 521, 1975 N.C. App. LEXIS 1878 (1975), rev'd, 290 N.C. 266 , 225 S.E.2d 543, 1976 N.C. LEXIS 1055 (1976).

This section creates no right to appeal a suspension under G.S. 20-4.20(b) . The General Assembly simply has not yet provided for appeals from suspension under G.S. 20-4.20(b) . Palmer v. Wilkins, 73 N.C. App. 171, 325 S.E.2d 697, 1985 N.C. App. LEXIS 3188 (1985).

A petitioner seeking judicial review of a decision of the North Carolina Driver License Medical Review Board must file such petition in the superior court of Wake County pursuant to former G.S. 150A-45 and may not obtain a hearing under the present section in the superior court of the county in which he resides. Cox v. Miller, 26 N.C. App. 749, 217 S.E.2d 198, 1975 N.C. App. LEXIS 2150 (1975).

Certiorari to Review Mandatory Suspension. —

Petitioner whose driving privilege was mandatorily suspended under G.S. 20-17(2) and G.S. 20-19(e) did not have the right to appeal under this section or under the Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 150B. However, the superior court could review the actions of the Commissioner by issuing a writ of certiorari. Davis v. Hiatt, 326 N.C. 462 , 390 S.E.2d 338, 1990 N.C. LEXIS 167 (1990).

Where petitioner, seeking conditional restoration of his driving privileges, pled sufficient facts to show he did not have right to appeal from final decision of DMV, he could then have petitioned for writ of certiorari to have case reviewed by superior court. Thus, superior court had jurisdiction to review case. Penuel v. Hiatt, 100 N.C. App. 268, 396 S.E.2d 85, 1990 N.C. App. LEXIS 977 (1990).

Discretionary suspensions and revocations of driving licenses by the department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles are reviewable under this section. State v. Cooper, 224 N.C. 100 , 29 S.E.2d 18, 1944 N.C. LEXIS 282 (1944); In re Wright, 228 N.C. 584 , 46 S.E.2d 696, 1948 N.C. LEXIS 285 (1948).

Trial court correctly reviewed the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles’ cancellation of a driver’s conditionally restored driving privileges under a petition for writ of certiorari rather than de novo review because although there was no right to appeal a cancellation or revocation under G.S. 20-25 , the driver could seek certiorari pursuant to G.S. 20-19(e). Cole v. Faulkner, 155 N.C. App. 592, 573 S.E.2d 614, 2002 N.C. App. LEXIS 1589 (2002).

Discretionary revocations and suspensions may be reviewed by the court under this section, while mandatory revocations and suspensions may not. Underwood v. Howland, 274 N.C. 473 , 164 S.E.2d 2, 1968 N.C. LEXIS 802 (1968); Taylor v. Garrett, 7 N.C. App. 473, 173 S.E.2d 31, 1970 N.C. App. LEXIS 1714 (1970).

Discretionary revocation of a driver’s license is reviewable under the provisions of this section but mandatory revocations are not. In re Austin, 5 N.C. App. 575, 169 S.E.2d 20, 1969 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398 (1969).

By Trial De Novo. —

All suspensions, cancellations and revocations of driving licenses made in the discretion of the Department (now Division) of Motor Vehicles, whether under G.S. 20-16 , 20-23 or any other provision of this Chapter, are reviewable by trial de novo. In re Wright, 228 N.C. 584 , 46 S.E.2d 696, 1948 N.C. LEXIS 285 (1948).

The hearing in the superior court is de novo, and the court is not bound by the findings of fact or the conclusions of law made by the Department (now Division). In re Wright, 228 N.C. 301 , 45 S.E.2d 370, 1947 N.C. LEXIS 324 (1947); Fox v. Scheidt, 241 N.C. 31 , 84 S.E.2d 259, 1954 N.C. LEXIS 534 (1954).

Upon the filing of a petition for review, it is the duty of the judge, after notice to the Department (now Division), “to take testimony and examine into the facts of the case, and to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to a license or is subject to suspension, cancellation, or revocation of license under the provisions of this Article.” This is more than a review as upon a writ of certiorari. It is a rehearing de novo, and the judge is not bound by the findings of fact or the conclusions of law made by the Department (now Division). Else why “take testimony,” “examine into the facts,” and “determine” the question at issue? Parks v. Howland, 4 N.C. App. 197, 166 S.E.2d 701, 1969 N.C. App. LEXIS 1466 (1969).

Any person whose driver’s license has been suspended under G.S. 20-16.2(d) has the right to a full de novo review by a superior court judge. This means the court must hear the matter on its merits from beginning to end as if no trial or hearing had been held by the Department (now Division) and without any presumption in favor of its decision. Joyner v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 226 , 182 S.E.2d 553, 1971 N.C. LEXIS 771 (1971).

G.S. 20-25 creates no right to appeal a revocation under G.S. 20-138.5 , since G.S. 20-138.5 appears in Article 3 rather than Article 2. Following a conviction for habitual impaired driving, under that section, permanent revocation is mandatory and the trial court lacks the authority to provide relief. Cooke v. Faulkner, 137 N.C. App. 755, 529 S.E.2d 512, 2000 N.C. App. LEXIS 496 (2000).

But Mandatory Revocations Under G.S. 20-17 Are Not Reviewable. And no right accrues to a licensee who petitions for a review of the order of the Department (now Division) when it acts under the terms of G.S. 20-17 , for then its action is mandatory. In re Wright, 228 N.C. 584 , 46 S.E.2d 696, 1948 N.C. LEXIS 285 (1948); Winesett v. Scheidt, 239 N.C. 190 , 79 S.E.2d 501, 1954 N.C. LEXIS 351 (1954); Fox v. Scheidt, 241 N.C. 31 , 84 S.E.2d 259, 1954 N.C. LEXIS 534 (1954); Mintz v. Scheidt, 241 N.C. 268 , 84 S.E.2d 882, 1954 N.C. LEXIS 57